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THESIS ABSTRACT 
This thesis assesses the concept of paranoia in relation to American culture 
and literature of the past four hundred years. paranoia is traced through a history of 
the discourses of science and culture which is extended into analyses of selected fears 
and anxieties manifested in American literature. The concept and diagnosis of 
paranoia is seen ultimately to register a vital ambivalence about the uses of power and 
the systematization of knowledge. 
The introduction and Chapter One assess the links between the concept of 
paranoia and myth, religion and rational science, particularly the mental sciences and 
their nosological drives, whilst identifying the paranoid energies at work within the 
political uses of reason, up to the nineteenth-century. Chapter Two explores the 
emergence of American cultural prerogatives for fear and anxiety expressed in the 
writings of Charles Brockden Brown in an immediate post-revolutionary scenario, 
drawing on materials related to Puritanism, early American psychology, disease, and 
social and political deviance. Chapter Three continues the history of discourses up to 
the present, focusing on the refinement of the concept of paranoia in the mental 
sciences since the rise of psychoanalysis. Chapter Four traces the intensities of 
paranoia in post-1945 American culture and literature, drawing on the work of 
Thomas Pynchon as an exemplary analyst of the fascination for political conspiracy 
and manipulation of fear and anxiety. Chapter Five uses Hubert Selby and Robert 
Duncan to explore two different literary approaches reaching beyond the enclosures 
of paranoia, celebrating in particular Duncan's efforts to utilize a poetics of creative 
paranoia. 
In conclusion, the destructive elements of paranoia which have been 
encouraged in certain ways in American culture are adjudged susceptible to the 
mediating and transformative effects of poetics extending from the very principles on 
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[mod. L. a. Gr, jtap&voLa, f. ttap&vo-os distracted, f. 3tapa- beside 
+ v6-os, vows mind. ] Mental derangement; spec. chronic mental 
unsoundness characterized by delusions or hallucinations, esp. of 
grandeur, persecution, etc. The various forms of the disorder are now 
usu. considered as belonging to the schizophrenic group of mental 
illness. Also in trivial use. ' 
paranoia 
... 
(features) gradually developing, systematized delusional states, 
without hallucinations but with preservation of intelligence, and with 
emotional responses and behaviour that remain congruous with and 
appropriate to the persecutory or grandiose delusions. ' 
They, the Greeks, would never have thought about calling these Hosts 
schizophrenic or catatonics, which were after all their own words. 
Paranoia and the like were clinical Atonist words invented by people 
who having lost the knowledge of what they were doing just kinda 
threw these terms out there. ' 
This dissertation intends to trace the theoretical and other dimensions given to 
the concept of paranoia in certain discourses of European, and specifically American, 
cultures. It will be argued that paranoia has developed a peculiar intensity and 
discursive impact within the hegemonies operating inside these cultures, these effects 
indicating destructive and endlessly reproducing fears within and about the uses of 
'Oxford English Dictionary (Oxford 1989), Vo1. XI, p. 201. The citation of historical use 
extends from: "1811 R. Hooper Lexicon Medicum 596/2 Parancea, alienation of the mind; 
defect of judgement" to "1977 Time 16 May 56/3 They constitute what has become a standard 
trip down paranoia lane. " 
2R. J. Campbell, Psychiatric Dictionary (Oxford 1981), p. 442. 
'Ishmael Reed, Mumbo Jumbo (New York 1972), p. 194. 
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power in any political circumstance. Selected elements within American literature and 
culture will provide the main territory of analysis, which will focus in particular on 
the ways Americans have perceived themselves, their culture, and threats to their 
existence in the past four hundred years. The approach will proceed from two 
mutually reinforcing fields of enquiry: a history of discourses will endeavour to trace 
the usage of the term paranoia, alongside and in alignment with a cultural and literary 
analysis, showing how medicine and the human sciences have accumulated and refined 
the discourses linked to the paranoid concept into charged systems of knowledge and 
apprehension. 
The tracing of paranoia and the cultural and clinical use of the term effectively 
follows the historical perceptions of madness, where paranoia is part of the corpus of 
insanities set aside for political reasons. The earliest known use of the term asserts 
paranoia in the form of a holistic referentiality, whereas today paranoia has assumed 
different levels and intensities of meaning within different contexts of use, particularly 
as, at one and the same time, the term attempts a concise clinical definition, and a 
sense as an amorphous social phenomenon. In its movement towards these different 
referentialities, paranoia has retained close links to the concepts of madness, and their 
formulations of meaning and terminology, whilst extending itself to locate something 
more in the shifting boundaries between sanity and insanity. Essentially, paranoia has 
moved from its initial status as a descriptive term for insanity, through the 
manipulations of madness, to intersect with some specific concepts of insanity whose 
peculiarity lies in their articulation of an authoritarian control which reflexively 
includes itself both as an ordering principle and as a threat. Consequently, the 
locations in which the meanings of paranoia occur are those productive of a 
7 
fundamental ambivalence about power, an ambivalence which simultaneously 
generates a desire for empowerment with a fear of being the subject of some form of 
power, particularly power of an unknown origin or energy, about which the paranoid 
perception seeks knowledge. 
The genesis of paranoia can be found in fear, where human beings' earliest 
intellectual formations combined perceptions of external threat with their accumulating 
abilities to structure emotional process: 
The search for a cause (of fear and death) has led man to suspect the 
sun, moon, stars, animals, ghosts, ancestors and family members. 
Intense fear produced generalizations attributing to these entities not 
only the cause of disease but other misfortunes. Thus in his 
demonology primitive man attributed to nonhuman and even inanimate 
nature his own human motivations and methods-an early but vivid 
illustration of projective reasoning. ' 
Notwithstanding the problems involved in using the term "primitive man, " the first 
thing that needs to be addressed in dealing with such a definition of paranoia, and 
those used as epigraphs to this introduction, is the stress placed on suspicion. It is 
from this basis that the authoritarian impulse to judge delusion or hallucination as such 
proceeds, utilizing an implicit sense that no qualitative fixity or substance attends the 
belief in question. Quite the opposite occurs, in fact, reflecting diagnostic certainties 
back at themselves: the only certain aspect of paranoia, and any origins it may have 
in fear, myth and religion, is that paranoia is not suspicion or superstition, but 
certainty and conviction, about which people have proof. The designation 
"superstition" rules out effective concentration on real threats, and vice versa, the clear 
distinction between these elements being part of political structures and their 
operation. In this important sense, then, psychiatric theory becomes an action focused 
4David Swanson, Philip Bohnert and Jackson Smith, The Paranoid (New York 1970), p. 23. 
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on realities needing control. ' 
In this passage the writers use arguments developed by Freud in Totem and 
Taboo (1913) and elsewhere to explain the animistic processes of the "primitive" mind 
in relation to the organization of rituals and religion. The focus by Freud and James 
Frazer in The Golden Bough (1890-1915) on primitivism and instinct in itself 
registers contemporary fears about energies considered to be latent and threatening to 
"orders of civilization, " particularly in fears located around proletarian energy whose 
control remained essential to the expansion of imperialist industrialization into the 
twentieth century. The structuring of fear and anxiety is codified, as it always has 
been, for such control, and particularly, as we shall see, in the mechanisms of 
paranoia. Discussing one of these mechanisms, Freud writes: 
The projection outwards of internal perceptions is a primitive 
mechanism, to which, for instance, our sense perceptions are subject, 
and which therefore normally plays a very large part in determining the 
form taken by our external world. Under conditions whose nature has 
not yet been sufficiently established, internal perceptions of emotional 
and intellective processes can be projected outwards in the same way 
as sense perceptions; they are thus employed for building up the 
external world, though they should by rights remain part of the internal 
world. This may have some genetic connection with the fact that the 
function of attention was originally directed not towards the internal 
world but towards the stimuli that stream in from the external world, 
and that that function's only information upon endopsychic processes 
was received from feelings of pleasure and unpleasure. 6 
The concept of projection has thus, theoretically at least, been identified as a formative 
'In this sense, it is worth remembering Karl Popper's stress on the mythological dimensions 
of Freud and Adler's theories: "As for Freud's epic of the Ego, the Super Ego, and the Id, no 
substantially stronger claim to scientific status can be made for it than for Homer's collected 
stories from Olympus. " Karl Popper, Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific 
Knowledge (New York 1962), p. 37-38. 
6Sigmund Freud, Totem and Taboo: Some Points of Agreement between the Mental Lives of 
Savages and Neurotics (1913) in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works 
of Sigmund Freud (London 1957), Volume XIII, p. 64. 
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action in the evolution of intellective process, as well as being central to paranoia, 
both historically and as a point at which boundaries are crossed between internal and 
external, normal and aberrant behaviour, sanity and insanity. Psychoanalytic theory 
asserts projection as a mechanism by which the ego protects itself against conflicts 
within the unconscious by attributing to external subjects, objects, or phenomena, the 
motives, attitudes, or problems which are in fact present, but deliberately 
unrecognized, in the unconscious. There is a very real sense in which these transfers 
of energies between the inner and outer set up the psychodynamic tensions which 
characterize paranoia in its modern dimensions, reinforcing the sense in which David 
Shapiro asserts that projection "is so central to our understanding of paranoid 
pathology and symptoms that it has almost come to define what is called 'paranoid' 
in psychiatry. !7 While this is undisputed, it is necessary to remember that projection 
as an explanatory mechanism, asserted by Freud, Shapiro and others as fundamentally 
"unexplained, " also acts as an assembled medium used to validate psychiatry's (and 
other doxa's) identifications of the origins of distortion, aberration and untruth within 
the paranoid process. The issue that needs to be addressed in a cultural and historical 
sense, alongside the sickness and destruction of paranoia, is how a concept has been 
formulated to explain the political siting of perception, and the determinative processes 
identifying the qualities constituting inner and outer states. Perhaps an alternative to 
projection avoiding some of the emplaced meanings attached to the term may be 
suggested in the word extension which, aside from projection's meanings of "a jutting 
out, " "a proposal for an undertaking" or "reading into a situation one's own feelings, " 
'David Shapiro, Neurotic Styles (New York 1965), p. 68. 
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suggests an "added piece" or a "property of occupying space. "$ 
The formulations of myth and religion, themselves involved intrinsically in the 
theory of projection, are also obviously elements of any history of paranoia, and these 
will be approached contextually within certain literary representations. For the 
moment, two alternative examples may be given to illustrate the potential presence of 
paranoia as a catalyst in structures of belief. C. R. Badcock, in his book The 
Psychoanalysis of Culture, examines the psychic dimensions of monotheistic religion, 
and using Freud's Moses and Monotheism and Totem and Taboo, as well as work 
done by James Strachey, isolates the Egyptian culture of the pharaoh Akhnaten and 
the Atenistic cult as an early example of how monotheism may extend from and 
reproduce individual and mass paranoia. What emerges as interesting are the 
involvement of paranoid tendencies in concentrations of consciousness on a singular 
non-anthropomorphic deity, and their manifestation in hierarchized sequences of 
imagery. In this latter case, the central image is that of the sun, or a singular energy 
source, emanating power in the form of rays, and Badcock quotes Strachey as 
evidence for his argument linking paranoid modes of thought historically through their 
image patterns, from Akhnaten through to the eponymous Freudian paranoid, Daniel 
Paul Schreber: 
But the Aten's intimate relations with Ahknaten are not merely paternal. 
It has not only procreated him; it enters into him and there creates 
ideas, thoughts, knowledge, which he then hands on to the rest of the 
world. The vehicle of the Aten's inspiration are its rays... (the) 
celebrated picture of the 'raying Aten' seen in countless drawings and 
8Extension was suggested by Eric Mottram in a conversation concerning projection and shifts 
in terminological meaning; subsequent research discovered a similar use by David Shapiro: 
"Projective ideas are not merely "expulsions" of unconscious thoughts or feelings onto external 
figures but extensions of the defensive relationship with such figures. " David Shapiro, 
Autonomy and Rigid Character (New York 1981), p. 143. 
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reliefs, is to my mind the pathognomic symptom of Akhnaten's case. 
These rays are the prototype of the various kinds of irradiations which 
have troubled paranoiacs through all the centuries and trouble them 
today. 9 
Notions of singular and central sources of penetrative energies or power, either visible 
or invisible, are invariably the framework of paranoid belief structures and inform 
those structures' grandiose or persecutory perceptions with degrees of political tension. 
Equally, isolating such image patterns can be a useful method in evaluating the 
potential or manifest paranoia of a social or cultural process, and may offer valuable 
interfaces in a similar analysis of literature. 
The second example comes from the philosophy of Giambattista Vico (1688- 
1744) expounded in his La Scienza Nuova, published in Naples in 1725. Vico sought 
to build his philosophy by categorizing the evolution of human modes of belief, 
beginning with the effort to "enter through the force of our understanding, the nature 
of the first men. i1° Influenced in this initial stage by Lucretius's poem, 'On The 
Nature of the Universe, ' which portrayed early humans drawn to a belief in deities 
through natural phenomena such as thunder, and the Epicurean notion that the origin 
of religion lay in primitive fears and anxieties, Vico identified the first stage of belief 
as the "superstitious. "" Such perception emerged from early language and thought 
which Vico deemed to be structured poetically in its imaginative rather than rational 
thrust, as evidenced in the formation of ancient ritual, symbology and myth. Vico 
9James Strachey, 'Preliminary Notes Upon The Problem of Akhnaten' in International Journal 
of Psychoanalysis, 20, p. 34. 
"Giambattista Vico, New Science, translated by Thomas Goddard Bergin and Max Harold 
Fisch (Ithaca 1968), p. 80. 
"The other stages are, respectively, the heroic, exemplified in Homeric poetry, and the human, 
involving contemporary abilities of abstract thought. 
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believed a poetic logic emanated from a primitive, concrete and anthropomorphic 
thought process, in which "[w]hen men are ignorant of the natural causes producing 
things. .. they attribute their own nature to them. 
"" His famous account of the 
invention of Jove, which so interested James Joyce, extends from this "poetic logic": 
... the sky fearfully rolled with thunder and flashed with lightning 
(and 
early humans) were frightened and astonished by the great effect whose 
cause they did not know, and raised their eyes and became aware of 
the sky. And because in such a case the nature of the human mind 
leads it to attribute its own nature to the effect, and because in that 
state their nature was that of men all robust bodily strength, who 
expressed their very violent passions by shouting and grumbling, they 
pictured the sky to themselves as a great animated body, which in that 
aspect they called Jove.. . who meant to tell them something by the hiss 
of his bolt and the clap of his thunder. 13 
Viewed anthropomorphically, projection begins to assume its creative dimensions, both 
as a necessary technique induced by fear to avoid destruction, and as an 
embellishment of the external world as pattern and possibly as a basis for art. The 
implicit potential of paranoia within projection indicates that from this 
anthropomorphic angle elements of creativity may at some level utilize the energies 
or configurations offered by paranoid perception. This possibility will be explored in 
detail at the culmination of the thesis. 
The bulk of the thesis, however, will be an analysis of the ways in which 
paranoia has manifested itself in American literature and culture, extending principally 
from an imperative of rationalization as it operates as a necessary energy for the 
consolidation of individual, state and global power. In his book, The American 
Ideology, H. T. Wilson has explored the ideological formulation and political pursuit 
12Vico, New Science, p. 180. 
13Vico, New Science, p. 377. 
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of rationalization and domination within the dimensions of what has been termed the 
"open society. " Wilson's focus is on the sociological and cultural theory emerging 
from the influential group of emigres arriving in the United States after 1925, drawing 
from the work of the Frankfurt School and others as it extends from Hegel, Marx, and 
especially Weber. Indeed, Weber's assertion that rationalization "creates irrationalities 
with the certainty of a fate, "14 becomes part of Wilson's argument that the United 
States has, since its colonial and revolutionary inceptions, come to be an exemplary 
site of rationalization and domination in its particular forms of cultural and political 
evolution. Wilson's premise will be a launching point for this dissertation as it extends 
into the scenario of dependence on or obsessive use of instrumental reason where, 
according to Max Horkheimer, "[p]aranoia, the madness that builds logically 
constructed theories of persecution, is not merely a parody of reason, but is somehow 
present in any form of reason that consists in the mere pursuit of aims. '15 
The history of discourses tracing the development of paranoia as a clinical and 
cultural term will demonstrate the problems and the paranoid potential involved in 
"critical rationalism as a scientific value which is committed to beginning in limit 
rather than ending by acknowledging it. i16 To go further than this, however, and to 
embrace and analyse American culture as more than simply paranoid, one can draw 
upon the materials available from a range of American writers whose energies have 
been directed at overcoming "the mere pursuit of aims" in an exploration of the limits 
14H. T. Wilson, The American Ideology: Science, technology and organization as modes of 
rationality in advanced industrial societies (London 1977), p. 145. 
"Max Horkheimer, The Eclipse of Reason (New York 1974), p. 176. 
16Wilson, The American Ideology, p. 5. 
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of American experience and even beyond. The work of Charles Brockden Brown and 
Thomas Pynchon will be used for this analysis, for their writing extends from two 
formative periods in the evolution of American culture where the possibilities for 
expanding limits are addressed within the paranoid retrenchments that characterised 
the early years of the new Republic, and the decades following World War Two. 
Before that challenge is taken up it is necessary to expand further on the notion 
of rationalization and how it may organise knowledge and foment paranoia within 
political process. Again, Wilson's appraisal of an "American ideology" is useful, where 
he asserts that: 
the open society model is revealed as the essence of the American 
ideology with all that this implies-limited tolerance, exchangism, 'free 
enterprise, ' the subversion of citizenship by consumerism and the 
media, the eclipse of common-sense rationality by science and 
professionalism, and the subordination of politics and culture to 
instrumental rationality norms favouring systemic integration. " 
From the outset, however, the late twentieth-century perspective Wilson adopts needs 
to be historicized with more depth and connected to the energies of fear and anxiety 
which underpin paranoia. Where fear and anxiety are engaged in the formulation of 
belief, a key strategy of political control has focused on a basic matrix in human 
awareness through which control may be effected. In consequence, the retention and 
operation of power has been inseparably linked to the manipulation of fear 
(specifically identified threat) and anxiety (ambiguous notions of threat) in 
subordinates and subordinate populations, as well as in those wielding power. In 
surveying this political process in the past five hundred years, one could examine 
some central assumptions of modern political theory by linking the following: 
17Wilson, The American Ideology, p. 26. 
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Machiavelli's stress on the function of conspiracy in political process with Thomas 
Hobbes' Leviathan (1651), which states that "[d]uring the time men live without a 
common Power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called 
warre, as is of every man, against every man. " One could then move on to the 
existential problems facing Ishmael aboard the Pequod and its command structure in 
Herman Melville's Moby Dick; Or, The White Whale (1851), the narrator deliberately 
named after the biblical figure whose "hand was against every man, and every man's 
hand against him. " A more recent culmination could be arrived at in the circumstances 
in which late 1960's and early 1970's political tensions, according to Michel Foucault, 
intensified "the major enemy.. . the fascism in us all, in our heads and in our everyday 
behaviour, the fascism which causes us to love power, to desire the very thing that 
dominates and exploits us. i18 It is important, of course, to beware the tendency 
evident in Foucault's remarks here concerning belief in an inherent propensity in 
humanity toward fascism, especially where it may dangerously dehistoricize the 
debate, and it will be an important function of this dissertation to try to analyse what 
is already apparent in this sequence of writers: namely, a need for and investigation 
of secure definitions of human propensity inside different political imperatives of 
control and authority. 
Two of the most prominent analysts of paranoia as a factor in the rationalising 
and fascistic energies within modern Western politics and culture have been Theodor 
Adorno and Max Horkheimer. Horkheimer frames the evolution of reason in the 
following terms: 
"Michel Foucault, Introduction to Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism 
and Schizophrenia, Volume One, translated by Robert Hurley, Mark Seem and Helen R. Lane 
(London 1984), p. xiii. 
16 
"Reason" for a long period meant the activity of understanding and 
assimilating the eternal ideals which were to function as the goals for 
men. Today, on the contrary, it is not only the business but the 
essential work of reason to find means for the goals one adopts at any 
given time... Reason is considered to come into its own when it rejects 
any status as absolute ("reason" in the intensified sense of the word) 
and accepts itself simply as a tool. 19 
The analyses of the development and uses of reason in The Dialectic of 
Enlightenment, The Eclipse of Reason, and Critique of Instrumental Reason focus on 
three interlinked processes which have moved perception and strategies of belief into 
scenarios where suspicion and delusion become actualized and often necessary 
products of rational thought. These processes are, respectively, the separation 
experienced between human beings and nature seen as an inevitable result of the 
Enlightenment, the alienation suffered under the aegis of this division, and the efforts 
required from the individual inside these systems of thought to replace missing 
absolutes in terms of self-justification and legitimation. Adorno and/or Horkheimer 
note the movement from what is termed "primitive objectivization, " the world 
experienced directly as prey or threat, through to the complexities of Enlightenment 
rationality determining nature as separate from civilization and the human, as being 
the catalyst for potential distortions of thought. In their terms consciousness of this 
separation effected within the systematizations of reason led to the social experience 
of alienation, which in turn allowed the advance of instrumental reason as a primary 
mode of social perception. The process contains within itself the energies of its own 
reproduction and emplacement since instrumental reason further promotes the effort 
to dominate the non-human, which must be paid for with the denial of human nature 
and other processes outside rationality. 
19Max Horkheimer, Critique of Instrumental Reason (New York 1974), p. vii. 
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The problem is one of security, as new forms of individual experience and control 
opened up by the use of reason create anxieties and displacements of the ego. This 
needs to be stressed to avoid the sense that reason in itself produces paranoia, that a 
system of thought generates problems prior to interaction with individual or mass 
perception. Reason, in the terms used here, offers the possibility of distortion or 
misapplication of sensibility as the effort to replace the sense of security formerly 
sought through connection to nature-an external absolute-finds itself in post- 
Enlightenment terms utilizing and enhancing the force and lubricity enabled through 
reason to attempt recognitions, justifications and legitimizations. In these 
circumstances, truth very quickly becomes a systematic function detached from any 
external affirmation or authority, and consequently perceptions derived through reason 
find themselves under pressure from the processes of their own formulation to assert 
an implicit truthfulness. Benjamin Franklin succinctly states the problem when he 
writes in his Autobiography, "So convenient a thing is it to be a reasonable Creature, 
since it enables one to find or make a reason for every thing one has a mind to do. "20 
In the conclusion to their Dialectic of Enlightenment, Horkheimer and Adorno 
take the political manifestation of reason to what they see as the logical conclusion 
implicit in its Enlightenment origins and subsequent practice. The dialectic of these 
tensions extending into the twentieth century is seen to lead directly to the priority of 
fascist order, and it is from this destiny, imaged most starkly in anti-semitism, that 
the pervasion of paranoia may be traced back into the functional perceptions allowed 
to individuals and their collectives in the post-Renaissance heritage. The argument 
occupies similar ground to that of Foucault's deliberations on a pervasive fascism, and 
20Benjamin Franklin, Autobiography (1771-1790; New York 1972), p. 88. 
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also suffers, it must be said, from some of the same problems of totalizing definition: 
Objectifying (like sick) thought contains the despotism of the subjective 
purpose which is hostile to the thing and forgets the thing itself, thus 
committing the mental act of violence which is later put into practice. 
The unconditional realism of civilized humanity, which culminates in 
Fascism, is a special case of paranoiac delusion which dehumanizes 
nature and finally the nations themselves. Paranoia takes root in that 
abyss of uncertainty which every objectifying act must bridge. 21 
This last sentence forms the core of an argument which encompasses many diverse 
social elements. Horkheimer and Adorno correctly focus on the ways in which 
civilization has intensified the problem experienced by humanity in its attempts to 
mediate between "subjective purpose" and the impingement upon it of objective 
necessity, this latter force emerging in the range of existential possibilities provided 
by human ingenuity and organization. Underpinning all human endeavour, the "abyss 
of uncertainty" creates the constant necessity of affirmation which is sought outside 
the self in objective forms, a process which finds its impetus in reason to overcome 
fear in cycles of domination. The fear is of uncertainty and an unidentified Other, and 
this fear becomes paranoia as subjective apprehension transforms itself into 
objectifying recognitions, just as the self, confronted with the Other, may seek security 
in the certainties of fear rather than the degrees of ambiguity and self-immolation 
required in projects of unity and interaction. 
This, in turn, provides the problem for creative endeavour in the realm of 
human activity: that humanity continues to choose the supposed securities of paranoia 
long after social and technological advancements have developed the potential for 
freedom from fear. Civilization at this juncture remains trapped inside the image of 
21Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, translated by John 
Cumming (1944; first English translation 1972; London 1986), p. 193. 
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the necessity of feeding upon itself, or suffering in spite of itself, as Freud determined 
in Civilization and Its Discontents. Horkheimer and Adorno explore the history of 
political thought in precisely these terms, whilst Jean-Paul Sartre explores what he 
suggests is a fascist logic inside certain forms of twentieth century perception, when 
he describes the anti-Semite and those who feel compelled to transform their anxieties 
into targeted hatred. The solace sought is a: 
longing for impenetrability... We have here a basic fear of oneself and 
of truth. What frightens [anti-Semites] is not the content of truth, of 
which they have no conception, but the form itself of truth, that thing 
of indefinite approximation. It is as if their existence were in continual 
suspension. But they wish to exist all at once and right away. 22 
Sartre goes on to describe two products of this alignment, namely the belief that the 
concrete possession of a particular object gives as if by magic the meaning of that 
object, " and the sensation of an "independence ... 
[termed] inverted liberty. i23 The 
prelogical origins of anti-Semitism combine with the force of rationality to emerge 
in the former case, where security is literally grasped from mystery in an effort 
reinforced at certain points in capitalist drives. The end result is a belief in one's 
independence and freedom when in fact perception becomes immobilized and 
manipulable, turning in on itself to produce suspicion, hatred and violence. 
Horkheimer and Adorno's analysis of the prelogical bases of such a paranoid 
tendency concentrates on the early function of ritual and religion in society, seeing in 
such actions both the ordering and use of fear and, later, a transfer of this influence 
to the organization of labour. The domination of mystery and nature becomes the key 
22Jean-Paul Sartre, Anti-Semite and Jew, translated by George J. Becker (New York 1948), 
pp. 18-19. 
2'Sartre, Anti-Semite and Jew, pp. 24,32. 
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to such a strategy of control, and the means used to achieve this end-primarily in 
politics and technology-have had fundamental consequences for human mental 
awareness. Engaged in domination as an end in itself, humanity has been forced 
repeatedly into the effort to control or disconnect itself from mystery (posed 
overwhelmingly as threat), and has developed for itself intensities of paranoia when 
such detachment fails and the range of connections within existence become 
terrifyingly real: 
The naked pattern of power as such, which dominates all around it as 
well as its own decomposing ego, seizes all that is offered to it and 
incorporates it, without reference to its specific nature, into its mythic 
fabric. The closed circle of eternal sameness becomes a substitute for 
omnipotence. 24 
Hannah Arendt's arguments in The Origins of Totalitarianism reach similar 
conclusions in her devastating analysis of the use of logic in the ideology of 
totalitarian political process. Arendt, like Sartre, Horkheimer and Adorno, and later 
Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guatarri, focuses on the "mind's submission to logic as a 
never-ending processi25 and its subsequent vulnerability to the operations of terror 
and control extending from the Enlightenment and modern military-industrial 
expansion. The predicament she portrays engages the arguments put forward by 
Hobbes in Leviathan, and the recognition is of the intervening centuries' political 
moulding and use of logic and forms of terror, inducing reciprocal social paranoia as 
technological advancement has propelled humanity in search of total control: 
The compulsion of total terror on one side, which, with its iron band, 
presses masses of isolated men together and supports them in a world 
which has become a wilderness for them, and the self-coercive force 
24Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, p. 190. 
2'Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951; London 1986), p. 473. 
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of logical deduction on the other, which prepares each individual in his 
lonely isolation against all others, correspond to each other and need 
each other in order to set the terror-ruled movement into motion and 
keep it moving. Just as terror, even in its pre-total, merely tyrannical 
form ruins all relationships between men, so the self-compulsion of 
ideological thinking ruins all relationships with reality. The preparation 
has succeeded when people have lost contact with their fellow men as 
well as the reality around them; for together with these contacts, men 
lose the capacity of both experience and thought. 26 
The power of Arendt's argument stems from her compelling linkage of the individual 
condition to political actions and the connection of ideology to the controlled isolation 
inherent in modern forms of reality. Loneliness and the extent to which human beings 
become vulnerable, in fact, develop paranoia and emerge as the products of the 
paranoid process in Arendt's assessment of the problem, a cycle which leads her to 
quote Luther's maxim that a lonely man "always deduces one thing from another and 
thinks everything to the worst. " Luther's remarks refer to the biblical statement that, 
paraphrased, suggest "it is not good that man should be alone, " from which has been 
extended the political notion of mutual forms of surveillance as the perfect method of 
social control, indicating Arendt's perceptive apprehension that paranoia entwines 
itself within any form of control at whatever historical stage one cares to view 
humanity. The point is, of course, that circumstances during and since the 
Enlightenment have intensified, and often deliberately so, the extent to which the 
social condition may be prone to and penetrated by paranoia, affecting the individual 
and the masses to varying degrees. 
Political theory has used reason in a variety of ways to facilitate and justify 
programmes of control, frequently combined with potent forms of mysticism, aiming 
to create enclosed systems where, as Max Horkheimer puts it, "[d]omination becomes 
26Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, pp. 473-474. 
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'internalized' for domination's sake. "27 James Glass has undertaken analyses of 
precisely this action as it extends from theoretical assumptions of political necessity 
through to the accumulation in the individual subject of learned fears as existential 
bases. Citing Plato, Machiavelli and Hobbes as major examples, Glass isolates the 
paternalist polarities within political theory whose primary lubrication is fear: 
... the fear of breaking limits, the fear of transgression, the fear of 
speech that might contradict the common "names" or "signs" of the 
entity, thing, or person who "rules. " The philosopher, then, transforms 
the "rational" into the paranoid; and the rationality of philosophic form 
becomes the instrument that removes from the polity any ambivalence, 
questioning, uncertainty, contingency, or passion that might undermine 
the order or domination. 28 
Glass's identifications range from the paranoia prevalent in Laws and Leviathan, and 
their connection of instrumental reason to paternal authority, through to less tenable 
links between individual paranoid forms and state-ordered functions, as primary 
contributions to the merging of individual and mass paranoia. Laws and Leviathan 
certainly provide compelling examples of how political consciousness is coerced into 
acquiring paranoid traits in the structuring of social order; both, as Glass notes, stress 
the need for constant forms of scrutiny set up to regulate internal space and the 
boundaries of political control, and both load their texts with a rhetoric of infection 
to intensify the threat of invasory elements. Internally, force becomes the medium of 
truth and justice exercised on behalf of a centralized system of control and anchored 
on a strategy of belief which requires the conformation of its subjects' perceptions: 
The subjects of Leviathan are expected to introject the sovereign's 
images of authority and to hold these images as their own. It is a 
27Horkheimer, The Eclipse of Reason, p. 93. 
James M. Glass, 'Notes on the Paranoid Factor in Political Philosophy: Fear, Anxiety and 
Domination' in Political Psychology, 9, (2), 1988, p. 210. 
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political effort at coercion as deadly and serious as the parent who 
creates the psychological conditions within the family nexus that 
literally force the child to internalize as its own, the parent's images of 
the world, the self, and right and wrong. 29 
Although Glass focuses accurately on the elements within political theory which set 
up a paranoid environment of control, the absence of economic factors dilutes his 
analysis and prevents it from indicating how paranoia reproduces itself as an operative 
element in a political context once affirmed theoretically, and from suggesting 
realistically the connection between individual and mass paranoid states. This emerges 
more fully in the sort of approach favoured by Deleuze and Guattari in their two 
volume study of Capitalism and Schizophrenia, where the movements and enclosures 
of energy within a Western political and cultural context are imaged as flows of desire 
operating between molar and molecular social formations of desiring machines, be 
those formations of a sexual, economic or familial nature. Here, the notion of a 
transition between individual and mass paranoia is rendered irrelevant as such 
polarities are broken down into a sense of interconnected accretions and releases of 
energy operating to the point where individual subjectivity itself is seen to be 
composed of series of controls and breaks of flows. Glass moves in this direction 
when he cites Victor Tausk's important illumination of the schizophrenic mind and the 
function of mechanical force30 alongside Hobbesian assertions of the political fusion 
of energies in the Leviathan "machine, " as well as the fear in both Plato and Hobbes 
that "desire expressed politically, sensuous nature erupting as political energy, 
29Glass, 'Notes on the Paranoid Factor in Political Philosophy, ' p. 214. 
30Victor Tausk, 'On the Origin of the Influencing Machine in Schizophrenia' in Psychoanalytic 
Quarterly, No. 2,1933. 
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provokes disintegration... "M But what is needed is an analysis which involves all 
these elements with the economy of energies in the socio- and psycho-political 
context, in conjunction with an essential understanding of how the action of forming 
any political theory, based as it is on anxieties of control, becomes a paranoid effort 
towards security and enclosure. In pursuit of this, Deleuze and Guattari identify: 
... a paranoiac 
fascisizing (fascisant) type or pole that invests the 
formation of central sovereignty; overinvests it by making it the final 
eternal cause for all the other social forms of history; counter-invests 
the enclaves and periphery; and disinvests every free "figure" of desire 
- yes, I am your kind, and I belong to the super race and class. 
32 
The alternate action Deleuze and Guattari posit as a "schizorevolutionary type or pole 
that follows the lines of escape of desire, " exactly the fear of the paranoid control 
apparatus, as a quotation from Laws (which Glass uses in a different context) reveals. 
Plato warns of anarchy if virtue, censorship and justice, defined and operated in 
authoritarian terms, are displaced, and states that: "[e]very office will be dismembered 
from every other; and all will no longer conspire only in one effect; the state will no 
longer be one but many, will be filled with conflicting factions and, ere long, 
destroyed. 33 Assembled here, and representing the sustained technique of Laws and 
Leviathan, is a coalescence of authoritarian paranoid anxiety where fear emerges in 
the context of centrifugal and multiple organizations of energy. The paranoid solution 
is to apply an unrestricted centripetal and singular force to the point where the 
language invests itself with a structural and metaphoric rationality which internalizes 
the other feared state. In consequence, the argument of Laws is formed as a procession 
"Glass, 'Notes on the Paranoid Factor in Political Philosophy, ' p. 221. 
32Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 277. 
33Cited in Glass, 'Notes on the Paranoid Factor in Political Philosophy, ' p. 212. 
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of short declarative clauses extended towards a repeated conclusion; effectively, the 
molecular structure of the text organized towards molar staticities. The singular 
predominates in the notion of one body, one state, and the effort to extend this 
internalized focus to all meanings results in the appropriation of terminology used to 
describe that which is feared to the function of controlled singularized actions: the 
desire therefore is that all will "conspire only in one effect, " and will be known in 
their uniformity. Fear of conspiracy at a simple textual level becomes an endlessly 
recycling investment in molar securities, seeking desperately to draw in the energies 
and diffusions of the multiple. Roland Barthes describes this action when he writes of 
"the sociological, philological, political sciences, which keep integrating what they 
have distinguished (they distinguish it only to integrate it more completely). "" 
Laws and Leviathan therefore represent the articulations of a paranoid necessity 
accompanying the development and use of political theory. Leviathan in particular, as 
a treatise written at Charles II's court-in-exile in Paris in response to the political 
upheavals in England in the 1640's, demonstrates the efforts required to assert 
dominance within a self-replicating structure of control. The response to the 
revolutionary or autonomous action is always a deep suspicion and the proliferation 
of violent enforcements of staticity through or on behalf of carefully accumulated laws 
and "natural" determinations, the essential justifications asserted by an authoritarian 
rationality. Glass's pertinent point that "[p]aranoia destroys the epistemic structure of 
consensual reality, not to mention a participatory politics and its delicate balancing of 
interestsi35 isolates a central problem of the paranoid effect within social interactions, 
"4Roland Barthes, Roland Barthes, translated by Richard Howard (New York 1977), p. 68. 
"Glass, 'Notes on the Paranoid Factor in Political Philosophy, ' p. 213. 
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in its rupture of shared communications and designation of reality and knowledge as 
regulated functions extended from a central source. Ultimately, two essential actions 
in identifying this process and analysing paranoia, notwithstanding the encompassing 
arguments which have been surveyed already, need to be built on their considerable 
theoretical achievements. The first of these is a more detailed historicization within 
specific cultural arenas which may overcome the generalizations of their "Western" 
or Eurocentric field with a more material sensibility, as well as problematising any 
sense that there has been a singular and clear trajectory from Enlightenment 
formulations of reason through to fascism in the twentieth-century. Secondly, the 
implicit notion (and, in fact, nostalgia) within Horkheimer and Adorno's work at least 
that the Enlightenment produced modes of reason which have simply been mishandled 
by ensuing political cultures needs to be interrogated within and alongside the 
critiques offered by a succession of writers and artists seeking an understanding of and 
alternatives to a rationalizing imperative in their cultures. 
The rest of the thesis will attempt this strategy within a study of American 
literature and culture, and add to it a detailed history of discourses tracing the 
etymological and scientific path of paranoia from ancient medicine to the present. 
Chapter One will take the history of discourses up to the beginning of the nineteenth- 
century, at which point Chapter Two will consolidate this information with an 
assessment of certain elements of paranoia explored by Charles Brockden Brown in 
the early years of the United States of America. Chapter Three will then continue the 
history of discourses through to the present day, after which Chapter Four will use the 
writings of Thomas Pynchon alongside other post-1945 materials to identify more 
contemporary dimensions of paranoia in American culture. Chapter Five will conclude 
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matters with an analysis of two very different writers who have confronted the 
implications of paranoia in their work and gone beyond the parameters suggested in 
the history of discourses and the perspectives of other American writers. In this sense, 
both Hubert Selby, Jr, and Robert Duncan provide an example of the necessary 
challenge to Plato's notion of the ideal state, where poets were to be excluded as 
dangerous and politically subversive elements, with their demonstrations of 
multiplicity in representational form, meaning and political manipulation of reality 
offering a fundamental threat to the stability of a new and perfect form of political 
control. The stress on literature in this dissertation will therefore culminate by focusing 
on its subversive power and specifically on the sense foregrounded by Duncan that 
any confrontation of political control by creative writing requires certain forms of 
what will be termed creative paranoia. Where Shelley called poets unacknowledged 
legislators of the world, there will be an emphasis throughout on the creative 
engagement made by a number of writers in an American context with the implicit 
and explicit idea of paranoia, developing out of its systematizations not rigid, 
exclusive and enforced perception, but multiple and politicized challenges to 




A History of Discourses: Ancient Medicine-1820 
1. Ancient Medicine 
A history of the term paranoia begins in the culture and medicine of ancient 
Greece where it first appears as a combination of meanings assembled to describe a 
mental state or condition. These meanings, respectively napa, Greek for "beside" 
and/or "distracted, " and vows, "mind, " can be found combined in the tragedies of 
Aeschylus (c. 525-456 B. C. ) and Euripides (c. 485-406 B. C. ) where they become fused 
as a general term for madness in response to the need for a vocabulary to describe the 
inner states of human beings beset by tragic events. At its inception, therefore, the 
etymological formation of the term sets out the tension of meanings and spaces which 
come to demarcate cultural and political conceptions of where aberration may be 
located, and specifically the notion of inner and outer (or "beside") states. Historically, 
paranoia's range through culture and psychiatry extends itself from this etymological 
base toward a fascination for the internal and external, the boundary drawn between 
them, and the possible transmission of energies between the two spaces. Writing in 
the fifth century B. C., the Greek tragedians confronted for Western cultures the 
problem of representing artistically the conflicts of passion and intellect, creating 
energized rituals from the materials of myth which move beyond the enclosure of 
religious practice. As a consequence, "the plays are replete with terms for mental life, 
terms that are a part of the portrayal of a wide range of intellectual activities and a 
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great variety of feeling states. "' 
More will be said in the next section about the proximity of the term at this 
historical stage to psychic and existential elements regarded today as paranoid; for the 
moment, it is important to stress that the dramatic uses of paranoia operate only as 
a general term for madness. An example of such a description can be found in 
Euripides' Orestes, where the chorus determines the attempt to justify murder as "the 
madness [napdvoLa] of evil-minded men" (11.823-824). 2 It is this general term that 
first emerges in a clinical context, taken up by the Hippocratic corpus of terms in the 
fifth and fourth centuries B. C. to designate insanity, sometimes within specific 
parameters: 
Hippocrates applies 'paranoia' to the delirium of high fever; several 
other writers put it in the context where it denotes senile deterioration, 
justifying action by the patient's son, according to Attic law. 3 
A son, if he could prove that his father was incompetent because of a 
mental disease called by Hippocrates "paranoia, " would be granted the 
request to have a guardian appointed. This law was considered 
important enough for Plato to retain it in his ideal State. ' 
Notably, the use of the term in medical theory and practice is simultaneous with its 
political exertion and its appropriation by the power of law, which marks the initial 
intersections of the term with the uses of authority, giving an ancient context to the 
possibilities of "the anti-democratic use of expert knowledge" outlined by Magali 
'Bennett Simon, 
Psychiatry (Ithaca 1978), p. 92. 
2Cited in Simon, Mind and Madness in Ancient Greece, p. 108. 
3Aubrey Lewis, 'Paranoia and paranoid: a historical perspective' in Psychological Medicine, 
1970,1, p. 2. 
4Gregory Zilboorg and George W. Henry, A History of Medical Psychology (New York 1941), 
pp. 45-46. Plato refers to this issue in Ids, 929. 
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Sarfatti Larson. 5 Such possibilities are not irrelevant here, for even if at this historical 
stage paranoia only referred to insanity, its involvement in the institutionalization of 
terminology signifies an attachment to the production of expert power, and 
consequently the social production of fears and confidences in that power's operation. 
It is from this basis that the history of paranoia as a scientific concept must extend, 
including within itself not only the tracing of a nosology but also the accumulation of 
fears which necessarily accompany the empowerment of a science. As this thesis 
hopes to demonstrate, the history of paranoia per se may be seen as the convergence 
of a concept with symptoms arising from the development of the functions of power, 
not least in those nosological and diagnostic spaces administered by the expertise of 
medicine, psychiatry and psychoanalysis. 
Others who used paranoia alongside Hippocrates (c. 460-357 B. C. ), Plato (c. 427- 
348 B. C. ), and the Greek tragedians were Aristophanes (c. 448-380 B. C. ) and Aristotle 
(c. 384-322 B. C. ), both of whom adhered to the meaning "insanity. " In Wasps, 
Aristophanes gives a description of a mental syndrome which approximates to modern 
concepts of paranoia, especially in its focus on litigious mania, as well as referring 
obliquely to the legal controls available in cases of senility: 
You see that great big man, the man asleep 
Upon the roof aloft: Well, that's my master. 
He keeps his father here, shut up within, 
And bids us guard him that he stir not out 
For he, the father, has a strange disease, 
Which none of you will know, or yet conjecture, 
Unless we tell... 
He is a LAWCOURT LOVER, no man like him. 
5Magali Sarfatti Larson, The Production of Expertise and the Constitution of Expert Power' 
in The Authority of Experts: Studies in History and Theory, ed. Thomas L. Haskell 
(Bloomington, Ind. 1984), p. 31. 
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Judging is what he dotes on, and he weeps 
Unless he sit on the front bench of all. 
... Supper scarce 
done, he clamours for his shoes, 
Hurries ere daybreak to the Court 
Such is his frenzy, that the more you chide him 
The more he judges: so with bolts and bars 
We guard him straitly that he stir not out. 6 
Thereafter, the classification of mental illnesses worked out by Hippocrates, 
which included epilepsy, mania and melancholia with paranoia, as well as the 
influential theory of the humours, remained predominant until the transfer of medical 
theory to Roman influence around 150 B. C. Effectively Roman physicians and 
theorists appropriated the Greek systems and added to or subtracted from them, 
according to their differences of opinion. Paranoia was only one of several medical 
terms which remained unused, probably because perception of mental illnesses became 
more specialized, generating more terminology and suppressing the need for a variety 
of general terms for insanity. But just as this specialization determined the 
disappearance of the term, so it began to isolate the psychopathology around which 
today's theories of paranoia orientate themselves. 
The important Roman figures in this respect were Aulus Cornelius Celsus (c. 1- 
100 A. D. ), Claudius Galenus (131-201 A. D. ), Aretaeus of Cappadocia (c. 100-200 
A. D. ) and Caelius Aurelianus (c. 250-320 A. D. ). In all four their diagnoses in and 
around the classical divisions of alienatio mentis: 7 phrenitis, melancholia and mania, 
6Aristophanes, Wasps, quoted in J. R. Whitwell, Historical Notes on Psychiatry (Philadelphia 
1937), p. 36. 
7"The concept of alienatio mentis is derived from alienum which points to a modification of 
the mind, in quality or quantity: Bartholomaeus Castelli, Lexicon Medicum, entries 'alienum' 
and 'mens alienatio. "' Guiseppe Roccatagliata, A History of Ancient Psychiatry (New York 
1986), p. 191n. 
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reveal the identified pathologies and curative processes which would effectively 
dominate the perceptions of mental health for centuries to come, as well as containing 
both the elements of paranoia passed on from Hippocratic medicine and those 
recognizable as paranoid to today's psychiatrist. Celsus determined that: 
the third group of psychoses, called "mania, " was characterized either 
by hallucinatory or by delirious symptoms, and it corresponded to what 
we now call paranoid schizophrenia, and partly to acute maniacal 
dysthymia... [He] thought that because "often delirium is born from 
fear" and that the physician must be sensitive to the patient's anxieties: 
"It is useful to stop the patients from staying among people who 
despise them, make them change country or travel for a long 
time... sometimes it is good to make them drink wine. "8 
Galen's medical experiences led him to isolate forms of insanity he called 
"paraphrosyne, " "extasis" and "explesis, " about which Guiseppe Roccatagliata 
comments: 
He made a distinction between [paraphrosyne and extasis] and those 
[psychoses] set off in a reactive way, which in modern nosology 
correspond to cycloid, psychogenic, or schizophrenic paranoid reactive 
psychoses. They originate from external stressful events: "a psychism 
disturbed in a sudden way by an external event. " Galen called this 
psychopathological manifestation explesis characterized by strong 
terror. He called it "a sudden and acute modification of the soul-with 
fear and dread.. . disorganizing of the mind.. . 
deliriums through false 
judgements. "9 
Aretaeus, like Celsus and Galen, drew on the Hippocratic theory of the humours and 
the Stoic concept of the pneuma in his efforts to elucidate mental illnesses. The 
pneuma was: 
the cohesive force that structured man in a hierarchy of functions, from 
the simplest to the most complex. This energy, independent of the 
BRoccatagliata, A History of Ancient Psychiatry, pp. 187-188. The quotations are drawn from 
Celsus, de re medica. 
9Roccatagliata, A History of Ancient Psychiatry, p. 201. The quotations are drawn from Galen, 
de locis affectis and Methodi Medendi. 
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soma, allowed the articulated organization of functionally 
nonhomogeneous parts of the human body. The pneuma, the soul, was 
a directive energy, for it had in itself a preordained aim: The pneuma 
is a force of cohesion which keeps the material parts united.. . man is a 
compound of parts... the pneuma is unity... "10 
Disruption of this unifying energy was seen as the cause of mental disturbance, and 
could be determined by the state and movement of the humours, a typical example of 
which was an excess of black bile on the brain, the classic symptom of melancholia. 
By this stage, therefore, medical perceptions had securely placed the human 
constitution inside a system of energies which could be identified in their dislocation 
or disruption by symptoms and physiological consistencies. Corporeality existed as a 
territory whose internality was mapped according to these consistencies, disease or 
aberration occurring as substances moved or invaded different spaces, causing changes 
in the spatial energies. 
Within these programmes, Aretaeus undertook influential analyses which included 
a study of fanaticism and its manifestation of megalomania, and the determination that 
mania existed as a bipolarity, one part energized and hyperactive, the other "languid, 
sad, [and] taciturn. "" In less severe forms of mania, Aretaeus identified the tendency 
of the patient to be "suspicious and-feel that they are being persecuted, for which 
reason they are irascible, " and in the melancholic saw similar trends, although 
stemming from different alignments of the humour: 
The melancholic isolates himself, he is afraid of being persecuted and 
'°Roccatagliata, A History of Ancient Psychiatry, p. 198. Roccatagliata adds an endnote: "If the 
symptom is the 'form of a damaged function-as the soul is supported by a humoural and vital 
complexion... it shows its dysfunction with delirium, hallucinations, mania, melancholy. "' For 
a comprehensive treatment of the pneuma concept, see Mark D. Altschule, Origins of Concepts in Human Behaviour: social and cultural factors (Washington, D. C. 1977), Chapter 1. 
11Roccatagliata, A History of Ancient Psychiatry, p. 230. 
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imprisoned, he torments himself with superstitious ideas, he hates 
life ... he is terror- stricken, he mistakes his fantasies for the truth-he 
complains of imaginary diseases, he curses life and wishes for death. 12 
The last of these figures, Caelius Aurelianus, differed from the others in his stress on 
the mechanistic elements of the organism rather than the fluid and metabolic 
dimensions of humour-oriented medicine. The mechanistic viewpoint, inherited by 
Aurelianus from Democritus, Leucippus and Lucretius, concentrates on atomic 
structure, and as a consequence mental tendencies could be diagnosed from 
constrictions or laxities of the essential organs' connections to the body and one 
another. The stress remains on spatial connection and the transmission of energies 
affecting body and mental states, where the diameter of the brain stem prescribed any 
one of three states: a tight state, which included anxiety, delirium and hallucination 
within its pathologies; a lax state, which approximated to melancholia; and a mixture 
of the two states, with alternating symptoms. 13 Aurelianus specifically included 
within his notions of "melancholicus" the tendencies of animosity and suspicion. 
2. The Renaissance 
As a term, paranoia does not reappear in cultural discourse or in psychiatric 
medicine until the seventeenth century, when its re-engagement in terminologies 
occurred in that century's proliferation of scientific discourse concerning mental 
disorders. Perhaps the most important social and cultural development in the 
Renaissance for paranoia's modern status as a concept, and its connection to political 
12Roccatagliata, A History of Ancient Psychiatry, p. 231. Both quotations are drawn from 
Aretaeus, de causis et signis acutorum morborum. 
13Roccatagliata, A History of Ancient Psychiatry, pp. 237-238. 
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action, occurred in conjunction with the ideas of Niccolö Machiavelli (1469-1527), 
particularly his Prince (1513). Machiavelli was himself the victim of Medici paranoia, 
and was exiled for a time from Florence on suspicion of conspiracy. His subsequent 
political theory, its identification of the uses of fear in statecraft, and its championing 
of ends over means laid the groundwork for Thomas Hobbes' Leviathan (1651) over 
a century later. Together, Hobbes and Machiavelli provided a fundamental shift in 
political theory and strategy which decreased religious influence and prioritized the 
military, emplacing real-politik and shifting belief and control structures into the 
secular domain where those structures existed to serve political ends. From this 
followed the creation of the modern nation-state productive of secularized forms of 
control and fear, in which paranoia may be said to be an ingredient essentially 
differentiated between economics and religion amongst both leaders and led. 
Machiavellian themes also played a major role in the development of Renaissance 
obsessions for revenge plots, paranoid systems of enclosed information and action 
which structured so much of the literature of the period, and set out essential 
parameters for writing which subsequently explored the nature of paranoia and 
paranoid representation. 14 
Part of the history of the Renaissance was the rekindling in European culture 
and science of an interest in the dimensions of psychiatry worked out within Greek 
and Roman cultures, and sustained efforts by contemporary medical thought to 
integrate and utilize classical knowledge. Robert Burton's The Anatomy of Melancholy 
14The key connection here is that between sixteenth and seventeenth century drama and the 
development of Gothic literature from the eighteenth century onward: in effect, the 
transmission of different techniques used in the literary representation of infection and/or 
subversion within the body-politic. 
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(1621), perhaps the most famous example of this tendency, presents the theory of the 
humours, particularly as they complement or accentuate melancholy, within a range 
of Renaissance belief structures, including philosophy, religion and medicine. In the 
section entitled 'Symptoms, or Signs of Melancholy in the Body, ' Burton writes: 
Suspicion and jealousy are general symptoms: [affected individuals are] 
commonly distrustful, timorous, apt to mistake, and amplify, testy, 
pettish, peevish, and ready to snarl upon every small occasion, with 
their greatest friends, and without a cause, given or not given, it will 
be to their offense... . If two talk together, 
discourse, whisper, jest, or 
tell a tale in general, he thinks presently they mean him, applies all to 
himself. Or if they talk with him, he is ready to misconstrue every 
word they speak, and interpret it to the worst. 
... Melancholy advanceth men's conceits more than any 
humour 
whatsoever, improves their meditations more than any strong drink or 
sack. They are of profound judgement in some things, although in 
others they judge not well because of their unease... 15 
Burton also cites a category involving "religious revelations. " 
The position melancholy assumed in Renaissance perceptions of mental processes, 
and the latency within its definitions of symptoms regarded as paranoid in a present- 
day context, can be observed in the poetry and drama of the period. Just as creative 
writing in ancient culture proved an essential arena of analysis, so Ben Jonson's Every 
Man in His Humour (1598) explores medical definitions, and at one stage a character 
comments: 
A new disease? I know not, new or old, 
But it may well be call'd poor mortal's plague: 
For, like a pestilence, it doth infect 
The houses of the brain... 
Till not a thought, or motion, in the mind, 
Be free from the black poison of suspect. 16 
The effect of melancholy on the individual is suggested perhaps most powerfully in 
15Robert Burton, The Anatomy of Melancholy (New York 1938), pp. 332-334. Text italics. 
16Ben Jonson, Every Man in His Humour, II, iii, 55-67. 
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Hamlet (1601). In Shakespeare's play individuality assumes an intense existential 
anxiety within the supposedly secure and certain hierarchy of rule, where political 
power is interrogated from a position of rapidly-dispelled uncertainty about the fluid 
cause and effect structures underlying the political system of control. The catalyst for 
this anxiety, and thence for the ensuing political destabilization, is the introduction of 
the unknown or uncontrollable into these systems whose basis for control is certainty 
of origin, prefigured most obviously in genealogical terms. Whilst the appearance of 
the ghost of Hamlet's father tenders an uncertainty, and a genealogical reversal, which 
may be mediated in the form of Manichean polarities and a reactionary array of 
superstition, the instability this provokes through Hamlet and his subversion of the 
ruling rationality cannot so easily be contained. If the religious sanction of belief in 
Manichean polarities produces a form of internally regulated paranoia, suitably 
ordered by the concerns of political control, then Hamlet represents an inflammation 
and rupture of this regulation correlative to the tragic process, where the conflicts of 
paranoia in political systems escalate into cycles of destruction affecting all parts of 
the social hierarchy. 
In a way that Shakespeare returned to repeatedly in other plays, Hamlet is 
about a crisis of belief concerning the vulnerability of individuals and political systems 
desiring certainty and continuity, and how belief may become paranoid in the 
circumstances of political control, religion and the friction of different forms of 
consciousness. Combined within Hamlet are the forceful, contradictory and 
marginalized qualities about which the Renaissance hegemony, to use Gramsci's 
concept, was so suspicious, particularly given Hamlet's position as heir, the possibility 
that he may be possessed by or involved with some form of diabolic energy, and his 
38 
artistic temperament. In the case of diabolism, a contemporary diagnostic interaction 
existed between the identification of the melancholic state and that involving 
possession by the devil, part of the consistent political recognition of creativity's 
disruptive potential. Indeed, it may be argued that the play's political context is 
precisely about the articulation and enforcement of these suspicions within the sphere 
of Elizabethan and Jacobean succession anxieties, " something which receives added 
intensity in the traditional anxieties concerning creative energy. In the Machiavellian 
contexts, Shakespeare plays upon these audience anxieties as mental instability 
becomes secular interaction with divinely designated orders; as Claudius states, 
"madness in great ones must not unwatched go. " 
The vocabulary Shakespeare's characters use in debating madness compares 
closely with eighteenth century psychiatric language; Hamlet talks of "antic 
disposition" and "distraction, " whilst Claudius is more direct in his recognition of the 
threat concealed within a set of symptoms: 
There's something in his soul 
O'er which his melancholy sits on brood, 
And I do doubt the hatch and the disclose 
Will be some danger... 18 
Earlier in the play Polonius's verbosity lampoons the rational diagnosis, but within his 
nonsense lies an accurate satire of contemporary technique: 
Mad let us grant him then. And now remains 
That we find out the cause of this effect - 
17In his book, Treason in Tudor England: Politics and Paranoia (London 1986), Lacey Baldwin 
Smith provides compelling analyses of a contemporary paranoia pervading sixteenth century 
English social and political life, from Tudor education and advice literature through to the 
conspiracies and stratagems of the court. Hamlet, the rest of the Shakespearian dramatic canon, 
and other contemporary drama, suggest a continuing obsession as the century drew to a close. 
"William Shakespeare, Hamlet, III, i, 165-168. 
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Or rather say, the cause of this defect, 
For this effect defective comes by cause. 
Thus it remains, and the remainder thus. 19 
The proximity of 'aberration' to political control creates a sense of menace and 
destabilization, invoking the discourses of rationality and their pursuit of origins 
through cause and effect, as an hilarious but subtle illumination of the rational desire 
to define and thus control: in effect (to use the terminology), the exertion of a political 
paranoia in the modern "trivial" senses of suspicion. Of course, each of the character's 
suspicions about the others are seen to be well founded, and thus the play dramatizes 
Freud's observation that truth inhabits every paranoid perception to some degree, 20 
and goes on to reveal the destruction resulting from the friction of separate projections 
as they intersect. Where the focus is more explicitly the conjunctions of madness and 
power, the images are clear; Polonius advises Claudius to "confine (Hamlet) where 
your wisdom best shall think" (III, i, 187-188), and Claudius refers to Hamlet's 
influence over "the distracted multitude" (IV, iii, 4), transferring terminology in his 
fear of insurrection. 
Altogether, the play extends a profoundly unsettling view of madness and isolates 
within its language the vocabulary of confinement and rational constriction which 
would develop through to the Enlightenment. 21 What must also be stressed in these 
19Hamlet, II, ii, 100-104. 
20"But the partial justification which we concede to paranoia 
it of chance actions will help us towards a psychological 
conviction that the paranoic attaches to all ... 
interpretations. 
them... " Sigmund Freud, The Psychopathology of Everyd 
Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Fi 
pp. 255-256. 
in respect of this view taken by 
understanding of the sense of 
There is in fact some truth in 
y Life (1901) in The Standard 
tud (London 1960), Volume VI, 
"Another classic example drawing on Burton, and with similar stresses to Shakespeare on 
confinement, mental instabilities, and power, occurs in Milton's Samson Agonistes (1671), 
where Samson's father, Manoa, instructs him to ignore his imprisoned musings: 
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contexts is the perception and status of creative energies in their involvement in the 
melancholic condition. Hamlet's melancholy is not solely the product of his mourning 
but emerges also from his engagement with knowledge and art, and in Burton's The 
Anatomy of Melancholy and other writings of the period the condition is selectively 
identified as one afflicting and necessary to the creative mentality. The engraving 
Melencolia by Albrecht Dürer (1471-1528) illustrates this with its melancholic figure 
surrounded by symbols of fertility. 
Two primary drives of The Anatomy of Melancholy proved it to be an important 
transitional formulation of knowledge in Western psychiatry, marking the end of one 
phase of the science and the beginning of the next. In the former action, the book's 
accumulative energy moves it toward the inclusion of an enormously wide range of 
symptoms under the definition of an existential state, and in this sense it precedes the 
nosological divisions of the next scientific age. The book's inclusivity, alternatively, 
creates the transition in the very assembling of such a vast profusion of individual 
qualities, revealing to the development of rational thought a territory to be ordered and 
specified. 
In looking at this transition Michel Foucault has suggested the creation of a 
peculiar tension which arose between terminology and symptomatology, melancholy 
being particularly representative of the phenomenon: 
The notion of melancholia was fixed, in the sixteenth century, between 
a certain definition by symptoms and an explanatory principle 
concealed in the very term that designated it... this clear and coherent 
syndrome was designated by a word that implied an entire causal 
Believe not these suggestions, which proceed 
From anguish of the mind and humours black, 
That mingle with thy fancy. (1.599-601) 
ed. John Carey & Alistair Fowler, The Poems of John Milton (London 1968), p. 366. 
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system, that of melancholia... The concept is fixed not by a new rigour 
in observation, nor by a discovery in the realm of causes, but by a 
qualitative transmission proceeding from a cause implied in the 
designation to a significant perception in the effects. 22 
In other words, Renaissance appropriations of medical knowledge from the periods 
preceding it and the transformations in their new uses ensured a different form of 
diagnostic process which relied less on the truth of symptomatology than on the truth 
of the political causalities doctors began to use as justifications. The result was a 
flowering of nosologies, which found its initial inclusive drive in the publication in 
Basle of Felix Plater the Elder's Praxis Medicum (1621). 23 Plater (1538-1614) 
attempted a full nosology of mental disorders, within which appeared a group entitled 
'Morbus mentis': 
1. Mentis imbecillatis: 
Hebetudo, tarditas, oblivio, imprudentia. 
2. Mentis consternatio: 
Somnus immodicus, carus, lethargus, apoplexia, 
epilepsia, convulsio, catalepsis, ecstasis. 
3. Mentis alienatio: 
Stultitas, temulentia, amor, melancholia, 
hypochondriacus morbus, mania, hydrophobia, 
phrenitis, saltus viti. 
4. Mentis defatigatio: 
Vigiles, insomnia. 24 
The third group, a minor part of a massive nosological undertaking, translates literally 
as 'Folly/silliness, Intoxication, Love, Melancholy, Hypochondria, Mania, 
22Michel Foucault, Madness and Civilization, translated by Richard Howard (London 1967), 
pp. 117-119. 
'Other nosologies were produced at this time by Schenck and Zacchias, who included "the 
pathological entities of fanaticism and religious exaltation or prophesying. " Swanson, Bohnert 
and Smith, The Paranoid, p. 24. 
'Quoted in Smith E. Jelliffe, 'A Summary of the Origins, Transformations, and Present-Day 
Trends of the Paranoia Concept' in Medical Record: A Weekly Journal of Medicine and 
Surgery, (New York, April 5,1913), Vol. 83, No. 14, p. 600. 
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Hydrophobia, Delirium, Palpitations, " and the terminological divisions signify the 
reorganization of definition by emerging logical techniques in favour of the mapping 
of a territory, where definition excludes as much as it attempts to include. Twentieth 
century arguments within the mental sciences about the precise parameters of 
paranoia, to be encountered later, stem directly from this action, indicating the extent 
to which the diagnostic urge of those sciences remains anchored in the evolution of 
the Enlightenment. 
3. The Enlightenment 
As a scientific term, paranoia reappeared in psychiatric nosologies and medical 
dictionaries towards the end of the seventeenth century, and reassumed its reference 
to general insanity in keeping with its direct retrieval from Greek and Hippocratic 
medicine. What exactly led to this reappearance remains unknown, but it is probable 
that the proliferation of nosologies stimulated a search for appropriate terminology to 
satisfy Enlightenment desires to organize and define. Greek and Hippocratic medicine 
offered a convenient source. Bartolomeo Castelli and Jacob Bruno's classic Lexicon 
medicum (1682) exists as an exemplary European instance of this retrieval of classical 
terminology in the period, drawing directly from Hippocrates and other Greek and 
Roman sources, as in the entry: "PARANOEA, IIapävota, etiam significat, 
Dementiam, Delirium. Hipper. 3 progn. t. 20. "25 Francois-Boissier de Sauvages 
(1706-1767) can be credited perhaps with being the first to involve the term in a 
post-classical nosology, where his Pathologia Methodica: seu De cognoscendis morbis 
(1739) features a 'Classis Sexta. Morbi Paraphronici, ' within which occurs the 
"Bartolomeo Castelli and Jacob Bruno, Lexicon medicum (Antwerp 1682), p. 886. 
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following: 
116. SECTIO 1. MORBI DELIRI, melancholici, seu in judicio, ratione 
a cogitatione depravitas, excepta Agrypnia. 1° AMENTIA. Paranoia 
Hipp. est universale, mite, chronicum, sine febre, delirium. 26 
De Sauvages's use of the term signalled its gravitation toward the designation 
'delirium, ' as nosologies began to align themselves along specific discursive divisions. 
Between 1743 and 1745 Robert James published the three volumes of his A Medicinal 
Dictionary, where a transfer of the term into English scientific discourse occurs. In the 
first volume's 'An Introductory Preface, tracing the Progress of Physic, and Explaining 
the THEORIES which have principally prevail'd in all Ages of the World, ' there 
occurs a "Class of Disorders drawn by Monsieur Le Clerc from Hippocrates. " This 
nosology includes the following entries: 
IIapa4oovvq, 
IIapa«op, q, 




HapavoLa, Madness, Loss of the Senses 27 
In the third volume the term appears, "PARANOEA, HapavoLa, from IIapavoEC, w, 
to be delirious. A Delirium, or Alienation of Mind. i28 Evidence, however, that such 
a definition remained general and shared its discursive locale may be obtained by 
looking a little further on to, "PARAPHROSYNE, IIapaýpoo'uvrl, from 
IIapapovcw, to be delirious. A Delirium, or Alienation of Mind. " James's text was 
26Francois-Boissier de Sauvages, Pathologia Methodica: seu De cognoscendi morbis 
(Monspelii 1739), pp. 132-133. Essentially, "Paranoia. .. 
is general and chronic delirium without 
fever. " 
'Robert James, A Medicinal Dictionary (London 1743-1745), Volume I, p. xxvi. 
James, A Medicinal Dictionary, Volume III. 
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sufficiently prestigious and ubiquitous to expect its transfer at an early opportunity to 
other parts of the English-speaking world. 
From this point onwards, 'paranoea' can be found in successive medical 
dictionaries and lexicons. In 1749, J. Barrow published his A New Medicinal 
Dictionary in which can be found the entry, "Paranoea, (from IIapavosw, to be 
delirious) a delirium. "29 Francois-Boissier de Sauvages expanded on his 1739 
remarks in his Nosologia Methodica (1763), where Aubrey Lewis states he describes 
"paranoia as the Greek equivalent of amentia: 'Amentia, Graecis paranoia; Latinis 
dementia, fatuitas, vecordia; Gallis imbecillite, betise, naiserie, demence. "' The 
characteristics of paranoia are determined to be a "delirium particulare mite sine 
furore et audacia cum morbo diuturno. Est ineptitudo ad recte ratiocinandum et 
judicandum" (a specific delirium without frenzy or audacity occurring as a daily 
disease. It renders inept the correct functioning of the reasoning and judicial 
faculties). 30 Essentially, De Sauvages uses paranoia to describe a form of delirious 
thinking not linked to fever, a definition endorsed in 1772 by both Plocquet and R. 
A. Vogel. Plocquet's term is seen to be interchangeable with "Paracope (delirium), " 
with a selection of sub-titles: "(a) Pathetica, (b) phronestica, (c) entomica, (d) 
encephalica, (e) hyperesthetica, (0 sympathica. i31 Vogel (1724-1774) is somewhat 
terser in his Academic w Prwlictiones, citing paranoia as "equivalent to vesania, or 
morbus mentis, which should include mania and melancholia, fatuitas, stupiditas, 
29J. Barrow, Dictionarium Medicum Universale, or A New Medicinal Dictionary (London 
1749), n. p. 
30Lewis, 'Paranoia and paranoid: a historical perspective, ' p. 2. 
"Cited in Jelliffe, 'A Summary of the Origins, Transformations, and Present-Day Trends of 
the Paranoia Concept, ' p. 600. 
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amentia, oblivio. "32 
While this profusion of nosologies emerged an important development occurred 
in the perception of insanities with the publication in 1758 of William Battie's Treatise 
on Madness, where a crucial passage differentiates from the contemporary view of 
mental aberration: 
Deluded imagination, which is not only an undisputable but an essential 
character of Madness... precisely discriminates this from all other animal 
disorders: or that man and man alone is properly mad, who is fully and 
unalterably persuaded of any thing, which either does not exist or does 
not actually appear to him, and who behaves according to such 
erroneous persuasion... Madness, or false perception, being then a 
preternatural state of disorder of Sensation. 33 
As Klaus Doerner has pointed out, this diverges from the attitudes Locke presents in 
his An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690-1706), in that madness now 
becomes not just a disorder of the mind, or a false association of ideas, but also a 
defect of sensation. 34 The mad person now no longer exists in purely rational terms, 
to be located by a "coercive sequestration of unreason, " but also appears as a 
representation of a new autonomous reality. Battie°s theories developed from the 
physiological basis of the efficacy of the "nerve substance, " the distortion or 
interruption of which affects sensation, and as sensation emerges from a materiality, 
so its aberration locates a new dimension in psychic space. The physiological bases 
can be traced back through Burton to the Greek and Roman spatial organizations and 
disruptions of corporeal energy and substance mentioned before; what has changed is 
32Lewis, 'Paranoia and paranoid: a historical perspective, ' p. 2. Vesania was a Latin term for 
general insanity. 
"William Battie, Treatise on Madness (London 1758), p. 6-7. 
'4K1aus Doerner, Madmen and the Bourg oisi (Oxford 1981), p. 78. 
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the philosophical background where Enlightenment rationality orders discourse and 
becomes the medium of scientific authority, thus ordering the disposition of mind and 
body. From this point on, madness exists as a material interiority and a spatial 
exteriority within the theoretical dimensions of an Enlightenment absolutist definition. 
In Britain, William Cullen endorsed the acceptance of Vogel's terminology by 
eighteenth century British psychiatry, and his First Lines of the Practice of Physic 
(1783) states: "vesaniarum ordinem hic instituere velim quac cum classe Vogelii nona 
Paranoiae inscripta eadem omino sint" (Here I would like to set the category of 
madnesses, which are altogether the same as Vogel's ninth class, entitled 
Paranoiac) 35 The main features of the aberration are cited as impaired judgement and 
afebrile course, with the exclusion of hallucinations and "morositas" (peevishness, 
erroneous appetites). 
Here it is necessary to refer to an essential development at this time in the 
cultural view of psychiatry and the controls exerted by the science and any individual 
who may adopt the mantle of authority extended by its rationale. This occurred most 
tangibly with the emergence of Mesmerism in France and thence throughout Europe 
and into America. The "discovery" by Franz Anton Mesmer (1734-1815) of an 
invisible and universal fluid which penetrated and surrounded all bodies, and which 
could be manipulated by trained individuals, polarized the hopes and fears generated 
about psychiatric practice at a time when Enlightenment certainties concerning the 
known universe were giving way to more radical perspectives as to the nature of the 
universe, the knowledge of its operations and the place within it occupied by human 
beings. The essence of the problem was the control of a human being or beings by 
35Lewis, 'Paranoia and paranoid: a historical perspective, ' p. 2. 
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another using unknown or unseen forces, as picked up some decades later so 
effectively by Edgar Allan Poe. Demonstrations of such power by Mesmer and his 
followers using forms of hypnosis struck at the heart of the political organizations of 
post-Enlightenment life, and led Mesmer's theories and practice to be alternately feted 
and rejected by the different political power bases in the Europe of his time, 
according, respectively, to their radicalism or conservatism. Robert Darnton has 
isolated this movement and its links to the French political upheavals of the late 
eighteenth century where discoveries made in science extended and intensified the 
scope of individual human powers and submissions, fostering perceptions which were 
consequently harnessed to varying degrees by radicals in their attacks on the 
Establishment, and later by the Establishment itself in a predictable appropriation of 
energies. 36 The political gravity of the situation is given in Mark D. Altschule`s 
comment that: 
The mesmerists were convinced that the hypothetical mesmeric fluid 
that pervaded the universe could be directed to the minds of the people 
and their leaders, inducing them to formulate a political system that 
would provide the universal justice, permanent peace, and unending 
prosperity necessary for the complete happiness for all of humanity. 37 
The effects of Mesmerism within psychiatric practice were crucial, essentially 
creating the environment in social and scientific perceptions where the space and 
power identified today with the analyst could begin to be assembled in forms distinct 
from those surrounding the doctor. In this action the techniques of Mesmerism built 
upon the foundations and arrangements of power already bequeathed from medicine 
36See Robert Darnton, Mesmerism and the End of the Enlightenment in France (Cambridge, 
Mass. 1968). 
37Altschule, Origins of Concepts in Human Behavior, p. 87. 
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the authoritarian proportions of the analyst, which were to be successively endorsed 
by Charcot, Freud and others. Indeed, Freud recognized this action and not 
coincidentally identified the potential for paranoia in manifestations of the 
analyst/analysand relationship where power could interfere with the control of therapy: 
We can easily recognize [in transference] the same dynamic factor 
which the hypnotists have named 'suggestibility, ' which is the agent of 
hypnotic rapport and whose incalculable behaviour led to difficulties 
with the cathartic method as well. When there is no inclination to a 
transference of emotion such as this, or when it has become entirely 
negative, as happens in dementia praecox or paranoia, then there is also 
no possibility of influencing the patient by psychological means. " 
The nineteenth century analysts utilized the hypnotic techniques pioneered by Mesmer 
and also retained the qualities of control and permission emanating from an unseen 
power source personified in and channelled through the figure of the analyst. The 
distinguished English doctor, John Elliotson, who was the first Professor of Medicine 
in the University of London, articulated the tensions of the problem when, in 
defending Mesmer against the established medical profession, he said: "[Mesmer] 
employed means without knowing more than the fact of their power; so do you. i39 
It is within these contexts that the emerging clinical status of paranoia should be 
viewed, for the movement of the term to locate a condition which involved the 
specific intersections of anxiety and power followed on from the formative influences 
of Mesmerism. 40 
38Sigmund Freud, An Autobiographical Study (1925) in S. E. C. P. W. (London 1959), Volume 
XX, p. 42. 
39Darnton, Mesmerism and the End of the Enlightenment in France, p. 173. 
40lnterest in Mesmerism continued in the United States for some time after Mesmer's death in 
1815 and the decline of his technique's popularity in Europe, as is evidenced by the 
seriousness in the preparation and reception of Chauncy Hare Townshend's Fusin 






This also emerges importantly from the shift which occurred between the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in the ways human beings thought and organized 
their strategies of belief. In a discussion about the Marquis de Sade, Michel Foucault 
articulates this shift from the Enlightenment perceptions of order envisaged in the 
philosophies of Descartes, Newton and Leibniz, in the following manner: 
Sade sought to insert into the combinations of representations the 
infinite power of desire, and when he did so he was obliged, almost as 
an afterthought, to take away the ego's privileged position. The ego 
became just one element within a combination. In the philosophy of the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the ego was king. Later, in the 
nineteenth century, with the philosophy of will, the ego remains king, 
though in a different way. Yet at the moment at which these two 
currents are joined, the ego is dissociated and dispersed among the 
various combinations. I believe that one of the most noteworthy 
characteristics of our era is that the sovereignty of the ego has been put 
in doubt. " 
Sade is useful for this dissertation not only in Foucault's somewhat rigid demarcation 
of change but also because of the crucial Sadean notion that infinite desire can only 
operate inside an enclosure of defined limits: a situation which, it will be seen, 
resembles the spaces paranoia delimits for its seemingly infinite means of pursuing 
certainty. 42 The shift in the position of the ego that Foucault describes radically 
altered the ways in which perception and consciousness were formed and manipulated 
by emplaced belief systems. One example concerns the theodicy debate which arose 
in the Enlightenment, and in particular from philosophical discourse like Leibniz's 
Theodicee (1710), to assert a change in the view of a human's subjectivity to the point 
41Michel Foucault, Foucault Live: Interviews 1966-1984, translated by John Johnston (New 
York 1989), pp. 82-3. 
42"For Sade, there is no eroticism unless the crime is 'reasoned'; to reason means to 
philosophize, to dissertate, to harangue, in short, to subject crime-to a system of articulated 
language... " Roland Barthes, Sade, Fourier, Loyola, translated by Richard Miller (London 
1976), p. 27. Text italics. 
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where an individual could be put on trial as the subject of their own history, with 
another individual as judge. Effectively, the disappearance of God as an arbiter in 
social process placed the ego in a position requiring forms of self-justification and 
legitimation in cultural systems which began to organize control around the idea of 
an individual's self-construction. Any analysis of paranoia, therefore-and 
specifically, any analysis of the ego or egos in relationships of power-must 
necessarily concentrate on this period in Western culture as a formative territory for 
the bases of current orientations of the paranoid concept. The "combinations" Foucault 
infers are the essential elements here: that is, the social and political forces amongst 
which the ego finds itself no longer prioritized and thus open to new forms of anxiety; 
and in particular, the profound changes wrought by the rise of capitalism and the 
industrial revolution where the tensions surrounding the sovereignty of the ego in a 
theatre of consumption and technological progression develop an environment in 
which paranoia proliferates in different ways. 
It is in this territory that one confronts perhaps the most fundamental cultural 
change of the past three hundred years, and the issue at the core of the paranoid 
problem in its modern context. From the creation of the individual in the modern 
sense-for this is what occurred when the ego began to involve itself in the 
arrangement of its own subjectivity-extend the influential epistemologies of Western 
culture (e. g. from Darwin, Marx and Freud), and all progress from a basic sense of 
the individual consciousness engaged in humanly-produced determining narratives. 
These epistemologies owe their formation to the changes in perception which ensured 
the end of the Enlightenment, but more specifically their concentrations of subjectivity 
were consolidated in the paradigm-breaking explorations of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. 
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For it was Rousseau who first took the notion of the human being as the subject of 
their own history and articulated it in the realm of cultural discourse to a point 
affirming the credibility of self-constitution. This possibility for the self of an 
autonomous value grew in the spaces opened up in cultural discourse by such writings 
as the Discours (1750-4), The Confessions (completed 1765, published 1781), and the 
dialogues, Rousseau Juge de Jean-Jacques (1775-6). 
Rousseau's action in these writings is to attack the rigidly held idea of the 
individual's sensibility being formed by an assumed binary of rationality working 
against the disorder of the passions, and to oppose it with a secularized confessional 
process of self affirmation which prioritized the emotional life of the individual. As 
Paul Cantor has suggested, it is vital to view this development as more than simply 
the substitution of one concept for another; Rousseau actually moves humanity's 
perception of itself from a fixed notion to one involving humanity in the 
indeterminacy of its own interpretations: 
For Rousseau, what man is can only be determined retrospectively, by 
looking at what he has developed into in a process which involves 
many historical accidents and which therefore has an element of 
arbitrariness in it. 43 
Such self-invention actively provided the existential and eighteenth century precursor 
to what Alfred North Whitehead termed the greatest invention of the nineteenth 
century.. . the invention of the method of invention, " which operated from a "technique 
of beginning at the end of any operation whatever, and of working backwards from 
that point to the beginning. "' The assumption of this perspective by technological 
43Paul Cantor, Creature and Creator: Myth Making and English Romanticism (Cambridge 
1984), p. 6. 
A. N. Whitehead, Science and the Modern World (New York 1948), p. 98. 
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progression, however, has been less concerned with the arbitrariness mentioned by 
Cantor than with the political imperatives lent by the conjunction of technology with 
Cartesian rationality and repetitive needs for certainty. This has produced a space for 
paranoia in the pathology of certain forms of modern technology, such as weaponry, 
surveillance and communications equipment, located at the transformative point 
between the logic of acceleration in technology's use and penetrative expansions, and 
the fears attending the strategies inherent in technological development and 
deployment. " 
The effect of Rousseau's work, however, was to develop a paradox for 
individuals who, faced with the vertiginous spaces of self-orientation within the 
arbitrariness of an historical process without absolutes, found themselves prone to the 
security seeking enclosures of the paranoid ego. Furthermore, this position was 
intensified in the realignment Rousseau's techniques enforced on the problem of evil, 
where the rationale of evil was no longer sought in fixed religious programmes but 
rather in an historical present. Essentially, Rousseau takes Bunyan's restatement of 
human existential process in The Pilgrim's Progress (1678-1684)--where Christian's 
assertion is "What must I do to be saved? "-and recharges it in a secular, ego-centric 
context. Outside the security of a religious programme and comfortingly identifiable 
sources of evil, of course, the tendency of consciousness is to cling to forms of 
nostalgia and suspicion for guidance, as Rousseau's later writings reveal. Huck 
Gutman's analysis of this paradox is simple and accurate: 
Although the first reward of constituting oneself as a subject is a 
feeling of centrality and well-being, an inevitable consequence of that 
45See Brian Easlea, Fathering the Unthinkable (London 1983) for a compelling cultural 
analysis of the fears and drives behind the development of nuclear technology and weaponry. 
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constitution, which depends upon division, is isolation... 
Divided by the individuating process from the social world, 
Rousseau recognizes that an "exaggerated sensibility" contributes 
powerfully to his growing paranoia... Such paranoia is but an extension 
of that primary move that divides self above that from which it has 
been separated. 46 
This predicament, Gutman explains, extends from the mode of Rousseau's discourse 
in The Confessions, and the consequent political orientation of the new form of 
subjectivity he introduces. Confessional modes traditionally act as a release and 
reinvolvement of the self in set ideological programmes but Rousseau crucially turns 
the technique into a process of self-creation with which to face a hostile environment 
(which Europe then was to the philosopher following the controversies of his life and 
writings). 
This in turn presents another drawback for the individual in that it adds to the 
problem of alienation the development of the greater visibility of the self for the 
purposes of social and political control. In creating a new secularized expression of 
the self to analyze personal securities and liberty, Rousseau freed the self from the 
constraints imposed by religious control but simultaneously moved it into a newer 
realm of observation and potential subjectivization, instigating a "new technology of 
the self which, although not as yet observedly traversed by power, was shortly to 
become a prime agent in the modern elaboration of power. i47 This placing of the self 
in a new position of surveillance marks the creation of the modern political subject 
for social modes of power, particularly in the contexts of contemporary revolutionary 
events, effectively producing "the result of making man the subject of his own history: 
46Huck Gutman 'Rousseau's Confessions: A Technology of the Self in ed. Martin, Gutman & 
Hutton, Technologies of the Self (London 1988), pp. 109-110. 
47Huck Gutman, "Rousseau's Confessions: A Technology of the Self, " p. 117. 
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the overtribunalization of the realm of human activity. X48 
Rousseau's assault on rationality, driven by his sense that reason was a 
principal cause of unhappiness in its inflexibility in the fluid area of human truths, is 
the next element in a comprehension of paranoid forms. Rousseau's Confessions 
appeared almost a century after the sequence of publications with which Isaac Newton 
effectively set the Enlightenment in motion, and thereby entrenched in Western 
perception, along with his countryman, John Locke, the dominance of mechanistic 
thought based on rigid notions of the traceable causality of any event or process. In 
fact, the foundation for the Enlightenment and for modern forms of paranoia had been 
laid by the seventeenth century philosophical investigations of Rene Descartes, and his 
championing of reason. Rousseau was very much a part of the eighteenth century 
reaction to Cartesian theory which proposed reason as the saving grace for humanity, 
where Descartes had sought to replace what he saw as centuries of superstition, 
custom and habit with an orderly mental system for locating and utilizing truth. 
Developing an a priori sense of the self and its potential to organize an inner 
compulsion towards rational thought, Descartes posited his famous-and famously 
redundant-cogito ergo sum as the basis for a tradition whose essence, Ernest Gellner 
suggests, "was the supposition that a cognitive procedure existed which stood outside 
the world and any one culture, [and which] was capable of independent judgement of 
48Hans Robert Jauss, The Literary Process of Modernism from Rousseau to Adorno' in 
Cultural Critique, 11, Winter 1988-89, p. 38. This "overtribunalization of the realm of human 
activity" is, of course, one of the major territories of Franz Kafka's writing and analysis of 
paranoia. It is essential to note also that Rousseau's work in political theory, especially his Du 
Contrat Social (1762), takes its place in a distinguished line of efforts to promulgate non- 
coercive and anti-paranoid social and political systems. Petr Alekseyevich Kropotkin's Mutual 
Aid: A Factor of Evolution (1902), and his refutation of the emphasis on struggle in social 
Darwinism, is another important assault on the supposed necessity of conflict and threat in 
social and political relations. 
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cognitive claims about the world. i49 Michel Serves' remark that "[s]omeone once 
compared the undertaking of Descartes to the action of a man who sets his house on 
fire in order to hear the noise the rats make in the attic at night, i5° is a somewhat 
more poetic rendering of the contradictions of the situation. 
From Cartesian affirmations of autonomous human mental process, Gellner 
moves on to show how reason underwent different forms of emphasis in ensuing 
Western philosophies, and reveals the extent to which reason maintained explicit links 
to evolving concepts of the self. In particular, he follows up a discussion of Hume and 
eighteenth century empirical philosophy by focusing on Immanuel Kant, a philosopher 
whose desire to determine the true dimensions of mental processes led, amongst other 
things, to a study of mental disorders and a realignment of Cartesian rationality. Kant 
followed the empiricists by overriding Cartesian self-autonomy with the idea that the 
self was subject to both reason and experience, the latter involving sensory input as 
well as an accumulation of cultural data. In this way, the self becomes a process rather 
than a fixed structure, a unifying linkage of sensational information and mental habits 
of connectivity which may be trained according to the dictates of reason. Kant 
grounded his sense of the crucial shifts occurring in the self s political position within 
his assessment of the consequences of the Enlightenment: 
Enlightenment is the leaving behind by man of his self-caused 
minority. Minority is the impossibility of using one's own reason 
without the guidance of another. That minority is self-caused when it 
is due not to the lack of reasoning power but to the lack of decision 
and courage to make use of it without the guidance of another. Sapere 
aude! Have the courage to make use of your own reason! is thus the 
49Ernest Gellner, Reason and Culture (Oxford 1992), p. 82. 
"Michel Serres, The Parasite, translated by Lawrence R. Scher (London 1982), p. 12. 
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motto of the Enlightenment. 51 
In the contemporary age of revolution, of course, many were fulfilling this motto 
beyond the notion of a leap of faith in the self in the series of political upheavals 
which included the American War of Independence. 
Part of Kant's massively influential Critique of Pure Reason (first edition 1781) 
included a section on 'Paralogisms of Pure Reason'-a paralogism being "a piece of 
false reasoning; a faulty syllogism; a fallacy of which the reasoner is 
unconscious i52-and in it Kant states that "in what we entitle 'soul, ' everything is in 
continual flux and there is nothing abiding except (if we must so express ourselves) 
the 'I, ' which is simple solely because its representation has no content... 153 Along 
with Kant's identification of an inevitable effort for transcendent or unconditioned 
knowledge as part of the use of reason, 54 this located one of the continuing problems 
extended into Western culture from the Cartesian inheritance and its sense of the self. 
The needs for certainty, which radically underpinned the evolution of reason, found 
in reason an appropriate vehicle with which to reach certainty, with or without divine 
sanction. However, as flaws of reason manifested themselves over time, in extensive 
"Immanuel Kant, Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung? (1784), cited in Henri F. 
Ellenberger, The Discovery of the Unconscious: The History and Evolution of Dynamic 
Psychiatry (New York 1970), p. 195. Text italics. 
"Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 1787 edition, translated by Norman Kemp Smith 
(London 1970), p. 353; cited in Gellner, Reason and Culture, p. 22. 
Kant states in the Critique that rationality strives always "to find for the conditioned 
knowledge obtained through the understanding the unconditioned whereby its unity is brought 
to completion" (Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 306). Roger Scruton adds the gloss to Kant's 
thinking that "reason (in its guise as inference) inevitably leads us to search for the 
'unconditioned, ' the ultimate premise whose truth is derived from no other source" (Roger 
Scruton, Kaut [Oxford 1982], p. 46-47). 
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use and philosophical critique, the extent to which reason reinforced a potential for 
paranoia became apparent, particularly in political and cultural terms where the self, 
or 'I, ' as authority basis or site of subordination, was seen to be without representative 
content. The desire for certainty meant that reason was harnessed to ensure a content 
and transcendence for the self, principally through annexations of ideology and 
definitions of the self in opposition to the other. Ironically, of course, both these 
actions are perpetually prey to subversion by reason turned in on itself, as 
deconstructionist philosophy has demonstrated, especially where reason may 
disintegrate singularity and autonomy into multiples and dependencies, and reveal 
itself to be founded on irrationality. In these circumstances, problems of uncertainty 
invariably determine the fixing of security on delusory bases, leading to paranoia. 
As the eighteenth century drew to a close, therefore, paranoia began to 
accumulate within its definitions the symptoms approximating to modern clinical and 
trivial meanings. Moving inside its connection to general insanity, paranoia had 
become the term identified with forms of delirium in which thought processes 
remained largely intact, as Kant asserted in his 'The Classification of Mental 
Disorders. '5' For Kant, "der Wahnsinn" was: 
... that disturbance of the mind in which everything that the madman 
says is indeed consistent with the formal laws of thinking.. . but in which the subjective impressions of a falsely inventive imagination are taken 
for actual perceptions. Of this class are those who believe they have 
enemies everywhere; who regard all expressions, remarks, or other 
indifferent actions of other persons as intended for them as traps set for 
them. Often, they are, in their unfortunate madness, so ingenuous in 
analyzing that which others unwittingly do, in order to explain it to 
their own satisfaction, that, if their data were only accurate, one would 
"Immanuel Kant, Anthropologie in gmatischer Hinsicht abgefasst (Königsberg 1798), Book 
1, Part 1. Available in English as The Classification of Mental Disorders, translated by Charles 
T. Sullivan (Doylestown, Pa. 1964). 
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have to pay tribute to their intelligence. 56 
As a term in German psychiatry, "der Wahnsinn" referred to forms of insanity 
featuring delirium with non-disordered thought processes, much as its English 
equivalent. Kant's phenomenological analysis became a key action in psychiatric 
explorations, and his description set the tenor for differentiating paranoia from other 
mental states. An example of the expansion of this psychiatric focus through other 
European psychiatries can be found in Vincenzo Chiarugi's Della Piazzia in Genere 
e in Specie, s' which discussed stages of delirious hatred against others. 58 
The first major development in nineteenth century psychiatry occurred when the 
great French doctor, Philippe Pinel (1745-1826), published his epochal text, Traites 
medico-philosophique sur Palienation mentale, ou la manie, in Paris in 1801.59 Its 
nosology divided mental disorders into four categories: melancholias; manias with 
delirium; manias without delirium; and dementia or mental deterioration. With 
reference to the first category, Pinel stated: "Melancholics are frequently absorbed by 
one exclusive idea, to which they perpetually recur in their conversation, and which 
appears to engage their whole attention. i60 The focus on the fixed idea and delusion 
56Quoted in Peter A. Magaro, 
Cognitive Process (Hillsdale, New Jersey 1980), p. 133. 
57Vincenzo Chiarugi, Della Pazzia in Genere e in Specie, Trattato Medico-Analitico, con una 
Centuri di Observazzioni (Florence 1793-4). Translated in 1987 by George Mora as On 
insanity and its classification (Canton, MA 1987). 
58David Swanson, Philip Bohnert and Jackson Smith, The Paranoid (New York 1970), p. 24. 
"Philippe Pinel, Traites medico-philosophique sur 1'alienation mentale, ou la manic (Paris 
1801). Translated into English in 1806 by D. D. Davis as A Treatise on Insanity, in which are 
contained the principles of a new and more practical nosology of maniacal disorders than has 
yet been offered to the public (Sheffield 1806). 
60Pinel, A Treatise on Insanity, p. 127. 
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and its isolation within Pinel's concept of melancholia may be regarded as a formative 
moment for paranoia. Although the term itself was still half a century away from 
intersecting with the symptoms described by Pinel and those included today within the 
paranoid concept, the organizational importance of Pinel's project for the years which 
followed was profound, encompassing as it did widely perceived sets of symptoms in 
a moral and scientific framework. Furthermore, in the Traites medico-philosophigue 
sur 1'alienation mentale, ou la manie Pinel extends his perceptions of certain 
melancholic states into the psychopathology of political power, providing brief 
character analyses of the Roman emperor Tiberius and Louis XI. For Pinel, these 
figures were examples of an inevitable erosion of psychological health where, because 
of their centralization in systems of total power, they are "prey to dark suspicions, 
sinistrous prognostications and terrors ever new and imaginary, which increased with 
their advancing lives, [and] they at length sought retirement from the effects of their 
tyranny... "61 
The beginning of the nineteenth century also saw the appearance of the first 
American psychiatric publications; previously, American doctors had depended on the 
prominent European texts, or their American reprints. The first American text to 
feature the term paranoia appears to be The Philadelphia Medical Dictionary (1808) 
by John Redman Coxe (1773-1864), which states: "Paranoice, diseases attended with 
deranged mind. i62 In 1812 the renowned American doctor, Benjamin Rush 
61Pinel, A Treatise on Insanity, p. 138. 
62John Redman Coxe, The Philadelphia Medical Dictionary (Philadelphia 1808), no page 
numbers. The entry: "Paranoie, the same as Vesanice, " appears in The American Medical 
Lexicon, on the plan of uincy's Lexicon Physico-medicum (New York 1802), which 
essentially reprints Quincy's famous English text. 
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(1745-1813), Surgeon Extraordinaire to the United States Government, published his 
Medical Inquiries and Observations Upon the Diseases of the Mind in Philadelphia, 
and a passage from section three of Chapter Five, entitled 'Of The Different Forms of 
Mania, ' although not using the term, approximates to present-day apprehensions of 
paranoia. It is worth quoting in full: 
There is a form of mania which is seldom the object of medical 
attention either in hospitals, or in private practice, but which is well 
known, not only to physicians, but to persons of common observation 
in every part of the world. Dr Cox has described it very happily and 
correctly in the following words: 
"Among the varieties of maniacs met with in medical practice, 
there is one, which, though by no means rare, has been little noticed by 
writers on the subject :I refer to those cases, in which the individuals 
perform most of the common duties of life with propriety, and some of 
them, indeed, with scrupulous exactness; who exhibit no strongly 
marked features of either temperament, no traits of superior or 
defective mental endowment, but yet take violent antipathies, harbour 
unjust suspicions, indulge strong propensities, affect singularity in 
dress, gait, and phraseology; are proud, conceited, and ostentatious; 
easily excited, and with difficulty appeased; dead to sensibility, 
delicacy, and refinement; obstinately riveted to the most absurd 
opinions; prone to controversy, and yet incapable of reasoning; always 
the hero of their own tale, using hyperbolic high-flown language to 
express the most simple ideas, accompanied by unnatural gesticulation, 
inordinate action, and frequently by the most alarming expression of 
countenance. On some occasions they suspect similar intentions on the 
most trivial grounds, on others are a prey to fear and dread from the 
most ridiculous and imaginary sources; now embracing every 
opportunity of exhibiting romantic courage and feats of hardihood, then 
indulging themselves in all manner of excesses. 
Persons of this description, to the casual observer, might appear 
actuated by a bad heart, but the experienced physician knows it is the 
head which is defective. They seem as if constantly affected by a 
greater or less degree of stimulation from intoxicating liquors, while the 
expression of countenance furnishes an infallible proof of mental 
disease. If subjected to moral restraint, or a medical regimen, they yield 
with reluctance to the means proposed, and generally refuse and resist, 
on the ground that such means are unnecessary where no disease exists; 
and when, by the system adopted, they are so far recovered as to be 
enabled to suppress the exhibition by the former peculiarities, and are 
again fit to be restored to society, the physician, and those friends who 
put them under the physician's care, are generally ever after objects of 
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enmity, and frequently of revenge. "63 
Here, the use by Rush of Cox's diagnosis provides an insight into a deeper 
sociological analysis extending from the assumptions Kant outlined in 1798. A 
comparison with the definitions given for "Paranoid Disorders" in the American 
Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders`' 
demonstrates a core of shared perceptions, and reveals differences only in 
contemporary solidifications of scientific terminology. What is primary to Cox's 
diagnosis, and important for a history of the discourses of paranoia, is its shaping of 
those meanings associated with paranoia which are accepted today both scientifically 
and trivially, and which have clearly emerged in the transition between Enlightenment 
philosophies and those that followed. Michel Foucault suggests that: 
Discursive practices are characterized by the delimitation of a field of 
objects, the definition of a legitimate perspective for the agent of 
knowledge, and the fixing of norms for the elaboration of concepts and 
theories. Thus, each discursive practice implies a play of prescriptions 
that designate its exclusions and choices. 65 
In this context the descriptions put forward by Rush and Cox reveal the tensions 
present in the assertion of psychiatry as a rational and scientific assemblage of 
knowledge. This is also evident in the operations of the existential state they seek to 
6'Benjamin Rush, Medical Inquiries and Observations Upon the Diseases of the Mind 
(Philadelphia 1812), pp. 167-169. Rush draws from Joseph Mason Cox's Practical Observations 
on Insanity (Philadelphia 1811, a reprint of the London 2nd edition), pp. 14-16. 
6'DSM III (American Psychiatric Association, 3rd edition, 1980), pp. 195-198; e. g. "The 
essential features [of paranoid disorders] are persistent persecutory delusions or delusional 
jealousy, not due to any other mental disorder... 
The persecutory delusions may be simple or elaborate and usually involve a single theme 
or series of connected themes, such as being conspired against, cheated, spied upon, followed, 
poisoned or drugged, maliciously maligned, harassed, or obstructed in the pursuit of long-term 
goals" (p. 195). 
6'Michel Foucault, Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews, 
translated by Donald F. Bouchard and Sherry Simon (Ithaca 1977), p. 199. 
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locate: it is a "mania, " it is "seldom the object of medical attention, " but it is "well 
known. " In other words, the state is on the margins of medical discourse but as 
something culturally prevalent and worryingly diffuse to psychiatry the time has come 
to exert the force of definition. Definition therefore follows in an accumulation of 
polarized terms, delimiting the actions of reason and unreason within the separation 
of discursive energies, concluding with the necessary exertion and benevolence of 
medical treatment. The underlying thrust of the discursive arrangements here 
represents the movements of power to identify and delimit that determined as different 
or unreason. Such difference threatens those, according to the final remarks in the 
extract, who become "objects of enmity, and frequently of revenge" to the "maniacs; " 
that is, "the physician, and those friends who put them under the physician's care, " 
those who signify levels of control and coercion, and those determined to be possessed 
by an objectifying force. The "friends" emerge by discursive supposition as the 
desirable and normal American, a necessary instrument of the extraordinary powers 
assumed by the physician. 
These discursive energies need to be highlighted within the scope of a history of 
paranoia not just as a tendency of psychiatric discourse as a scientific and rational 
force, but also to provide a focus on the efforts made to delimit a concept of 
aberration concerning a range of social behaviours. It is from this set of tensions that 
the notion of a "continuumi66 of paranoia has emerged, ensuring the recognition by 
scientific discourse that paranoia exists in the range of social behaviours from those 
termed normal through to those determined psychotic. What invests this notion with 
66See, for instance, D. A. Schwartz, 'A Re-View of the "Paranoid" Concept' in Archives of 
General Psychiatry, Vol. 8,1963, p. 349; and Wray Herbert, 'Paranoia: Fearful Delusions' in 
The New York Times magazine, March 19,1989, p. 62. 
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its ambiguities is precisely the operation of discursive power in its attempted 
separation of social behaviours which remain both inseparable and necessary to 
existential process. The effect is to engender paranoia as a definition, and a reaction 
to power's exertion from all areas of the experience, whether as the subject defining 
and confronting the possibility of diffusion, or as the "object" of delimitation and the 
focus of external constraints. 
Before the psychiatric term "paranoia" moved closer to those symptoms described 
by Kant and Cox, the German physician and psychiatrist, Johann Christian Heinroth 
(1773-1843) used it in the formulation of his own idiosyncratic psychiatric nosology, 
presented in his Lehrbuch der Störungen des Seelenlebens. 67 Heinroth's use of the 
term stems both from Greek medicine and the re-emergence of the term in the 
eighteenth century. His concept of mental disorder was underpinned by a notion of 
mental health which ascribed spiritual and religious observance of principles as 
essential to the maintenance of sanity, which Thomas Szaz has located as important 
evidence of psychiatry's assumption of religious responsibility within the medical 
sciences. In this sense it is crucial to note that Heinroth's title revolves around the 
German word Seele, which means both mind and soul, an etymology to be used 
extensively nearly a century later by Sigmund Freud. 68 From the outset it is clear that 
Heinroth takes the pastoral responsibilities of the analyst very seriously: 
"Johann Christian Heinroth, Lehrbuch der Störungen des Seelenlebens (Leipzig 1818). 
Translated by J. Schmorak as Textbook of Disturbances of Mental Life, or Disturbances of the 
Soul and Their Treatment (Baltimore 1975). 
68See Thomas Szaz, The Myth of Psychotherapy (New York 1978), p. 70: "The cause of all 
mental disease, according to Heinroth, is selfishness and sin, two terms he often used 
synonymously. " On Freud, see Bruno Bettleheim, Freud and Man's Soul (Harmondsworth 
1974). 
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All passion is truly a state of human disease... Passions form a very 
complex issue in the human soul. For they are as varied as the object 
of desire and fear and the forms of existence and possession can be. 
But all have in common that they rob the soul which panders to them 
of peace and freedom... Anyone imprisoned by passion is unfree and 
unhappy. 69 
The Lehrbuch was published in two volumes, the first entitled 'Theory, ' and the 
second, 'Practice, ' and it is in the first volume that Heinroth sets out both his nosology 
and the concepts which structure his perception of mental aberration. The text 
progresses through a series of numbered tenets which develop an argument based on 
Kantian philosophy, and medical ideas fostered in the previous century. These undergo 
an intensification by way of Heinroth's convictions concerning reason and spiritual 
freedom: 
§156. The fundamental law of the soul and of sound life is the law of 
freedom: for the essence of the soul is freedom; whilst the source of its 
preservation, the element of its life, and thus also the condition and law 
thereof, is reason. Nature has created man to be free only on condition; 
he can be free in actual fact through reason, if he obeys it, if he 
impresses it on his capacity for self-determination, his capacity for 
freedom, if he makes it the principle which governs this capacity. 'Only 
the moral man (the man of reason) is free, ' rightly says Schiller; and 
each deviation from reason is a step towards the domain of 
non-freedom, in which the mental disturbances have their origin. 
But man has a propensity for deviating from freedom, which is 
known as the propensity to evil, and which could also be named a 
propensity to indolence; for the essence of reason is pure activity, and 
evil, which is the exact opposite of reason, is absolute indolence. Thus, 
man's reason and evil are conversely related: the more reason, the less 
evil, and vice versa. The field of conflict of these two principles is the 
freely floating human life itself, the free man who can himself decide 
which side he will take, whether he will devote his life to reason or to 
evil, to pure activity (spirit, light) or to absolute indolence (matter, 
darkness). Most people live in a twilight which contains both very dark 
and lighter sites; but whoever has lost his reason altogether, must live 
in total darkness. And it is the genesis of this darkness which we shall 
69Heinroth, Textbook of Disturbances of Mental Life, Volume 1, p. 16. 
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now follow in detail. 70 
Following on from the controls evident in the extract from Benjamin Rush, it is clear 
that discursively Heinroth's text takes no chances when dealing with as profound an 
issue as that of insanity. And as with Rush, the use of measured oppositions is 
striking, particularly here in Heinroth's theoretical chiaroscuro. But what intensifies 
Heinroth's project even further is his deliberate enmeshing of "soul and.. . sound life" 
inside a "condition" of freedom and health extended from that inclusive term of 
enclosure, "Nature. " For the development on from the simple polarities of light and 
darkness is that of a quasi-dialectical relationship of freedom, deviation and law, all 
emanating from the "[n]ature [which] has created man to be free only on condition. " 
Naturally enough, that condition is a locking of freedom into the system of reason, an 
internalization which stems, appropriately enough, from a law, "[t]he fundamental law 
of the soul. " The key to the problem here is Heinroth's equation that freedom equals 
reason, and that any deviance from prescribed reason, or "propensity for deviating, " 
means the loss of freedom essentially because such deviance occurs externally, steps 
outside "condition and law, " to a point of "origin" in a "domain of non-freedom. " And 
finally, just as the location of deviation is placed securely outside any constitutional 
freedom, so the location of power is placed securely inside forms of regulation by the 
assurance that "the essence of reason is pure activity" as opposed to the "indolence" 
or inactivity of evil/deviation. 
As we shall see when we turn our analysis to early American literature, these 
perceptions of reason and freedom, and their connections to "activity" and "indolence, " 
are vital elements of the debate about the new American republic at the end of the 
70Heinroth, Textbook of Disturbances of Mental Life, Vol. 1, p. 105. Text italics. 
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eighteenth century and ensuing decades. Some American writers begin to probe ways 
in which deviation and uncontrollable activity exist within and threaten social 
existence, or in fact become required adjuncts to the enforcing of control and the use 
of reason. In line with contemporary psychiatric investigations their explorations 
necessarily become forms of paranoia about the effects and reproduction of paranoia 
within American society and their own narratives' search for meaning, just as 
similarities between the psychiatry of Benjamin Rush and Heinroth become clearer in 
their approaches to forms of supposed social deviance. Indeed, as might be expected 
of a physician practising during and in the aftermath of the American revolutionary 
period, Rush extended his psychiatric determinations to the effects of revolution and 
liberty on American individuals and their society: 
The excess of the passion for liberty, inflamed by the successful issue 
of the war, produced, in many people, opinions and conduct which 
could not be removed nor restrained by government... The extensive 
influence which these opinions had upon the understandings, passion 
and morals of many of the citizens of the United States, constituted a 
species of insanity, which I shall take the liberty of distinguishing by 
the name of Anarchia. 71 
Heinroth's psychiatry is much more systematized than Rush's, however, and 
further tenets build up his view of insanity as a state of impaired spiritual development 
until he concentrates his attention on the 'Historical Perspectives' of psychiatry to 
indicate the heritage of his ideas. In this backward glance the source for the extensive 
use of paranoia in his nosology is given as "Hippocratic writings, " which is affirmed 
by the term's use variously in Greek and Latin. Heinroth's justification for selecting 
"Benjamin Rush, Medical Inquiries and Observations Upon the Diseases of the Mind, p. 277. 
Text italics. For a more extensive analysis of these issues with regard to Benjamin Rush, see 
George Rosen, Madness in Society* Chapters in the Historical Sociology of Mental Illness 
(New York 1969), pp. 176-177 and Rosen's, 'Political Order and Human Health in Jeffersonian 
Thought' in Bulletin of the History of Medicine, 26,1952, pp. 32-44. 
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"map&voicf is its relatedness to all the other Hippocratic terminology describing 
insanity: 
§98. Hippocratic writings differentiated between passing and 
permanent, feverish and non-feverish states of confused speech and of 
irrational speech and action in general. Temporarily confused speech 
was named paraphrenitis, while permanently confused speech, which 
is a symptom of the disease, was known as phrenitis or paraphrobyne 
megale with complementary names such as meta gelotos, meta spoydes 
etc. The parakopsai, exensai, manenai, ekmanenia, are also used to 
describe mad ravings accompanied by violent gestures; the same 
phenomena in a milder form are named leresai, paraleresai, 
paraphronesai, and paranekhtenai. The general name for all conditions 
of this kind is paranoia which is the common feature of phrenitis, 
melancholia and mania. 72 
and further on: 
§104. The condition which is generally referred to as paranoia in 
Hippocratic writings, and which we would denote as dementia or loss 
of reason, Celsus calls insania and divides it into three forms, the first 
of which he calls phrenitis. Strangely enough, the other two forms 
received no names, and the fact that Celsus never uses the words mania 
and melancholia is no less strange. 73 
Heinroth takes the meaning of paranoia to be general dementia as in both Hippocratic 
and eighteenth century usage, and consequently spreads the term lavishly around his 
nosology as an umbrella title. 
For a history of paranoia, therefore, the importance of Heinroth rests not in any 
innovative assemblage of meaning or symptoms under that term, but simply in the 
high profile he gave it. In terms of developing a vision of delusion whereby delusion 
comes, in his estimation, to be the result of "passion" and "vice, " Heinroth furthered 
the perception of delusional states as important manifestations of madness, and worthy 
of analysis in the location of aberration. In affirmations "that the essence of dementia 
72Heinroth, Textbook of Disturbances of Mental Life, Vol. 1, pp. 42-43. Text italics. 
73Heinroth, Textbook of Disturbances of Mental Life, Voll, p. 47. Text italics. 
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is thinking imprisoned in perverted concepts, v04 Heinroth was: 
probably the first clinical psychiatrist to sense the need of a unitary 
concept in psychology-like that of the total personality of today. He 
was probably the first to whom the ideational content of the mentally 
sick presented not merely a set of aberrations but a psychological 
process full of meaning. " 
Physicians and psychiatrists who followed Heinroth did not elaborate or utilize 
his nosology or medical reasoning, primarily because of the movement of thought and 
science away from the rationale of the eighteenth century into the shifting currents of 
Romantic and nineteenth century thought. But they were aware of Heinroth and his 
conclusions, and subsequently of his terminology. Equally, the fact that Heinroth's 
methods of diagnosis can be seen as an apotheosis of eighteenth century psychiatric 
technique, as well as a culmination of his own spiritual conclusions, provided 
paranoia with accretions of meaning consonant with Heinroth's use. Whilst succeeding 
theoreticians might disclaim the manichean dogma Heinroth attached to the term in 
the scope of his project, they could not effectively remove it, something which is 
particularly noticeable as paranoia drifted into wider cultural use. The history of 
madness is essentially a history of marginalization, and can be read as a reaction to 
threats to the controlling forces within societal structures. This process is clear in 
Heinroth's theories, never more so than in the concluding section of Volume Two of 
his Lehrbuch, entitled 'Ethical Part or Prophylaxis': 
'Introduction : Faith as a Principle of Prophylaxis. ' 
§537. The treatment of soul disturbances does not end with the cure or 
with the forensic and police business. There is still another aspect of 
the treatment which must be followed, namely, measures aimed at the 
extermination of these plagues which torment humanity, just as any 
74Heinroth, Textbook of Disturbances of Mental Life, Vol. 2, p. 345. Text italics. 
'SZilboorg and Henry, A History of Medical Psychology, p. 471. 
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other pestlike or destructive evils must be terminated. The only 
question is whether we have the means, such as quarantine against pest 
or pestlike diseases or vaccination against smallpox. In our case there 
is no question of quarantine, once the enemy has established his 
quarters; some kind of vaccination would be possible only if we 
assumed that there is some certain and safe protecting agent against all 
cases of soul disturbances, and if a man who is still healthy could be 
vaccinated with it, the evil could no longer manifest itself. 76 
Such dreams of total protection against a totality of evil were not uncommon in the 
medical discourse of this period. What is striking here, even if it is in some senses 
coincidental, is the intersection of a use of paranoia with the motivations and anxieties 
which become the modern condition's basic structure, particularly in its "trivial" 
dimensions as a cultural phenomenon. The ambivalence entertained in the 
apprehension of the other, the fascination it generates simultaneous with the desire to 
destroy it, exclude it absolutely, or at least to determine its nature and thus control it, 
operates to differing degrees in all psychiatric and cultural discourse (not least in the 
colonial environments which form the beginning of this American exploration of 
paranoia). It is ironic and inevitable, therefore, that in examining the dimensions of 
a condition he called paranoia, Heinroth's manifestations of anxiety rather than his 
rational prescience brought to his conclusions the elements sought today in 
conjunction with the term. 
76Heinroth, Textbook of Disturbances of Mental Life, Vol. 2, p. 428. Text italics. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
The Suspicion of Human Agency 
Charles Brockden Brown 
and Early American paranoia 
1. Consciousness itself is the malady 
Early American paranoia 
Is it possible that the circumstances of the Revolution conditioned 
Americans to think of resistance to a dark subversive force as the 
essential ingredient of their national identity? 1 
David Brion Davis frames this question at the beginning of The Fear of 
Conspiracy: Images of Un-American Subversion from the Revolution to the Present, 
in a commentary to the section he entitles "Conspiracy in the American Revolution 
(1763-1783), " where he includes an extract from the writings of George Washington. 
Indulging the style his collection of variously paranoid "images" generates, Davis 
heads the Washington extract "There Has Been a Regular Systematic Plan, " and 
includes the following passage written by the phlegmatic General in 1774: 
... but the crisis 
is arrived when we must assert our rights, or submit to 
every imposition, that can be heaped upon us, till custom and use shall 
make us as tame and abject slaves, as the blacks we rule over with 
such arbitrary sway... I am as fully convinced, as I am of my own 
existence, that there has been a regular, systematic plan formed to 
enforce [the contentious acts of the 1760's and 1770's concerning the 
North American colonies passed by the British Parliament]. 2 
Taken together, both question and quotation suggest important issues in any debate 
about American paranoia, ranging from the religious imperatives governing American 
led. David Brion Davis, The Fear of Conspiracy: Images of Un-American Subversion from 
the Revolution to the Present (Ithaca 1971), p. 23. 
Zed. Davis, The Fear of Conspiracy, p. 34. 
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culture and its perception of itself, through senses of political control and 
freedom-most obviously here to do with race-to the needs to create a certain 
articulation of the self in its peculiar American condition. In the contexts of this last 
point, James H. Hutson believes it essential to recognize an early creative tension in 
American politics and society between confidence and "jealousy, " jealousy used in its 
eighteenth century condition where it refers to "vigilance and suspicion... [e]very entry 
under the word jealousy in Dr. Johnson's Dictionary begins with suspicion. i3 
It is these elements which will provide the basic focus in beginning an analysis 
of American paranoia and literature, though, with respect to Davis, it will be 
necessary to go further back to some earlier founding fathers and ideologies to 
assemble a profound sense of what conditions American national identity and its 
potential pathologies. Two periods will be of interest: they are the colonial period up 
to and including the American Revolution in the 1770's, and then the immediately 
following decades; for it is in this span of early American history that a series of 
events and cultural changes occurred which secured certain paranoid bases peculiar 
to American culture. A sequence of historical analyses produced out of the twentieth 
century Cold War years have variously seized on these two periods as inaugural for 
what Richard Hofstadter calls a "paranoid style, " or a specifically anxiety-ridden 
beginning of Western settlement in North America. Hofstadter concentrates on 
political themes in his elucidation of an American tendency to focus on threat and an 
anxiety about power, but a virtual academic industry has emerged from the auspicious 
'James H. Hutson, 'The Origins of "The Paranoid Style in American Politics": Public Jealousy 
from the Age of Walpole to the Age of Jackson' in ed. David D. Hall, John M. Murrin & 
Thad W. Tate, Saints and Revolutionaries: Essays on Early American History (New York 
1984), p. 336. 
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groundwork of scholars like Perry Miller to highlight early American and particularly 
Puritan tendencies towards anxiety as a dominant factor in individual and community 
life. ' 
Although like David Brion Davis, Hofstadter does not extend his analysis 
further back than the final post-Independence decades of the eighteenth century, it is 
clear that the colonial period was a fertile space in which anxiety, and even in the 
historians' words, paranoia, were rife as cultural phenomena. Hutson again suggests 
with some insight that the derogatory cast given by the designation "paranoid" 
removes its application by Hofstadter and others to the American Revolution itself, as 
if the inherent rightness of the Revolution and surrounding events defers any 
pathological cast. But against this one must set the sense that out of early American 
and Puritan culture there arose a heightened sensibility to perceived internal and 
external threats which carried through into the United States' definition of itself as a 
nation and American political policies in ensuing centuries, particularly where, from 
the outset of the American state, there has been a political need for perceptions of 
conspiracy and threat to ensure the unity and fixed coherence present within a siege 
mentality. 
This chapter's approach will fix on Charles Brockden Brown, the first 
professional American writer. His writings, composed and set at the turn of the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and emerging from what Richard Slotkin has 
4See Richard Hofstadter, The Paranoid Style in American Politics and Other Essays (New 
York 1965); Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (Cambridge, 
Mass. 1967) and The Origin of American Politics (Cambridge, Mass. 1968); Philip Greven, 
The Protestant Temperament Patterns of Child-Rearing, Religious Experience, and the Self 
in Early America (New York 1977); Henry F. May, 
ibe Enlightenment in America (New 
York 1978); Sacvan Bercovitch, The Puritan Origins of the American Self (New Brunswick, 
N. J. 1975). 
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identified as a particular literary inheritance of frontier tales, Puritan captivity 
narratives and exploration stories replete with anxieties, ' offer a series of exemplary 
analyses of the individual and modes of belief as they occurred in the early years of 
the new republic. As a writer engaging creatively with the anxieties and fears of a 
nation creating itself, and working within the cultural flux between Enlightenment and 
nineteenth century senses of political and social awareness, Brown's texts may be 
taken as key fictional and documentary statements concerning the ways in which 
American anxieties about health (mental and physical), political liberty and religion 
organized themselves in the formative years of the American nation. Furthermore, 
Brown's writings also bear within themselves efforts to deal with the problematic 
legacy of Puritan thought and perception as it extends into this revolutionary period. 
A novelist and a journalist, Brown was fascinated by the processes of control 
which exerted themselves on the individual, be they of internal or external origin, and 
his writing repeatedly involves an exploration of complex forms of paranoia about 
how individuals could be manipulated by malign control, that control identified 
variously as supernatural, diabolical, conspiratorial, totalitarian, or within a range of 
extraordinary individual human energies. The vulnerability of the individual to 
manipulation, particularly their mental states, even inside the prescribed safety of 
family and post-revolutionary community, becomes the suitably American territory 
of Brown's narratives in the 1790's and early 1800's, where much energy is expended 
in confronting what Max Horkheimer has called "[t]he crisis of reason... manifested in 
'See Richard Slotkin, Regeneration Through Violence: The Mythology of the American 
Frontier 1600-1860 (Middletown, Conn. 1974). 
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the crisis of the individual, as whose agency it has developed. f16 Equally, one must 
consider the convergence of two important elements in the production and effects of 
narrative fiction in early America as they contribute to this environment: firstly, as 
Cathy Davidson has detailed, the extent to which the expansion of printing technology 
and publishing distribution in the late eighteenth century, via the proliferation of 
newspapers, journals and novels, created an unprecedented and unsettling 
dissemination of information and ideas to a formerly remote society; ' and secondly, 
the ways in which that material impact enabled the consolidation of the shift achieved 
through the novel towards the understanding of human plot as a determining agency, 
in which victim and villain assumed greater autonomy within schemes of universal 
significance, and readers felt authorized to engage writing with their own 
interpretations. 
The cultural and philosophical background from which Brown's fictions extend 
involved not only the complex shifts from Enlightenment thought into the beginnings 
of Romanticism and its American developments, but also the radical upheavals in 
social and political perspectives brought about by those central events in Western 
consciousness, the American and French Revolutions. The novels effectively situate 
themselves in an immediate post-revolutionary tension, seeking securities in 
environments which offer the possible destabilization of political and social order as 
individual doubt interacts with revolutionary subversions. The efforts to find security 
of perception as a basis for wider stability begin at the point where American 
'Max Horkheimer, The Eclipse of Reason (New York 1974), p. 128. 
'See Cathy Davidson, Revolution and the Word: The Rise of the Novel in America (New York 
1986). 
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inheritances of Hobbes and Locke, and their translocation in the philosophy of 
Jonathan Edwards, come up against the doubts engendered by late eighteenth century 
political thought and action. Edwards essentially coalesced Lockean concepts of 
sense-perception (from An Essay Concerning Human Understanding [1690-1706]) 
with domestic religious imperatives, emerging with a system which explained human 
activity and thought operating from a will "not independent of the affections, i8 the 
will motivated by the understanding. This allowed the formation of an optimistic 
psychology based both on reason and the influence of external objects, in which 
control of perception and its veracity lay firmly within the bounds of rational 
disclosure and therefore sanctioned explanation. 
By the 1790's, however, such rationality had sustained attacks for its empirical 
reduction of phenomena and displacement of the irrational tendencies of human 
behaviour. 9 A text such as the Reverend Samuel West's Essays on Liberty and 
NQcessity (1793) challenged what he saw as an oversimplification of mental process. 
West added to Locke and Edwards the possibilities of mental self-determination, 
where he divided mental process into three faculties, perception, propension, and 
volition. Perception involved the impression of the mind, propension the affecting of 
the mind, and volition, crucially, determined the mind as "an agent, self-determining 
its acts. i1° With regard to this notion of mental self-determination, West stated: 
"John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (London 1977), p. 63. 
'See Roland Hagenbüchle, 'American Literature and the Nineteenth-Century Crisis in 
Epistemology: The Example of Charles Brockden Brown' in Early American Literature, 
Vol. 23, No. 2,1988, for a wide ranging assessment of the philosophical tenor of the period, 
and Brown's investigations into the status of the self, cause and effect processes, and 
inferential methods of knowledge. 
"Cited in Herbert Wallace Schneider, A History of American Philosophy (New York 1946), 
p. 232. 
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If any one dislike this account of the matter, let him inform me how 
we came by the ideas of independence, efficiency, etc. If these ideas 
be not on consequence of experiencing in ourselves, that, in willing and 
choosing, we act independently of any extrinsic cause, from what 
quarter do they arise? " 
Brown's presentation of mental process reveals that his understanding of the 
philosophical and psychological debate was acute, and abreast of contemporary 
developments: from a member of the American Philosophical Society, alongside men 
such as Joseph Priestley, Benjamin Rush and Thomas Jefferson, one would expect 
nothing less. The pervasion of Locke's influence in eighteenth and nineteenth century 
American culture has been detailed, " and, as John F. Slater has indicated, Brown 
would certainly have been aware of Jonathan Edwards' theories, whilst he also 
published essays by Jonathan Edwards, Jr. in his capacity as editor of three different 
magazines between 1799-1810.13 Slater makes a case for recognising in the language 
of expostulation and fear in Edgar Huntly; Or, Memoirs of a Sleep-Walker (1799) 
parallels to Edwards' vocabulary throughout his sermons and philosophical writings. 
14 
Brown's connections to the American Philosophical Society, in fact, provide 
an index to the nature of the debate his writing undertakes, particularly as it represents 
a form of interrogation of the mixture of opinions and allegiances which characterised 
American thought at the end of the eighteenth century. Brown's attraction to radical 
"Cited in Schneider, A History of American Philosophy, p. 232. 
12Merle Curti, 'The Great Mr. Locke, America's Philosopher, 1783-1861' in Huntingdon 
Library Bulletin, XL, (April 1937). 
"The Monthly Magazine and American Review (New York April 1799-December 1800); Tiff, 
Literary Magazine and American Register (Philadelphia 1803-1807); and The American 
Register, or General Repository of History, Politics and Science (Philadelphia 1806-1810). 
"John F. Slater, 'The Sleep-Walker and the Great Awakening: Charles Brockden Brown's 
Edgar Huntly and Jonathan Edwards' in Papers on Language and Literature: A Journal for 
Scholars and Critics of Language and Literature, 19 (2), Spring 1983, pp. 199-217. 
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thinkers is well documented and it is certain that he read Rousseau and Paine. William 
Godwin's Enquiry Concerning Political Justice (1793-1798) and his novel Things 
They Are; Or, The Adventures of Caleb Williams (1794), however, are the central 
works of a radical nature which affected the course of Brown's writing, opening up 
libertarian vistas-or, at least, enquiries into the aegis of perceptual and political 
modes-in his plots. These plots' complexity and their structuring of an interrogative 
process represent the dilemma of American attempts at consolidation in the turbulent 
post-Declaration of Independence years, where political extremities jostle reliance on 
conservative and inherited forms. The sense one draws from Brown's writing, and it 
is added to by biographical detail, suggests an exploratory movement outwards which 
finds itself forced into contraction or reaction back into whatever bases of stability 
may be assembled in the circumstances. These bases, significantly, the novels fail to 
recuperate in any American form promising libertarian progress, as each narrator's 
representation of consciousness terminates in the confirmation of accumulated fears. 
Godwin's Caleb Williams illustrates this tendency in its emphasis on individual 
responsibility in the face of state and social political powers, and the chilling 
dramatization of their exercise. This converges with Brown's writing in the authors' 
parallel obsessions with detection and penetration through acute development of 
human capabilities, the consequences of incomplete knowledge in the face of possible 
omniscience-something reinforced by Enlightenment stress on systems-and above 
all, in contrast to the contemporary manifestations of Gothic literature, with their 
investigation of these processes in realistic social and political milieu. Caleb Williams, 
in fact, is a masterly depiction of the social production and effects of paranoia within 
the essential vehicle of the revenge plot, and Brown in turn moved outwards into an 
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American scenario from Godwin's extraordinary synthesis of an individual's mental 
predicament caught in the intersections of power in England of the 1790's. Godwin's 
concentration of fears of class fluidity, sexual transgression, the ambiguities of power, 
xenophobia, and the implication of pervasive state and private surveillance systems 
working in tandem to exert both the indiscriminate force of law and the whim of 
another's gratification are recharged by Brown into a global significance adjusted to 
American notions of domestic and imperial action. 
Godwin's narrative, like those in Brown's novels, is articulated in the first 
person and develops an energy of terror which draws in and finds wanting all the 
resources placed at the disposal of the victim in a universe where the only certainty 
is the use of power: 
I sometimes supposed that it was all a delusion of the imagination; till 
the repetition of the sensation brought the reality too painfully home to 
my apprehension. There are few things that give a greater shock to the 
mind than a phenomenon in the conduct of our fellow men, of great 
importance to our concerns, and for which we are unable to assign any 
plausible reason... [U]nacquainted with the source of the evil, observing 
its perpetual increase, and finding it so far as I could perceive entirely 
arbitrary in its nature, I was unable to ascertain its limits, or the degree 
in which it would finally overwhelm me. " 
Inexplicability recedes for Caleb Williams when he observes that perpetrators "cannot 
produce a great and notorious effect without some visible agency, however difficult 
it may be to trace that agency to its absolute author, " and he feels later on "a secret 
foreboding as if I should never again be master of myself. i16 This confrontation of 
the division of self generates a self-consciousness of power and its lack, determining 
"William Godwin, Things As They Are; Or, The Adventures of Caleb Williams (Oxford 
1970), p. 296. 
16Godwin, Caleb Williams, pp. 296,316. 
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the onset of paranoia, and it is the point of greatest intertextuality between Godwin 
and Brown. 
Alternatively, Godwin's largely uncritical use of "sensation, " "reason" and 
"imagination" marks an element of divergence from Brown: throughout his fiction, 
Brown ceaselessly posits the questioning of consciousness as a sole determinant of 
truth and experience-where it may be that "[c]onsciousness itself is the malady, the 
pest; of which he only is cured who ceases to think""-whilst in the act of writing 
and producing fiction in America, putting forward the creativity of mind within a 
communitarian emphasis as a possible counter to this pessimistic outlook. In this 
sense, the revenge plot used by Brown operates with a greater interplay between 
individual and social anxieties in recognition of the American experiment in 
democracy. In introducing the unknown into American domesticity, Brown's target is 
profoundly political and guaranteed to synthesize, as Godwin does, a unity of fears 
enclosing protagonist and reader alike in the political need for paranoia. At the level 
of sensory perception in the American scene, the issue is depravity: 
The will is the tool of the understanding, which must fashion its 
conclusions on the notices of sense. If the senses be depraved, it is 
impossible to calculate the evils that may flow from the consequent 
deductions of the understanding. '8 
That depravity may be a product of criminal or demonic motivations within a 
programme of providence honed to deal with threats specific to America: the 
'Charles Brockden Brown, Edgar Huntly; Or, Memoirs of a Sleep-Walker (1799; Bicentennial 
Edition, ed. Sydney Krause, S. W. Reid & Alexander Cowie. Kent State, Ohio 1984), p. 277. 
Hereafter referred to as 'EH. ' 
"Charles Brockden Brown, Wieland; Or, The Transformation (1798; Bicentennial Edition, ed. 
Sydney Krause, S. W. Reid & Alexander Cowie. Kent State, Ohio 1977), p. 35. Hereafter 
referred to as 'W. ' 
80 
unexplored landscape and space of the continent, its ancient inhabitants, incursions by 
outsiders to disrupt prototype senses of Manifest Destiny within a Manichean scheme 
of conflict; or considerably more disturbing, the issue of internal, or in Melville's 
terms, "natural depravity, " an infection brought from the Old World and already 
contained within the agents of American providence. These forces mesh with one 
another and also with the barely concealed sense that William Burroughs exposes 
when he states, "America is not a young land: it is old and dirty and evil before the 
settlers, before the Indians. The evil is there waiting. "" 
This can be extended to involve the discourses used by Brown to describe 
mental processes compared to the debate occurring within contemporary philosophical 
and psychological texts. Throughout Edgar Huntly and Wieland, and in Ormond; Or. 
The Secret Witness (1799) and Arthur Mervyn; Or, Memoirs of the Year 1793 (1799- 
1800) to a lesser extent, Brown writes of "faculties" and "sensibilities, " "volition" and 
"sensation, " "ratiocination" and "depravity, " amongst other terminology, when his 
protagonists explore their psychological predicaments. In Edgar Huntly Clithero Edny 
gives an extraordinary account of the transformation of his mental processes as he 
relates the events following his killing of Wiatte and leading up to his attempted 
murder of his benefactor and his fiancee. It is worth following through momentarily 
to demonstrate the extent of Brown's psychological insights, and not least because the 
passage in question stands in some proximity to the psychological descriptions already 
offered from Kant and Rush. Edny explains his perception and feelings immediately 
before his fatal confrontation with Wiatte as being filled with doubt, where "[i]t 
seemed as if there lurked, under those appearances, a tremendous significance, which 
19William Burroughs, The Naked Lunch (1959; London 1982), p. 21. 
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human sagacity could not uncover" (EH, p. 68). After killing Wiatte in self-defence 
the excitable somnambulist prepares to assume a superhuman capability via "means 
[which] demanded, as I conceived, the most powerful sagacity and the firmest 
courage" (EH, p. 73). So profoundly disturbing had been Edny's actions in self- 
defence, and their likely repercussions for those around him, that his mental process 
pursues alarming obsessions within an anchoring cage of reason which supports an 
overwhelming urge towards self-empowerment. Edny believes that Wiatte's death 
could not have happened: 
without a series of anterior events paving the way for it. If his death 
came from us, it must be the theme of design. It must spring from 
laborious circumvention and deep laid stratagems. 
No. He was dead. I had killed him. What had I done? I had 
meditated nothing. I was impelled by an unconscious necessity. Had the 
assailant been my father the consequence would have been the same. 
My understanding had been neutral. Could it be? In a space so short, 
was it possible that so tremendous a deed had been executed? Was I 
not deceived by some portentous vision? I had witnessed the 
convulsions and last agonies of Wiatte. He was no more, and I was his 
destroyer! (EH, p. 74) 
The result of such mental and physical revolution, which includes an explicit assault 
on patriarchal restraints, is a narrowing of frames of reference to an extreme that 
might, in Edny's affected mind, guarantee the validity of his future agency and 
conduct. Within the jostling narrative frames of reference which involve Edny's 
confessional discourse inside Huntly's epistolary and also confessional medium, the 
account plays with its sense of paranoia from illuminatingly uncertain and displaced 
bases. Consequently, Edny describes his loss of freedom of thought to the point where 
he believes himself: 
fettered, confounded, smitten with an excess of thought, and laid 
prostrate with wonder... My fancy began to be infected with the errors 
of my understanding. The mood into which my mind was plunged was 
incapable of any propitious intermission... I paused on the brink of the 
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precipice, as if to survey the depth of that phrensy that invaded me; 
was able to ponder on the scene, and deliberate, in a state that partook 
of calm, on the circumstances of my situation. My mind was harassed 
by the repetition of one idea. Conjecture deepened to certainty. (EH, 
p. 77-78) 
The use of such terminology in the fiction of the time was not uncommon, particularly 
in emergent fantasy writings; 20 what marks out Brown's overall technique is his 
fusion of a critique of Lockean sensationalist psychology with further exploration of 
the problem of what fashions and organizes mental process. Avoiding the exclusive 
rationalities of Lockean inheritances, Brown was able to explore the spaces opening 
up within mental process alongside contemporary political upheavals, using `the effects 
of language and imagery to assert this spatiality. When Edgar Huntly meditates on 
how to gain access to the secret locking system guarding the box containing Clithero 
Edny's personal belongings, within which Huntly believes there may be evidence to 
explain Edny's irrational and somnambulistic actions, the inference is clear: "Some 
spring, therefore, secretly existed which might forever elude the senses, but on which 
the hand, by being moved over it, in all directions, might accidentally light" (EH, 
p. 117). What Huntly wants-and needs-to discover is evidence confirming a system 
or framework of action, continuing the careful accumulation of data by Brown 
projecting Edny as Huntly's double (or vice versa). Michel Serres' analysis of systems 
and their relation to knowledge provides a useful context for this and other obsessional 
processes in Brown's writing: 
When we do not understand... when the thing is too complex for the 
means at hand, when we put everything in a temporary black box, we 
prejudge the existence of a system. When we can finally open the box, 
we see that it works like a space of transformation. The only systems, 
20See Allan Gardner Smith, The Analysis of Motive : Early American Psychology and Fiction (Amsterdam 1980). 
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instances, and substances come from our lack of knowledge. The 
system is nonknowledge. The other side of nonknowledge. One side of 
nonknowledge is chaos; the other, system. Knowledge forms a bridge 
between the two banks. Knowledge as such is a space of 
transformation. 21 
Huntly eventually has to break the lock to get inside the box, leaving his trace, and 
by this action continues to force himself and others towards dangerous transformations 
based on the paranoid assumption of total knowledge and a resonant fear of chaos. 
That rupture or chance might be required to penetrate such interiority also plays a role 
in these accumulating episodes which form together as a critique, particularly when, 
as Clara Wieland states: "Ideas exist in our minds that can be accounted for by no 
established laws" (W, p. 87). Inside this action, it is clear that these quotations, and, 
indeed, the four main novels, effectively constitute Brown's own essay concerning 
human understanding, in the sense that they are all writings concerned with 
self-consciousness, the transformations and enclosures possible within psychic space, 
and the effects on humans of inadequate law systems asserting control. 
Brown's concentration in this case is on the instabilities which form, in 
actuality, the bases of human perception. His use of Erasmus Darwin's Zoonomia 
(1794-1796), a standard medical work of the time, and in particular the chapter on 
'Mania Mutabilis, ' featured widely in his writings in the determination of the 
ambiguities presented to human sense. Wieland refers explicitly to Zoonomia in 
Dr. Cambridge's medical apprehensions of Wieland's condition, where Cambridge 
believes the "illusions" held by Wieland are "all reducible to one class" (W, p. 179), 
continuing the desire of medical efforts observed throughout Brown's writing to 
totalise the cause and effect structures of disease. In the twelfth part of the article 
"Michel Serres, The Parasite (London 1982), p. 73. 
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sequence, 'The Man at Home, ' Brown is more forthcoming when discussing love's 
distinction as "disease" as it affects mental process, stating that: 
[t]he will is necessarily guided and directed by opinion. Opinions may 
be erroneous or they may be conformable to truth. The influence of 
erroneous opinions on the will, may, in a popular or loose sense, be 
ZZ termed a morbid influence... 
"Popular" and medical views of "erroneous opinion" are always likely to be hostile 
and to connect them to the destruction of death; more to the point is Darwin's 
assertion that somnambulism is a "disease of volition, " demonstrating the explicit 
focus on the action of will behind erroneousness rather than any sense of incapability. 
Transformations, what Edgar Huntly terms "Passage into new forms, 
overleaping the bars of time and space, reversal of the laws of inanimate and 
intelligent existence... " (EH, p. 239), or the use of unknown or unseen energies to 
change the known and controlled, consequently become important processural actions 
and potential fields of knowledge. This is figured most obviously in the subtitle of 
Wieland; Or, The Transformation, and remains prevalent in the uses of ventriloquism 
in that novel, in the somnambulism of Edgar Huntly, the penetrative disguise ploys 
of Ormond, and in the havoc wrought by disease in both Ormond and Arthur Mervyn. 
The paranoid tendencies represented in the texts largely respond to and orientate 
themselves around these actions on several different levels. Just at the historical point 
when paranoia was emerging within psychiatric discourse as an existential condition, 
and gathering around itself certain terminologies, Edgar Huntly articulates his mental 
predicament in proximity to those prescriptions. The eighteenth century had seen the 
term "paranoea" gradually isolated within a range of prescribed "deliriums" and 
'Charles Brockden Brown, 'The Man at Home' in Weekly Magazine, April 21,1798, n. p. 
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"melancholies, " so that when Huntly mentions "a species of delirium, " "erroneous 
perceptions, " and their "capricious combinations, " he is clearly placing his mental state 
within certain referential parameters. The movement from this into the images of fears 
of enclosure and control (with their famous links to the intensities of Poe and his pit) 
achieves a level of paranoid inclusivity whose scope involves a range of anxieties with 
both contemporary and universal relevance. 
The rest of this chapter will now go on to explore certain colonial inheritances 
in Brown's writing, adding to the psychiatric materials already gathered suggestions 
as to how American religion, early American politics, and a burgeoning rhetoric of 
deviance and disease combined to synthesize and expose a peculiar American 
paranoia, before ending with a substantial analysis of one of Brown's critically 
neglected yet instructive narratives. 
2. We hold these truths to be self-evident 
Puritanism and paranoia 
At the core of an apprehension of paranoia in American culture is an 
understanding of the part played by religion in the early years of colonisation, for it 
was the merging of colonial activities with an authoritarian Protestant religion that 
produced what Perry Miller has termed "the complex, jostling reality of this anxious 
[New England] society. 1123 The core group of settlers in New England merged their 
spiritual origins in religious persecution in post-Reformation Europe with a 
contemporary experience conditioned by the harsh necessities of survival in a hostile 
environment. That they then extended a broadly Manichean perspective into American 
'Perry Miller, The New England Mind: The Seventeenth-Century (New York 1939), p. 482. 
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culture is less than surprising. Important elements in this view of the universe 
generated by the experience of the New World were the sense that the Puritans 
believed themselves to be settling in the Devil's territories populated by his Native 
American cohorts, and the overwhelming need in the face of the unknown to construct 
oppositional forces against which to define themselves. As Robert Levine puts it, "[a] 
typological reading of New World history virtually demanded that there be 
conspirators to combat and overcome. X24 Colonial Puritans also began an exploration 
of an equally vast but much more ambiguous internal space within which responses 
to their environment and developing culture were infused with an ambivalence about 
the condition and empowerment of the self. 
The extent to which American consciousness was informed by a specific 
religious framework of perception from its colonial origins remains today an intrinsic 
part of the nation's psychological make-up, remarkable particularly in America's 
senses of itself, its providential "beginning, " consequent actions, and frequent 
dystopian introspections. Many of the first settlers from Europe emigrated to North 
America to escape religious persecution and the pernicious influences they saw as part 
of the Renaissance and its further secularization of society. For the American Puritans 
a fundamental element of their quarrel with cultural and religious change in Europe 
was the continuing reorientation and prominence of the self in social discourse on 
from the Renaissance. In an attempt to counter this Puritanism intensified its attack 
on the self, seeing it both as a territory of infection and sinfulness, and as a distraction 
from God. In explicit terms, Puritanism ordered its perceptions around the idea that 
'Robert S. Levine, Conspiracy and Romance: Studies in Brockden Brown, Cooper, Hawthorne 
and Melville (Cambridge 1989), p. 7. 
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the enemy was the self, and consolidated the complex process of fears and creative 
energies which has become the vital part of the American process of cultural identity 
known as individualism. Confessional discourse therefore became a preferred mode 
of representation where it could combine self-analysis with revelation of the self 
before God and the elect: 
Calvin sets out the Reformed position when he requires us to "rid our 
selves of all seife-trust, " and his words resound through Puritan 
literature. "Not what Seife will, but what the Lord will, " thundered 
Thomas Hooker. The self was "the great snare, " "the false Christ, " a 
spider's "webbe [spun] out of our bowels, " the very "figure or type of 
Hell. "25 
The connections between Puritanism and sixteenth and seventeenth-century 
obsessions with reason have also been made clear by Perry Miller, and they remain 
essential parts of an appreciation of paranoia in American culture. The assembling of 
an ordered perception of the universe determining that universe as a series of codes 
whose coherence may be deciphered by an elect able to utilize a divinely bequeathed 
logic sets up a primary tension liable continuously or periodically to paranoid fears. 
Puritan use of logic extended from the belief that it was a quality given to Adam by 
God to differentiate between good and evil, and that Adam's fall was subsequently a 
fall from reason, detaching humanity from logic in its divine and perfect sense. Evil 
in these terms became a perversion of reason, an inability in human beings to use 
reason infallibly, rendering them liable to delusion and misapprehension. An American 
anti-Enlightenment tract like Seth Payson's Proofs of the Real Existence and 
Dangerous Tendency of Illuminism (1802) is filled with a sense of the inevitable 
uBercovitch, The Puritan Origins of the American Self, p. 22. See also, David Leverenz, Thy 
Language of Puritan Feeling: An Exploration in Literature, Psychology, and Social History 
(New Brunswick, N. J. 1980), pp. 9-10. 
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disaster following the use of reason without divine sanction, as part of its fears of 
revolutionary subversion26 in ways that extend out of the Puritan perception of reason 
outlined by Perry Miller: 
Adam had been created in the image of God, possessed of perfect 
holiness and an intuitive grasp of the principles of right reason, but 
after the fall he was no longer able to tell what should follow upon 
what, or to perceive the interconnections of things. 27 
More precisely, Miller indicates a sense in Puritan attitudes that what is left to 
humanity after the Fall is an incomplete system of reason, "a lapse from dialectic... 
[T]he loss of an ability to use the syllogism, and innate depravity might most 
accurately be defined as a congenital incapacity for discursive reasoning. i28 This 
coincides with aspects of paranoia explored by Freud and Jacques Lacan some years 
later [see below, p. 193] where mental process is determined to function only on the 
"leg of the syllogism that leads outwards, "" leading to delusive certainties intent on 
filling in gaps in coherence according to the measure of anxiety generated in the 
individual. For the Puritans in America, having escaped rigorous persecution in 
Europe, and then undergoing the extraordinary hardships of the New World, anxiety 
was the common denominator of experience which was organized and intensified by 
the dominance in belief of predestinarian doctrine, each individual then made 
dependent on the absence in themselves of the one thing which would render existence 
and reason complete: the certainty of salvation. 
26Seth Payson, Proofs of the Real Existence and Dangerous Tendency of Illuminsim 
(Charlestown 1802; published according to an Act of Congress), p. 213. 
21Perry Miller, The New England Mind, p. 111. 
'Perry Miller, The New England Mind, p. 111. 
29Sigmund Freud, 'Draft H' in The Origins of Psycho-Analysis (New York 1954), p. 111. 
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In fact, under such stress, Puritanism moved on from purely syllogistic 
reasoning to an axiomatic structuring of thought, seeking order in the action of 
assertion where "true doctrine is a series of axioms, and correct propositions are so 
self-evident that in almost all cases doubt can be resolved by the mere statement of 
the disjunctive syllogism. i30 The situation is essentially one of completing or 
overriding whatever epistemological gaps exist in the universe by an authority or 
power granted through anxiety and facilitated by a systematization excluding all doubt 
as evil. The production of doubt or continuation of mystery then accumulates around 
itself the stigma of evil, especially where any incident or phenomena may confound 
the operations of axiomatic reason, and the existential environment becomes ripe for 
paranoia when one considers the extent to which Puritanism developed a self- 
interrogative tendency guaranteed to see in all events and one's reaction to them the 
opposed forces of good and evil. 
The effect this had on Puritan communities and individuals has been 
documented in analyses of the primary confessional form of Puritan writing, but more 
importantly in the repetition since the seventeenth century of creative attempts to 
understand this inherited conviction within sectors of the American psyche. Charles 
Brockden Brown is only one early American writer at the vanguard of these attempts 
and the intensities generated in the form of his narratives-explicitly confessional in 
their epistolary and stated purpose-resonate with the kinds of tensions Sacvan 
Bercovitch describes when he quotes from William Whitaker's A Disputation on Holy 
Scripture (1849) to illustrate the ongoing Protestant tendency of thought in 
interpretation, where "When we proceed from the thing to the thing signified, we bring 
30Freud, 'Draft H, ' p. 151. 
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no new sense, but only bring to light what was before concealed in the sign. "" The 
pressures of needing to believe that the correct and concealed interpretation of the 
code is held, or can be reached, by the self amid a world of conflictual evidence leads 
to the destructive modes apparent in Puritan confessional discourse: 
The state of mind might be described as a schizophrenic single- 
mindedness. With few exceptions, the myriad auto-machiae 
demonstrate that private insecurity is proportionate to public 
affirmation, just as, conversely, the force of I-ness is transparent in the 
violent vocabulary of self-abhorrence. 
The struggle entailed a relentless psychic strain; and in New 
England, where the theocracy insisted upon it with unusual 
vigor-where anxiety about election was not only normal but 
mandatory-hysteria, breakdowns, and suicides were not uncommon. 32 
Bercovitch uses the term "schizophrenic" which, in recent decades, has eclipsed 
paranoia as a diagnostic term due to the determined rarity of what is called "pure" 
paranoia, as the ongoing history of discourses will demonstrate later. Notwithstanding 
the terminology, the enclosure described here is terrifying, breeding a potential for 
paranoia both in personal doubt and in the presumed necessities of political force, 
where Puritanism persists as the creation of a vast, intrinsically melancholic reality, 
as David Leverenz has also indicated in his identifications of Puritan obsessiveness 
and paranoia. 
33 
Indeed, the connections of paranoia to such perceptual tendencies are pursued 
by a recent American psychiatric authority on paranoia, David Shapiro, who correctly 
stresses the need to confront the dynamic nature of paranoia where those affected 
31William Whitaker, A Disputation on Holy Scripture (Cambridge 1849), cited in Bercovitch, 
The Puritan_Qrigins of the American Self, p. lll. 
32Bercovitch, The Puritan Origins of the American Self, p. 23. 
33Leverenz, The Language of Puritan Feeling, p. 111. 
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must be seen not as being assailed by anxieties, but as actively searching them out; 
searching, if we link modern analysis to certain momentums in Puritan perception, to 
provide revelation in environments of concealment. Describing paranoid tendencies 
within the compass of his sense of "neurotic styles, " Shapiro suggests that an 
individual afflicted is "no longer merely a victim of historical events... his way of 
thinking and his attitudes-his style, in other words-having also been formed by that 
history, are now integral parts of that neurotic functioning and move him to think, 
feel, and act in ways that are indispensable to it. i34 Furthermore, Shapiro goes on to 
discuss the ways in which paranoia distorts both reality and physical and mental 
states, tracing in case studies the ways in which clinically diagnosed paranoiacs 
perceive their bodies as instruments and mechanisms, desiring rigid control of a 
potentially errant machine. In support of this he cites the illuminating phrases used by 
Roy Schafer in his apprehension of paranoid states, where Schafer assesses paranoid 
individuals' "inner surveillance, " which he likens to an "internal police state. 01 
These descriptions are not given here to diagnose American Puritans as 
paranoid, but merely to juxtapose modern American diagnoses to a potential in the 
psychodynamics of American Puritan perception, somewhat in the wake of Wilhelm 
Reich's identification of a northern European predilection for "character armouring" 
which he extended through political and economic conditions to Western 
36 psychopathology. The ways in which a paranoid potential may be realised in an 
34David Shapiro, Neurotic Styles (New York 1965), p. 21. 
35Roy Schafer, Psychoanalytic Rorschach Interpretation (New York 1954), cited in Shapiro, 
Neurotic Styles, p. 75. 
16 See Wilhelm Reich, Character Analysis (3rd edition; New York 1949). 
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American environment which inherits qualities of Puritan perception can be explored 
in this manner in the fictional psychopathology pursued by American writers like 
Charles Brockden Brown, particularly where their narratives engage with the key 
process of projection. Projection plays an important and a complex role in the 
regulation of mental and physical tensions produced by anxieties and fears, and the 
vocabulary with which Shapiro describes the process is relevant once again in locating 
flows of influence from Puritan perception on into 1790's America and beyond: 
[Projection] is subjectively relieving. It accomplishes, after all, not only 
a transformation of an internal into an external tension, but also, more 
specifically, a transformation of a tension that is disorganizing and 
noxious to a tight, rigidly directed psychological system into one that 
constitutes a fresh object for that directedness... 
[I]n projection, internal tensions are not "expelled, " but are transformed 
into continuing tensions vis-ä-vis the external world. 37 
As Shapiro argues in his later approach to the issue, significantly titled Autonomy and 
Rigid Character (1981), projection is not a device, but the outcome of a tendency 
produced under certain conditions of increasing tension so that tension is not relieved 
but forestalled and realigned before it becomes intolerable. 38 It is these physical and 
mental tensions, and particularly their involvement in "transformation" which will 
engage us further on in our analysis of Charles Brockden Brown. 
More immediately, however, the number of potential suicides and breakdowns 
among characters in Brown's fiction, and the actual hysteria and self-abhorrence 
invigorated in the first person narratives links them to this Puritan scenario: what has 
changed on from the seventeenth century, and earlier, are the drives energizing 
insecurities. Election is no longer the sole issue, though it may remain a subliminal 
"Shapiro, Neurotic Styles, p. 93. 
"David Shapiro, Autonomy and Rigid Character (New York 1981), p. 145. 
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force; a multiple and more diverse set of threats exist at the end of the eighteenth 
century and their orchestration in a system of evil continues to grapple with the sense 
of human perceptual inadequacies under the aegis of reason whose use has overtones 
more of a political than religious nature. This is certainly not to deny the political 
necessities, however, inherent in the American Puritan programme whose social 
structure depended on a hermeneutic rigidity, as savage political force in the various 
New England Antinomian dissidences and witch-hunts demonstrated, and whose 
notorious inflexibility has so often been credited with ensuring the survival and intitial 
possibility of the American nation. 
In the political contexts of the 1790's the religious inheritances of Puritanism 
also transform themselves into a double fear-a fear simultaneously that the American 
utopian project may be missing the crucial elements assumed to be available to a 
committed nation in their ongoing experiment in libertarianism; and a retroactive fear 
that such a completion may have occurred and that the American dream had become 
the American nightmare of total control under the infiltration of a force of evil. Both 
extensions of anxiety into fear operate out of millennialist origins in which desires for 
the security of an assured knowledge or ending-even if such knowledge is of self- 
destruction-come to dominate the detective urge of Brown's narratives. A 
consequence of this in those narratives is the frequency of a desire for suicide in the 
face of unacceptable phenomena, and an interchangeable pursuit/pursued action as 
Brown's protagonists, like Clara Wieland in Wieland, Althorpe in Somnambulism. A 
Fra t (1804), and Edgar Huntly in Edgar Huntly, seek both within and without 
themselves to extirpate evil. 
The sequence of death in Wieland reveals the destruction and paranoia 
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generated by religious dogma. Such damage is connected explicitly to Old World 
religious infections as it extends at the novel's opening from the brand of French 
Albigensian doctrine practised by Wieland, Snr. This transfusion from across the 
Atlantic sets in motion the horrific consequences of a realized potential for fanaticism 
juxtaposed in Wieland and the linked text Memoirs of Carwin the Biloquist (1803- 
1805) where the Jesuitical and Illuminati dimensions given to Carwin's perverse and 
conspiratorial actions become apparent. Wieland, Snr's convictions set out from the 
scriptural rationale, "Seek and ye shall find" (W, p. 8), and construct a personal system 
of belief "embraced not.. . because it was the best, but because it had been expressly 
prescribed to him" (W, p. 12). The results of being unable to adhere to the demands 
of this system are a mental breakdown followed by mysterious combustion in a self- 
constructed temple adjacent to the family habitation. 
Fever, delirium and disease follow this unexplained event, about which Clara 
Wieland's uncle, predictably a doctor, believes "half the truth had been suppressed" 
(W, 18), the destruction expending itself on the first generation by killing Wieland, 
Snr and his wife. Clara's ensuing meditations on the fate of her father are significant 
for what is to follow in the life of his son, especially when she asks if it may be "a 
fresh proof that the Divine Ruler interferes in human affairs, meditates an end, selects 
and commissions his agents, and enforces, by unequivocal sanctions, submission to his 
will? " The more empirical tendency of thought, however, is as active in the face of 
mystery, for she adds immediately afterwards: "Or, was it merely the irregular 
expansion of the fluid that imparts warmth to our heart and blood, caused by the 
fatigue of the preceding day, or flowing, by established laws, from the condition of 
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[Wieland, Snr's] thoughts? " (W, 19). 39 This apparently contrary beginning illuminates 
disturbing tensions as the narrative oscillates between philosophy and physiology, 
sensation and reality, always aware of its predicament in an age of contrary and fragile 
systems of knowledge. The structured enforcements of religion are juxtaposed with a 
supplanting empiricism, the latter retaining space in "the condition of his thoughts" for 
the inconsistency and obsession which Brown ceaselessly posits as a fundamental 
denominator of human agency. 
Indeed, the empirical side of this meditation and the ways in which empiricism 
is undercut in the narrative lead Clara Wieland and certainly the American reader of 
the period to "seek" the meaning of "established" and perhaps concealed "laws, " an 
action which stresses Daniel Boorstin's caution against any tendency to over- 
systematize American thought. Boorstin's perception of American thought in the 
colonial and post-colonial era focuses on a dynamic experiential quality utilized in the 
actions of survival, expansion and exploration, where the dependence is very much 
one on "self evidence, "' inviting the infusion of empiricism. The extent to which 
this occurred is borne out by the critical cast of Charles Brockden Brown's fiction and 
his analyses of the American psyche under internal and external pressure, particularly 
in his focus on the vulnerability of that psyche to phenomena unexplainable by evident 
causalities. Left at the end of the narrative with a choice between an empiricism which 
folds before the stratagems of Carwin, and a religion palpably destructive in her 
brother's fanaticism, Clara Wieland has little recourse but to murmur beliefs about 
39A footnote is added in the text reinforcing the remarks about Wieland, Snr's demise with 
documentary evidence said to be found in "the Journals of Florence-the 'Journal de 
Medicine'... [and t]he researches of Maffei and Fontana" (W, 19n). 
40Daniel J. Boorstin, The American : The Colonial Experience (New York 1958), p. 152. 
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diabolical influence, and to repeat a dependence on the now shattered "established 
laws" from the vantage of France, the locale from which the Wieland family first 
acquired its damaging tendencies of thought. The inadequacy of the "established laws" 
is excused by the extraordinary phenomena confronted and the internal corruption of 
the victims: 
I leave you to moralize on this tale. That virtue should become a victim 
of treachery is, no doubt, a mournful consideration; but it will not 
escape your notice, that the evils of which Carwin and Maxwell were 
the authors owed their existence to the errors of the sufferers. ... If Wieland had framed juster notions of moral duty, and of the divine 
attributes; or if I had been gifted with ordinary equanimity or foresight, 
the double-tongued deceiver would have been baffled and repelled. (W, 
244) 
This concentration on an internal corruption worked by and/or with external 
forces of a malign and possibly diabolic nature extends explicitly from Puritan 
inheritances matured and secularized in the intervening years by the rigours of the 
early American experience. David Brion Davis makes it clear that the founding fathers 
reacted to the failure of the New World to provide the hoped-for New Jerusalem as 
the manifestation of a universal conspiracy, 41 whilst Henry May notes the parallels 
between this and his concept of the "Revolutionary Enlightenment" as it occurred in 
the United States: 
As a number of historians have suggested, there is much in common 
between millennial and sectarian movements and the new revolution of 
the later eighteenth century. The Revolutionary Enlightenment is linked 
to prophets and preachers of the past by its hatred of lukewarmness and 
cynicism, its demand for absolute commitment, its dedication and 
intolerance, its constant invocation of the instincts of the people against 
the sophistication of the learned. 42 
41David Brion Davis, Homicide in American Fiction (Ithaca 1957), p. 9. 
42May, The Enlightenment in America, p. 154. 
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Indeed, May describes how the effects of the Enlightenment, in its "Revolutionary" 
and other guises, provoked forms of mutual paranoia between proponents and 
opponents of the cultural and political changes sweeping through Europe and America 
in the late eighteenth century. Where the previous quotation identifies the often 
fanatical anxieties of those seeking to construct reasoned utopias, so there also existed 
equal fervour in opposition which "came to see all forms of Enlightenment as parts 
of the same gigantic conspiracy, a plot which began by questioning existing ideas and 
institutions with the purpose of destroying them eventually. X43 The paranoia of our 
ensuing "democracies" extends from this political inheritance, emerging around and 
inside the systematizations of power and knowledge, a process in Brown's narratives 
signified contemporarily by the conjunctions of religious belief and revolutionary zeal 
(the latter most obviously in the repeated appearances of characters involved in 
Illuminati or similar schemes) as they threaten and supplant perceptual inadequacies. 
The predicament for the narrators and contemporary American population alike is one 
of finding ways to mediate these paranoid tensions, analyzing the realities made 
available to them, the better to determine true threat. In Wieland, Theodore Wieland 
represents the mania and manipulability of the believer, whilst Carwin plays on this 
facility with the depravity Brown suggests any individual is likely to allow to conquer 
the better angels of their nature once in possession of extraordinary powers: 
These images were unavoidably connected with that of Carwin. In this 
paroxysm of distress, my attention fastened on him as the grand 
deceiver; the author of this black conspiracy; the intelligence that 
governed in this storm. 
Some relief is afforded in the midst of suffering, when its 
author is discovered or imagined, and an object found on which we 
may pour out our indignation and our vengeance.... Mixed up with 
43May, The Enlightenment in America, pp. 153-4. 
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notions of supernatural agency were the vehement suspicions which I 
entertained, that Carwin was the enemy whose machinations had 
destroyed us. (W, 190) 
Where rational cognition asserts itself, it invariably attempts to confront the 
mysterious and uncontrollable interference of Carwin's powers in a lengthy discourse 
of alternatives and probabilities, particularly here in the vital indeterminacy of 
discovery or imagination. The absence of the crucial evidence-the source of 
power-motivates the cognitive desire for security to leap over this absence into 
affirmations of a religious hue, the narratives emotively fixing upon a stark diabolism 
as the source whilst underneath this Brown provocatively lays bare the paranoid 
"condition of... thoughts. " 
The "transformation" of Wieland's title, therefore, is one very much to do with 
an energized disturbance of physical and mental action, the question of volition 
asserting itself as primary in a period centrally concerned with the declining force of 
religion and recognised inadequacies in secular forms of state control. All five major 
characters in Wieland-Wieland, Snr, Clara and Theodore Wieland, Carwin and 
Pleyel-undergo transformations producing the disturbing spectacle of an individual 
acting outside the parameters of "ordinary equanimity" and known capability. Michael 
Gilmore sees the transformative process in broader sociological terms, perceiving the 
Wieland family and Pleyel as secularized and bourgeois representatives transformed 
from a Puritan past-in the senses both of the family's immediate religious roots and 
the origins of American colonial consciousness-into a fragile Enlightenment which 
suffers a retrenchment to the dimensions of Puritan conflict structures. Gilmore states 
that "[t]he transformation of Brown's title refers both to the Fall and the promise of 
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redemption..., X44 to which needs to be added that such fluxes receive their 
energization in the paranoid fatalism which attends the characters in their moments of 
change and reflection. Brown's narratives and the actions of his characters dramatize 
explicitly that it is in the confrontation of Puritan doctrine (with its emphasis on 
human helplessness) and Enlightenment-driven notions of democracy in the New 
Republic (assuring the success of revolutionary self-empowerment) that much 
damaging paranoia unavoidably emerges. The narratives repeatedly demonstrate that 
the agency of destruction has its origins in human processes, especially a thrall before 
the unexplained workings of power, and the suspension of a failed empiricism among 
victims and perpetrator alike fosters their paranoia and their tendency to rely on 
religion for absolute knowledge. At his trial, where in his own words he is charged 
with "diabolical malice" (W, 164), Theodore Wieland proclaims his trust in the 
"Omnipotent" being who directed him to his appalling act, stating, "I know not what 
is crime; what actions are evil in their ultimate and comprehensive tendency, or what 
are good. Thy knowledge, as thy power, is unlimited. I have taken thee for my guide, 
and cannot err" (W, 176-177). This isolates the appeal to the absolute which is so 
disastrous an act and so often signifies entrapment inside paranoia, as American 
literature and history has regularly testified. Symbolically, Wieland takes as his 
"guide" words emerging out of a cultural and political matrix whose more extreme 
discourses stress the millennial fate within which or toward which America moves. 
Norman Cohn has confirmed this process in his analysis of similar cultural contexts, 
where he states that: "revolutionary chiliasm thrives best. .. where history is imagined 
'Michael T. Gilmore, 'Calvinism and Gothicism: the example of Brown's Wieland' in Studie 
in the Novel, 9, (1977), p. 117. 
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as having an intent purpose which is preordained to be realised on this earth in a 
single final consummation. "" Indeed, virtually all of Brown's major narratives and 
characters participate in this implosion of paranoia as an inevitability or existential 
necessity within the 1790's American environment, whatever their religious or political 
stance. 
The truly revealing part of religious process for an analysis of paranoia-and 
here we participate fully in the meaning-seeking tendencies we may call 
paranoid-operates in religion's most transformative energy: the desire for and action 
of revelation. As James Hillman has pointed out, using Karl Jaspers and C. G. Jung, 
revelation is central to the human obsession with the possibility of unseen orders and 
meaning, and functions as the foundation of religion and religious order. In this 
obsession, paranoia occurs in proportion to the necessity for delusion, both for the 
perceptions of religion and a superseding theology, psychiatry: 
Paranoia is given with our theological Weltbild. Consequently, 
psychiatry cannot reach the endemic paranoia, the delusional potential, 
in individuals without addressing its source in the collective: that 
doctrinal need for a hidden God to reveal himself and whose 
revelations cannot be clearly distinguished from delusions. 46 
Hillman's comments open a path into the terrain of power where paranoia exists as 
the reality, and delusion exists only as a notion determining the enforcement of power, 
particularly when he cites Jung's statements that: "Religion means dependence on and 
submission to the irrational facts of experience, "47 and: "I make my patients 
"Norman Cohn, The Pursuit of the Millennium (London 1957), p. 307. 
46James Hillman, Eranos Lectures 8: On Paranoia (Dallas 1988), p. 39. 
"Hillman, On Paranoia, p. 41; quotation from C. G. Jung, The Undiscovered Self in Collected 
Work s (London 1967), Vol. 10, p. 505. 
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understand that all things which happen to them against their will are a superior force. 
God is nothing more than that superior force in our life. You can experience God 
everyday. "M The problem, however, is that people do experience God everyday in 
their self-conciousness about power, and they may be either criminal or authoritarian 
specialists enforcing forms of behaviour in society, the psychoanalyst being just one 
representative. 
In these contexts, it is clear that the extent to which the revelation of unseen 
meanings hardens and disrupts perception and requires submission in Wieland stands 
as a devastating critique not just of the predominant belief and philosophy of the 
period, but also, on a universal scale, of the potential uses of power which Jung 
asserts as a kind of therapeutic thrall. Brown's particular understanding of this problem 
is figured in his depiction of the hereditary yet differentiated traits of Wieland father 
and son, the elder possessed of self-revelations which immobilize him inside a system 
where he becomes fearful and vulnerable to unseen energies which finally kill him; 
and the younger, who responds so tragically to external stimuli to follow a similar 
pattern. Operating both internally and externally, then, the forces brought to bear on 
the Wieland family receive their impetus through revelation, in which spaces of 
mystery and anxiety are rendered significant as language and meaning emerges from 
the unknown, exactly as Carwin uses ventriloquism to dupe the Wieland family circle 
in a playing out of the tensions involved in the deciphering and use of privileged 
knowledge. Such narrative action focuses on the sort of early American reliance on 
a mixture of eighteenth century thought and American Puritan priorities to be found 
48Hillman, On Paranoia, p. 41; quotation from ed. William McGuire & R. F. C. Hull, C. G. 
Jung Speaking: Interviews and Encounters (Princeton 1977), p. 241. 
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in writing like Joel Barlow's The Vision of Columbus (1787), where revelation is very 
much of the moment. When Columbus asks the Angel why God has not given humans 
all the information they need, she replies, in Henry May's terse gloss, that: 
Man must learn his limitations, must abjure passions, which lead to the 
damaging extremes of skepticism and zeal. He must rely on revelation 
to supplement reason. And finally, he must have confidence in the 
coming of the millennium, foretold by the prophets and made manifest 
by the whole tendency of history. 49 
In this sense, Brown's remarks in the opening 'Advertisement' for Wieland, 
juxtaposing ventriloquism with science, the latter to provide validation through 
language, are a measure of the text's profound subversiveness: 
The power which the principal person is said to possess can scarcely 
be denied to be real. It must be acknowledged to be extremely rare; but 
no fact, equally uncommon, is supported by the same strength of 
historical evidence. 
Some readers may think the conduct of the younger Wieland 
impossible. In support of its possibility the writer must appeal to 
physicians, and to men conversant with the latent springs and 
occasional perversions of the human mind. (W, 3; my italics) 
Carwin's conversation-whether it be direct dialogue or ventriloquism-is a focus 
simultaneously of attraction, duplicitous force and revelation, all of which provide an 
excavation of the desire for revelation amongst a group of Americans susceptible from 
the roots of their belief to such linguistic and historical conspiracy. As Hillman points 
out: 
We cannot suppress the fact that the God of our culture's theology is 
a divinity who must reveal to be divine, reveal in words, words that are 
literal, that this theological God is himself a literalist which, if pursued 
to the end, is therefore 'lunatic, ' or paranoid; and this, not because this 
God is admittedly an avengingly jealous God or because of the 
monomanic self-reference-all things refer to and signify him, or 
because he is by dogma hypervigilant and without weakness, that is, 
omniscient and omnipotent, not this; but because he is a theological 
"May, The Enlightenment in America, p. 192. 
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God, a God of scripture, and the holiness of Writ, who identifies 
himself with his word. so 
This is the power under which Theodore Wieland exists and which informs the 
understanding of his family to render them vulnerable to the paranoia attending their 
perception of the revelatory voices. The first instance of ventriloquism, when Wieland 
is convinced he hears the voice of his wife warning him not to approach the "temple" 
(the site of his father's worship and combustion), produces the basis of Carwin's 
exploitations as the tenor of the family's convictions are revealed. Confronted with 
evidence that his wife could not have spoken to him as he believed-in fact, "assured" 
by the family members "with one voice"-Wieland responds: "'One thing, ' said he, 
with emphasis, 'is true: either I heard my wife's voice at the bottom of the hill, or I 
do not hear your voice at present"' (W, 32). The either/or syndrome links tightly with 
the Manichean fanaticism soon to be energized by the agency of voice, an action 
prepared for in Clara's statement immediately afterwards that: "[h]is father's death was 
always regarded by him as flowing from a direct and supernatural decree" (W, 35). 
The second occasion when a voice is heard, informing Pleyel and Theodore 
Wieland that Pleyel's European mistress was dead, produces in Clara the notion that 
"[h]ere were proofs of a sensible and intelligent existence, which could not be denied. 
Here was information obtained and imparted by means unquestionably superhuman" 
(W, 45), and an impression of a "mysterious but not a malignant agency.. . the idea of 
superior virtue had always been associated in my mind with that of superior power" 
(W, 46). When Carwin, the "author" of the voices, appears soon afterwards his voice 
engenders in Clara "an emotion altogether involuntary and uncontroulable" (W, 52), 
50Hillman, On Paranoia, p. 40. 
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beginning an obsession which she retrospectively identifies as being the start of a 
disastrous causality: 
So flexible, and yet so stubborn, is the human mind. So obedient to 
impulses the most transient and brief, and yet so unalterably observant 
of the direction which is given it! How little did I then foresee the 
termination of that chain, of which this may be regarded as the first 
link? (W, 53-54) 
The beginning of the causality is much further back, if in fact its origin can be traced. 
In summary, Puritanism had every right to be paranoid after its persecutions 
in Europe and its colonial difficulties: what became the intrinsic problem for the 
American culture within which it operated as a legacy was an internalization of 
virulent forms of paranoia capable of re-emergence during ensuing individual and 
national disturbances. 
3. Deviance, Disease and paranoia 
Deviance, especially deviance from a prescribed position of health, offers 
further materials for an analysis of early American paranoia. As a period of transition 
between Puritan notions of natural depravity and post-Enlightenment senses of 
individual innocence and health within American social and medical perceptions, the 
years between 1790 and 1820 were characterised by a questioning and intense 
uncertainty about the security of family and community which paralleled the overt 
fears for state security in the immediate post-revolutionary period. The epidemics of 
disease which struck the eastern seaboard at this time focused these energies of fear 
into a specific rhetoric of infection, as is clear from materials as diverse-and 
congruent-as state legislation, anti-Illuminati and anti-Jacobin tracts, and the 
narrative concerns of a writer like Brown. 
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The plots and action in Brown's major novels explore the American approach 
to deviance and its threat to the New Republic, often within epidemic environments, 
and develop much of their narrative charge from a legacy of colonial fears about the 
effects in the community of the sick, insane, poor, and repeatedly in Brown, the 
unknown outsider. Colonial attitudes identified poverty as the basis of lack in any 
citizens' moral and constitutional condition in line with the Protestant work ethic, and 
determined that the regimes of self-policing already encouraged in Puritan life-styles 
should be extended into familial responsibility to counter threats to social stability. 
Extensive codes of control, including the poor and settlement laws, were developed 
to diminish the inevitable drain on local governments' capital resources if legal and 
social services were needed to restrain and/or eject deviant or unknown individuals. 
This reached selective intensities where: 
legislation in the province of Rhode Island, for example, revealed a 
suspicion of strangers so intense as to seem almost paranoid... . it is clear 
that one colonial response to the problem of deviancy was to try to 
maintain order through insularity, like a quarantine against a disease. 
Yet nowhere was this method enough. "s' 
David Rothman is only one of a number of recent historians who have explored the 
social products in early America of the confluence of a puritan and colonial past, a 
selectively influential Enlightenment, a revolution, and the greater social mobility and 
fluidity present in the early decades of the nineteenth-century. Such products are at 
their most visible in determinations of economic necessity, where punitive shape and 
direction is given to the extension of disparate ingredients of fear and anxiety in the 
treatment of marginal sections of the populace, such as the poor and indigent. As 
"David Rothman, The Discovery of the Asylum: Social Order and Disorder in the New 
Republic (Boston 1971), pp. 22,48. 
106 
Walter Trattner also suggests, the cultural conditions of the eighteenth and then the 
nineteenth century have only served to intensify a paranoid perspective which has 
remained largely endemic in America ever since its colonial origins: 
The Enlightenment, by helping to wear away the notion that misery and 
want were endemic to society, made it appear as though the poor were 
personally responsible for their condition. The same was true for the 
American Revolution; by fostering the belief that poverty need not 
exist, it encouraged a harsh and suspicious view of the poor. God's will 
was no longer a satisfactory explanation for defective social 
conditions... 52 
Yet where poverty and lack of means provides visible evidence of deviance for 
American legislatures, the need to secure the origins of the condition meant the focus 
on deviance went much further despite the equivocal status of theory and 
practice-which, of course, never recognized itself as remotely equivocal. Already 
emplaced social systems of order became an essential target for blame in early post- 
revolution America, as those investigating "located roots of deviance not in the 
criminal, but in the legal system, " believing concurrently that "deviancy began with 
the family. iS3 The problem then, as, indeed, more recently within debates about 
disintegrating and dysfunctional nuclear families as sites or origins for wider social 
malaise, existed in the contradictions of supporting and enforcing conflicting forms 
of discipline, and of believing in the existence of a functioning, uniform and 
normative social entity called 'the family, ' despite the social realities of the times. 
Caught in the residue of Puritan forebodings about evil, but eager to exercise 
eighteenth century optimisms about the use of reason, a distinctly uneasy sense that 
52Walter I. Trattner, From Poor Law to Welfare State: A History of Social Welfare in America 
(New York 1979), pp. 47-48. 
53Rothman, The Discovery of the Asylum, pp. 61,66. 
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deviance and criminality impinged externally on an initially innocent human sensibility 
was retained among many Americans involved in the politics of social control. 
Significant action in Brown's narratives extends from this social debate and 
details responses by broken family units to the intrusion of an outsider, relating the 
psychological, social and economic disaster which occurs when these 'families' take 
into their midst an unknown and deviant individual. 54 The issue of trust, at the core 
of democratic concerns, is repeatedly seen to be an expensive and vulnerable option, 
deployed and then belatedly retracted as intruders gain access to material, mental and 
physical resources. Characters like Carwin, Ludloe, Edgar Huntly, Clithero, Craig, 
Ormond, Althorpe, Welbeck, and even, temporarily, Arthur Mervyn, represent this 
intrusive force, and all significantly emerge from disintegrated family units or have 
no apparent family at all, and sometimes form quasi-fraternal or quasi-matrimonial 
relationships with others in radical utopian styles suggesting the possibility of 
replacing the family with an alternative socially engineered unit. In terms of social 
identity, they are outside nurturant and self-sufficient structures and prey parasitically 
on nurturant resources. For the state and those besieged they represent the fearful 
prospect of beings with uncertain or undetectable origin, who further confound 
emplaced social structures by their parasitical dimension, consuming without, it 
appears, any reciprocal exchange. 
Brown's treatment of these characters throws into sharp relief the inadequacy 
of social theory and judgement as it existed in his time, especially where he utilizes 
'A significant form of deviance, incest, which figures prominently in Brown's writing, is not 
dealt with here. Useful treatments of this issue include James R. Russo, 'The Chimera's of the 
Brain: Clara's Narrative in Wieland' in Early American Literature, Vol. 16, No. 1,1981, pp. 60- 
88; and Norman S. Grabo, The Coincidental Art of Charles Brockden Brown (Chapel Hill 
1981). 
108 
the disturbing scope of materials offered in an internal or psychological survey of 
human potential for deviance alongside contemporary opinion about invasive agencies. 
His deviant characters oscillate between the either/or scenarios of the dissolute and the 
disciplined, deliberately blurring such rationalized distinctions as they demonstrate 
their extraordinary capabilities which are rendered consciously and malevolently, or, 
more problematically, in the realms of unconscious activity. Brown draws deeply from 
the ingrained Puritan conviction that the enemy may be us, and those characters who 
face the assault of these deviants agonise over their complicity in epistolary and 
confessional modes where a variety of efforts to rationalize the irrationality of human 
behaviour fail and consequently validate the paranoia of those both inside and outside 
social norms. Thus, Edgar Huntly's final letters attempting to warn Sarsefield of 
Clithero's pursuit of his wife conclude with self-admonishment for inadequate 
reasoning and an attempt to exorcise the damage of the psychopathic Clithero by 
projecting empty certainty in an appeal to chance and a diminished divinity: 
May heaven avert the consequences of [Clithero's] design. May you be 
enabled by some means to prevent their meeting. If you cannot prevent 
it-but I must not reason on such an event... 
Heaven grant that some means may suggest themselves to you of 
intercepting his approach. Yet I know not what means can be 
conceived. Some miraculous chance may befriend you; yet this is 
scarcely to be hoped. It is a visionary and fantastic base on which to 
rest our security. (EH, 283,290-1) 
Sarsefield, in reply, relates the clash of reason, force and unreason which effectively 
silences Edgar Huntly's wider optimism, extended as Sarsefield's response is from the 
authoritative position of a mentor and one able to unleash the powers of a "chief 
Magistrate, " police and the contemporary psychiatric establishment: 
I will not torture your sensibility by recounting the incidents of 
[Clithero's] arrest and detention. You will imagine that his strong, but 
perverted reason exclaimed loudly against the injustice of his treatment. 
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It was easy for him to outreason his antagonist, and nothing but force 
could subdue his opposition. (EH, 293) 
Characteristically in Brown "perverted reason" meets necessary force, or, in fact, 
perverted reason grounded in authoritative force as it struggles against an energized 
agency drawing on similar and profoundly different resources where reason fails in 
the mysterious realms of human capability. The paranoia focused on deviants becomes 
a reflective yet necessary and immobilising response to their disturbing individual 
paranoia and destructive desires, as Brown both endorses and problematises the 
exercise of force. 
The intensity of suspicion about these 'unknown' individuals for an early 
American readership is increased by Brown as he focuses ideas of contemporary 
political threat on the characters' past and present political allegiance, and their contact 
with known areas of revolutionary instability. Much has been written about the 
'exposure' of Illuminati-type organizations in the United States between 1790-1810, 
and the ways in which they respond to linked American fears about the supposed 
Jacobin threat from post-1789 France spreading post-revolutionary instability. 55 
Similar links have been established with the ferociously anti-democratic legislation 
55See, for instance, Jedediah Morse, A Sermon, Exhibiting the Present Dangers, and 
Consequent Duties of , iti . en of the United States of America. Delivered at Charlestown, 
April 5,1799. The Day of the National Fast (Charlestown, Mass. 1799)--[Morse based much 
of his argument on materials drawn from John Robison's Proofs of a Conspiracy Against All 
the Religions and Governments of Europe, Carried on in the Secret Meetings of Free Masons, 
Illuminati and Reading Societies (Edinburgh 1797; New York 1798), and Abbe Barruel's 
Memoires pour servir ä 1'histoire du Jacobinism (Paris 1794; translated as Memoirs Illustrating 
the History of Jacobinism {New York 1799}), both of which, according to Henry May, had 
several American editions]-Vernon Stauffer, New England and the Bavarian Illuminati' in 
Columbia University (New York) Studies in History, Economics and Public Law, Vol. 82, 
1919, pp. 1-374; May, The Enlightenment in America, pp. 258-277; Gordon S. Wood, 
'Conspiracy and the Paranoid Style: Causality and Deceit in the Eighteenth Century' in ]IN 
William and Mary Quarterly, Vol. XXXIX, No. 3, July 1982, pp. 401-441; Robert S. Levine, 
Conspiracy and Romance, pp. 17-24. 
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passed in the United States in June and July of 1798 which subsequently became 
known as the Alien and Sedition Acts. As Thomas Jefferson indicated, such was the 
obsession in all forms of social discourse with these matters of threat and the infection 
of revolutionary extremism that "one who keeps himself cool and clear of the 
contagion, is so far below the point of ordinary conversation, that he finds himself 
insulated in every society. 1156 One of the Founding Fathers at least believed that 
American society during the period which Brown wrote could be characterised, albeit 
from our present perspective, as rife with the illness of paranoia. 
John C. Miller has detailed the political environment that produced the Alien 
and Sedition Acts in his excellent book, Crisis in Freedom, noting in political rhetoric, 
legislation and the media the escalating paranoia about, alternately, internal and 
external subversions of the American state, and in response to the Acts, the erosion 
of liberties hard won just two decades before. His assessment of the Federalist party's 
perception of threat draws together many of the themes already discussed here: 
That democracy was incompatible with order and security was owing, 
the Federalists supposed, to the depravity of human nature... Their 
struggle with the Republicans was a conflict between good and evil on 
a scale almost without precedent since biblical times. 57 
Miller also makes clear the deliberate use by the Federalist party elders of such 
paranoia, disseminating it from "the top and spread downward among the peopleiS8 
in ways characteristic of totalitarian needs for control of perception to align the masses 
with the vision required by those in power. The infusion of this into law is a vital 
"Cited in John C. Miller, Crisis in Freedom: The Alien and Sedition Acts (Boston 1951), p. 8. 
"John C. Miller, Crisis in Freedom, pp. 15,21. 
"John C. Miller, Crisis in Freedom, p. 22. 
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ingredient, and the legal ramifications of the Alien and Sedition Acts ensured this: in 
a sequence of test cases, primarily concerning sedition, the truth of an assertion was 
determined insufficient as a defence before the threat of bringing down state 
structures. The United States government and legal structure effectively emplaced a 
paranoid vision within its essential processes which overrode any claims to reality or 
truth in a way which has been repeated with varying intensities throughout American 
history in the face of dissidence and deviance from patterns of conformity. The 
reasons given are always contained in statements intended to quash reasoned 
opposition or debate, just as the Federalists justified the Alien and Sedition Acts as 
war measures, consolidating the continued and continuing process of America's vision 
of itself permanently at war. 
It is a mistake, however, to view the Federalist responses to supposed 
subversion as simply a product of the period's counter-revolutionary concerns. Most 
of these responses can be traced as extensions of previously existent cultural tensions 
focused on dissidence and deviancy, and the materials that Charles Brockden Brown 
deploys in his writing concerning these issues confirm this, demonstrating how 
paranoia is part of the very fabric of social perception and engages with state fears. 
The history and identity of his deviant protagonists draws together the overt 
revolutionary qualities of Jacobinism with the perceived threat to state social 
equilibrium from vagrant and stateless individuals, especially those who have had 
contact with that other European outpost of revolutionary threat, Ireland. Carwin 
receives his education in radical thought and action at one of Ludloe's habitations in 
Ireland, before he travels through Spain and adopts the Catholic religion, developing 
amongst the Americans with whom he comes into contact, "[a] suspicion... that his 
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belief was counterfeited for some political purpose" (W, p. 81). Clithero also emerges 
from Ireland to wreak havoc in America, just as one of Brown's major influences, 
William Godwin, had had his vagrant Caleb Williams seized upon his impersonation 
of an Irishman whilst attempting escape from Falkland's "police" to Ireland. This Irish 
context was as potent a threat in American eyes as the French connection, where Irish 
revolutionary activity against the British was seen to be part of the web of global 
subversion of democratic order in the late 1790's identified most frequently with 
Illuminism: 
It was not doubted that this dreaded [Irish] brotherhood had extended 
its operations to the United States: Wolf Tone, Hamilton Rowan and 
Napper Tandy, the leaders of the United Irishmen driven from Ireland, 
had settled temporarily in the United States. All the Irish in the 
Republic were under suspicion of belonging to this revolutionary 
organization.... [and a] "dark and silent system of organized treason and 
massacre, imported by the UNITED IRISHMEN. 159 
Of final interest in this brief survey of deviant behaviour and Brown's 
representation of related and frictional paranoia is the extent to which state control 
of the indigent, subversive and mentally ill became an effort to limit the mobility, as 
Rothman puts it quoting from eighteenth-century American ordinances, of "persons 
who wander about. i60 The transformations which assured a more fluid and mobile 
59John C. Miller, Crisis in Freedom, p. 45. Quotation from Gazette of the United States, 24 
November, 1798. Seth Payson's comments on this situation are also 'illuminating': "In May 
1798, the declaration and constitution of the American Society of United Irishmen were 
discovered and published in Philadelphia. This society was evidently founded on the principles 
of the illuminated lodges in Europe; and we are not left in the dark as to their object; for no- 
one, who will attentively read their constitution, can hesitate to say, it was to enlist and 
organize the discontented and fractious, and particularly foreigners, in the different parts of 
the United States, in order to diffuse the spirit, and promote the infernal designs, of Illuminism 
in this country. " Seth Payson, Proofs of the Real Existence and Dangerous Tendency of 
Illuminism, pp. 208-209. Text italics. 
60Rothman, The Discovery of the Asylum, p. 27. The quotation is from the Acts and Laws of 
his Majesty's English Colony of Connecticut in New-England (New London, Conn. 1750). 
Further on, Rothman discusses the "first hospital exclusively for the insane in the American 
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society in the United States between 1780 and 1820 also selectively enhanced fears 
about the movements of potentially dangerous individuals. The efforts of welfare 
provision and disciplinary procedures were precisely to limit mobility, taking over 
from the inadequacies of familial and communal order in their abilities to absorb 
dangerous vagrants. These procedures sought to staticize and enclose those with 
mobility where movement was used for anything other than approved political and 
economic purposes in a period where movement outside localized boundaries, 
notwithstanding the state needs for trade and exploration, was inherently revolutionary. 
A political paranoia about the threat of nomadic61 figures is evident in 
Brown's narratives and embraces the problem to be explored in greater detail later on 
concerning the paranoia linked to movement, creativity, and alternative systems of 
perception. For Brown's deviant characters penetrate and move through space thought 
to be secure, possess extraordinary capabilities and different senses of the world, and 
indeed force upon their victims recognition of that difference in the midst of fragile 
epistemologies. Although the disturbing agencies of the deviants are creatively 
challenged by the narrators in the production of narratives, and thereby counter the 
destructive yet nonetheless creative energies extended from a Carwin, Clithero, 
Ormond, or Welbeck, the narratives' fascination for these characters engages with 
colonies, opened at Williamsburg, Virginia" where "[t]he burgesses, concerned that 'several 
persons of insane and disordered minds have frequently been found wandering in different 
parts of this colony, ' established in 1769 a lunatic asylum. Although it might help to cure 
those not 'quite desperate, ' its primary task was to preserve the peace of the community, to 
keep the insane from roaming about" (p. 43). Rothman quotes here from William Henning, The 
Statutes at Large, VIII, 378-381, An Act to make Provision for the Support and Maintenance 
of Idiots, Lunatics, and Other Persons of Unsound Minds. ' 
611t is interesting, and perhaps not entirely coincidental given the anthropological and 
revolutionary concerns of the era, that the Oxford English Dictionary dates the adjectival use 
of nomad to 1798. 
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them as curiously vital for the libertarian debate, in their role as testers and breakers 
of authoritarian limits. What becomes an obsession for Brown is the ways in which 
democratic freedoms may grant both vulnerability and permission to take advantage 
of vulnerability, especially if one possesses extraordinary skills within the scope of 
duplicity and fanaticism. The paranoid process Brown reveals in his versions of 
American society is therefore both defence-as in Wendell Phillips' maxim, often 
quoted in these contexts, "Eternal vigilance is the price of liberty"-and guarantor of 
perpetual disintegrations of trust: democracy needs paranoia to maintain itself, yet 
finds the process continually denying the extension of democracy to all areas of 
existence. 
In this sense, paranoia exists as an enclosing medium of interface between 
different powers, authorities and subversives, inclusive yet exclusive in their 
contradictory forms of knowledge and capability. Deleuze and Guattari articulate some 
useful senses of the nomadic position in relation to state authority for this argument, 
even though their analysis traces a larger history of nomadic groups and their use by 
state authorities to form and energize a war machine despite not being of the state. 
Freedom of movement always retains subversive potential so that: 
each time there is an operation against the State-subordination, 
rioting, guerilla warfare, or revolution as an act-it can be said that a 
war machine has revived, that a new nomadic potential has appeared, 
accompanied by the reconstitution of a smooth space or a manner of 
being in space as though it were smooth... It is in this sense that the 
response of the State against all that threatens to move beyond it is to 
striate space. 62 
The spatial concerns of Brown's writing frequently bear out this pattern, gaining 
"Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. 
Volume Two, translated by Brian Massumi (Minnesota 1987), p. 386. 
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momentum in the flows of detailing the politics and movements of a character like 
Ormond, and then folding back on itself and striating narrative space in efforts to 
reconfigure plot, decorum and sense. Constantia Dudley's father attempts to persuade 
her against a match with Ormond in just such an effort: 
What could be expected from [Ormond], half of whose life had been 
spent at the head of a band of Cossacks ... and supporting 
by flagitious 
intrigues the tyranny of Catherine, and the other half in traversing 
inhospitable countries, and extinguishing what remained of clemency 
and justice by intercourse with savages? 
It was admitted that his energies were great, but misdirected, 
and that to restore them to the guidance of truth was not in itself 
impossible; but it was not so with relation to any power that she 
possessed... She must go with him to some corner of the world where 
his boasted system was established. What was the road to it he had 
carefully concealed, but it was evident that it lay beyond the precincts 
of civilized existence. 63 
Constantia Dudley, of course, ultimately becomes the agency of Ormond's defeat, and 
her valiant resistance, crucially effected through a "desperate and random" knife thrust, 
precedes "the inspection of bodies and the examination of witnesses" in a clash of 
necessities, both escaped from reason: "The violence of Ormond had been repulsed 
by equal violence... Not to deplore the necessity which had produced this act was 
impossible: but, since this necessity existed, it was surely not a deed to be thought 
upon with lasting horror, or to be allowed to generate remorse" (0,291). 
Brown's fascination with a character like Ormond does not therefore celebrate 
his extraordinary qualities despite the damage done in seeking alternative "systems"; 
nor does he place Ormond in the freedoms Deleuze and Guattari articulate for their 
vision of 'nomad thought, ' which, according to their translator, "does not lodge itself 
'Charles Brockden Brown, Ormond; Or, The Secret Witness (1799; Bicentennial Edition, ed. 
Sydney Krause, S. W. Reid & Alexander Cowie. Kent State, Ohio 1982), p. 211. Hereafter 
referred to as 'O. ' 
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in the edifice of an ordered interiority; it moves freely in an element of exteriority. It 
does not repose on identity; it rides difference. "6' The problem for Brown is that 
movements in "exteriority" and "difference" cannot forever evade the extensions of 
paranoia and their damage implicit in the binaries of us and them. The revolutionary 
optimisms of America at the end of the eighteenth century are countered by an 
increasingly conservative pessimism in Brown's writing which would look askance at 
such recent theoretical acceptance of "affirmation" and "force": 
The modus operandi of nomad thought is affirmation, even when its 
apparent object is negative. Force is not to be confused with power. 
Power is the domestication of force. Force in its wild state arrives from 
outside to break constraints and open new vistas. Power builds 
walls. 65 
For the forceful activities of Ormond, and indeed of a Carwin, Ludloe, or Clithero, do 
not inhabit a narrative familiar with Nietzsche, and have more to do with the 
relentlessness of obsessive, paranoid enclosures than the later explorations by 
American writers of the democratic and anti-paranoid potential in Dionysian and other 
strategies of release. 
***** 
Plague operates by invisible agents, and we know not in what quarter 
it is about to attack us. No shield, therefore, can be lifted up against it. 
We fear it as we are terrified of the dark in which tho much of our 
panic be, doubtless, owing to the influence of education, and may be 
removed by habitual exposure to it, yet our defenseless condition and 
the invisible approaches of the danger may contribute to our alarms. 66 
Of all fears in the face of the unknown and the uncontrollable, none is as intense as 
'Brian Massumi, A User's Guide to Capitalism and Schizophrenia (Cambridge 1992), p. 5. 
65Massumi, A User's Guide to Capitalism and Schizophrenia, p. 6. 
"Charles Brockden Brown, letter to James Brown, October 25,1796, quoted in David Lee 
Clark, Charles Brockden Brown: Pioneer Voice of America (Durham, N. C. 1952), p. 156. 
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the fear generated by disease, especially contagious disease. In the 1790's such fear 
retained the presence and resonance within life historian Fernand Braudel attributes 
it in relation to the "plague" of medieval Europe: "Leader of the dance of Death, it 
was a fixture, a permanent structure in men's lives. "6' Behind the evolution and 
spread of disease in history exists an enormous and complex system of causalities, as 
Braudel and other analysts have commented. 68 A crucial element of this system for 
humanity has always been the economic structures and interdependencies of and 
between social groupings, in direct relation to the parasitic dimension of all disease. 
Where bacillae require certain host conditions and movements to maintain their 
existence and initiate their distribution, so economic enterprise requires certain 
organizations of people to operate successfully and enable expansion. In the merging 
of their parasitic relationships, the history of economy has consequently been the 
history of the distribution of epidemics, where, to put it very simply, the spread of 
disease has followed and adjusted itself to trade routes. Furthermore, the history of 
epidemics indicates with great clarity the demarcations of social groupings and their 
parasitic relationships; Braudel again: "At the first sign of the disease, the rich 
whenever possible took hurried flight.. . The poor remained alone, penned up in the 
contaminated town where the State fed them, isolated them, blockaded them and kept 
them under observation. "69 
Brown's novels deal extensively with these issues in their depiction of epidemic 
"Fernand Braudel, The Structures of Everyday Life: The Limits of the Possible. Civilization 
and Capitalism, 15th-18th Century, Volume One, translated by Sian Reynolds, (London 1988), 
p. 78. 
68See, for instance, William H. McNeill, Plagues and Peoples (New York 1977). 
69Braudel, The Structures of Everyday Life, p. 85. 
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situations, and in particular the states of anxiety generated by the invasion of an 
unknown and invisible parasitic force which alternately upsets and hardens the 
pre-existent forms of social parasitism. Paranoia seems always a part of parasitism, 
developed in the exchanges of anxiety between host and guest, oscillating as 
circumstance dictates and exploitation and symbiosis fluctuate. Michel Serres has 
demonstrated in his book The Parasite (1982) that the presence of any parasitic action 
involves fundamental changes in the cultural matrix of energies, be they energies of 
signification or simply of exchange, offering the possibility both of destabilization and 
restoration of order. The presence of disease materials in Brown's novels exemplifies 
this action, analyzing disorder against which the protagonists must exert themselves 
until the point is reached where they and forms of social order have restored stability 
against what is frequently viewed as an internal attack on minds, bodies and 
communities. 70 As we shall see, this involves various paranoid actions of defence, 
though before observing this in the texts it is worth looking in detail at the historical 
background of epidemics from which Brown drew, and at the ways in which political 
control reacts to such invasions. 
Yellow fever epidemics struck the north eastern United States several times 
between 1790 and the early years of the nineteenth century, probably as a result of the 
communication links forged between the United States, the Caribbean, and the west 
coast of Africa to facilitate the slave trade. Charles Brockden Brown had personal 
70Charles Brockden Brown's Monthly Magazine, August 1799, Vol. 1, No. 5, published an 
'Extract of a Letter from a Gentleman in Philadelphia to his Friend in England, dated July 7, 
1799, ' almost certainly written by Brown himself. In it the following passage occurs: "We rely 
upon the rigorous execution of a quarantine law for the security of the place. This can only 
be compared to attempting a defence by the outworks, while the enemy is already in 
possession of the citadel" (p. 327). 
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experience of these outbreaks in both Philadelphia, in 1793 and 1797, and New York 
in 1798, even surviving an attack of the disease himself in 1798.71 In a series of 
informative articles, Shirley Samuels has detailed the range to which Brown's use of 
disease materials and other issues involving the disturbance of social order extends in 
their commentary on individual and communal organization in urban America of the 
1790's. 72 Beginning from the identification of a "conjunction between contagion and 
politics, " she goes on to link these intertwining forces with social controls focused 
primarily at the level of the family "as a way of countering the linked threats of 
revolution, contagion, and political and sexual infidelity, "73 extending this initially 
into a reading of Arthur Mervyn which sees Mervyn's progress through the novel as 
a movement from exclusion back into the socio-economic securities of the familial 
cell. This in turn registers the re-emplacement of order by the "larger field of social 
discourses and practicesi74 from which the novel is seen to emanate, organized 
primarily in Samuels' view by the relationship of control and supersedence existent 
between the asylum and the family, especially where she endorses Foucault's view that 
"the eighteenth century witnessed a major shift from a concept of family as a 'model' 
or analogue of government to a concept of the family as an 'instrument' of 
71Donald A. Ringe, Charles Brockden Brown (Revised Edition; Boston 1991), p. xi 
"Shirley Samuels, 'Plague and Politics in 1793: Arthur Mervyn' in Criticism: A Quarterly for 
Literature and Arts, 1985,27 (3), pp. 225-246; 'The Family, the State, and the Novel in the 
Early Republic' in American Quarterly, 1986,38,3, pp. 381-395; 'Infidelity and Contagion: 
The Rhetoric of Revolution' in Early American Literature, 1987,22, pp. 183-191; 'Wieland: 
Alien and Infidel' in Early American Literature, 1990,25, pp. 46-66. 
"Samuels, 'Plague and Politics in 1793: Arthur Mervyn, ' pp. 225-226 
74Samuels, 'Plague and Politics in 1793: Arthur Mervyn, ' p. 226. 
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government. "'S Whilst Samuels' analyses penetrate quite deeply the relationships of 
social control in the face of epidemic and political disorders, her concentration on the 
asylum/family connections tends to gloss over Brown's assertion in Arthur Mervyn, 
as in all his novels, of the key relationship between individuals and their fears in the 
face of external controls. In this sense, it seems crucial that all of the novels dealt with 
here feature endings in which the protagonists remain single and most leave America 
for Europe; even Arthur Mervyn, ostensibly bound for conjugal bliss with his 
"mamma" Achsa Fielding, has yet to be married at the end of the novel, and registers 
some not unimportant doubts whose language seems vital with regard to Mervyn's 
progress through disease and disorder: 
I merely write to allay these tumults which our necessary separation 
produces; to aid me in calling up a little patience till the time arrives 
when our persons, like our minds, shall be united forever. That 
time-may nothing happen to prevent-but nothing can happen. But 
why these ominous misgivings just now? My love has infected me with 
these unworthy terrors, for she has them too. 76 
Infection remains the major fear throughout the novel, and is combatted by political 
and individual strategies of containment and exclusion. An analysis of the systems of 
fear and confidences generated in turn by these strategies will demonstrate that their 
effects of alienation are registered individually in line with the effect on Brown of the 
influence of Godwin and Rousseau. Brown's protagonists are not so much existentialist 
heroines and heroes making their way through adversity as one might view an Ishmael 
or a Raskolnikov; rather, they are early explorations of consciousness and anxiety as 
"Samuels, 'The Family, the State, and the Novel in the Early Republic, ' p. 388. Samuels draws 
from Michel Foucault, 'Governmentality' in Ideology and Consensus, 1979,6, p. 17. 
"Charles Brockden Brown, Arthur Mervyn; Or, Memoirs of the Year 1793 (1799-1800; 
Bicentennial Edition, ed. Sydney Krause, S. W. Reid & Alexander Cowie. Kent State, Ohio 
1980), p. 445. Hereafter referred to as 'AM. ' 
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American and Western culture emerged from the restraints and false optimisms of the 
Enlightenment. Effectively, Brown's texts engage themselves in the tensions between 
an idea of individuality and its orientations within the "larger field of social discourses 
and practices. " 
As numerous studies of the history of epidemics or plagues have discovered, 
cultural and political reactions to these catastrophes involve the reduction and 
distortion of social perception and belief patterns, operating primarily in terms of an 
increased and centralized political control overlaid by religious designation. Faced with 
the havoc created by disease in any community, anxiety provokes an immediate 
attempt to identify origins or sources of disruption focusing on the other or that 
outside the social using rigidly structured moral prerogatives. In her book Illness as 
Metaphor, Susan Sontag determines that the cultural use of metaphor surrounding 
disease is utilized to explain the threat to self or an internalized community, and she 
states that: "The medieval experience of the plague was firmly tied to notions of moral 
pollution, and people invariably looked for a scapegoat external to the stricken 
community. "" Such reaction was widespread following the yellow fever epidemics 
of the 1790's in America, and was given a specific political orientation due to the 
proximity to upheavals in France, as the Gazette of the United States exemplifies in 
its connection of Jacobinism to disease: 
God had sent out one as a corrective of the other. Our cities have been 
punished in proportion to the extent of Jacobinism; and in general at 
least three out of four of the persons who have perished by pestilence 
have been over zealous partizans. 78 
"Susan Sontag, Illness as Metaphor (New York 1978), p. 71. 
"Gazette of the United States, June 21,1800, cited in John C. Miller, Crisis in Freedom, p. 40. 
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The political controls which fuel this distorted perception move in very deliberate 
ways towards an understanding and organization of epidemic confusions. Michel 
Foucault firmly places the socio-political impulse behind contemporary developments 
of panoptic surveillance controls in disciplinary actions alongside the regulations 
concerning epidemics. In the face of disease, as in penology, power exerts itself 
towards its fundamental dream of total vision and analysis, seeking to: 
... 'prevent anyone 
from concealing and dealing with those sick of the 
contagion, unknown to the magistrates. ' The registration of the 
pathological must be constantly centralized... 
The plague is met by order; its function is to sort out every possible 
confusion: that of the disease, which is transmitted when bodies are 
mixed together; that of the evil, which is increased when fear and death 
overcome prohibitions... Against the plague, which is a mixture, 
discipline brings into play its power, which is one of analysis... 
Underlying disciplinary projects the image of the plague stands for all 
forms of confusion and disorder. 79 
The action of power in these circumstances is paranoid: its energies are directed 
towards centralization in an effort to set up a complete referentiality where everything 
has meaning and is connected to an analytic centre, and where multiplicities, or "a 
mixture, " are reduced to manageable dualities or singularities. In doing so it sets up 
orders organized by intensified belief patterns whose effort is to dispell ambiguity and 
uncertainty by an urgent location of evil, evil effectively being disorder or the 
unknown. The violence generated by such action is well-known, exerted on the 
community primarily in terms of staticity and separation. 
It is worth connecting Foucault's pertinent remarks to the career of a doctor 
working amid the epidemics in Philadelphia in the 1790's who was certainly known 
to Charles Brockden Brown, and whose work has already been approached. Benjamin 
"Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, translated by A. M. 
Sheridan (London 1987), pp. 196-199. 
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Rush was a prominent figure in the medical and establishment circles of the United 
States at this time as well as being a member, simultaneously with Brown, of the 
Philadelphia Philosophical Society. As a young radical, it seems probable that Brown 
would have at least been aware of Rush because of the latter's prominence and his 
adherence to philosophical tenets of scientific materialism, precisely the position 
Brown's novels challenge in their various ways. Rush admired the scientific theories 
of Joseph Priestley, and organized his medical approach around necessitarian concepts 
which posited human life as part of a mechanical system, an attitude which, in the 
supposed perfections of its totality, both cemented his sense of the correctness of his 
own medical outlook, and brought him into conflict with other doctors of different 
persuasions. Rush also followed his acknowledged master, Dr William Cullen, in 
orienting his medical technique around an almost structuralist concept of disease, 
believing disease to be ordered by an accessible sequence of laws, the discovery of 
which would locate a "single cause of all disease. iS° The fusion of this scientific 
singularity with the political and millennial views Rush publicly espoused, such as his 
assertion that "I consider it possible to convert men into republican machines, "" 
demonstrates the ways in which late-eighteenth-century thought and practice could 
be formulated and exercised to the point in which fanaticism and paranoia are more 
than latent. Henry F. May suggests this when he says that "Rush.. . serves as the best 
possible warning of the dangers of Enlightenment without the slightest mixture of 
80May, The Enlightenment in America, p. 208. 
"Benjamin Rush, 'Of The Mode of Education Proper in a Republic, ' in Essays: Literary, Moral 
and Philosophical, ed. Michael Meranze (New York 1988), p. 9. 
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skepticism. "82 In the intensity of epidemic conditions, as biographers and 
commentators indicate, Rush manifested many of the tendencies Foucault ascribes to 
socio-political reactions to disease. William Hedges finds that "Rush's piety tends in 
a crisis to become a crude extension of his deep-seated need to believe himself in the 
right, to believe he is in possession of the truth. Those who disagree with him become 
his persecutors, 1183 whilst Carl Binger finds a "paranoid suspiciousness" in Rush in 
circumstances in which "(h)e simply had to be right, especially since he felt appointed 
by God to save his afflicted city. i84 James J. Abraham similarly suggests that Rush 
was "a man of very fixed ideas... one who was almost a fanatic in the advantages of 
phlebotomy" and states that he suffered a mild "persecution mania" during the 1793 
epidemic in Philadelphia. " The intersections here of religion, medical dogma, and 
the control of human energies through circulatory regulation need assertion in the 
circumstances of the medical rivalries in the 1793 epidemic, and the medical scenarios 
detailed by Brown. Particularly important are the tensions of control which extend 
from the professional or official figure-here the doctor-rendering that figure the 
centralization point for fears about chaos, and the point from which sanctioned and 
dictatorial powers emanate. Braudel and McNeill detail the fears against doctors in 
82May, The Enlightenment in America, p. 208. 
"William Hedges, 'Benjamin Rush, Charles Brockden Brown, and the American Plague Year' 
in Early American Literature (7), 1972-1973, p. 299. 
84Carl Binger, Revolutionary Doctor: Benjamin Rush 1746-1813 (New York 1966), pp. 207, 
230. 
"James J. Abraham, Lettsom: His Life, Times, Friends and Descendants (London 1933), 
pp. 367,370. In somewhat different circumstances, General Jack D. Ripper provides a more 
modern example of such paranoid phlebotomy, where a pre-emptive nuclear strike is launched 
against the Soviet Union to counter communist subversion and the threat to the purity of 
American "precious bodily fluids. " See Dr. Strangelove; Or, How I Stopped Worrying and 
Learned to Love the Bomb (Stanley Kubrick 1964). 
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epidemic situations according, respectively, to their cost and the utter uselessness and 
pain of their remedies. Rush, in a letter to his wife Julia during the 1793 epidemic, 
articulates the fear of the professional in revealingly political terms, when he describes 
the yellow fever as a "monarchical disorder, i86 which whilst it projects American 
revolutionary identifications of the fever's source, also reflects fundamental fears about 
the disruption of political order, particularly as it may affect the hierarchy in which 
the doctor as expert may take her/his place. 
These brief comments on Benjamin Rush provide historical insights to any 
analysis of the epidemics in novels like Arthur Mervyn and Ormond. Brown's 
depictions are complex interweavings of social and political anxieties within the 
interaction of community and individual, and domestic and international concerns, as 
Constantia Dudley's reaction to the first onset of fever in Philadelphia reveals: 
Contagious diseases, she well knew, periodically visited and laid waste 
the Greek and Egyptian cities. It constituted no small part of that mass 
of evil, political and physical, by which that portion of the world has 
been so long afflicted. That a pest equally malignant had assailed the 
metropolis of her own country-a town famous for the salubrity of its 
airs and the perfection of its police-had something in it so wild and 
uncouth, that she could not reconcile herself to the possibility of such 
an event. (0, p. 35) 
Barring medical issues and the disruption of the family, which emerge later in the 
novel, all the important elements of control and fear surrounding disease within the 
American context are present in this paragraph. The fear that corruption from the Old 
World (represented here in terms of classical antiquity but paragraphs later given a 
contemporary European reference) might spread to the New telescopes provincially 
into fears of metropolitan disruption, where the "perfection" of the Philadelphia police 
"Hedges, 'Benjamin Rush, Charles Brockden Brown, and the American Plague Year, ' p. 299. 
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is under threat. All is oriented around the notion of evil, in which the "political" 
complements the "physical"-an important distinction when Brown comes to depict 
burial gangs touring the city removing the dead and the half-dead alike; whilst evil 
is determined as an invasive force, penetrating the internalized projection of the 
American metropolis, internalized even to the extent of its syntactical position between 
dashes. 
Brown's ability to provide acute analyses of the anxieties in these epidemic 
situations operates, as in Defoe's A Journal of the Plague Year (1722), from his 
narratives' focus on and extension from individual experience. Arthur Mervyn in 
particular uses the device of a series of layered first person narratives to provide 
different temporalities and experiences, highlighting the experience of the epidemic 
most effectively through individual response. Foucault and Sontag both make the point 
that plague is regarded as an attack on the community in terms correlative to the state 
of political order and that the individual, where such order is threatened, is staticized 
and determined as healthy or infected very quickly under epidemic controls. In both 
Ormond and Arthur Mervyn the narrator and/or chief protagonist are constantly 
reaffirmed as individuals within varyingly destructive enclosures of infection and 
political control, wherein they struggle to maintain their mobility and difference, and 
both novels, interestingly enough, detail their protagonists' movements in 
contradistinction to that of the masses. Thus, Constantia Dudley remains in 
Philadelphia and moves around the town whilst a large part of the population head out 
into the country; and Arthur Mervyn similarly moves into, around, out of, and back 
into Philadelphia against the predominant flows of people. Staticity becomes 
synonymous with death, just as characters fear their potential incarceration in the 
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notorious Bush Hill hospital, which in actual fact was a house converted by order of 
the citizens committee: 
I had indeed a roof over my head. I should not perish in the public 
way; but what was my ground for hoping to continue under this roof? 
My sickness being suspected, I should be dragged in a cart to the 
hospital; where I should, indeed, die, but not with the consolation of 
loneliness and silence. Dying groans were the only music, and livid 
corpses were the only spectacle, to which I should there be introduced. 
(AM, pp. 154-155) 
The anxieties of the individual are placed frictionally within the structures of epidemic 
control, themselves only an intensification of the organizations of power within the 
culture, so that the individual resists emergency measures and expresses his fears of 
enclosure through programmed millennial images: effectively, forms of paranoia 
operating against and yet in formation with one another, their belief patterns stemming 
from similar desires for control. 
These connections of anxiety receive their confirmation in Arthur Mervyn by 
the unusual shift in perception which occurs when Mervyn abruptly overcomes the 
narrative's expressed fear of the Bush Hill hospital and decides to go there and "offer 
(him)self as a superintendent. " Mervyn adds: At least while I had the power, I was 
bound to exert it to the wisest purposes. I resolved to seek the City Hall 
immediately... " (AM, pp. 179-180). Similarly, when visiting Welbeck in prison Mervyn 
expresses a desire to learn "new motives to sincerity and rectitude" (AM, p. 334), a 
further gravitation inwards towards the centres of control from his nomadic sequence 
of movements. In Deleuze and Guattari's terms Mervyn undergoes a 
reterritorialization, is reclaimed from the peripheral and fluid position he maintains in 
his nomadic singularity in the face of the epidemic controls, back toward sanctioned 
institutions. From fear of authoritarian control Mervyn moves to a position embracing 
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the securities offered by centralized surveillance activities, in line with Shirley 
Samuels' description of the Philadelphian community's reaction to the reform of the 
Bush Hill hospital, where: "The new administration reformed the institution so 
successfully that people began to desire the hospital, and had finally to certify that 
they were indeed suffering from the plague in order to be admitted there. "g' This 
marks out the dream of political control: to make the controlled desire their ordering, 
a process dependent upon the simultaneous alignment of mass anxieties with those of 
authority. 
The abruptness of Mervyn's change from fear of, to acceptance and 
participation in, socio-political control is tempered somewhat by the fact that his 
passage through the novel becomes one exemplifying the re-emplacement of social 
orders. Initially destitute and parasitic, and engaged in a series of penetrations to the 
centre of domestic privacies, Mervyn later turns these actions into forms of 
experiential therapy for himself and those around him, so that he can act as an agent 
of reassurance as the second part of the text moves on from the epidemic to the 
restoration of order. This reassurance essentially involves the removal of suspicions 
about Mervyn for the other characters-primarily through the agency of his "mentor" 
Dr Stevens and his wife, signifying acceptance by the social controls of medicine and 
'family' respectively-and concurrently his reintegration with them and the 
reconstructed society on several different levels. Politically, we have already seen how 
Mervyn's desires reorient themselves towards control, whilst his penetrative actions 
similarly become reflections of the desire to see all social space ordered, as when he 
seeks Clemenza Lodi in a brothel: 
"Samuels, 'Plague and Politics in 1793: Arthur Mervyn, ' p. 233. 
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Once more I reflected on the rectitude of my intentions-on the benefits 
of my expedition, and of gaining access to the object of my visit 
without interruption or delay... I thought, with scornful emotions, on 
the bars and hinderances which pride, and caprice, and delusive 
maxims of decorum, raise in the way of human intercourse. I spurned 
at these semblances and substitutes of honesty, and delighted to shake 
such fetters into the air and trample such impediments to dust. I wanted 
to see a human being, in order to promote her happiness. It was 
doubtful whether she was within twenty paces of the spot where I 
stood. The doubt was to be solved. How? By examining the space. 
(AM, p. 317) 
Mervyn's purpose here and elsewhere in the second part of the novel involves 
intrusions and surveillances designed to clarify sexual and familial organization, 
primarily by opening up these spaces to language (or "human intercourse") and thus 
control through the arrangement of discourse. Ostensibly, Mervyn seeks to dispell the 
paranoia of the plague experience in himself and others, an effort undertaken in the 
telling of the stories, and then promote reintegration and order, acting as a conduit 
both as a literary device and as an individual force for social transformation. The 
problem is, however, that Mervyn's transformation from innocence to 
experience-within the scope of the contemporary Romantic process-involves him 
in an absorption of the practices of social order which threaten and, indeed, ensure the 
reintroduction of a paranoid potential, exactly within Mervyn's craving for familial and 
political correctness. He becomes an agent seeking knowledge and directing suspicion 
having been transformed from the suspicious circumstances of an unknown agency, 
developing systems of certainty and, in Serres' phrase, "non-knowledge, " out of the 
determined chaos of his past and the epidemic experience. He can carry the 
temporarily detoxified but always available virus of paranoia back into the new 
American state's dream of social order which may require its activity at another 
opportune political moment. 
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4. Eternal Melancholy 
'Somnambulism. A Fragment' 
A short story by Brown entitled 'Somnambulism. A Fragment, ' and published 
anonymously by him in his Literary Magazine and American Register (Philadelphia, 
May 1805), provides a useful conclusion to this study of the narrative representation 
of certain paranoid qualities present within American social consciousness in the 
period. Indeed, it highlights with some intensity the extent to which Brown's fiction 
interrogates the pursuit of guilt, both as an internalized individual necessity, and as 
part of state and social processes designed to locate the certain origin of volition. 
Brown's fascination for this territory of human and interpersonal activity becomes 
more than just a confirmation of philosophical and psychological precepts, however, 
as his writing self-consciously turns on the creative elements contained within the 
destructive transformations he depicts. The story concerns the murder of a young 
woman travelling with her father at night in a remote part of the American 
countryside, and is narrated by the presumed murderer, a young man named Althorpe 
whom, it is proposed, committed the act whilst sleep-walking. The plot establishes 
a scope of anxieties resonant within the issues already discussed, and works its way 
through them to a point of abrupt narrative cessation appropriate to the drama of self- 
confession and the collective implosion of paranoia produced within a culture gripped 
by a range of obsessions: social and political infidelity, unexplained phenomena and 
their deviation from the humanly-designated mechanism of natural process (and thus 
from the control of reason), and the consequent application of cause and effect 
explanatory force which seeks above all to locate the origin of action and enforce law 
where knowledge may be discontinuous. If one builds in to this analysis Michel 
Foucault's assertion that "[t]here are two meanings of the word 'subject': subject to 
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someone else by control and dependence; and tied to [one's] own identity by a 
conscience or self-knowledge, ' 88 then the narrative dramatizes the action of the latter 
as a product of the former, particularly in circumstances where "someone else" 
remains unknown. 
As such, the story is replete with anxieties whose frictions with one another 
are used skillfully by Brown to provide momentum and surprise within a forerunner 
to the detective genre. An epigraph to the story develops an initial documentary 
realism, relating a murder case almost exactly the same as the one dealt with in the 
narrative. Some key phrases reside in this epigraph, accurately determining the 
dimension of the paranoia which afflicts the story's characters, and which, most 
interestingly in terms of the presentation of such perceptual alignments, targets the 
creative process itself, as that process comes under suspicion and finds itself linked 
to the destruction which becomes the focus of the narrative. The epigraph, from "the 
Vienna Gazette of June 14,1784, " describes a murder and fixes upon a young man 
known to sleep-walk as the perpetrator in language revealing for the context of the 
narrative which follows: 
... the attention of physicians, and of the people, has been excited by the 
case of a young man, whose behaviour indicates perfect health in all 
respects but one. He has a habit of rising in his sleep, and performing 
a great many actions with as much order and exactness as when 
awake... After an accurate scrutiny, by the tribunal of the circle, he has 
been declared author of the murder: but what renders the case truly 
extraordinary is, that there are good reasons for believing that the deed 
was perpetrated by the youth while asleep, and was entirely unknown 
to himself. 89 
"'Michel Foucault, 'The Subject and Power' in Critical Inquiry, 8 (Summer 1982), p. 781. 
"Charles Brockden Brown, 'Somnambulism. A Fragment' in Somnambulism and Other Stories, 
ed. Alfred Weber (Frankfurt am Main 1987), p. 5. Hereafter referred to as 'S. ' 
132 
The story thus proceeds from an idea of "behaviour, " "perfect health" and "order" as 
a set pattern against which deviance may be measured, and it is fitting in these early 
American circumstances that measurement extends by progression from the 
representatives of scientific knowledge, then "the people, " before moving into the 
hands of a "tribunal. " That is, initiated from the modern physician who retains 
significant political power in Ackernecht's useful differentiation between the medicine 
man and his modern counterpart, where the former "plays his role as the most 
irrational man in an irrational pattern, " whilst the physician is "rationalizing even the 
irrational. i90 Combined with this, the notion of scrutiny from an authority seeking 
the "author" of the event, who "was entirely unknown to himself, " suggests 
consummate and far-reaching tensions operating in the determination of certainty and 
the ways in which that certainty may be reached in social discourse. 
The course of the narrative is simple yet provides a superstructure inside which 
a profoundly complex psychology is worked out: Althorpe, in a form of confession, 
tells of his acquaintance with Constantia Davis and her father, who have stayed for 
a period at his uncle's house. Mr Davis needs to leave urgently necessitating an 
overnight journey, and his daughter, the object of the narrator's passion, decides to 
accompany him. Althorpe attempts to dissuade both from their purpose, an action he 
becomes unable to explain to them in any convincing manner, and is only able to 
explain to the reader in terms of a fear of Constantia Davis's disinterest in him and 
potential marriage elsewhere, and, crucially, by a foreboding of the coming disaster. 
Daughter and father leave and Althorpe, consumed by melancholy and excitement, sits 
9OErwin H. Ackernecht, 'Problems of Primitive Medicine' in Bulletin of the History of 
Medicine, XI, 5 (1942), quoted in Henri F. Ellenberger, The Discovery of the Unconscious: 
The History and Evolution of Dynamic Psychiatry (New York 1970), p. 48. 
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up brooding on the course of their journey until he falls asleep in a chair in the 
parlour. Whilst asleep Althorpe dreams he follows the father and daughter and 
attempts to avert the assassination of Constantia Davis. He is unsuccessful and pursues 
the murderer and exacts revenge. Awakened next morning by his uncle, Althorpe feels 
refreshed and sets to the work of the day until his new peace is shattered by news of 
Constantia Davis's murder. Althorpe thereafter relates the details of the night's 
happenings as gleaned "at different times, from the witnesses" (S, 13), until the 
narrative ends abruptly on Constantia's death at the house of a physician. The night's 
journey had been one in which the father and daughter had been pursued by a 
shadowy figure who remained on the periphery of their vision exciting curiosity and 
fear. At first they believe the figure to be Althorpe, providing a distant escort, but then 
a traveller reassures them that this must be the local "idiot, " Nick Handyside, who was 
given to worrying strangers to the area by harmlessly pursuing them. When they are 
in the depths of the forest, however, a loud scream causes their horse and carriage to 
bolt, the carriage to be destroyed, dashed against a protruding oak, and the servant 
dispersed to locate the frightened animal. Leaving the exhausted Constantia, Mr Davis 
sets off for help but hears a pistol shot and returns to find his daughter mortally 
wounded. A nearby physician, Inglefield, arrives to help but Constantia Davis dies of 
a head wound. 
The tale, therefore, is a narrative sandwiched between two forms of 
authoritative representation, and as such the central anxiety is that of the narrator, 
expressed directly in the articulation of feelings and sensations. Althorpe's remarks, 
however, also reveal the anxieties of the other characters-the Davis's and Althorpe's 
uncle, primarily-and the cultural anxiety oriented around specific targeted threats to 
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the cohesion and power of social order. The family, most immediately, experiences 
a fatal disruption which is worked out in the triangular relationship of 
father/daughter/suitor, with Althorpe depicted clearly as an outsider seeking to 
penetrate and emplace himself within social conformity. Indeed, he describes his 
position, without parents, as one of isolation under the care of his uncle: "My age and 
situation, in this family, rendered silence and submission my peculiar province" (S, 
9). The reactions of father and daughter are correlatively forceful and suspicious as 
Althorpe's efforts of persuasion are repulsed: these efforts are viewed by Mr Davis as 
"interference" despite the superficial benevolence of his view of Althorpe; and by 
Constantia Davis as "overweening and fickle" presaging "mischief" despite her sense 
of the young man's feeling. Significantly, also, the only dialogue reported between 
Constantia and Althorpe is an explicit denial based assertively on independent female 
capability-a compounding of Althorpe's social anxieties by a rebuff both from the 
object of desire and the feminine. This factor sets up a further tension within the 
patriarchally organized discourse which consolidates a range of forces in an attempt 
to explore and control deviance, manipulating those most vulnerable and concluding 
with a woman's sacrifice. 
However, the social priorities of family and gender become only a part of the 
wider energy concerning the threat of the unknown and irrational which infuses 
Brown's writing, as those qualities reflect the inexplicable force of nature. This issue 
actively sites Brown's fiction as transitional in its exploratory probing of phenomena 
and social disruption attendant upon the breakdown of Enlightenment certainties 
assembled to allow the force of reason under the momentums of fear accessibility to 
all parts of the perceived universe. Brown effectively documents here, as in his novels, 
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the action of accumulated anxieties transformed on contact with the inexplicable and 
irrational, particularly as a reflection of that inexplicability, into fears whose targets 
absorb and redistribute the destruction meted out to them. 
Brown's debt to the radical thinkers of the immediate and preceding period as 
it contributes to this function of his writing has been indicated. What emerges as 
striking in these terms in this story, however-and it is a key part of Brown's creative 
and explorative action in his writing-is the explicit sense of a grappling with the 
tenets of sensory and social control, and the place within that schema of creative 
faculties as they extend from the political dicta underlying Enlightenment 
comprehension of the universe. Indeed, Brown's focus in 'Somnambulism. A 
Fragment' and in many of his other narratives is that central problem which has 
consumed psychologists from before the Enlightenment, through Freud, to the present: 
is the unconscious a manifestation of volitional autonomous action; or is it the result 
of social conditioning? The most obvious target for the text are the initial chapters of 
Leviathan (1651), where Hobbes runs through "Sense, " "Imagination" and "Reason and 
Science" as they may be seen to determine the dimensions "Of Man. " Brown's 
consideration of these political imperatives are so precise, in fact, that Hobbes' 
examples of sensory order and disorder reappear in the actions of Althorpe, 
particularly in the references to "fancy" and "imagination, " and the circumstances of 
his falling asleep and subsequent dream. Hobbes' assertion at the beginning of 
Leviathan that "there is no conception in a man's mind, which hath not at first, totally, 
or by parts, been begotten upon the organs of sense, " and that imagination "is nothing 
but decaying sense, 1191 emplaces an associative view of mental processes, allowing 
"Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Harmondsworth, Middlesex 1979), pp. 85,88. Text italics. 
136 
the prescription of causality and the determination of responsibility according to 
observed phenomena. Hobbes then discusses the problems for this view presented by 
dreams and visions, or non-sentient perception, and identifies "distemper of some of 
the inward parts of the Body" as their cause in line with the contemporary psychiatric 
approach, giving an example where: 
The most difficult discerning of a mans Dream, from his waking 
thoughts, is then, when by some accident we observe not that we have 
slept: which is easie to happen to a man full of fearfull thoughts; and 
whose conscience is much troubled; and that sleepeth, without the 
circumstances, of going to bed, or putting off his clothes, as one that 
noddeth in a chayre. 92 
Althorpe follows this course but his circumstances are disturbed by the prominence 
throughout his sleeping and dreaming of the intangibility and expansions offered 
within his non-sentient process. Hobbes' requirement that "fancy and imagination 
needs to be held in strict check by judgementi93 is overridden by the extraordinary 
force of the unknown energy behind the dream, and the narrative responds by seeking 
causal explanations attached to the idea that: 
"[a]ll Fancies are motions within us, reliques of those made in the 
sense... In summe, the Discourse of the Mind, when it is governed by 
designe, is nothing but Seeking, or the faculty of Invention.. .a hunting 
out of the causes, of some effect, present or past, or of the effects, of 
some present or past cause... 94 
But the absence of cause in the narrative-enforced as the only available control of 
the uncontrollable-denies this tracing, despite the production through confession of 
"designe, " and denies the location sought by the Hobbesian enforcement of "civill 
92Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 91. 
93R. L. Brett, Fancy and Imagination (London 1969), p. 11. 
'Hobbes, Leviathan, pp. 94,96. 
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Obedience" where "no man therefore can conceive anything but he must conceive it 
in some place, X95 an obsession with physical origin whose destruction continues 
today by direct inheritance in the use of lobotomy and electroshock 'therapy. ' 
The central issue in 'Somnambulism' in these terms is the operation of an 
inexplicable natural force outside the prescribed norms of behaviour, which effects 
complete control over human capability beyond the resources of reason and scientific 
knowledge. It is this issue which directly reflects the contemporary Mesmeric 
controversy and linked political fears noted at the end of Chapter One. Thus the 
narratorial anxiety of Althorpe concerning Constantia, apparent as paranoia within the 
agency of "melancholy, " meets the force of social anxiety resulting in the death of a 
woman through the distortion of passion. The result is the classic culmination of 
obsession and control, staticity and death, a textual action with its own Hobbesian 
lineage, as Leo Braudy reminds us, where Hobbes "explained that language was really 
invented to facilitate social order by repressing the non-sociable self. X96 
To explore this equation further, for equation it becomes under the aegis of 
rational explanatory force seeking to determine responsibility, it is worth following the 
narrative through to trace its assemblage of perception and the ways in which the 
writing projects anxiety as a function of creatively confronting the unknown. The 
unknown in the story, of course, is somnambulism, unknown to the point of being 
absent entirely from the text except in the epigraph which preempts the narrative, 
setting up tensions within somnambulism's status as a departure from volition. 
Althorpe's nocturnal activity prescribes a spectrum of terrors, the primary energy 
95Hobbes, Leviathan, pp. 93,99. 
96Leo Braudy, 'Providence, Paranoia, and the Novel' in E. L. H., 48,1981, p. 621. 
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arising in the first-person narrative as the pure terror that he remains "unknown to 
himself, " capable of action beyond the range of sentience and conscious control, 
97 
and therefore outside the programmes of perception laid out by Hobbes and Locke, 
and toying with the assertions of Brown's contemporary, Benjamin Rush, that, 
"Dreaming, I have said, is a transient paroxysm of delirium. Somnambulism is nothing 
but a higher grade of the same disease. It is a transient paroxysm of madness. "" 
Where Hobbes requires a site of perceptual and experiential origin, the narrative can 
only provide the absence available in Althorpe's dream, and outside itself, the 
displaced territory of the epigraph, establishing the paranoid effort made by the 
narrative to demarcate the boundary of inside and out. The "unknown" also highlights 
the range of perceptual inadequacies and ambiguities evident in the other characters' 
knowledge, particularly of themselves and one another, all of which ferment together 
to develop the narrative's atmosphere of suspicion based on a sequence of socially- 
exerted presuppositions. Althorpe's reflections on his own mental and social state in 
fact come to reflect the fragility of the other characters' ability to interrelate, so that 
the portrayal of events and its absent cause becomes a symptom of a more general 
malaise of social insecurity and involuntary enforcement of desire. In consequence, 
the reliance on cause/effect structures consistently finds itself without an identifiable 
cause, allowing narrator, characters and reader alike the opportunity to perceive the 
abyss, or absence, from which springs paranoia: 
"'Brown is known to have written a novel entitled Sky-Walk; or, The Man Unknown to 
Himself, completed in December 1797 but unpublished and since lost. It is probable that both 
'Somnambulism. A Fragment' and Edgar Huntly; or, Memoirs of a Sleep-Walker (1799) 
incorporate parts of the earlier text; see 'S, ' p. 149. 
"Benjamin Rush, Medical Inquiries and Observations Upon the Diseases of the Mind 
(Philadelphia 1812), p. 304. 
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All men are, at times, influenced by inexplicable sentiments. Ideas 
haunt them in spite of all their efforts to discard them. Prepossessions 
are entertained, for which their reason is unable to discover any 
adequate cause. The strength of a belief, when it is destitute of any 
rational foundation, seems, of itself, to furnish a new ground for 
credulity. We first admit a powerful persuasion, and then, from 
reflecting on the insufficiency of the ground on which it is built, 
instead of being prompted to dismiss it, we become more forcibly 
attached to it. 
I had received little of the education of design. I owed the formation 
of my character chiefly to accident. I shall not pretend to determine in 
what degree I was credulous or superstitious. A belief for which I 
could not rationally account, I was sufficiently prone to consider as the 
work of some invisible agent; as an intimation from the great source 
of existence and knowledge (S, p. 8). 
The tension here surrounds the efficacy of the human use of rationality against 
phenomena outside rationality's sphere of influence. Althorpe focuses this by his own 
disclaimer attributing "accident" to those areas of development and experience outside 
comprehension, which seeks simultaneously to link them to "design" and tie them into 
a structure of accountability. When any "design" fails to materialize, designation takes 
over and the problem of unaccountable phenomena rapidly finds its articulation in a 
vocabulary expressive of political fears interwoven with the creative surge attending 
the discovery and exploration of unknown human energies: 
The revolution was almost incredible which my mind had undergone, 
in consequence of these incidents. It was so abrupt and entire that my 
soul seemed to have passed into a new form. 
... At length, as I 
have said, I sunk into profound slumber, if that 
slumber can be termed profound, in which my fancy was incessantly 
employed in calling up the forms, into new combinations, which had 
constituted my waking reveries. (S, pp. 11-12) 
This passage also highlights the need to reflect on the creative and expansive 
possibilities allowed within the perceptual philosophies of the Enlightenment. Locke's 
famous concept of human consciousness entering experience as a tabula rasa which 
accumulates associative experiences exposes an alternative to the control available in 
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a system of causal reliance, especially here in terms of the potential for humanity to 
rejuvenate and embrace new experiential process, as the revolutionary movements of 
the eighteenth century asserted in their claims to moral rectitude. The "revolution, " 
however, is swiftly terminated as Althorpe's personal recollections end soon afterward 
in a compact relation of his dream introduced as "ideas... full of confusion and 
inaccuracy, " and centred crucially around "pursuit of the guilty... detected... in an artful 
disguise" (S, p. 12). At the point where detection of culpability may be made, or the 
circumstances of Althorpe's excited mental condition explored, the narrative produces 
brevity and an intense ambivalence concerning the creative possibilities of such 
excitement. Guilt is excavated as a reflective quality and possibility for all in the 
realm of unconscious action, and the narrative then pursues the accounts of witnesses 
to determine what such energy may perform, whilst forestalling its actual presence in 
the text. 
The anxiety permeating the narrative and projected at the unknown receives 
its transformation into fear just as Althorpe's anxiety, it seems, transforms through 
dream into action-as it becomes clear that what occurs within Althorpe's non- 
sentience is an appalling and undeviating certainty, something made clear in Adolf 
Hitler's remark in a radio speech in Munich, March 14,1936, when he said, "I go my 
way with the assurance of a somnambulist. "99 Energy without fixed origin, appraised 
and launched within the characterization, so often termed natural, of inhumanly 
directed certainty-the Davis's, crucially, are told "that they had nothing to dread from 
human interference" (S, p. 19)-describes the parabola on and within which paranoia 
"Cited in Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man (London 1964), 
p. 298. 
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becomes such a prevalent (re)action. For in the face of such certainty, where 
destruction always lurks to confirm paranoia, the proclaimed certainty of 
Enlightenment system disintegrates and hardens into forms of surveillance and control 
generated within and without the human subject, projecting back paranoid certainties 
of insane and implosive force. Certainty then becomes in Brown the staticity and 
silence of confirmed fear, forged in the knowledge of human participation in an 
unremitting cycle-which signals the end of so many of his novels and this narrative, 
where his protagonists become certain of their and others' complicity in this cycle of 
fear breeding fears. 
This action becomes clear in the concluding part of the narrative which offers 
the events of the night at a safe remove. Not only is restraint put on any further 
exploration of creative energy in human experience but the detective function of the 
narrative proceeds to the crime and thereafter closes down any speculative effort by 
the introduction of law and science, in the person of the physician, and the most 
effective measure, the abrupt ending of the text. The ending, in fact, occurs as the 
ambivalence about creativity violently oscillates towards repulsion as the destructive 
consequences of such energy are placed in the context of law. The physician, 
Inglefield, comes upon the victim and the narrative articulates the primary concerns 
for social order: "To the physician the scene was inexplicable. Who was the author 
of this distress; by whom was the pistol discharged; whether through some untoward 
chance or with design, he was as yet uninformed... " (S, p. 23). The "author" is sought 
as responsible for the destruction and threat to order (by the possible introduction of 
another form of uncontrollable consciousness-"chance or... design") which may 
accompany creative energy; he concedes to the pervasive anxiety turned fearful and 
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paranoid in its efforts to locate the unaccountable by ceasing to write, a destruction 
paralleled by the realization of his own agency in the destruction of Constantia Davis, 
and a return to his "peculiar province" of "silence and submission. " 
The cumulative effect of the narrative strategy and the balance of elements 
within it is to represent a disturbance of the pattern of trust in nature, a formulation 
from the period of the problem endemic to American views of their own territory and 
consciousness. This generates an ambivalence simultaneously aware of the promise 
sustained in prototype senses of Manifest Destiny, whilst propelled by the erosion of 
Enlightenment mechanistic views and the desire to enclose and use nature, into 
suspicion, as the grids of human perception fit neither nature nor the patterns of 
conformity assembled by and for themselves. Nature, of course, remains inscrutable, 
and the urge for certainty continues and moves into a focus on human agency in the 
circumstances, juxtaposing human energies with the natural cycles assumed to be their 
origin. In turn, the writing represents this dilemma for the functions of social power 
in its use of symbol, effectively dramatizing the contemporary debate in literary 
consciousness and practice identified by Paul De Man as a friction and regression 
between symbol and allegory. De Man, through Hans-Georg Gadamer, highlights the 
priorities given to symbolism over allegory as Romanticism took hold in Western 
literature, which seek the point where: 
subjectivity of experience is preserved when it is translated into 
language; the world is then no longer seen as a configuration of entities 
that designate a plurality of distinct and isolated meanings, but as a 
configuration of symbols ultimately leading to a total, single, and 
universal meaning. This appeal to the infinity of a totality constitutes 
the main attraction of the symbol as opposed to allegory, a sign that 
refers to one specific meaning and thus exhausts its suggestive 
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potentialities once it has been deciphered. 10° 
This effort has clear implications for the paranoid presence at this stage in Western 
consciousness, highlighting in the transfer of meaning between perceptual strategies 
the urge for totality driven on from obsessions with "specific meaning" towards 
"intimation[s] from the great source of existence and knowledge" (S, p. 8). De Man, 
however, extends the situation's complexity by investigating the relationship between 
subject and object in early nineteenth century Romanticism as it reveals, in fact, the 
failure of symbolic totalities to provide a lucidity or connectivity tenable in the face 
of nature and human experience: 
The dialectical relationship between subject and object is no longer the 
central statement of romantic thought, but this dialectic is now located 
entirely in the temporal relationships that exist within a system of 
allegorical signs. It becomes a conflict between a conception of the self 
seen in its authentically temporal predicament and a defensive strategy 
that tries to hide from this negative self-knowledge. On the level of 
language the asserted superiority of the symbol over allegory, so 
frequent during the nineteenth century, is one of the forms taken by 
this tenacious self-mystification. 'o' 
Brown's writing in 'Somnambulism' presents this problem precisely as it operates in 
the conflict dramatized between nature and the organization of power asserted by the 
subject and cultural hegemony. At the forefront of nature's implication in the murder 
is an oak tree mentioned early on in the narrative as an obstacle to travellers on the 
road taken by Constantia Davis and her father. The language used is again revealing 
of the tensions present in the story, here beginning the development of what ostensibly 
may be a symbol of human interaction with nature, while underneath these 
100Paul De Man, The Rhetoric of Temporality' in Blindness and Insight: Essays in the Rhetoric 
of Contemporary Criticism (London 1983), p. 188. 
'°1De Man, 'The Rhetoric of Temporality, ' p. 208. 
144 
preparations simmers an ambivalence more disposed toward the threat posed by nature 
to the human ordering of the landscape: 
I imagined the possibility of their guide's forgetting the position of a 
certain oak that grew in the road. It was an ancient tree, whose boughs 
extended, on all sides, to an extraordinary distance. They seemed 
disposed by nature in that way in which they would produce the most 
ample circumference of shade. I could not recollect any other 
obstruction from which much was to be feared (S, p. 11). 
The beneficence of the oak in its shade, age and wider cultural resonance as a 
representation of solidity and dependability stands beside the malignant qualities 
detected in its position athwart human progression, boughs extended almost 
anthropomorphically to restrain those confronting it. In this way the symbol becomes 
polarized, in effect soaking up the paranoia generated around it by human perception 
determining the inability of the symbol to represent the totality of cause. The oak is 
so central and inclusive an icon in the story that it assumes the 'presence' of a symbol, 
drawing in a series of meanings and representing a sequence of interconnected 
qualities. The urge of the narrative for coherence and fixed meaning, however, fixes 
it as a lynchpin of the threat of natural and objective force, and its representation 
becomes allegorical to the extent its threat is "deciphered. " In fact, the traces of 
anthropomorphism are central to the connection of the mysterious human energies, 
kept outside the narrative, and the inscrutability of nature, causing the symbol of the 
oak later to contract toward a more allegorical function of distinct singular menace in 
its implication of human agency distorted by nature into irrational action. As this 
occurs, technology as an extension of human energy also plays a part, thrust by 
humanity up against the frontier of known and unknown in the environment as part 
of a rational force, and invariably shattered in consequence, as the carriage is against 
the protruding oak, causing the isolation of Constantia Davis and enabling her murder. 
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Importantly, again, the sequence of this action is begun by evidence of a 
distrust and constriction of the creative impulse behind the narrative whose purported 
connections to the act of murder emerge as a force of termination. After being trailed 
by the mysterious and silent figure through the woods-as opposed to the traveller's 
description of Nick Handyside, who describes the "idiot's" tendency to "howl" and 
cry-the Davis's are startled by an inarticulate scream "rendered more awful by the 
profound stillness that preceded and followed" it, which stampedes the horse and 
carriage from which they had alighted: 
The monster had shown some skill in the choice of a spot suitable for 
his design. Neighbouring precipices, and a thick umbrage of oaks, on 
either side contributed to prolong and heighten his terrible notes. 
... This accident happened at about a hundred yards from the oak, 
against which so many cautions had been given. It was not possible, at 
any time, without considerable caution, to avoid it. It was not to be 
wondered at, therefore, that, in a few seconds, the carriage was shocked 
against the trunk, overturned, and dashed into a thousand fragments. 
... In a few minutes they arrived at the oak. The chaise appeared to have 
been dashed against a knotty projecture of the trunk, which was large 
enough for a person to be conveniently seated on it. Here again they 
paused (S, pp. 21-22, text italics). 
As the culmination of the story nears, the narrative's temporal focus appropriately 
tightens, and correspondingly the characters' temporal status begins more strikingly to 
merge with the intense foreboding that each character accumulates as the narrative 
follows its course. The notion of "design" thus is reinforced, linked definitively to the 
oak both as the spatial and temporal representation of the point where nature, 
humanity and irrational force meet. Indeed, up to this point the figure in the woods 
is referred to only with mild apprehension, a reflection of harmlessness undermined 
only by the insistence present in the narrative that this figure represents a departure 
from rationality, where "his talents, differently applied, would have excited rational 
admiration" (S, p. 19). But once the denouement approaches, the vocabulary changes, 
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indicating a polarization of perception as the figure is referred to successively as a 
"monster" (from the description of Nick Handyside), a "spectre" (after the scream), 
and then at the point of destruction, a "demoniac" (S, pp. 19,21,22,23). And as 
superstition crowds in to suggest cause, the oak becomes the scene of instantaneity, 
a frozen temporality where opposed forces of existence meet head on and fuse the 
anxieties of those witnesses able to recount the moment into fear. The narrative 
isolates Mr Davis's thoughts as he is separated from his daughter, musing on: 
the impropriety of leaving a woman, single and unarmed, to the 
machinations of this demoniac. He had scarcely parted with her when 
these reflections occurred to him. His resolution was changed. He 
turned back with the intention of immediately seeking her. At the same 
moment, he saw the flash and heard the discharge of a pistol. The light 
proceeded from the foot of the oak (S, p. 23). 
Crucially, also, the scene is attended by a collective loss of reason where "design" 
takes over: Mr Davis's "imagination" becomes his sole mental refuge, leading to "the 
confusion of his thoughts, hindering him from tracing" Constantia`s head wound, and 
divesting him "of all presence of mind. " Similarly, Constantia is described as being 
"senseless" in a vacuum created by the fact that "the author of [t]his calamity had 
vanished" (S, p. 23). Such a vacuum is quickly filled by appropriate forces of social 
order which include the physician as well as most of his family... [and] his people" 
(S, p. 23), so that where the Davis family, their servant and technology are sundered 
order may be re-emplaced, and action removed from the wilderness to habitation. 
But such affirmation has no resonance and offers no hope, and as was stated 
before with regard to much of Brown's fiction, the final tone is one of silenced 
acknowledgement and resignation, an acceptance of the limitations of system as all 
that balanced thought may rely on, countered by the devastating evidence that 
unknown or uncontrollable energies exist in which human complicity, either volitional 
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or otherwise, is certain. The reinforcement of the programmes of knowledge endorsed 
by the hegemony, and broken in the face of such energy, reimpose themselves in the 
classic narrative form of paranoia, revenge, tracing causalities and apportioning and 
exacting blame. Althorpe's narrative action in this sense is to detect himself, building 
on Puritan senses of the enemy within, and historicizing the social line of control at 
the point where confession holds sway in secular necessities. This is where the 
individual, according to Foucault, becomes more and more the subject of self- 
regulation, culminating in the nineteenth century's intensification of scientific detection 
strategies, and by involvement and extension, psychoanalysis. 
Brown, of course, had already detected the damage inevitable in such 
politically and culturally insistent strategies, and in the context of this study Leslie 
Fiedler's comment "that over his whole frantic, doomed career, the blight of 
melancholy presides" is both etymologically and biographically apposite. 102 Such 
knowledge is warily present in the revelatory discourse of another of Brown's 
somnambulists, Edgar Huntly's Clithero Edny: 
Death is but a shifting of the scene, and the endless progress of 
eternity, which, to the good, is merely the perfection of felicity, is, to 
the wicked, an accumulation of woe. The self-destroyer is his own 
enemy: this has ever been my opinion. (EH, 87) 
Alongside the truth in such profound and obvious pessimism, of course, remains the 
creative surge available in melancholy, whether American or individual, if only it can 
be given a trajectory out of paranoid enclosures. A significant part of Charles 
Brockden Brown's achievement is to create fiction which gives extraordinary scope 
for the reader's inferential processes, demonstrating paranoid potentials and the 
102Leslie Fiedler, Love and Death in the American Novel (1960; London 1970), p. 137. 
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opportunities for creative engagement in narratives which avoid the imprisoning 




A History of Discourses: 1820-present 
1. The Nineteenth-Century 
The term paranoia continued to appear in medical dictionaries and lexicons 
throughout the first half of the nineteenth century, continuing its links to delirium. The 
development of interest by psychologists such as the American Thomas Upham in a 
condition termed monomania began the century's refinement of discourses towards a 
pattern of meaning in America and Europe which would link paranoia to a more 
specific concept of mental behaviour. Upham's Elements of Mental Philosophy (1831) 
became an important systematization of the Scottish Common Sense philosophy which 
dominated American thinking in the early part of the nineteenth-century, and in it he 
refined notions of mental process into two actions: the "Intellectual" and "Sentient. " 
In enlarging on the separate "elements" of mental process Upham undertook an 
evaluation of mental disorders, determining that monomania was a condition where: 
the alienation of reasoning is not so extensive but exists chiefly in 
relation to certain subjects, in respect to which the belief is affected. 
When the train of reasoning leads the person within the range of these 
particular subjects, whatever they are, we at once discover that the 
intellect is disordered. ' 
In 1838 Jean Esquirol (1772-1840) published Des Maladies Mentales2 in 
'Thomas Upham, Elements of Mental Philosophy (1831; rpt New York 1848), Volume One, 
p. 440. Cited in Allan Gardner Smith, The Analysis of Motives: Early American Psychology 
and Fiction (Amsterdam 1980), p. 139. 
2Jean Esquirol, Des Maladies Mentales considerees sous les rapports medicale, hygienique et 
medico-legale (Paris 1838). Translated by E. K. Hunt as Mental Maladies: A Treatise on 
Insanity (Philadelphia 1845). 
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which he devoted considerable analysis to forms of monomania: 
By this term ... Esquirol, its originator, 
designated that form of insanity 
in which, while the memory, the conceptions, and judgements generally 
are not destroyed, and no pronounced emotional disturbance exists, yet 
the patient is controlled by some expansive delusion or ambitious 
project. ' 
Esquirol describes three main types of monomania, with many sub-groupings. These 
types are intellectual, affective, and instinctive. The "monomanie intellectuelle" is 
closest to modern conceptions of paranoia, where: 
The patients start from a false principle, which they follow logically 
without deviation, and from which they derive legitimate consequences 
which (in their turn) modify their affects and acts of volition; outside 
4 this partial delusion, they feel, reason and act as everybody else. 
In fact, Esquirol's theories regarding monomania were known in Europe before the 
publication of Des Maladies Mentales, and as the earlier Cyclopedia of Practical 
Medicine indicates, citing Esquirol as responsible, the term largely supplanted the 
age-old use of melancholia within medicine and psychiatry: 
The term monomania, meaning madness affecting one train of thought, 
or involving only a single morbid impression, was on these 
considerations substituted, and has generally been adopted of late times 
instead of melancholia. ' 
The transitions for paranoia tangible in the work of Upham and Esquirol were not 
only significant in nosological terms, for the period in which they attempted their 
definitions and annexations of mental conditions saw an intensity in the relations 
between law and the mental sciences. These drives for the security of fixed 
3E. C. Spiztka, Insanity, its Classification, Diagnosis and Treatment; a Manual for Students and 
Practitioners of Medicine (New York 1883), p. 287. 
'Jean Esquirol, Mental Maladies: A Treatise on Insanity, translated by E. K. Hunt (Philadelphia 
1845), Volume One, p. 332. 
Sed. Forbes, Tweedie & Connolly, Cyclopedia of Practical Medicine (London 1833), Volume 
Two, p. 835. 
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identification of mental conditions provoked crucial upheavals in the use of law as 
psychiatrists and psychologists assumed and sought power within their culture and 
societies. The application of evidence by "experts" in the mental sciences has a long 
history but has never been more fraught than in the mid-nineteenth-century when, as 
David Brion Davis suggests, law in European and American states confronted the 
issue of total and partial insanity, and the responsibilities of criminals within those 
mental conditions: 
As psychiatry moved toward the conception of a unified 
personality... the law searched for some area in the mind of the 
paranoid, the schizophrenic, and the psychopath which remained 
inviolate and capable of bearing the burden of normal guilt. The 
ambiguous and fluctuating states of legal insanity by the 1840s 
necessitated some clear and definite state of authority, when French and 
English psychiatry threatened to undermine the basic principles of 
criminal jurisprudence. ' 
Although Davis's terms do not entirely match the psychiatric language of the 1840s, 
his sense of the shifts of power in these contexts is acute, and relevant in any 
discursive tracing of paranoia where suspicion, anxiety and the uses of guilt emerge 
as responses and tools for manipulation in the formation of social and political power. 
To all intents and purposes the transition of paranoia from a broad-based 
psychiatric concept of delirium to one of particular clinical reference to a set of 
symptoms occurred in the sixty years following 1840. The essential process of refining 
this set of symptoms into a working clinical concept occurred in Germany. In 1845 
Wilhelm Griesinger published Die Pathologie und Therapie der psychischen 
Krankheiten in which he used the term "Partielle Verrücktheit"' to describe incurable 
'David Brion Davis, Homicide in American Fiction 1798-1860 (Ithaca 1957), p. 66. 
7The literal meaning of verrücktheit in German comes from verrücken, to shift or move, and 
theit, thought, an etymological construction almost identical to the Greek napävoLa. 
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mental illness with attendant delusions of persecution or grandeur. His points of 
reference were two case studies of his own which had developed these delusional 
ideas secondarily to mania and melancholia, and he went on to determine such 
aberrational tendencies as part of a group which he called "Mental Weaknesses"; 
tendencies he saw making up the mass of mental illnesses exhibited by 
institutionalized patients. 
By 1852, Ernest Lasegue was able to refer in his Etudes Medicates to the 
German psychiatric explorations in this area, stating in a section of his book entitled 
"Wire des Persecutions" that the "partielle verrücktheit" of contemporary German 
psychiatry referred to delusions of persecution, whilst in 1860 Benedict Morel added 
to psychiatric understanding of the dynamics of "monomania" in his Traite des 
maladies mentales by identifying the systematized character of the patient's delusions. 
Consequently, Morel coined his own term for monomania, "Manie systematisee. " 
From 1860 onwards a flood of publications and periodicals emanated from the 
German psychiatric scene, fashioning the clinical dimensions of an incurable mental 
aberration which exhibited delusions of persecution or grandeur of a systematized 
nature, alongside traits of suspicion and anxiety. Karl L. Kahlbaum (1828-1899) 
published his nosological statement in 1863, Die Gruppirung der Psychischen 
Krankheiten, in which a system of classification was elaborated under the stringent 
observation of phenomena, pathology, causation, course and outcome. Following 
Griesinger's lead, he asserted the incurable nature of the "Partielle Verrücktheit" 
condition, stating his belief that the condition was essentially an affectation of the 
intellect, rather than having any emotional or physiological causality. In this act, 
Kahlbaum confirmed the growing psychiatric opinion that paranoia deserved an 
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autonomous position as a mental condition rather than being part of a larger 
aberrational process. In 1865 Snell suggested, in line with Esquirol's conclusions, that 
the paranoid condition should be named "Primäre Monomanie, " but two years later 
redefined his position, outlining the systematized and constructed nature of the 
delusions and affirming the German term "Primäre Verrücktheit. "8 Sander located 
what he believed to be an hereditary nature of the paranoid condition where the 
intellectual processes remained fundamentally intact in 1868,9 whilst some ten years 
later, Carl Westphal was able to draw the conclusions of the past thirty years into the 
assertion that "Verrücktheit" was an independent primary psychosis, essentially an 
affection of the intellect, and never secondary to melancholia. 'o 
According to Aubrey Lewis, the crucial shift in terminology occurred in the 
following years: 
Mendel and Werner had a considerable share in getting "paranoia" 
more widely used than the synonym Verrücktheit. Mendel had 
advocated the exclusive use of "paranoia" in 1880, Werner took the 
same standpoint in 1891, and Verrücktheit, though it did not entirely 
fall out of currency, was regarded generally as an old-fashioned, 
ambiguous term. " 
What ensured that these suggestions were taken up by the psychiatry of the time, 
however, was the inclusion of the term in the sequence of influential publications 
8L. Snell, 'Monomanie als Primäre Form der Seelenstörung' in Allgemeine Zeitschrift für 
Psychiatrie, 22,1865, pp. 368-381. 
9W. Sander, 'über eine spezielle Form der primären Verrücktheit' in Archiv für Psychiatrie und 
Nervenkrankheiten, vereinigt mit Zeitschrift für die gesamte Neurologie und Psychiatrie, 1, 
1868, pp. 387-419. 
`°Carl Westphal, 'Uber die Verrücktheit' in Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Psychiatrie, 34,1878, 
pp. 252-257. 
"Aubrey Lewis, 'Paranoia and paranoid: a historical perspective' in Psychological Medicine, 
p. 4. Ernest Mendel contributed an entry 'Paranoia' to Real-Encyclopädie, ed. A. Eulenberg, 
(Vienna 1880), and C. Werner published Die Paranoia (Stuttgart 1891). 
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through the last decades of the nineteenth century which effectively endorsed 
psychiatry, and then created psychoanalysis, as valid areas of human knowledge, with 
the scientific, cultural and academic centralizations of opinion which accompany such 
endorsement. Paranoia was no different from several other terms at this time in its 
intersection with and adaption to a prescribed condition and set of empirically 
determined symptoms organized according to the emergence of a scientific doxa. 
Minor diagnostic differences still remained, obviously, and the identification of the 
basic mechanisms regarded today as the underlying structure of paranoia had yet to 
be "discovered": this "discovery" would occur as paranoia came of age as the 
twentieth century began. 
The first of these publications was Richard von Krafft-Ebing's Lehrbuch der 
Psychiatrie. The text went through successive editions and revisions, and was 
translated into English in Philadelphia in 1904. In it, Krafft-Ebing (1840-1902) 
applies the term paranoia to: 
... a chronic mental 
disease occurring exclusively in tainted individuals, 
frequently developing out of constitutional neuroses, the principal 
symptoms of which are delusions... 
... and, in contrast with the delusions of primary hallucinatory insanity, 
are, from the beginning, systematized, methodic, and combined with 
the process of judgement, constituting a formal delusional structure. 
This capability of combining and reasoning activity, in contrast with 
the psychic processes in primary hallucinatory insanity, is possible 
owing to the relative freedom from damage of the intellect, at least on 
its formal side (judgement); so that on superficial observation one is 
struck by the clearness and logic of such patients (monomania). 
Notwithstanding the apparent lucidity of consciousness, this is, 
however, disturbed in a peculiar way, in that, in spite of the absence of 
emotion, in spite of the clearness of apperception, the patient cannot 
correct his imagination, hallucinations, etc., and rather - devoid of the 
power of criticism - accepts them as facts. Thus his judgements are 
necessarily based upon false premises, and the creation of delusional 
conceptions is the necessary result, the foundation and keystone of 
which, notwithstanding the correctness of the logical creation, are 
fictions... 
155 
I have never seen paranoia in untainted persons. The taint, in the 
vast majority of cases, has been hereditary. 12 
Krafft-Ebing's concentration on the dysfunction of reason in paranoid consciousness, 
and his suggestion of an hereditary origin for the condition, are the striking elements 
in his analysis. In the former, the identifications made by Kant and Cox are 
compressed into the highly rationalized discourse which marks the psychiatric 
discourse of the period, proceeding mechanically to its conclusion and seemingly 
unaware that its location of unreason operates precisely within the parameters of 
"clearness and logic" and "process of judgement" connected to the aberration. Linked 
to this is the latter drive toward an origin of the condition, a manifestation of the 
nineteenth century obsession with source in the effort to control which found its 
apotheosis in some extrapolations from Darwinian theory. As science affirmed the 
heredity of humanity, so psychiatry could enhance its use of a means of tracing 
aberration, for which purpose rationality provided a suitably plastic medium. In the 
"combination" of these drives, the analyst need only locate his perception of "taint" 
and pursue it through a system of traces. The point is not that Krafft-Ebing's analysis 
is diagnostically wrong-headed, but that it fails to identify how close it comes itself 
to paranoia in its uses of reason, where "judgement" is all that separates the analyst's 
premise from those determined to be "false premises. " 
In nosological terms, Krafft-Ebing outlines two forms of the paranoia within 
which to articulate the progressions and developments of the condition. "Original 
Paranoia" concerns cases beginning before or during puberty, developing the idea of 
12Richard von Krafft-Ebing, Lehrbuch der Psychiatrie auf klinische Grundlage für practische 
Ärzte und Studirende (Stuttgart 1879); translated by C. G. Chaddock as Text-book of insanity, 
based on clinical observations for practitioners and students of medicine (Philadelphia 1904), 
pp. 368-371. 
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an "hereditary taint. " "Late (Acquired) Paranoia" concentrates on cases beginning after 
puberty, with two sub-sections: "persecutory paranoia" (with its own subsidiaries of 
paranoia sexualis and querulous paranoia [which involves mania for litigation]); and 
"expansive paranoia" (involving delusions of grandeur, with subsidiaries of inventive, 
or reformatory paranoia, religious paranoia, and erotic paranoia). 
In the same year Krafft-Ebing's Lehrbuch der Psychiatrie first appeared, Emil 
Kraepelin (1856-1926) published the first in his ongoing series of the Psychiatrie: ein 
kurzes Lehrbuch für Studirende und Aerzte, within which appeared what remains 
today a yardstick definition of paranoia: 
[Paranoia is] the insidious development of a permanent unshakeable 
delusional system from inner causes in which the clarity and order of 
thinking, willing, and action are completely preserved... 
[Delusion] effects a deep seated change of the total outlook on life, and 
a derangement of standpoint towards the surrounding world... 
Every delusional idea is a representation falsified by the disease... [they] 
are mistakes aroused pathologically, which are inaccessible to 
rectification by rational means. 13 
Kraepelin's definition went through several revisions in the successive editions of his 
Lehrbuch as he sought to isolate an essential condition of paranoia. This drive 
resulted in the consensus-forming opinion that paranoia in its "true" form was 
incurable, and the assertion that "true" paranoia was an extremely rare condition in 
its pure form as differentiated within the accumulated symptoms drawn from the 
concepts of monomania and "verrücktheit. " In the initial editions, Kraepelin adhered 
closely to the symptomatic and causal descriptions of paranoia given by Kahlbaum 
and others in German psychiatry, but by 1896 he began to view paranoia as closely 
13 Emil Kraepelin, Psychiatrie: ein kurzes Lehrbuch für Studirende und Aerzte (Leipzig 1883- 
1913); translated by A. Ross Diefendorf as Clinical Psychiatry: a text-book for students and 
physicians (New York 1907), p. 238. 
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linked to another aberrational construct, "dementia praecox. " This was a term first 
suggested by the French psychiatrist, Benedict Morel, in his 1860 Traite des maladies 
mentales, to organize various forms of dementia. Kraepelin's use of the term occurs 
more specifically with regard to a condition which today would be termed 
schizophrenia. In the 1896 Lehrbuch, Kraepelin grouped "dementia paranoides" with 
"dementia praecox" and "catatonia, " as three distinct degenerative diseases or 
"Verblödungsprozesse. " Paranoia itself, as a pure condition, remained distinct, 
differentiated by the non-impairment intellectual processes. 
n 
In the 1899 Leh buch, Kraepelin went further, and combined "dementia 
paranoides, " "dementia praecox" and "catatonia" as a single disease, "Dementia 
Praecox, " whilst maintaining paranoia as a separate and extremely rare condition in 
its pure non-degenerating form. The problem became the presence of particular 
symptoms in both "Dementia Praecox" and his "pure" paranoia to the point where, in 
1912, he published a paper entitled "Uber Paranoide Erkrankungen, 1114 which 
suggested that paranoia no longer be used as a psychiatric term in view of its complex 
and different use over the preceding decades, and its confusing similarities to 
"Dementia Praecox. " Kraepelin suggested further that the term "paraphrenia" be used 
to describe a paranoid condition which later develops the degenerations associated 
with "Dementia Praecox, " whilst any use of the term paranoia should be limited to 
delimiting a psychogenic disorder alongside other hysterias. Thus, the qualities of 
paranoia entered the ambiguous territory demarcating psychosis and neurosis. In its 
non-degenerating form and as a psychogenic disorder (relating to an illness which has 
14Emil Kraepelin, 'Uber Paranoide Erkrankungen' in Zentralblatt für die gesamte Neurologie 
und Psychiatrie, No. 11,1912, pp. 617-638. 
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no obvious organic basis), paranoia remained within the bounds of the recently 
formulated concept of neurosis, whereas its fixed delusional system and incurability 
placed it as a psychosis. 
This tension between psychosis and neurosis in the diagnosis of paranoia 
remains today, as evidenced in Paranoia: A Study in Diagnosis. 15 The text is devoted 
to analysing what the authors determine the "paradoxes" of paranoia, the movements 
between psychosis and neurosis being just one of these. In tracing the different 
interpretive facilities of psychosis and neurosis, particularly the more recent 
S 
"dismissals" of the demarcation by Thomas Szaz and R. D. Laing, they conclude by A 
asserting paranoia's essential paradox, which they see as the condition's definition 
through psychiatric discourse but that discourse's inability to securely locate the 
condition's proposed aberration. 
Kraepelin's project, therefore, marks another discursive end and beginning in 
a history of paranoia. His definition reappears throughout the twentieth century as a 
formed basis to any discussion of the condition, as does the assumption that paranoia 
is invariably unresponsive to the therapeutic or curative techniques of psychiatry. 
Equally, Kraepelin's consciously articulated doubts as to its specific dimensions have 
resulted in a debate which continues today. In recalling the definition quoted from the 
Lehrbuch, a brief semantic analysis, as with the notions put forward by Krafft-Ebing, 
highlights the emergence of an urge for diagnostic certainty based prominently on 
words and phrases whose meaning conveys a rational intensity in proximity to the 
location of unreason. Examples such as "insidious, " "representation falsified, " and an 
15Yehuda Fried and Joseph Agassi, Paranoia: A Study in Diagnosis (London 1976). Fried is 
a psychiatrist, and Agassi a philosopher. 
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"inaccessab[ility] to rectification" reoccur in Lectures XV and XVI of Kraepelin's 
Einführung in die psychiatrische Klinik: 
in paranoia.. . the real root of the malady 
lies in a morbid predisposition, 
and that we have to deal with a manifestation of degeneration. The 
insidious development of the disease, its fundamental incurability, and 
the insignificance of visible disturbances would perhaps also be in 
favour of this view. 16 
Historically, there is no doubt of Emil Kraepelin's commitment to furthering human 
knowledge of mental disease and the reduction of human suffering, and that those 
suffering unmistakably from paranoid psychoses need aid for themselves and to 
prevent them harming others. At the same time, it is evident that textually and 
theoretically, at least, his efforts remain encapsulated in a system of discourses aligned 
within a science of control of the mind and body of those identified as requiring 
control. As has been stressed before, the discourses dealing with paranoia are 
fundamentally no different from those involved in the analysis of other mental 
conditions, but again it is striking that the focus on the aberrant elements contains 
within itself a marked fear of the irrational and invisible, which in turn provides 
impetus for the rational closure of definition. Contemporarily, the controversy 
surrounding the writings of Lautreamont had revealed that morbidity inevitably 
generates suspicion in the mysteriousness of its energies produced contrary to the life- 
force; the fact that they may be "pre-disposed, " or originate beyond the range of 
detection, increases the perception of their intensity, and in a movement that seems 
timeless, the analysis is once again that used in the power-plays of Hamlct. Once 
again it is essential to appreciate within the definition of paranoia regarded today as 
16Emil Kraepelin, Einführung in die psychiatrische Klinik (Leipzig 1902); translated by 
Thomas Johnstone as Lectures on Clinical Psychiatry (London 1904), p. 152. 
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formative a regulatory action which may itself be called paranoid. 
To conclude this section it can be seen that the conjunction of psychiatric 
meanings in the discourses dealing with paranoia at this time also demonstrates, if it 
were ever needed, the profound interaction between the sanctioned meanings and 
arrangements of those discourses used within science, and those employed in the wider 
framework of culture. Whilst the French psychiatrist Seglas, who worked in the 
Salpetriere with Charcot and Falret, felt able in 1887 to publish an article entitled "La 
Paranoia, Historique et Critique, "" (something of a terminological coming of age), 
so the 1889 Ninth Edition of Encyclopedia Britannica included an entry, "Paranoia, " 
and the 1890 edition of Webster's Dictionary did likewise for the first time, although 
its definition-"Mental Derangement, insanity"-was the somewhat dated. The 
movement into "trivial use" might be said to have occurred when the New York 
Tribune, December 1st, 1891, believed its readers capable of understanding what was 
meant when a column stated, "I should designate his troubles as paranoia. "" 
2. Freud and paranoia 
A culmination of this scientific and cultural recognition of paranoia occurred 
almost immediately afterwards when, in the process of elaborating his theories of 
psychoanalysis, Sigmund Freud identified key elements of the condition. Freud's 
theory of paranoia, like Kraepelin's definition, remains today at the core of scientific 
17J. Seglas, 'La Paranoia, Historique et Critique' in Archives Internationales de Neurologie, 13, 
1887. Scglas's article was translated and reprinted as "Paranoia" in the Journal of Nervous and 
Mental Diseases (New York 1888). 
"One of the citations of historical use under the entry 'Paranoia' in the Oxford Eng ish 
Dictionary. 
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and cultural perception, though in the latter case and "trivial" use, Freud's statement 
that paranoia retains an essential homosexual component continues to be suppressed. 
Such an attitude, in itself a form of anxiety about supposed deviancy, provides an 
appropriate reflection of the underlying theme within the scope of Freud's analyses: 
that paranoia occurs within and emerges from the social and instinctual perceptions 
of power and empowerment. This is, of course, a simplification, but it needs to be 
made from the outset to avoid the tendency to lose a comprehensive picture in the 
details of analysis. Furthermore, it can be argued that other forms of neurosis and 
mental illness conform to this broad diagnosis, but it will be asserted here that there 
is a specific relation between paranoia and power, the identification of which first 
clearly emerged in Freud's work. 
It is also important to note the extraordinary elements in Freud's writing and 
practice which fundamentally shifted the perspectives held about the patient or 
analysand, and beyond that, about the individual, as the locus of a more subtle and 
penetrating accumulation of socio-political forces. Michel Foucault articulates the 
tensions of this development when he states: 
... nineteenth-century psychiatry really converges on Freud, the first 
man to accept in all its seriousness the reality of the physician-patient 
couple, the first to consent not to look away nor to investigate 
elsewhere, the first not to attempt to hide it in a psychiatric theory that 
more or less harmonized with the rest of medical knowledge... But on 
the other hand he exploited the structure that enveloped the medical 
personage; he amplified its thaumaturgical virtues, preparing for its 
omnipotence a quasi-divine status... He transformed this into an 
absolute Observation, a pure and circumspect Silence, a Judge who 
punishes and rewards in a judgement that does not even condescend to 
language; he made it the Mirror in which madness, in an almost 
motionless movement, clings to and casts off itself. 19 
19Michel Foucault, Madness and Civilization, translated by Richard Howard (London 1967), 
pp. 277-278. 
162 
The extraordinary scope of Freud's writing goes far beyond the organized response to 
threat which infuses the rhetoric of the psychiatric discourse examined so far, but as 
Foucault observes, within Freud's assured progression to a newer level of observation 
there exists a significant realignment of scientific control. The effect of this is to 
continue in a new form what was isolated before as a concern for power in the 
expert/patient relationship, a concern whose reactions to aberration continued a force 
of marginalization wherever the control of diagnosis may be exerted. Freud's 
elaboration of the theory of neurosis and the resultant foreshortening of the spaces 
between it and "normalcy" (or, in fact, the abolishing of "normalcy") obviously 
reduced the intensity of threat manifested in and around the notion of mental 
aberration, as did elements of the theory of transference in its attempt to elucidate the 
relationship of power between the analyst and analysand. However, at a certain level 
the effects and exertion of power remain irreducible, and in following Freud's 
contribution to the theory of paranoia it can be seen that the uses of power produce 
their own paranoid energies. A primary aspect of this occurs in Freud's development 
and use of the Oedipus complex, as Deleuze and Guattari have argued in Anti_ 
Oedipus, a complex they determine in one sense as a system of controls centered on 
paternal and economic domination as an expression of scientific validity. 
Correspondingly, Foucault's phrase to describe the Freudian analyst, "a Judge who 
punishes and rewards in a judgement, " becomes apposite here in terms of Freud's 
major statement on paranoia, the 1911 Psycho-Analytic Notes On An 
Autobiographical Account Of A Case Of Paranoia (Dementia Paranoides), as this 
analysis produced as an exemplary paranoiac a man who suffered under the 
pedagogical judgements of his father, and the tensions he endured as a prominent 
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Judge within the German judiciary. 
Freud's interest in paranoia spanned most of his life, a range exhibited in his 
published writings from the 1895 correspondence with Wilhelm Fliess through to 
some of his last writings in 1939. From this work emerge five important analyses: 
Drafts H and K sent to Fliess in 1895, "Analysis of a Case of Chronic Paranoia" 
(1896), Psycho-Analytic Notes On An Autobiographical Account Of A Case Of 
Paranoia (Dementia Paranoides) (1911), A Case of Paranoia Running Counter to the 
Psycho-Analytic Theory of the Disease (1915), and Some Neurotic Mechanisms in 
Jealousy, Paranoia and Homosexuality (1922). Their accumulation of a theory of 
paranoia, within the contexts of the rest of Freud's psychoanalytical work, produced 
the basic outline of paranoia as a psychical mechanism of defence operating during 
the return of repressed feelings, which facilitates the mental technique of projection 
to ensure that those feelings need not be consciously confronted. The projection of 
their force externally results in the production of delusory anxieties, suspicions and/or 
feelings of grandeur. In concentrating primarily on the male paranoiac, but later 
attempting to include female orientations, Freud identified what he believed to be a 
homosexual origin or catalyst of the condition, which in instinctual and social terms 
provoke the psychic tensions or repression setting in motion paranoid reactions. Freud 
also uncovered links between paranoia and narcissism and obsession, which centered 
analyses on the notion that paranoia was a disturbance or distortion of ego function. 
An indirect Freudian contribution to the theory of paranoia, and one which 
remains largely ignored, was the extent to which the notion of paranoid obsession with 
causalities received its cementation in Freud's emplacement of diagnosis within a 
narrative pursuit of origins. This narrative priority provided its own set of paranoid 
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tensions according to Julia Kristeva, who, like Deleuze and Guattari, identifies the 
oedipalizations of Freud's theory and influence as problematic: 
This much is becoming known-after so many biographies confided on 
the couch: a narrative is, all in all, the most elaborate attempt, next to 
syntactic competence, to situate a speaking being between his desires 
and their prohibitions, in short, within the Oedipal triangle. 20 
The problem extends from the social and cultural senses that psychiatry, and then 
psychoanalysis, use their discursive powers to assume the socio-political dominance 
ascribed historically to religion, where theory or forms of rational disclosure may 
become creed. In Freud's case the exertion of power is all the more subtle and 
effective, endorsing and controlling the subject at the point of utterance and self- 
inscription, ensuring that the mediums of language and social communication exist as 
nets of codes from which the analyst may draw the power of diagnosis. The subject 
is always to be found encoded as s/he will always be a product of the essential origin, 
the Oedipus complex, and as such positioned at a point of theoretical and existential 
tension, as Kristeva notes. 
A separate study would be required to follow through in detail the development 
of Freud's theory of paranoia, so the discussion will limit itself briefly to a selection 
of issues. In the first of the cited analyses, the 1895 Drafts H and K, Freud elaborated 
on his statement "that chronic paranoia in its classical form is a pathological mode of 
defence "'1 by outlining the condition in comparison to hysteria, obsessions, 
hallucinatory confusion and hysterical psychoses. In doing this he asserted that "[t]he 
20Julia Kristeva, The Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection, translated by Leon Roudiez 
(New York 1982), p. 140. 
21Sigmund Freud, 'Draft H' in The Origins of Psycho-Analysis (New York 1954), p. 109. 
165 
determining element in paranoia is the mechanism of projectioni22 and began an 
exploration of the mechanism which culminated in the 1911 and 1913 studies, the 
c 
Shreber case and Totem and Taboo respectively, linking projection to psychosexual 
A 
repressive tensions and the broader notion of animistic and religious thought. From his 
earliest deliberations, however, Freud was careful to place paranoia in the context of 
a disruption of perceptual process, within which the theory of projection provided the 
essential link between normal causalities of thought and belief, and those distorted into 
paranoid functions: 
The purpose of the paranoia, therefore, was to fend off an idea that was 
intolerable to her ego by projecting its subject-matter into the external 
world. 
... It is a question of the abuse of a psychical mechanism which is very 
commonly employed in normal life: the mechanism of transposition or 
projection. Whenever an internal change occurs, we can choose whether 
we shall attribute it to an internal or external cause. If something deters 
us from accepting an internal origin, we naturally seize upon an 
external one. ' 
In these senses projection became the bedrock for explanations about paranoia which 
simultaneously could include the normative functions of mental process alongside 
aberrant symptoms, providing a scientific resolution to the issue of paranoia as "an 
intellectual psychosis "24: how could an individual, as Rush and Kant seemed to ask, 
manifest aberration within largely normative mental capabilities? 
Freud's awareness that these early remarks on projection were an outline of a 
process, and thus were inadequate to explain either the intricacies or origin of 
paranoia led to his re-examination of the concept in the 1911 Psycho-Analytic Notes 
22Freud, 'Draft K in The Origins of Psycho-Analysis, p. 153. 
23Freud, 'Draft K, ' p. 111. 
24Freud, 'Draft H, ' p. 109. 
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On An Autobiographical Account Of A Case Of Paranoia (Dementia Paranoides). In 
the effort to use the theory of projection within the parameters of Judge Schreber's 
case, and in line with the observations he shared with Jung and Ferenczi about the 
presence of an implicit "homosexual wishi25 in paranoia, Freud produced the famous 
dialectical progression in which: 
... it is a remarkable fact that the familiar principal forms of paranoia 
can all be represented as contradictions of the single proposition: "I (a 
man) love him (a man), " and indeed that they exhaust all the possible 
ways in which such contradictions could be formulated. 26 
This first proposition, due to its 'unacceptable' nature, cannot enter the individual's 
conscious, and through the force of repression re-emerges negatively as, "I do not 
love him-I hate him. " The projection completes itself in externalized delusions of 
persecution in the concluding proposition, which asserts "I do not love him-I hate 
him, because HE PERSECUTES ME. " 
Freud's dissatisfaction with this as a comprehensive explanation of projection 
as it occurs within paranoia emerged in the conclusions of the Schreber case, where 
he stated: "It was incorrect to say that the perception which was suppressed internally 
is projected outwards; the truth is rather.. . that what was abolished internally returns 
from without. i27 Since this formulation a number of analysts and commentators have 
attempted to go further. The most convincing of these have been developed from the 
subtext of Freud's remarks on paranoia in the case of Schreber and elsewhere which 
2'Sigmund Freud, Psycho-Analytic Notes On An Autobiographical Account Of A Case Of 
Paranoia (Dementia Paranoide) (1911) in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological 
Works of Sigmund Freud (London 1958), Volume XII, p. 59. 
26Freud, S. E. C. P. W., Vo1. XII, p. 63. 
27Freud, S. E. C. P. W., Vol. XII, p. 71. 
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stresses the condition, its mechanisms and possible origin as engaged in the 
interactions of the individual and power. The tempering of power as the overt element 
extends from Freud's concentration on sexuality-particularly on homosexuality-as 
manifested in his libido theory, which, to be fair, is a theory of sexual dominances in 
mental process, which in turn is influenced by the central framework of Freudian 
power, the Oedipal complex. The scope of the difference can best be explained if one 
considers the stress on sexuality and the Oedipal complex organizing itself as a form 
of religion, particularly given the phallic-paternal orientations of the theories; 28 in 
comparison, the analyses we will now move onto are secular in their thrust, including 
sexuality, but not limiting themselves to its exposition as a singular explanatory force. 
Paul Ricoeur, in his Freud and Philosophy: an Essay on Interpretation, briefly 
discusses projection and paranoia in the Freudian perspectives of religion and 
animism, and begins by quoting from Totem and Taboo: 
"in primitive men the process of thinking is still to a great extent 
sexualized. This is the origin of their belief in the omnipotence of 
thoughts. " On the other hand, what to me seems very penetrating in 
Freud's initial insight is his view that the first religious problematic is 
a problematic of omnipotence; it was only natural for a psychoanalysis 
of religion to look for the equivalent of this problematic in the 
interplay of desires. 
... It is here that a new mechanism must be 
introduced, the mechanism 
of projection, patterned on paranoia. Freud does not give us a complete 
theory of projection [in the Schreber case], but rather takes it up at the 
point where it furnishes an economic solution to a conflict of 
The best exposition of this theme, which includes critiques of Jung, Reich and D. H. Lawrence 
as inheritors and reinterpreters of a Freudian "faith, " can be found in Philip Rieff, The 
Triumph of the Therapeutic: Uses of Faith After Freud (New York 1966). Ernest Jones 
remembers Freud stating to him that: "... the simplest way of learning psychoanalysis was to 
believe all that he (Freud) wrote was true and then, after understanding it, one could criticize 
it in any way one wished. " Ernest Jones, The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud (London 
1948), p. 204. 
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ambivalence... 29 
Ricoeur then locates the ambivalence operating between Schreber and his father, and 
by transference his physician Flechsig, moving from there into the interconnections 
between these processes and Schreber's delusions about God, his own grandeur and 
passive femininity. Ricocur's concentration on "projection in a religious theme" allows 
him to approach the mechanism from an acute angle, and in connecting it to Freud's 
elaborations on religion, animism and feelings of omnipotence in Totem and Taboo 
as formative actions in primitive consciousness and the unconscious, he states that 
"[t]he function of projection is... reconciliation. i30 This point is reached by 
determining Schreber's paranoid use of projection as a mechanism designed to mediate 
the ambivalence felt in the loss of omnipotence brought on by repressed homosexual 
feelings, and the consequent focus on paternal authority figures, which in this case are 
expressed explicitly as God-like. The reconciliation sought may emerge in a number 
of ways in the continuum of mental process, and in the Schreber case manifests itself 
in delusions of persecution by God (who supplants Flechsig), whom Schreber believes 
is turning him into a woman for the purposes of sexual abuse. The ambivalence occurs 
in the tension between the repressed desire for passivity in the face of omnipotent 
control, and the threat this poses to the individual's own sense of omnipotence. In a 
wider dimension, Ricoeur's remarks conclude that: 
Man is capable of religion as he is of neurosis, we said; let us add: he 
is capable of religion as he is of paranoia. This proposition-which is 
considerable indeed-is not so much an answer that closes as a 
29Paul Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy: an Essay on Interpretation, translated by Denis Savage 
(New Haven 1970), pp. 238-239. Ricoeur quotes from Freud, S. E. C. P. W., Vol. XIII, p. 89. 
30Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy, pp. 238-239n. 
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question that opens. 31 
The "question that opens" is precisely about the effects of power on the mental 
processes of individuals, either experienced from without or asserted from within, or 
both, and it locates the theoretical space within which this thesis extends itself. 
Two more post-Freudian treatments of paranoia serve to reinforce Ricoeur's 
conclusions. In his treatment of projection, David Shapiro concentrates on the concepts 
of autonomy and rigid character and argues convincingly that: 
Projective ideas are not merely "expulsions" of unconscious thoughts 
or feelings onto external figures but extensions of the defensive 
relationship with such figures. Accordingly, these ideas are determined 
not directly by the feelings that intensified that defensiveness but by 
the particular defensive concerns and anticipations that are excited. 
... Can projection, understood 
in this way, be described as a defense 
"mechanism"? It is not, in my opinion, a satisfactory description. 
Projection is not a device; it is an outcome of a process, a tendency of 
the organism under certain conditions of increasing tension-which is 
to say not so much that projection relieves tension as that it forestalls 
an intolerable development of tension. 32 
The idea of a "tension" takes us back to Kristeva's remarks on the individual within 
the controls of analysis, and equally may be seen to lead back historically into the 
L 
theories of anxiety neurosis, the prime example being Wilhem Reich's concept of 
A 
"character armouring. " Shapiro pursues his argument in relation to the Schreber case 
by acknowledging the validity of Freud's diagnosis of a repressed homosexual wish 
as a pivotal element, but asserts that certain needs for autonomy play a similarly 
significant role. 
Shapiro begins by moving outwards from his statement that in Freud's "analysis 
31Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy, pp. 240-241n. 
32David Shapiro, Autonomy and Rigid Character (New York 1981), pp. 143-145. 
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of the sources of behaviour there was no theory of action. 03 Like Ricoeur, he sees 
the ambivalence of the paranoid position as an index of the condition's organization, 
particularly in its dimension as a reaction to power, and he reinforces this position by 
a detailed analysis of the Shreber case which utilizes important background 
information brought to light by William G. Niederland. Niederland's research into 
Schreber's childhood, his father and family life confirm Freud's assumptions that 
Schreber's relationship with his father provided the catalyst for his paranoia, but it 
also uncovered an horrendously authoritarian upbringing performed by a fanatic in the 
fields of child rearing, and social and moral deportment. The father, Dr Daniel 
Gottlieb Schreber, published widely, and his most famous book Erziehungslehre 
(Educational Doctrination)34 continued to be admired and used in Germany into the 
twentieth-century, especially during the political emphases of the 1930's and 40's. 
Daniel Paul Schreber consequently became a victim of a regime which involved rigid 
control of mental and physical activity, brooking no refusal or distraction, and which 
utilized various mechanisms to ensure that whether standing, sitting or lying, the 
child's posture remained correctly designated. In applying these discoveries to 
Schreber's Memoirs (the text used by Freud in his analysis), Niederland locates 
significant links between Schreber's delusional constructs and the actuality of his 
upbringing and domination, such as feelings of chest and head compression, which 
relate back to the halters and braces he was forced to wear as a child. 35 Niederland 
"Shapiro, Autonomy and Rigid Character, p. 11. 
The book's full title was Kallipaedie oder Erziehung zur Schönheit durch naturgetreue und 
gleichmässige Förderung normaler Körperbildung (Kallipaedie or Education to Beauty Through 
Natural and Symmetrical Promotion of Normal Body Growth). 
35William G. Niederland, The Schreber Case: Psychoanalytic Profile of a Paranoid Personality 
(New York 1974), pp. 60-61. 
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also details the remarkable chronological parallels of father and son: Daniel Gottlieb 
Schreber suffered a debilitating head injury at the age of fifty-one, and after a period 
of self-enforced seclusion, died aged fifty-three; his son first fell ill at the age of 
fifty-one, and suffered a marked deterioration two years later, during and after which 
he became convinced he had suffered a divine "death" and sexual reorientation, 
existing thereafter as a woman for the purposes of sexual abuse by God. A view of 
the case from these biographical perspectives, then, taken together with Freud's 
incisive sexual analyses, promotes an aetiology of the resultant paranoia which lays 
greater emphasis on the effects on the individual existing within an extraordinary 
power structure. In consequence, the argument here is not so much an effort to 
prioritize the effects of power over a Freudian sexual emphasis, or even to denigrate 
that emphasis; rather, it is an attempt to see power and sexuality in these contexts as 
equally involved and interlinked agencies in the production of paranoia. Power and 
sexuality act in concert; indeed, any attempt to differentiate between them as causal 
elements is doomed to failure. 
These considerations align themselves with David Shapiro's thoughts in the 
conclusion of his examination of the Schreber case and its contributions to a theory 
of paranoia. He states: 
Neither the existence of unconscious homosexuality nor the revulsion 
against it is capable of explaining the nature of paranoid pathology; 
something of the opposite is true. The nature of paranoid rigidity and 
of the paranoid problem of autonomy is capable of explaining both a 
special impulse toward and a special abhorrence for "female" sexual 
surrender-in men, a homosexual impulse... We know, in fact, that 
many kinds of internal and external circumstance, apart from the 
intensification of homosexual impulses, are capable of intensifying, at 
least temporarily, the sense of vulnerability, defensiveness, and 
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projective distortion in already defensive, rigid characters. 36 
The stress therefore should be on what Freud called at the outset in his analyses of 
paranoia "a particular psychical disposition, 07 and should concentrate on Shapiro's 
valuable, though formally tentative, distinction that paranoia may be "a pathology of 
autonomy. "38 
Two further issues provide evidence supporting this conclusion, and their 
continuing controversy in the debate about paranoia lends credence also to the 
perception of a discursive paranoia in and around the organizations of a science and 
culture, which continues in turn to locate specific anxieties about the dissemination 
of power in the social matrix. These are the presence of homosexuality in paranoia 
and the difficulties patriarchal explorations of the condition have had in identifying 
or including an autonomously feminine paranoid experience. In both cases Freud's 
work was instrumental in setting up certain theoretical preconditions which isolate an 
ambivalence in their consequent development. Analysts have since been forced to 
concentrate their energies in acknowledging the validity of Freudian concepts, whilst 
seeking to prove methodological and/or experiential differences. In effect, the 
progression becomes one of tapping the source of theoretical power before moving on 
in an effort to locate an autonomous analysis, something which Freud himself would 
have diagnosed within an oedipal dimension. The stress here, however, continues to 
be on broader formations of power. 
Since Freud's theory, and contemporary affirmations such as the papers 
"Shapiro, Autonomy and Rigid Character, pp. 165-166. 
37Freud, 'Draft H, ' p. 109. 
38Shapiro, Autonomy and Rigid Character, p. 167. 
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published by Sandor Ferenczi, 39 psychoanalysts and psychiatrists have engaged in 
repetitive actions to prove or disprove homosexuality as a key element in paranoia, 
whether as an origin, an aetiological energy, or a resultant sexual orientation. Kenneth 
Lewes has pointed out, however, that a close reading of Freud reveals that: 
The association of homosexuality with paranoia represented a real 
confusion. Freud meant to show that the homosexual component of 
mankind's universal bisexuality served as the driving force behind the 
paranoid delusions. 
... The connection 
between homosexuality and paranoia was 
strengthened because of their joint origin in narcissism. 40 
The effort to resolve the "confusion" surrounding homosexuality and paranoia resulted 
in a variety of theoretical and empirical studies whose cumulative force has been to 
diminish the profile of homosexuality in these contexts. That it continues to linger in 
the theory and analysis of paranoia is a testament both to the enduring authority of 
Freudian perspectives and the continuing social tensions surrounding homosexuality. 
The empirical studies carried out have varied in their results, some confirming 
Freud's theory and others denying the existence of a widespread causal presence of 
homosexuality. 41 Harold S. Zamansky's 1958 study of the problem produced the 
findings which remain the most popular amongst analysts and sociologists alike, 
essentially because they isolate homosexual tensions amongst institutionalized male 
39see, for instance, 'On the Part Played by Homosexuality in the Pathogenesis of Paranoia' 
(1912), and 'Some Clinical Observations on Paranoia and Paraphrenia' (1914), both in Sandor 
Ferenczi, Sex in Psycho-Analysis (Boston 1916). 
40Kenneth Lewes, The Psychoanalytic Theory of Male Homosexuality (New York 1988), 
pp. 60,73. With regard to this last point, the connections between narcissism and paranoia 
indicate a preoedipal paranoid activity; more will be said on this subject when considering the 
work of Melanie Klein. 
41See Robert May, 'Paranoia and Power Anxiety' in Journal of Projective Techniques, 34, 
1970, pp. 412-418, for an assessment of research done to determine the links between 
paranoia and homosexuality. 
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paranoiacs but determine that such tensions arise from the existential perspectives 
formed by paranoia rather than being in any way causal factors: 
It is suggested, therefore, that the results of the present experiment 
support the view of paranoia... that the person with paranoid delusions 
is indeed characterized by strong homosexual impulses, but that these 
impulses themselves serve a defensive function, that of helping to 
neutralize and erotize powerful hostile wishes against male figures... 
The homosexuality of the male paranoid appears as an intermediary 
process in the development of his delusions, rather than being a 
primary aetiological agent. 42 
Eysenck and Wilson's comment on these conclusions is succinct and to the point when 
they say that "the paranoid's reaction to homosexual situations can be viewed as 
consistent with, and a part of, his general suspiciousness and vigilance in relation to 
threatening stimuli. 1143 The situation is one in which the anxieties produced by the 
male paranoiac's social position - not least his reaction to institutional control - set 
in motion a process of withdrawal and defence within which homosexual impulses 
may arise, essentially oriented around the social fears concerning homosexuality and 
the concentrations of power around male figures. Western cultures, at least since 
Ancient times, have promulgated fears about homosexuality, primarily aimed at its 
alleged potential for interference in reproductive processes and disruption of the social 
power base structures, patriarchally organized in tribal and family cells. The 
connections between paranoia and homosexuality in these terms seem clearly to be, 
as Freud proposed, a product of the complex sexualization of power, though, as with 
the theory of projection, the tendency is to seek origins in a behavioural orientation 
42Harold S. Zamansky, 'An investigation of the psychoanalytic theory of paranoid delusions' 
reprinted in ed. Hans J. Eysenck & Glenn D. Wilson, The Experimental Study of Freudian Iheories (London 1973), pp. 310,312. 
43Zamansky, 'An investigation of the psychoanalytic theory of paranoid delusions, ' 314. 
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rather than see paranoia as a product of something deeper and, perhaps, asexual. 
Certainly, Zamansky's investigation, within its confessed limitations, places as much 
stress on the possibility of paranoia being a reaction to homosexual status in the 
institution and culture, as to it being involved at a deeper genetic level. 
The major contribution made by Freud's study of Schreber in these respects 
becomes the tracing of male desires within social transmissions of power where the 
extremes of submission, absolute dominance and autonomy find a medium of 
expression in their erotic charge. Writers such as Norman Mailer, William Burroughs 
and Allen Ginsberg present different aspects of this issue in their work, involving 
homosexuality in their perspectives of the Reichian theory of sexual discharge as a 
social and individual formation of energies determined by flows and impedances. 
Mailer's aggressive heterosexuality in his writing connects homosexuality (and 
masturbation) to an inability to fully discharge energies in cycles of being, citing the 
alienation of technologically advanced capitalism as a primary impedance factor. 44 
Whilst there is certainly some truth in Mailer's view of the social production of 
individuals and the obstruction of their sexuality, his evident homophobia distorts the 
analysis into its own anxieties about the status of male power. Both in contrast and 
in comparison, William Burroughs pursues in his writing a homoerotic emphasis and 
misogyny, frequently evoking utopias of masculine community which provide a 
startling parallel to his savage critique of the organized exclusions of religion, 
capitalist desire and law enforcement, particularly where his homosexual 
"counterinsurgent forces.. 
. are homosexual because the fear and suppression of 
'See, for instance, Mailer's The Naked and the Dead (1948), An American Dream (1965) and 
The Prisoner of Sex (1971). 
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homosexuality is part of the militarist structure and its alliance with female 
dominance. t14' The exclusion of women thus extends within a paranoia bred from 
Burroughs' exposure of the power manias afflicting Western cultures in their 
production and control of desire, and offers a further example of the reflexive nature 
of anxieties about power and its investment with sexuality. 
The element of misogyny highlighted in both Burroughs and Mailer leads 
conveniently into the obvious exclusion, or non-presence, of women in the history of 
paranoia. This action involves a broad sweep from the patriarchally selective 
diagnosis of patients according to their gender through to concentrations on male 
prerogatives in theory, spanning the history and discourse of psychiatry itself, as this 
analysis demonstrates. Freud's location of homosexuality as a process invariably 
present in paranoia can be seen as a culmination of the patriarchal exclusion of 
women from the condition, even to the extent that in his A Case of Paranoia Running 
Counter to the Psycho-Analytic Theory of the Disease, he constructs an ingenious 
argument to explain the conformity of a case of female paranoia to the male model 
isolated in the Schreber case. Naomi Schor thus correctly interprets Freud's analytic 
action posing the questions: "can females theorize, albeit in the caricatural mode of 
the mad? Does the homology between male and female paranoia include the 
prestigious intellectual (hyper)activity associated with the male model? t146 The 
answer, according to Freud, is yes, but with conditions which deny the possibility of 
45Eric Mottram, 'William Burroughs: Survivalist in a Manichean World' in The Final Academy 
(London 1984), p. 31. See, for instance, William Burroughs, Port of Saints (1973) and Cities 
of the Red Night (1981). 
46Naomi Schor, 'Female Paranoia: The Case for Psychoanalytic Feminist Criticism' in Yak 
French Studies, 62,1981, p. 206. 
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affirmation, namely the conformity of female paranoiacs to a process which includes 
a homosexual impulse at some catalyzing moment (which Freud insists occurs in 
relation to the female figure of power for the female, the mother, or someone 
identified with the mother), and, as Schor carefully explicates, an objectification of the 
woman by localizing symptoms in her corporeality, thus inhibiting any diagnostic 
stress on mental activity. 
Such conditions clearly deny women an autonomous place within the theory 
of paranoia. Not only is "female" paranoia subordinated to the male condition by 
certain masculine prerequisites, but it is also subjected to the classic imprisonment by 
medicine within patriarchal theory determining the female body a field of peculiar 
tensions and feelings insofar as they can be identified and controlled by the scope of 
male power. In this sense, Freud and the other theoreticians do not allow women the 
space to feel or experience their own paranoia, but rather dictate to them what that 
condition may be. The pervasion of this social control extends throughout culture, as 
Schor confirms when she comments on the designation of female predilections for 
jealousy as the "typical type of female paranoia. " Quoting the remarks of Ruth Mack 
Brunswick, "Freud's favourite female disciple in his later years, " Schor demonstrates 
how the construction of theory may assimilate the identities culturally determined for 
gender and reproject and reinforce them: 
I should like at this point to make a possible differentiation between 
two of the types of true paranoia, the jealous and the persecutory. The 
latter, as we have seen, is an elaborate psychosis of an essentially 
masculine nature, and is the commonest form of paranoia in men. The 
jealous form, on the other hand, is par excellence the paranoia of 
women.. . In contradiction to the philosophic, systematizing persecutory 
paranoia, the delusional jealousy is both feminine and rudimentary and, 
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as it were, closer to the normal and neurotic 47 
The jealous woman as a cultural stereotype is thus possessed of a secure enough 
identity, with assured qualities, to be admitted within the framework of on-going 
psychoanalytic theory. Once there, if she then submits the territory of her body and 
a correctly aligned sexuality to analytic surveillance, and these conform and exhibit 
inferior symptoms to those prescribed from the male condition, she may then be 
admitted into the theory of paranoia. 
Again, it is clear that the action of theory, in its systematization and 
accumulation of knowledge, operates as an organization of power committed to certain 
exclusions and apprehensions according to patriarchal anxieties. This manifestation 
may be termed patriarchal paranoia, for want of a better term to describe the tensions 
which have informed male/female relations in patriarchal societies throughout their 
existence, and which remain today as prevalent as ever. The product of this patriarchal 
power anxiety, through the enforcement of prescribed identities and physical 
coercions, has in fact been a paranoia distinct to femininity. In an analysis of women 
diagnosed as paranoid, Klein and Horowitz found that 70% of the sample identified 
male figures as persecutors, and that any sexual content to delusion tended toward 
heterosexual attack or domination, in opposition to Freudian theory's requirement of 
homosexual orientation. 48 The point is not lost on Phyllis Chesler, whose book 
Women and Madness demonstrates through statistical evidence drawn from psychiatric 
institutions, case studies, and analysis of the pressures exerted upon women by the 
47Ruth Mack Brunswick, The Analysis of a Case of Paranoia (Delusion of Jealousy)' (1929), 
quoted in Schor, Yale French Studies, p. 207. 
48H. Klein and W. Horowitz, 'Psychosexual Factors in the Paranoid Phenomena' in American 
Journal of Psychiatry, 105,1949, pp. 697-701. 
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major psychiatric and psychoanalytic theoreticians, how paranoia (as one of several 
mental disturbances with a similar status) affects and afflicts women, and in specific 
forms relating to their gender. In her remark that "[t]he problems of being both black 
and female in a racist and sexist society are staggering, the permutations of violence, 
self-destructiveness, and paranoia endless, " Chesler alludes to the tensions experienced 
by those transfixed by the weight and manipulations of social power. 49 More 
recently, Deborah Tannen has researched the linguistic bases of gender difference, and 
uncovered the strikingly different attitudes towards social empowerment embodied in 
feminine and masculine communication. In Tannen's perspective: 
Women tend to use language to create intimacy and connection, and 
men use language to preserve their independence and negotiate their 
status. The question overriding women's interactions is, "Do you love 
me? " or, if it's not a close relationship, "Do you like me? " 
And the question in men's minds is, "Are you trying to dominate 
me? "so 
Given the different priorities evident at such a basic social level it is hardly surprising 
gender consciousness has always been an arena filled with the potential of paranoia, 
manifested on both sides in anxieties of threat and counter-threat to vulnerability and 
authority. The production of paranoia both by those wielding power and those subject 
to its enforcement is mutual, grounded in the suspicions and fears which both feel 
bound to utilize to make sense of their existential experience. 
It is this urge to make sense, and primarily make sense of the processes of 
domination, which culminate in the theory of paranoia as Freud left it. That the 
a9Phyllis Chesler, Women and Madness (New York 1973), p. 224. 
50Deborah Tannen, interviewed in City Paper (Washington, D. C. ), November 9,1990, p. 20. 
See also her book, You Just Don't Understand: Women and Men in Conversation (New York 
1990). 
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systems set up by theory (and, by extension, of practice) might stimulate paranoia are 
consistently recognized within his writing, but the application of this fact to the effects 
of his theoretical authority seem ultimately to be displaced to the issue of transference, 
where the debate is confined within narrow limits which do not threaten the idea of 
analytic dominance. The consequence of this is an organization of knowledge used by 
and taken on from Freud whose effect has been to encourage as much paranoia as it 
has identified and assisted. 
In concluding this section, two things remain to be said to reinforce the 
importance of Freud to a history of paranoia in what has been the briefest of analyses, 
and one which has necessarily had to concentrate on only one element of Freud's 
pioneering work with regard to paranoia. As Philip Rieff has pointed out, a 
fundamental difference between Freud and his forebears was Freud's concentration on 
locating meaning in the arrangement of symptoms, rather than simply following the 
empirical evidence of an illness. 51 It is this technique-in effect, the retracing of a 
narrative and a reconstruction (and thence relaunching) of a life-which must always 
be borne in mind when approaching the notion that the discourses of psychiatry and 
psychoanalysis may produce paranoia in their coercions. Freud gave Western 
knowledge, those who organize its dissemination within cultures, and the individuals 
inside them, the possibility of interpreting and penetrating existential circumstance to 
a deeper, previously hidden level. In doing this it is fair to say that he raised the 
intensity of anxieties experienced between the sources of power in culture and those 
dominated, in that greater scope was given to the effort to trace causalities as they 
operated on an individual level, which reflected, in turn, the exertion of specific and 
51Philip Rieff, Freud: The Mind of the Moralist (New York 1961), pp. 42-43. 
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general forces. In the contexts of Freud's era, the movement from the nineteenth to the 
twentieth centuries, this essentially informs Daniel Bell's statement that "[t]he real 
problem of modernity is the problem of belief, "" taking the debate on from the 
tensions articulated by Hamlet, through the Enlightenment, to a newer form of self- 
perception. Put in another way, Freud permitted both the analyst and the patient to 
view their positions inside the narratives determining their lives, and refer outwards 
from that point with sets of self-explanatory causalities whose truth was essentially 
secular and based on a functional rationality. 
Finally, the issue of power, and specifically, power at its basic interpersonal 
level as a medium in which paranoia is pervasive, according to Freud, receives a 
curious endorsement in the example given by Hendrik Hertzberg and David 
McClelland of institutionalized paranoid behaviour. The two writers suggest that the 
tensions suffered by paranoids contribute meaningfully to the sociopolitical 
organization of institutional life, where paranoia provides the credentials for assuming 
power within any psychiatric patient collective. They cite a psychiatrist's recollection 
of an incident at a mental hospital where a: 
gas main had broken, and the poisonous fumes were seeping into the 
wards. It was vital that the hospital be evacuated, and the staff was 
undermanned. The expected chaos and panic did not materialize, 
however, because a group of paranoid schizophrenics, once released 
from their cells, immediately took charge of the evacuation, organized 
it, and carried it out quickly and efficiently. These paranoids saw 
nothing unusual in the fact that the hospital was about to be engulfed 
53 by an invisible, deadly, malevolent force. 
Equally, B. M. Rutherford's studies in psychopathology and political influence in 
"Daniel Bell, The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism (New York 1976), p. 28. 
53Hendrik Hertzberg & David C. K. McClelland, 'Paranoia' in Harper's Magazine, June 1974, 
p. 59. 
182 
mental institutions have found that paranoid characteristics are positively associated 
with political influence and activity, 54 as earlier and contemporary work by Harold 
Lasswell and Richard Hofstadter has suggested in sociopolitical contexts 55 The aim 
of paranoid consciousness is to continuously map out and prepare for any threat, and 
as such to monitor uninterruptedly the status of power in a given situation in order to 
safeguard what is perceived to be one's autonomy. This intensity of power perception 
consequently not only opens up the potential for delusion and causes rigidity of belief 
and action, but also in some circumstances allows the paranoid to identify and assume 
control of the mediums of political power. The input of paranoia to political process 
is evident in any view of history-Hitler and Stalin come to mind as recent 
examples-and it is this political stress which marks the discourses of paranoia, 
notwithstanding the homosexual complications, in and after Freud's creation of 
psychoanalysis. With its continuing masculine stress, the history of paranoia went on 
to involve itself in the twentieth century's dreams and fears about absolute totalitarian 
power, and these final quotations are representative of the current dimension of 
paranoia in psychiatric and psychoanalytic discourse towards which this history is 
headed: 
paranoia in males is the outcome of an intense conflict over power: on 
the one hand a wish to rectify a sensed inadequacy by deriving strength 
from another, and on the other hand a fear of being destroyed by the 
powerful other. 56 
54B. M. Rutherford, 'Psychopathology, Decision Making and Political Involvement' in Journal 
of Conflict Resolution, 10,1966, pp. 387-407. 
-"See Harold D. Lasswell, Psychopathology and Politics (1930; rpt. Chicago 1977) and Pmt 
and Personality (New York 1948); and Richard Hofstadter, 'The Paranoid Style in American 
Politics' in The Paranoid Style in American Politics (New York 1965). 
56H. Wolowitz, 'Attraction and aversion to power: a psychoanalytic conflict theory of 
homosexuality in male paranoids' in Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 70,1965, p. 370. 
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The paranoid male is gripped by an ever-expanding metaphor of power 
and masculinity which blots out all other aspects of human relation and 
makes him able to see things only in terms of who's on top and who's 
doing what to whom. " 
3. The Early Twentieth Century 
Apart from Freud, the twentieth century has seen a number of other important 
contributions to the theory of paranoia, as well as its extension into wider cultural 
use. The 1903 edition of The New International Encyclopedia, published in New York 
City, recorded under the entry "Paranoia" that psychiatry laid great stress on the 
organic and physiological nature of the disease, and affirmed that those afflicted, 
which it terms "cranks ... are able to carry on a business or practice a profession. 
X58 
The intensity of the debate within psychiatric discourse as to an agreed identity for the 
condition made it more visible for those eager to share the new psychoanalytic and 
psychiatric knowledge with a wider audience, and thus it appeared in the rash of 
cultural and historical analyses which characterized the first decades of the century. 
Two examples of this early diagnostic exertion focused on Jesus Christ, and reveal the 
rapid and blanket transfer of concepts between science and culture in their initial 
interactions. Using the gospels, the commentators determined that: 
In short, the nature of the hallucinations of Jesus, as they are 
described... permits us to conclude that the founder of the Christian 
religion was afflicted with religious paranoia. 59 
Everything that we know about (Jesus Christ) conforms so perfectly to 
the clinical picture of paranoia that it is hardly conceivable that people 
57May, 'Paranoia and power anxiety, ' p. 417. 
58The New International Encyclopedia (New York 1903), VoI. XIII, p. 690. 
"Charles Binet-Sangle, La Folie de Jesus (1910), cited in Thomas Szaz, The Manufacture of 
Madness (New York 1970), p. 311. 
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can even question the accuracy of the diagnosis. 60 
While such certitude characterized populist diagnosis, it was ironic that within 
the mental sciences themselves paranoia was undergoing a merging process which 
threatened to dissolve it as an autonomous condition. Following on from the late 
nineteenth century confusion with terminology, paranoia had emerged just prior to the 
related condition of schizophrenia, and it was the hardening and inclusivity of 
schizophrenia as a new concept in the first decades of the twentieth century that 
seemed likely to absorb its discursive relative. This action was most fully realized in 
the work of the Swiss psychiatrist, Eugen Bleuler (1857-1939), who provoked 
important reassessments of paranoia with his influential theory of schizophrenia. 
Bleuler suggested that paranoia was essentially similar to, if not part of, schizophrenia 
(or what was known before under the title "dementia praecox"). He elaborated three 
forms of paranoia with reference to Kraepelin's formulations: paranoia, a paranoid 
form of dementia praecox, and an intermediate condition. In Affektivität, 
Suggestibilität, Paranoia (1906), and the major study, Dementia Praecox, oder Gruppe 
der Schizophrenien (1911), 61 he outlined these forms of paranoia with specific 
reference to their symptomatic similarities to schizophrenia, moving finally to the 
point where he asserted that, owing to the extreme rarity of the "pure" paranoia of 
Kraepelin's classification, paranoia was really symptomatic of schizophrenia, 
particularly in terms of delusional formation. 
60William Hirsch, Conclusions of a Psychiatrist (1912), cited in Szaz, The Manufacture of 
Madness, p. 311. 
61Eugen Bleuler, Affektivität, Suggestibilität, Paranoia (Halle a. S. 1906) and Dementia 
Praecox, oder Gruppe der Schizophrenien (Leipzig 1911), translated by Joseph Zinkin as 
Dementia Praecox;. The Group of Schizophrenias (New York 1950). 
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The influence of Bleuler's ideas and the expansion and importance of 
schizophrenia in psychiatry, in tandem with the internal dynamics given to the theory 
of paranoia by Freud, have ensured that paranoia and schizophrenia remain closely 
interrelated in psychiatric discourse. Indeed, a popular diagnosis of mental patients in 
the late twentieth century continues to be "paranoid-schizophrenia. " paranoia, 
however, has maintained a certain independence because of the persistent fascination, 
first clearly articulated by Kant in 1798, for a mental condition whose distortions leave 
it so close to "normal" mental functioning. The translation of this fascination into 
cultural discourse has lent paranoia a sharper distinction in cultural terms than is 
perhaps present today in psychiatric and psychoanalytic diagnosis, where its use is 
frequently limited to symptomatic tendencies, blurring the notion of a separate 
condition. In contrast, schizophrenia remains largely applicable to immobilizing and 
dysfunctional conditions whose cultural use has been erroneously limited to the idea 
of split or multiple personality. 
Since Kraepelin, Freud, and Bleuler, therefore, there has been little alteration, 
as far as the mental sciences are concerned, in either the dimension of paranoia or its 
academic and clinical use. The recognition at the turn of the century that paranoia was 
a condition involving symptoms and possible aetiological functions which manifested 
themselves in other mental aberrations ensured that psychiatrists and psychoanalysts 
have been wary of isolating paranoia in diagnosis, often preferring instead to see 
paranoid tendencies as part of a wider process. Such processes include obsessive 
neuroses and hysterical psychoses as well as schizophrenia. This wariness also 
stemmed from the increasing dissemination of the term into cultural use, creating a 
reflexive tightening in academic and clinical terms, as if to retain something of the 
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diagnostic power and mystique which psychiatric discourse attempts to appropriate for 
itself. 
The clinical theory of paranoia received a fresh and intriguing perspective in 
the 1930's and 40's with Melanie Klein's work in child analysis. In The Psycho- 
Analysis of Children (1932) and a selection of other texts, Klein explored the 
psychological dimensions of the early months of life, concentrating on the ways in 
which human beings develop their mental and perceptual functions. Beginning from 
the moment of birth, determined as the formative moment of psychological trauma for 
all humans, she then went on to outline a series of phases which she saw the infant 
moving through in terms of mental development up to and including its involvement 
in the sexual complexities of the Oedipus Complex. For Klein the trauma of birth and 
separation from security and nourishment confronts the infant with its first experience 
of externality which inevitably produces anxiety. In extremely simplified terms, the 
ways thereafter in which the infant develops its mental functions in response to this 
anxiety determines its future mental health and perceptual abilities. 
The first phase of mental development thus becomes one in which the infant 
must construct psychic defences aimed at mediating a potentially overwhelming 
anxiety. Klein believed that the infant emerged from the trauma of birth capable only 
of the simple binary reactions of love and hate, which in later formulations of her 
theories she identified with the Freudian life and death forces, Eros and Thanatos. The 
experience of hatred in particular colours this first phase, developing in the infant a 
sadistic intensity toward those external objects regarded as threatening or non- 
comforting. The psychic defence functions which evolve with the development of the 
ego alongside this binary are consequently the basic defence functions of psychic life, 
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and focus on external objects according to their experiential status for the infant as an 
introjective process, aimed at loved objects, or a projective process, aimed at hated 
objects. The infant consequently perceives external objects in the first phase of its life 
not in terms of their essential identity but simply in terms of whether experience with 
them is pleasurable or unpleasurable. Klein later added to introjection and projection 
the defence mechanisms of splitting, whereby the ego can defend itself against the 
perceived bad object by splitting itself and disowning the part(s) of the ego associated 
with that object, and projective identification, in which the ego identifies with an 
external object and projects its feelings onto it in order to create a sense of security 
through psychic connection. 
In formulating this approach, Klein convincingly explains the origin, 
development and prominence of projection and introjection as defence mechanisms in 
human mental process, and articulated them within this phase of infantile life which 
she saw as requiring the infant to adopt a "paranoid-schizoid position. " She argued 
that each infantile experience in this phase involves a form of projection in which 
external objects assume the qualities of internalized reactions so that internal pleasure 
equates with a "good object" (e. g. the breast generating pleasure through nourishment, 
contact, etc. ) whilst internal displeasure equals a "bad object. " The importance of this 
basic formulation was Klein's belief that its distortion in the ensuing development of 
the ego, when the transition is made from identifying internally to mediating this 
technique with externally recognized phenomena, could lay the bases of future mental 
illness. The problem, Klein felt, lay in the development of ambivalences in feeling 
towards objects where both loving and destructive feelings arose especially with 
regard to loved objects, such as the mother. In this situation it is necessary for the ego 
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to "introject" the loved object (that is, absorb and build into one's own personality 
ideas and personality traits observed externally) rather than continue to project internal 
feeling. Failure to undergo this transformation in perceptual process and thus to ease 
the possible anxieties, according to Klein, results in future depressive illness and lays 
a basis for paranoid traits in the personality, essentially through a continuing and 
selective exclusion of reality: 
From the beginning the ego introjects objects "good" and "bad, " for 
both of which its mother's breast is the prototype-for good objects 
when the child obtains it and for bad when it fails him. But it is 
because the baby projects its own aggression on to these objects that 
it feels them to be "bad" and not only in that they frustrate its desires: 
the child conceives of them as actually dangerous-persecutors who it 
fears will devour it, scoop out the inside of its body, cut it to pieces, 
poison it-in short, compassing its destruction by all the means which 
sadism can devise... Hence, quite little children pass through anxiety 
situations (and react to them with defence mechanisms), the content of 
which is comparable to that of the psychoses of adults. 62 
Klein identifies quite clearly that it is the energy of aggression, connected as it is in 
these contexts to hatred and the death drive, which the infant must learn to control and 
utilize within its developing senses of mental defence. The consequence of failure is 
seen to be: 
scotomization, the denial of psychic reality; this may result in a 
considerable restriction of the mechanisms of introjection and 
projection and in the denial of external reality, and it forms the bases 
of the most severe psychoses. Very soon, too, the ego tries to defend 
itself against internalized persecutors by the processes of expulsion and 
projection. At the same time, since the dread of internalized objects is 
by no means extinguished with their projection, the ego marshals 
against the persecutors inside the body the same forces as it employs 
against those in the outside world. These anxiety contents and defence 
mechanisms form the basis of paranoia. 63 
62Melanie Klein, 'A Contribution to the Psychogenesis of Manic-Depressive States' (1935) in 
The Selected Melanie Klein (New York 1987), pp. 116-117. 
63Klein, 'A Contribution to the Psychogenesis of Manic-Depressive States, ' p. 117. Text italics. 
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The importance of Klein's views for a theory of paranoia lie in their 
identification of a paranoid perceptual tendency shared by all in the initial stages of 
life. It must be said in fairness to Karl Abraham that Klein's identification of a 
"paranoid-schizoid position" in infancy, and its development around notions of 
ambivalence, introjection and projection, proceeded in part from Abraham's prior 
opinion that paranoia consisted of a regression to an earlier phase of anal sadism 
which involved a partial introjection of the loved object. TM Klein, however, 
incorporated these ideas, particularly the acute analyses of the ambivalence and hatred 
surrounding excrement, into the wider dimensions of her project and took them further 
in the attempt to trace the initial developments of mental process. If her ideas are an 
accurate description of early mental life-and they proceed from case studies-then 
the premise put forward by Freud and others in more recent years, that perception is 
formed and informed in part by paranoia, can be endorsed from the beginnings of 
existential awareness. 
As well as identifying paranoia as an "exaggeration" or "abuse" of "normal" 
mental process, certain twentieth century analyses have followed the lead initiated by 
Freud in Totem and Taboo and have more directly opened up the connections between 
paranoia and prevailing social conditions. Ernst Kretschmer's formulation of paranoia 
in the early decades is an instance of this, where his description of "sensitive delusions 
of reference" inside mental tendencies linked to contemporary diagnoses of paranoia 
suggests as a causative function psychological stress more or less related to social 
trauma. 65 Jacques Lacan went further than this in his 1932 doctoral thesis on 
64Karl Abraham, The Selected Papers of Karl Abraham (New York 1954), p. 490. 
'See Ernst Kretschmer, Der sensitive Beziehungswahn (Berlin 1927). 
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paranoia. In it he concluded an intricate study of a patient, including a selection of 
her writings, by asserting that paranoid mechanisms make up the very structure of the 
ego, a conclusion contemporarily in line with Melanie Klein's work, though 
approaching the issue differently, not least in Lacan's concentration on mature mental 
process and linked functions of language. Furthermore, what adds flavour to Lacan's 
writings at this time was his involvement with the French surrealist movement, which 
tinged his doctoral rigidity with an impetus toward discovering the full range of 
mental and perceptual possibilities. In the same time-frame that Lacan published his 
thesis, surrealists such as Salvador Dali were examining the dimensions of their 
creative activity and linking these to the vistas seen to be available to those with 
mental disorders. Silvano Arieti states that: 
Dali often refers to his own paranoia, and he has written, "all men are 
equal in their madness... madness constitutes the common basis of the 
human spirit. " I believe that what he calls "the common basis of the 
human spirit" is the primary process; it is not Plato's universals but 
those fantastic universals that Vico described... 
Dali correctly believes that paranoiacs have "a special capacity for the 
recognition of double images inasmuch as their disordered minds are 
hypersensitive to hidden appearances, real or imagined. i66 
Lacan's analysis is less flamboyant, particularly as it continues in its own way the 
analytic drive for certainty through exhaustive post-Freudian surveillance of a patient's 
personal history: 
66Silvano Arieti, Creativity: The Magic Synthesis (New York 1976), pp. 228-229. Arieti quotes 
from Salvador Dali, The Concept of the Irrational (New York 1935). See also John M. 
MacGregor, The Discovery of the Art of the Insane (Princeton, N. J. 1989), Chapter 16, 
pp. 271-291; and David Vilaseca Perez, The Apocryphal Subject: Masochism, Identification 
and Paranoia in Salvador Dali's Autobiographical Writings (unpublished PhD thesis, University 
of London 1992), for interesting discussions of Dali and paranoia. An amusing incidence, 
perhaps, of the reflexive nature of such a paranoid strategy can be found in the 1950's claims 
by United States Congressman Dondero of Michigan that surrealistic and abstract art was 
being used by communists to "addle" the brains of Americans. 
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The key to the problems of nosology, prognosis and therapy of 
paranoid psychoses must be found in a concrete psychological analysis, 
applying all the facets of the subject's development of personality, 
utilizing the occurrences of his history, the progress of his 
consciousness, and his reactions in the social milieu. 
The method therefore implies a basis of psychopathological 
monography, as exhaustive as possible. " 
In line with nineteenth century analyses and the example of Freud, Lacan pursues an 
enclosure of the patient from the origin of an identified pathological essence, 
suggesting that from that point all of relevance may be included in the totalizing 
sweep of the analyst's gaze. It can be argued that Lacan's realization of the inclusive 
impossibilities of this project may have been the incentive which led to his 
concentration on language and signification as they affect and control mental process. 
In the analysis of language, as Lacan relentlessly pursued it, lay the possibility of a 
social reductiveness or microcosm of mental process, while at the same time the 
structured fluidities of meaning prescribe an infinite variety of psychic patterns aligned 
within a basic pattern. 
From this, Lacan's later treatment of paranoia extended into his theories 
concerning the unconscious, aggressivity, symbolic order and the mirror stage. The 
stress remained on the presence of paranoia at basic levels of human interaction 
where Lacan asserted that "the social dialectic... structures human knowledge as 
paranoiac, " outlining a process working at the primary level of signification and 
belief. 68 Some years after this Lacan suggested that it is a: 
67Jacques Lacan, De La Psychose Paranoiaque dann ses Rapports avec la Personalite Suivi de 
Premiers Ecrits sur la Paranoia (Paris 1975), p. 345. Text italics. Passage translated by Marzia 
Balzani. 
"Jacques Lacan, 'The mirror stage as formative of the function of the I as revealed in 
psychoanalytic experience' [paper delivered 17 July, 1949] in Ecrits, translated by Alan 
Sheridan (London 1985), p. 3. A year earlier, Lacan had explored the ramifications of paranoia 
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solidity, this mass seizure of the primitive signifying chain, [which] 
forbids the dialectical opening that is manifested in the phenomenon of 
belief. 
At the basis of paranoia itself, which nevertheless seems to us 
to be animated by belief, there reigns the phenomenon of the 
Unglauben. This is not the not believing in it, but the absence of one 
of the terms of belief, of the term which is designated the division of 
the subject. If, indeed, there is no belief that is full and entire, it is 
because there is no belief that does not presuppose in its basis that the 
ultimate dimension that it has to reveal is strictly correlative with the 
moment when its meaning is about to fade away. 69 
In terms which no doubt brutalize the subtleties of Lacan's argument, paranoia is 
viewed as a consequence of believing in an environment where belief is, by the 
necessity of its dependence on the signifier, continually incomplete. Paranoia becomes 
the attempt to rectify this incompletion in its psychotic seizure of the signifying chain, 
its attempt to seal the leakage of meaning in a systematized programme of belief. But 
such a seizure compounds the problem by disallowing "one of the terms of belief, " the 
term which essentially "designates the division of the subject. " Lacan appears to come 
to these linguistic conclusions directly from Freud's early remarks in Draft H that: 
Whenever an internal change occurs, we can choose whether we shall 
attribute it to an internal or external cause. If something deters us from 
accepting an internal origin, we naturally seize upon an external one. 
In the second place, we are accustomed to our internal states being 
betrayed to other people (by the expression of emotion). This explains 
normal delusions of observation and normal projection. For they are 
normal so long as in the process we remain conscious of our own 
internal change. If we forget it, and if we are left only with the leg of 
the syllogism that leads outwards, then we have paranoia, with its 
exaggeration of what people know about us and of what people have 
in and from aggressivity, also using some elements of Klein's understanding of paranoia, and 
stating that: "What I have called paranoiac knowledge is shown.. . to correspond in its more or less archaic forms to certain critical moments that mark the history of man's mental genesis, 
each representing a stage in objectifying identification. " 'Aggressivity in psychoanalysis' [paper 
delivered mid-May 1948] in Lacan, Ecrits, p. 17. 
69Jacques Lacan, 'Of The Subject Who Is Supposed To Know... ' [Seminar delivered 10 June, 
1964] in The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis, translated by Alan Sheridan 
(London 1986), p. 238. Text italics. 
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done to us-what people know about us, what we have no knowledge 
of whatever, what we cannot admit. This, then, is a misuse of the 
mechanism of projection for purposes of defence. 7° 
The logical structure of thought, or the use of syllogistic or dialectical reason, allows 
the possibility for human mental distortion under certain stresses, or as Lacan would 
argue, within the very linguistic dimension of thought. 
The pioneering American psychiatrist Karl Menninger came to similar 
conclusions about the pervasiveness of paranoia in social terms, writing in 1930 that: 
The symptoms called "paranoid" constitute the cancer of the mental 
life. "Paranoid" is a technical word, so apt, however, that it has been 
taken over into popular speech. It should be. 
... Paranoid delusions perpetuate class and economic wars. 
" 
Menninger unfortunately does not enlarge upon this last statement, and some thirty 
years later restated his position in terms congruent with 1960's sociological analyses, 
describing paranoia amongst other behaviour disorders as a response to stress. 72 
Along with analysts like David Riesman, Menninger saw the effects of modern 
technological society overriding "normal" regulatory functions within human mental 
process. The consequence was seen to be more extreme or more rigidly repressed 
measures of mental orientation, and in a classification of behaviour disorders 
Menninger linked paranoid tendencies to "directed aggression, " as well as more 
generally to neurotic personality disorders. 
Menninger's remarks were part of the ground swell of societal analyses which 
extended from Freud's explorations in Totem and Taboo and Civilization and Its 
"Freud, 'Draft H, ' pp. 111-112. Text italics. 
71Karl Menninger, The Human Mind (New York 1937), p. 83. 
72See Karl Menninger, The Vital Balance (New York 1964). 
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Discontents. In the 1930's and 40's the work of Wilhelm Reich and Erich Fromm, 
amongst others, focused on the political manifestations of mental disorder allied to the 
rise of fascism, with paranoia seen to be a necessary adjunct to the exercise of fear 
and social tension. The condition was not mentioned specifically or dealt with at 
length, however, nor did it figure as a causal possibility beyond the analysts' 
borrowings from Freudian theories of human belief processes. Significantly, the 
explicit application of paranoia to fascism came in the wave of anxieties and 
prejudices generated during World War II, resulting in texts like Richard M. Brickner's 
Is Germany Incurable? (1943). Brickner endorses the pattern of paranoia producing 
paranoia seen already in psychiatric contexts, attributing through extensive 
generalization a paranoid quality to the German psyche. Brickner identifies six 
elements which he argues generate this national tendency: 
... the need to dominate... The notion of equality is inadmissable, and, 
if it occurs, intolerable... 
... suspiciousness-what is commonly called the persecution complex... 
... an exaggeratedly high opinion of one's own importance (megalomania) [and therefore, no sense of humour]... 
... false rumination over past events-retrospective falsification. 
... absolutely logical character, once its original warped premises have 
been granted. 
... the use of projection. 
73 
In the circumstances of Hitler and his entourage's psychological manipulation of the 
German people, some truth inhabits Brickner's argument; however, these propositions 
are allowed to stand in themselves as truths, with little or no evidence or 
reinforcement. In Freud and Lacan°s terms, Brickner moves from one leg of his 
syllogism to the conclusion with a rapidity and force generated by the latent social 
fears emerging in a United States which had just entered the war against Germany. In 
73Richard M. Brickner, M. D., Is Germany Incurable? (New York 1943), pp. 61-64. 
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effect, Brickner simply borrows the fears of Teutonic expansionism which have 
inhabited European consciousness for centuries, and which are being re-employed 
today, as Germany unites in the Europe of the nineties, as an explicit psychic and 
political counter to the prospect of accumulated German power. 
Brickner concludes by determining two "causes" of paranoia in the German 
instance, respectively a "constitutional theory" of heredity, 74 and environmental 
factors, particularly as they affect childhood and upbringing. This latter suggestion is 
interesting, if only in the contexts of the Schreber case and Klein, but is weakly and 
implausibly argued. Brickner finally compounds the insubstantiality of his propaganda 
when he makes the claim that: 
In the United States, society is obviously not set up in such a way as 
to encourage paranoid thinking. Good-humoured American "spoofing" 
carries the day more readily than the deadly seriousness of the paranoid 
way of life. A legislative body like Congress, which must not only 
secure the consent of the governed but put up patiently with incessant 
criticism from the governed, is inconceivable as a permanent part of a 
paranoid-tinged culture. 75 
If one considers what happened to American political dissidents through the Great 
Depression and the 1930s, and Japanese-Americans during World War Two, 
Brickner's claims are laughable. Derision, however, would be a costly standpoint 
within the next few years, for by March 1947 the Truman Administration had 
instituted unprecedented loyalty and security checks, and what came to be known as 
"McCarthyism" began. 
74Just two years previously an American study of 400 institutionalized psychotics with 
paranoid trends determined that only eight patients (2%) had an ancestral history of paranoid 
illness; see C. Miller, 'The Paranoid Syndrome' in Archives of Neurology and Psychiatry, 49 
(1941), p. 953. 
'Brickner, Is Germany Incurable?, p. 91. 
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4. paranoia since 1945 
The status of paranoia in psychiatric and psychoanalytical discourse since 1945 
has been one involving a greater specificity of definition and diagnosis, alongside an 
incorporation of paranoia more and more into the corpus of schizophrenia as a mental 
condition. Simultaneously, paranoia has gained wide dissemination throughout the 
social sciences where it has been used by "experts" and a variety of writers alike to 
describe a pervasive mental and behavioural affliction in modern life. 
An offshoot of the mid-century psychopolitical debate with which the last 
chapter ended, and one peculiar in its form to the United States, attempted to establish 
that a paranoid element existed within American culture, and cited evidence 
specifically within the fascist polarities supposed to have been overcome in the 
victories of 1945. As an arena containing wildly fluctuating fears and exertions of 
totalitarian power, the issue of race in the United States has always been worthy of 
a paranoid diagnosis. But it was only after World War II that such a diagnosis was put 
forward within the terminology, and then, ironically, by a white man with reference 
to what he considered were African-American existential states. In his essay "The 
White Negro, " first published in Dissent magazine in 1957, Norman Mailer developed 
the long-held thesis that racism creates a specific mental attitude of tension and 
defence into the identification of certain forms of these states, and their value in the 
struggle to counter the deadening automaton-inducing effects of modern totalitarian 
and technological society. Under the impetus of social-darwinist energies, the 
argument moves out from a survivalist beginning in which: 
The Negro has the simplest of alternatives: live a life of constant 
humility or ever-threatening danger. In such a pass where paranoia is 
as vital to survival as blood, the Negro had stayed alive and begun to 
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grow by following the need of his body where he could. 76 
In the end, however, it is not paranoia which Mailer celebrates, but certain 
psychopathic tendencies as they exert cultural influence in their effort "to create a new 
nervous system-to meet the tempo of the present and the future. "" This transfer 
extends from Mailer's acute understanding of paranoia and its workings in the 
American psyche, notwithstanding the borrowed simplicities of his premise here, 
where he realizes that the tendency of paranoia to rigidity may produce the very 
opposite of the flexible tempo-sensitive perception he seeks to define in relation to 
the Hipster. 
In its use of paranoia, Mailer's analysis is retroactively racist in its selective 
and exclusive action, appropriating a needed energy for the suitably ordered "white 
negro. " Thomas Pynchon's approach to the problem, in his brief and pertinent study 
A Journey into the Mind of Watts (1966), prefers to focus on a "pocket of reality" in 
which a "terrible vitality" exists in the face of: 
basic realities like disease, like failure, violence and death, which the 
whites have mostly chosen-and can afford-to ignore.. . Watts is tough; has been able to resist the unreal. If there is any drift away from 
reality, it is by way of mythmaking. '8 
An attempt to affirm the seriousness of such cultural diagnosis on behalf of African- 
Americans came later with William Grier and Price Cobbs' Black Rage (1968), where 
the two black psychiatrists culminated their brief but deep and wide-ranging analysis 
"Norman Mailer, The White Negro' in Advertisements For Myself (1959; London 1961), 
p. 285. 
"Mailer, 'The White Negro, ' p. 289. 
"Thomas Pynchon, A Journey into the Mind of Watts (London 1983), pp. 3,4,10. The essay 
originally appeared in the New York Times Magazine, June 12,1966. 
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by defining a "black norm": 
Black men have stood so long in such peculiar jeopardy in America 
that a black norm has developed-a suspiciousness of one's 
environment which is necessary for survival. Black people, to a degree 
which approaches paranoia, must be ever alert to danger from their 
fellow white citizens. It is a cultural phenomenon peculiar to black 
Americans. And it is a posture so close to paranoid thinking that the 
mental disorder into which black people most frequently fall is 
paranoid psychosis. 79 
It would certainly be fair to argue that the history of African-American culture is a 
history in itself of the phenomenon Grier and Cobbs describe, and one as old as the 
racism it continues to confront. To Grier and Cobbs, however, goes the distinction of 
elucidating in the psychiatric discourse of paranoia what drives the endeavour of that 
culture at every significant level, to extend Mailer's Darwinist metaphor, as part of a 
necessary existential inheritance. The energy continues today in the work of Afro- 
American artists like jazz-musician Ornette Coleman, whose disruption of an 
emplaced musical perspective, as well as his racial origin, have brought him into 
contact with significant cultural anxieties. Coleman incisively recognizes the 
dimension of the paranoia he faces when he states: 
As a black man, I have a tendency to want to know how certain 
principles and rights are arrived at. When this concern dominates my 
business relationships, I'm cast into schizophrenic or paranoid 
thinking... I do not wish to be exploited for not having the knowledge 
or know-how required for survival in today's America. It's gotten so 
that in your relationships to every system that has some sort of power, 
you have to pay to become part of that power, just in order to do what 
you want to do. This doesn't build a better world, but it does build 
more security for the power. Power makes purpose secondary. 8° 
79William H. Grier and Price M. Cobbs, Black Rage (New York 1968), p. 173. Text italics. 
80Ornette Coleman, interviewed by Dan Morgenstern, quoted in Joachim E. Berendt, The Jazz 
Book: From Ragtime to Fusion and Beyond (first translated from German 1975; London 
1992), pp. 121-122. 
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The Afro-American writer Ishmael Reed, who traces the American racist experience 
of paranoia back into the history and fears of secret societies as they exist as 
manipulative agencies behind a projected cultural reality, goes further when he said 
recently in an interview: 
Paranoia-someone once called it heightened sensitivity. I think 
paranoia is a good thing.. . for women and minorities in this 
country-they've earned their paranoia. Some of the things they felt 
were happening, were happening. In the '60s, there was secret 
surveillance by the government. 81 
In opposition, however, to any suggestion that race paranoia is a cultural 
necessity unique to Afro-Americans, it is clear that the same necessity inhabits the 
experience, to different degrees, of any other post-fifteenth century non-caucasian 
American people. Blackness does generate specific fears within the contexts of white 
anxieties, particularly in terms of inherited Manichean perceptions, but these have 
been readily translated by the focus of racism to other groups. The first settlers 
referred to Native Americans as "black men in the forest, " long before the arrival of 
the first slaves, and the attribution of diabolic qualities has extended from there to 
include Asian and Slavic peoples, right up to and continuing today. Recent studies of 
the psychological environment facing immigrants to the United States have identified 
paranoia and forms of schizophrenia as a prevalent threat to assimilation into the host 
culture, with one researcher into Mexican immigrants' experiences concluding that 
"evidence is found that suspiciousness and the belief that others cannot be trusted 
increase the association of thought problems and of hallucinations and delusions with 
81Ishmael Reed, The Writer and the Joys of Paranoia' in The Washington Post, 31 August 
1990, p. D1. 
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paranoid beliefs. "82 
By extension from this theme of social anxiety, the history of extremist or 
alarmist twentieth century politics in the United States has drawn its fair share of 
paranoid discourse and diagnosis, the most famous examples being Woodrow Wilson's 
Red Scare of the 1920's, various manifestations of white supremacist groups such as 
the Ku Klux Klan, and McCarthy's pursuit of communism in the 1950's. In each case 
the situation is again one of paranoia meeting and/or defining and generating 
paranoia in the conflicts of domination and fears of powerlessness. The example of 
George Lincoln Rockwell, leader of the American Nazi Party for a period after World 
War II, is exemplary. On July 3,1960, Rockwell was arrested in Washington, D. C. 
while addressing a rally, and his prosecutors requested he be committed to an 
institution for 30 days' psychiatric evaluation. The diagnosis stated that Rockwell had 
a "paranoid personality, " but argued that prosecution on such psychiatric evidence in 
the circumstances would infringe on Rockwell's rights of free speech, presumably 
because Rockwell made sense to his investigators, however distorted his political 
ideology. In turn, and no doubt invigorated by this experience, Rockwell spent the 
early sixties preaching his own diagnosis of Jewish influence in the United States, 
stating that: 
The startling answer to the Jewish enigma is that the Jews are insane. 
The Jews as a race are paranoid... 
The Jewish masses are afflicted with the symptoms of paranoia: 
delusions of grandeur, delusions of persecution. The Jews believe 
themselves to be God's Chosen People, and they eternally complain 
82John Mirowsky, 'Disorder and Its Context: Paranoid Beliefs as Thematic Elements of 
Thought Problems, Hallucinations, and Delusions under Threatening Social Conditions' in 
Research in Community and Mental Health, 5,1985, p. 203. 
201 
about persecution. 83 
In a more mainstream case, Senator Barry Goldwater's run for the presidency in 1964 
was greeted by 1,189 members of the American Psychiatric Association declaring him 
"psychologically unfit to serve as President of the United States" due to their diagnosis 
that he too exhibited a "paranoid personality. i84 The columnist Frank Getlein located 
the key event for this diagnosis, and for the proliferation of paranoia as a term in 
these political contexts, when he wrote: "[t]he present eruption of paranoia to its 
dominant status has to be dated at the assassination of President Kennedy. 1185 The 
resonance of this event, striking at the core of American power consciousness, is 
something which even now American culture still tries to comprehend, as traumatic 
memory and paranoid speculation continue to intertwine. The most thoughtful use of 
the term, however, came in the 1964 publication of Richard Hofstadter's widely 
influential essay, "The Paranoid Style in American Politics, " which described in detail 
the manifestations of this American political tendency. 
To Hofstadter goes the distinction of giving cultural credence and academic 
validity to the use of paranoia within social and cultural analysis, if only in the United 
States. Hofstadter's careful argument and intelligent use of historical materials as well 
as contemporary evidence would have been enough to secure the essay's reputation 
within academic circles, but what ensured that his ideas went further was their popular 
dissemination through the essay's first publication medium, the November 1964 issue 
of Harper's Magazine, and the prominence within the essay of compelling statements 
"Cited in Thomas Szaz, The Manufacture of Madness (New York 1970), p. 312. 
84Szaz, The Manufacture of Madness, p. 312. 
85Frank Getlein, The Politics of Paranoia (New York 1969), p. 5. 
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such as: 
In fact, the idea of the paranoid style would have little contemporary 
relevance or historical value if it were applied only to people with 
profoundly disturbed minds. It is the use of paranoid modes of 
expression by more or less normal people that makes the phenomenon 
significant... 
It is, above all, a way of seeing the world and of expressing oneself. 86 
Hofstadter's essay thus crucially secures the proximity of paranoia to "normal" social 
and political process and convincingly argues the implicit and continuing action of 
paranoia in American culture and politics, even if that presence in its more malign 
forms is limited to the margins of public life. What appeals most of all, in a populist 
sense, is the stress on the location of truth, and its interactions in the arena of 
American political perspectives, where the "paranoid style" takes coherence to levels 
of intensity beyond the norm in its committed use of rationality. Hofstadter sees that 
the "paranoid style": 
is nothing if not coherent-in fact, the paranoid mentality is far more 
coherent than the real world, since it leaves no room for mistakes, 
failures, or ambiguities. It is, if not wholly rational, at least intensely 
rationalistic... 87 
This identification of certainty tied into the political scope of rationality, emerging 
from Hofstadter's more general comments on paranoid fears to do with power and 
powerlessness, becomes the lynchpin of the essay's conclusion. It not only serves to 
explain the episodic return of paranoia in the arena of American politics and the 
capability of its practitioners to attract attention and/or support, but with a clarity of 
86Richard Hofstadter, The Paranoid Style in American Politics' in 'Be Paranoid Style in 
American Politics (New York 1965), p. 4. The essay was first delivered as the Herbert Spencer 
Lecture at Oxford University, November 1963, and then published in abridged form in 
Harper's Magazine, November 1964. 
87Hofstadter, 'The Paranoid Style in American Politics, ' p. 36. 
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its own brings wider cultural recognition to the discourse of psychiatry and 
psychoanalysis on the same topic, whose own dissemination was limited variously by 
elitist opacities and specialization. 
Following the political opportunism and terror of the 1950's, and the Kennedy 
assassination, both of which provided the motivation for Hofstadter's analysis, the 
downturn of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s became the period in which 
paranoia found really widespread American cultural acceptance and use. This was 
given the popular sanction of Rolling Stone magazine when it published a collection 
of its late 1960s and early 1970s articles under the title, The Age of Paranoia, using 
the writing of Hunter S. Thompson and Ralph Gleason amongst others. In one of the 
articles, "Festival Paranoia, " Gleason reports from the ostensibly communal and 
utopian events of 1969 that: "These are the paranoid years. Paranoia is not only 
fashionable, its endemic. Nobody trusts or believes anybody anymore and the resulting 
rot is doing more harm than speed. "88 Harper's Magazine followed up its publication 
of Richard Hofstadter's essay a decade later with a June 1974 cover article by Hendrik 
Hertzberg and David McClelland, entitled "Paranoia. " The article was subtitled 
somewhat tardily, "An We fixe whose time has come, " while the contents page bore 
the citation, "Paranoia -a psychosis that soothes egos, smooths social relationships, 
and runs the country. " The writers conclude in agreement with Hofstadter that 
"Paranoia is the very opposite of meaninglessness; indeed, paranoia drenches every 
detail of the world in meaning, X89 and also interestingly highlight the notion of a 
"Ralph J. Gleason, 'Festival Paranoia, ' 6 September, 1969 in ed. Rolling Stone Editors, The, 
Age of Paranoia (New York 1972), p. 424. 
89Hendrik Hertzberg and David C. K. McClelland, 'Paranoia' in Harper's Magazine, June 1974, 
p. 60. 
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"positive paranoia" which they draw from Andrew Weil's book, The Natural Mind: A 
New Way of Looking at Drugs and the Higher Consciousness (1972). 90 Weil's 
concept springs from his explorations of drugs and their place in Western and non- 
Western cultures, which he undertook in the 1960s at Harvard medical school and then 
the Haight-Ashbury district of San Francisco. He contrasts "positive paranoia" with 
"negative paranoia" within the framework of two possible strands of human 
experience, so-called "straight thinking" or the domination of logic-based intellectual 
process, and "stoned thinking, " or intuitive, non-intellectual process, as they arise 
from Western cultures' reaction to consciousness-altering substances. Weil's route to 
his conclusions, evident in his book's quotations and references, is a potent mix of 
personal empirical study (he has published many authoritative articles in scientific 
periodicals) and the classic post-World War Two counter-culture development in 
America by way of Eastern mysticism, Aldous Huxley, D. T. Suzuki and Christmas 
Humphries, and an informed 1960's interrogation of establishment opinion. Weil picks 
up on paranoia as "a common experience in the drug subculture and elsewherei91 
and differentiates between two forms of the condition. The first occurs in "straight" 
intellectual perception and its pattern-forming tendencies, which he believes produce 
profoundly negative tensions through misunderstanding and fear of the alternate 
consciousness made available by hallucinogenics, a fear primarily of loss of the 
identity granted by rigid, linear and logic-based experiential process. In contrast, the 
second form directly utilizes the urge toward pattern and coherence as a positive 
90reprinted and revised as The Natural Mind: An Investigation of Drugs and the Higher 
Consciousness (Boston 1986). 
91Weil, The Natural Mind, p. 177. 
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experience of unity and centeredness. Weil states that "anyone who reads firsthand 
accounts of mystic experience or flashes of enlightenment must be struck by the 
underlying identity with negative paranoia, " and goes on to say that: 
Psychologists in the Haight-Ashbury Research Project of Mount Zion 
Hospital's Department of Psychiatry (a NIMH-funded project) have 
recently turned up cases of what they call "benign paranoia": young 
members of the San Francisco drug subculture... who seem to feel that 
"the universe is a conspiracy organized for my benefit. "92 
Weil argues that cultural ways need to be found in which this "positive paranoia" can 
be substituted for the negative form to ease the aggressions and fears produced by the 
straight intellect's inability to deal with the ambivalences which daily confront mental 
process. 
More recently "positive paranoia" has re-emerged in Fred H. Goldner's theory 
of "pronoia, " which he terms the "positive counterpart to paranoia. 03 Goldner is 
more specific than Weil in his definition of an individual's perception which 
persistently misinterprets others' reactions to s/he as more favourable than they really 
are. Hilariously, and with more than a little relevance, a number of analysts 
immediately leapt to the defence of medical practice by disavowing Goldner's claim 
that "pronoia" deserved the status of a disease: 
Goldner implies that pronoia is a disease by comparing it to paranoia, 
yet the former does not fit the disease framework. Since the behavior 
in question is easily medicalized, however, it could in time qualify as 
a disease. This would be unfortunate, and Goldner's insights are best 
approached outside the medical framework. 94 
'Weil, The Natural Mind, P. 179. "NIMH" is the National Institute for Mental Health. 
"Fred H. Goldner, 'Pronoia' in Social Problems, 30,1982, pp. 82-91. 
94Richard Hawkins, Laurence J. Kirmayer & Fred H. Goldner, 'Comments on "Pronoia"' in 
Social Problems, 31,1983, pp. 165-179. See also Laurence J. Kirmayer, Paranoia and Pronoia: 
The Visionary and the Banal (Montreal 1983). 
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Unfortunately, since 1972 the ideas of Weil and Goldner have had little effect 
in the mediation of any ambivalence to do with drugs which has swung 
overwhelmingly towards the negative attitudes prevalent today. The position of 
paranoia as a "common experience" in drug culture has intensified particularly with 
the ascendancy of amphetamine and cocaine-derived substance use, as any reading of 
recent psychiatric evaluation of narcotics use will demonstrate. 95 Paranoia has long 
been known to be induced in those using amphetamines or "speed" beyond certain 
metabolic endurances, and more recently has emerged as a major dimension in crack- 
cocaine addiction cycles. Within the range of these drug uses paranoia centres on the 
mixture of anxiety induced by illegality and connected surreptitiousness and violence, 
the placing of a consciousness in a fixed desire cycle of manipulated supply and 
accelerating demand where pattern means everything, and the increased intensity of 
awareness, suspiciousness and delusions of grandeur produced by the drugs. 
The use of technology and the rapid technological advances made since the 
beginning of the century have also been areas of cultural activity and experience 
thought to be conducive to paranoia. Anxieties about technology, particularly as that 
technology may exert invasory, surveillance or physical control of human beings, have 
always been part of social perceptions of the inventor or technician; one has only to 
trace the literary representations of shamans, wizards and witch doctors through to 
more recent and analogous treatments of alchemists, scientists and inventors to 
uncover a pervasive sense of threat. A linked phenomenon is one of the lightning rods 
of paranoid discourse, namely the intense scrutiny given to Masonic organizations 
95see, for instance, the bibliographies in William Meissner's The Paranoid Process (New York 
1978), and Psychotherapy and the Paranoid Process (Northvale, N. J. 1986) for their detailing 
of the enormous research investigating paranoia and drug use. 
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whose formation occurred at a crucial intersection of religious and technological 
energies, where the fraternity of mobile groups of technicians arose, at their outset at 
least, in the construction of religious enclosures and structures for worship. More 
prominent in the paranoia surrounding Freemasonry are the fears generated by secrecy 
and the sense of unseen controlling networks permeating social activity, yet at certain 
points in its emergence, such as the period of medieval and Renaissance construction 
of cathedrals in Europe, anxieties about the Masons had a great deal to do with 
technological skill and its capability of focusing energy into social control. 96 Henry 
Adams's famous metaphor of focused energy in his "The Dynamo and the Virgin" 
section of The Education of Henry Adams (1907) suggests the catalyst of these fears, 
as they arise at the intersection of human belief, technological endeavour and divine 
or infinite energy, when he states that technology's "value lay chiefly in its occult 
mechanism. i97 In this, the unexplained, the invisible and the potential of infinite 
force or control all operate within the "respect of power, " as Adams terms it, to 
undermine human senses of security and post-Enlightenment reliance on reason, 
producing a number of possible responses. Among these Adams debates the pursuit 
of historical causalities, in itself a paranoid exercise when taken to extremes, and 
another, and more predominant social strategy, that of falling back into already- 
emplaced structures of superstition which seek less to locate origin or explanation than 
to find security in the exertion of their own control. 
The application of paranoia as a psychological concept to the twentieth century 
96for an interesting yet culpably paranoid account of the development of Masonic societies, see 
Michael Howard, The Occult Conspiracy (London 1989). 
97Henry Adams, The Education of Henry dams (1907; New York 1931), pp. 380-381. 
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phenomenon of technological fears has been one which has gained momentum 
particularly within the contexts of electronic, nuclear and weapons technology. Ground 
was broken for the application of psychology to technological fears long before, a late 
and important example in the United States being George M. Beard's inclusive concept 
of "neurasthenia, " which he elaborated in a number of books and pamphlets towards 
the end of the nineteenth century. Beard's American Nervousness, Its Causes and 
Consequences (1881) determined that: 
nervousness is strictly deficiency or lack of nerve force. This 
condition... has developed mainly within the nineteenth century, and is 
especially frequent and severe in the Northern and Eastern portions of 
the United States... 
The chief and primary cause of this development and very rapid 
increase of nervousness is modern civilization, which is distinguished 
from the ancient by these five characteristics: steam power, the 
periodical press, the telegraph, the sciences, and the mental activity of 
women. 98 
Notwithstanding a fear of women's independence, Beard's stress is wholly on 
technology and he develops an argument whose underlying thrust pits the human field 
of energies, imaged primarily through the notion of "nerve force, " against the 
interferences and drainage which he sees as being implicit in the use of technological 
energies. 
The anxieties articulated and analysed in recent years about technological 
advance draw on similar fears, and psychiatry and psychoanalysis have not been the 
only sciences to identify their manifestation using the concept of paranoia. For some 
years, computer science has been a site of some psychiatric investigation of paranoia, 
one element utilizing computer models of artificially constructed intelligence to pursue 
"George M. Beard, American Nervousness, Its Causes and Consequences (New York 1881), 
p. vi. Text italics. Significantly, Beard states further on that "[n]ervousness does not mean 
unbalanced mental organization" (p. 1). 
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the possible dimensions of paranoid perception. 99 These models generate a particular 
validity at the comparative level of computing's binary logic and similar binaries in 
paranoid thinking, a validity which ironically has been endorsed by both machines and 
operators in the 1980's emergence of the so-called "computer virus. " Invading and 
causing the seizure and immobilization of computer data banks and programs, such 
"viruses" are programs transmitted electronically through computer link-ups and the 
exchange of information, invariably using modes of priority to assert their precedence 
over all other command operations. The posing of the problem in terms of disease and 
the disruption of health is in itself a resonant discourse of paranoia, as has already 
been analysed with regard to American plague fears in the 1790s; more immediately, 
however, some of those concerned with the subversion of many levels of the global 
computing network indicated the cast of their perceptions when, in a theoretical and 
practical response to the threat, they termed an "anti-viral" alignment of computing 
processes the "Watchdog/Paranoia concept. i10° In effect, this concept describes the 
programming of a computer system to interrogate all inputs with an artificially 
generated suspicion as to their content and intent, and to implement security 
procedures to protect memory and function should an input attempt any "corruption" 
of the system. Again, to link human and artificial intelligence processes, a notable 
parallel occurs between the two in their paranoid dimensions when the investigators 
of the "Watchdog/Paranoia concept" determine that any effective protection of 
99see, for instance, William S. Faught, Motivation and Intentionality in a Computer Simulation 
Model of Paranoia (Basel 1978). 
loaf E. Sobczak and R. W. Trickey, 'Front-End Anti-Viral Detection Using 
Replicating/Self-Replicating Software' in U. S. Government Publication 
No. DA214 . XSP (Application Configured Computers, Inc., Baldwin, New York), 19 
October, 1989. 
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computer systems alongside those systems' continued and efficient operation is 
currently impossible. In computing terms, such blanket coverage disables the speed 
and capacity of systems, mirroring the staticity and rigidity enforced on the paranoid 
by endlessly recycling suspicion, a perceptual situation which is intensified in both 
perspectives by the permutations of applicable logic. 
At a more mundane level, computers have highlighted the persistent popular 
fear of technology in their extension of technology beyond the service of simple 
human needs to the satisfaction of a scientific thrust whose energy comes from the 
pursuit of logical progressions, and more importantly, the increasing capitalization of 
the technological presence in everyday life. One analysis of the problem has connected 
paranoia and its power anxieties to computer fears, concluding that the perception of 
an "[e]xternal locus of control has... been identified as a predictor of computer 
anxiety. "101 In the same context, the psychologist Dr. Mike Burton involves the 
historical extent from magic to mechanics in his vocabulary when he says about 
"technophobia"-the fear of technology-that if computers "were designed around the 
humans who were to use them, working in information technology wouldn't be such 
a black art. 11102 The argument in favour of simplistic icon-based process in 
computers and other modern technology is undercut, however, by the implicit ideology 
of the article in which Burton's ideas appear. Rather than evoking the scenario of a 
technological environment free of paranoia, which Burton advocates, the article 
101R. Baumgarte, 'Computer Anxiety and Instruction, ' unpublished paper presented at the 
Spring Meeting of the Southeastern Psychological Association, Atlanta, GA, March 28-31, 
1984. 
lo2Dr. Mike Burton, 'A Programme For Paranoia? ' in The Sunday Times Magazine, 8 May, 
1987, p. 74. 
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includes product endorsement and ends by intensifying the power anxieties from which 
"technophobia" ultimately arises. Those suffering from computer "technophobia" are 
instructed to "[l]earn to use the machine in ways you may never need. By doing this 
you'll achieve a comforting feeling of mastery-and a reputation as a citizen of the 
age. "103 In trying to fit both human and machine to prevailing economic 
requirements it thus becomes necessary to generate anxiety as part of the larger 
commitments to social control carried out by corporate capitalism. 
Further application of paranoia to technological fears has been evident at 
different sociological levels in the twentieth century, present to varying degrees in the 
societal analyses mentioned before of Freud, Reich and Fromm, amongst others. It has 
emerged more specifically in recent years as a descriptive term for the human 
condition within the psychological pressures of the cold war, about which the writings 
of Arthur Koestler, sociologist Christopher Lasch and psychotherapist Joel Kovel are 
exemplary. Koestler's extraordinary book, The Ghost in the Machine (1967), 
undertakes a critique of human perceptions and control of behaviour as he sees it 
extending from a history of misinterpretation and discoordination of human mental 
capabilities and resources. A key part of Koestler's analysis rests on his suggestion as 
to how humans have organized mental process, predicating a capability to recognize 
what he calls "holons, " or component parts of systems or wholes, and use them 
accordingly in the development of understanding which can take in the minutiae of 
a situation as well as a bigger picture. Koestler then identifies a "paranoid streak" 
running throughout history which he believes emerges from combinations and 
misalignments of older superstitious tendencies and instinctive thought processes, with 
"'Burton, "A Programme for Paranoia? ' p. 74. 
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newer forms of rationality affirming belief from the egotistically assumed complete 
bases of holons. Added to this, finally, is the twentieth-century phenomenon of mass 
fanaticism within modern totalitarian politics, with all these issues determining in 
Koestler's view that the "integrative tendencies of the individual are incomparably 
more dangerous than his self-assertive tendencies... the delusional streak which runs 
through our history may be an endemic form of paranoia, built into the wiring circuits 
of the brain. i104 Koestler's vocabulary remains linked to that identified before in this 
discursive history as eager to secure physiological locations for aberrancy over other 
factors, particularly where he settles on the term "schizophysiology, " arising out of his 
explorations of bicameral brain operations, as one more specific to the debate. That 
notwithstanding, Koestler elucidates a penetrating and impassioned argument against 
the distortion of creative activity, or what he calls the capability of "self- 
transcendence, " within which paranoia has its agency: 
Thus the glory and the tragedy of the human condition both derive 
from our powers of self-transcendence. It is a power which can be 
harnessed to creative or destructive purpose... 
What we are concerned with is a cure for the paranoic streak in 
what we call normal people, i. e., mankind as a whole: an artificially 
simulated, adaptive mutation to bridge the rift between the 
phylogenetically old and new brain, between instinct and intellect, 
emotion and reason. " 
Unfortunately, Koestler concludes with a plea for "a state of dynamic equilibrium in 
"Arthur Koestler, The Ghost in the Machine (1967; London 1989), pp. 233,239. Text italics. 
Koestler's work extends from a sequence of extraordinary investigations in this area of human 
behaviour which include Elias Canetti, Crowds and Power (1960; London 1987) and Eric 
Hoffer, The True Believer (New York 1951). See also Josef Rudin, Fanaticism (Notre Dame 
1969) and Andre Haynal, Miklos Molnar and Gerard de Puymege, Fanaticism: A Historical 
and Psychoanalytical Study (1980; New York 1983). 
"5Koestler, The Ghost in the Machine, pp. 245,336. Text italics. 
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which thought and emotion are re-united, and hierarchic order is restored, i106 basing 
his belief in its attainability in contemporary optimisms about the potential chemical 
regulation of thought within democratic controls. Admittedly, this faith is beyond 
Aldous Huxley and Timothy Leary's promotion of mescaline and LSD, respectively, 
but in the light of pharmaceutical multinational corporations and their controls over 
behaviour as evidenced, say, in the recent Prozac affair, such faith is both dated and 
alarmingly dependent on notions of "hierarchic order" within which paranoia 
inevitably holds its sway. 
Christopher Lasch's The Minimal Self: Psychic Survival in Troubled Times 
(1984) undertakes a cultural analysis from the statement that Western societies exhibit 
a "growing dependence on technologies no one seems to understand or control, " 
giving rise to a dominant sense "of victimization and paranoia, of being manipulated, 
invaded, colonized, and inhabited by alien forces. i107 Kovel is altogether more 
incisive with his concentration on annihilation fears in Against the State of Nuclear 
Terro r (1983), outlining a social context shaped by the use of science in an effort to 
dominate nature using logic and force. The effect on the psyche of such a "Cartesian- 
technocratic" attitude and practice, in tandem with the resentment shared by all 
humans at losing the unconditional omnipotence of infancy, is seen to be threefold: 
a deep-seated hatred, terror and paranoia. All three reactions are directed at 
overcoming a sensed powerlessness, and are only intensified in the atomic age by the 
threat of mass destruction, where global strategy is one of terrorism and coercion 
106Koestler, The Ghost in the Machine, p. 336. 
.. 'Christopher Lasch, The Minimal Self: Psychic Survival in Troubled Times (New York 
1984), p. 44. 
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supposed to prevent terrorism and coercion. 'os 
These sociological uses of paranoia have tended toward a looser use of the 
term in their inclusive scope, whereas psychiatric discourse has maintained the 
direction detailed before with regard to specializations and exclusions, with little 
advancement or expansion of the paranoia concept beyond the dimensions outlined 
by Freud. One exception to this in American psychiatry occurred in the influential 
work and theories of Harry Stack Sullivan (1892-1949) who diverged from Freudian 
theory by diminishing the role of projection and dismissing the homosexual element 
insisted upon by Freud as a vital component of any paranoid manifestation. Sullivan's 
distinctly sociological approach, which he termed "interpersonal psychiatry, " was 
founded principally on an analysis of the reflexive effects of an individual's self- 
esteem, observed in its variations from infancy through to the interpersonal 
relationships developed in psychological maturity. Within this theoretical framework 
Sullivan determined two scenarios in which paranoia may develop. The first viewed 
paranoia as a residual state of schizophrenia, most often occurring after transitory 
schizophrenic attacks and brought on by the panic and anxiety implicit in the acute 
personality destabilization caused in schizophrenia. The second approach goes deeper 
and identifies a causal process which begins in childhood from a catalyst termed 
"malevolent transformation, " in which, in simple terms, the child's unsatisfied desire 
for affection and tenderness is transformed into resentment (the concept used by Joel 
Kovel, above). The problem this presents for the child, and the tension which sets up 
a potential for paranoia, according to Sullivan, is that experienced in a relationship 
"'As in the geopolitical strategy fostered and adopted by the United States between 1960- 
1989, aptly called Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD). 
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where elements of physical security and comfort are forthcoming but emotional 
contact is limited or non-existent. Such a tension develops in the individual a 
difficulty in distinguishing between those who pose a threat and those who might offer 
emotionally gratifying contact. If a pattern of rejection by loved ones continues, and 
particularly if it extends into adolescence, Sullivan predicts disastrous consequences: 
A great many children learn that anger will aggravate the situation and 
they develop instead resentment; and resentment has very important 
covert aspects. Sometimes even the resentment has to be concealed in 
childhood, and this gradually results in a self-system process which 
precludes one's knowing [the child's] resentment. Again, I have 
commented on the fact that the manifesting of the need for tenderness 
toward the significant people around one often leads to one's being 
disadvantaged, made anxious, made fun of, and so on. And in this way 
the groundwork is laid for the malevolent attitude toward life in 
general, in which other people are viewed as enemies, which is the 
greatest disaster that happens in childhood, in that it may represent a 
great handicap for profitable experience in the subsequent stages of 
development. " 
The movement onwards into paranoia occurs in a mode where "the usual solution in 
chronological maturity is to cover one's chronic defect in self-esteem by disparaging 
others-a solution which is used by all of us in varying degrees. "'lo The perspective 
is, again, markedly one of experience and perception of empowerment, beginning from 
the index of Sullivan's psychiatric investigation, self-esteem, while projection in any 
pure mechanistic form is deflected in the assertion that "people with chronically low 
self-esteem anticipate unfavorable opinions in others; and I do not think that the 
mechanism of projection accounts for much of anything. ""' 
109Harry Stack Sullivan, The Interpersonal Theory of Psychiatry (New York 1953), p. 345. Text 
italics. 
"'Sullivan, The Interpersonal Theory of Psychiatry, p. 344. 
"'Sullivan, The Interpersonal Theory of Psychiatry, p. 359. 
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Sullivan's influence on American psychiatry has since been pervasive, though 
his dismissal of projection, coming before the work done by David Shapiro, has had 
little effect on a scientific perception whose basic structure remains largely Freudian. 
Post-World War II studies of paranoia have thus either re-examined the Freudian 
premises, or tentatively expanded the medical gaze to include sociological 
perspectives, though as we have seen, the discursive practice is always one careful to 
determine the boundaries of medical certainty, within which it includes itself. Such a 
tendency informs the work of the most prominent of current American analysts of 
paranoia, William Meissner, S. J. His The Paranoid Process (1978) and Psychotherapy 
and the Paranoid Process (1986) both present exhaustive theoretical and practical 
examinations of the condition, the former text noting at the outset the current status 
of paranoia in contemporary mental science: 
The trend.. . has been in the direction of using the concept of paranoia 
with greater flexibility and with greater applicability. It is used not only 
as a diagnostic category but also as a descriptive personality trait which 
is characterized by isolation, hypersensitivity, guardedness, 
suspiciousness and the use of projection as defence. 112 
Meissner's involvement in "the trend" becomes a reflection of the dominant psychiatric 
and psychoanalytic connection of this fluid identity to wider cultural analysis. 
Paranoia is referred to as a "process" within a set of pathologies whose identities and 
territory of operation are carefully traced in the intersection of case studies and the 
historical development of theory. The notion of "greater flexibility" in these 
circumstances is a misnomer, a nervous and rigid gesture from inside a scientific and 
historical retrenchment outwards toward a vague, generalized notion of social and 
cultural activity, which wallows unconvincingly in the wake of Freud's central premise 
112William Meissner, S. J. The Paranoid Process (New York 1978), p. 3. 
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in Civilization and Its Discontents: 
The essential insight I have tried to articulate and substantiate, both by 
careful study of more traditional views of paranoia and by careful 
examination of pathological expressions of the syndrome, is that the 
basic mechanisms, which play themselves out in distorted and 
exaggerated forms in the pathology, are in fact the same basic 
mechanisms endemic to the human developmental process. These 
mechanisms contribute meaningfully and in profoundly important ways 
to the building up of human personality, to the establishment and 
sustaining of human identity, and to the elaboration and maintenance 
of the social and cultural structures within which such identities take 
shape and find their ultimate expression and cohesion. The consequence 
of this perspective is that paranoia, as a form of psychopathology, 
cannot simply be dissociated from the positive forces and processes 
which serve to build up and maintain meaningful and constructive areas 
of human growth and experience. The question remains ultimately to 
what degree the deviance and impairment of paranoid forms of 
pathology are indeed the price we pay for the constructive 
achievements and attainments that characterize human society and 
culture. "' 
The "consequence" of Meissner's "perspective, " following these prefatory remarks, is 
a deflection of this fundamental issue from the bulk of the text until the final chapter, 
entitled "The Paranoid Process in Adaption, " which attempts to bridge the textually- 
accumulated gap between psychopathology and a colourless, empty sociology. A range 
of conclusions are sought but all tail off into generalization as they move outside and 
become disconnected from the emplacements of psychiatric discourse. When Meissner 
states: "Our basic hypothesis with respect to the organization of society is that social 
processes organize themselves in such a way as to provide appropriate contexts within 
which the paranoid process comes into play ... "14 he articulates a truth; 
he also says 
a great deal about the siege mentality of psychiatric science and its desire to include 
and regulate all social process within its vision, something about the fluid status of 
"'Meissner, The Paranoid Process, pp. ix-x. 
114 Meissner, The Paranoid Process, p. 807. 
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paranoia as a concept in contemporary science and culture, but nothing at all of any 
gravity for an understanding of its influence in human existence. The cornerstone of 
Meissner's approach is his theory of process, a strategy formulated in reaction to the 
increasingly diffuse identity of paranoia in both scientific and cultural terms. This 
effort is primarily aimed at involving the current premier segments of psychoanalytic 
theory in a total apprehension of paranoia, as is stated at the beginning of Meissner's 
Psychotherapy and the Paranoid Process: 
The theory of the paranoid process builds on and extends three 
essential aspects of the psychoanalytic perspective: systematic ego 
psychology, object-relations theory, and self psychology. The core 
elements of the paranoid process operate as ego functions, but they also 
derive from and modify object relationships, and contribute core 
constituents to the organization of self structure. "' 
The rigidity of his analysis, however, and its commitment to a discursive logic more 
intent on gaining the validity granted by its "scientific" apprehension overcomes any 
growth or potential for flexibility which might be promised in the notion of "process. " 
Meissner's ultimate conclusion in terms of a cultural overview is an empty repetition 
of the theoretical and narrative effort, a final refocusing of attention on a resonant 
symbol of psychoanalytic control, where it is explained that "[t]he burden of the 
argument is that there is a link and a line of continuity that runs between the 
psychoanalytic couch and the rest of the broad realms of human experience and 
activity. 11116 Process in Meissner's terms thus becomes a shackle to psychiatric 
discourse, rather than the release required to extend or dissolve the boundaries of 
knowledge and power which would lend a genuinely new and valuable perspective on 
115William Meissner, S. J., Psychotherapy and the Paranoid Process (Northvale, N. J. 1986), 
pp. 14-15. 
"'Meissner, The Paranoid Process, p. 817. 
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paranoia. The desire is for precisely the control imaged in the centering on the 
analyst's couch where all identities converge and the truth of an identity may be 
formed by the analyst in a continuity which promises the safety of repetition. 
The nub of the problem, as we have seen throughout this history of discourses, 
is the paranoia inherent in the use, arrangement and analysis of power, for Meissner's 
project effectively articulates the force behind the analyses of a condition which, 
perhaps more than any other so-called mental aberration, is inextricably linked to 
control: the control of perception, and thence, the control of others. The psychiatric 
discourses of paranoia carry out such a programme themselves and are consequently 
in the reflexive position of anxiously formulating the dimensions of a condition whose 
frictions with discursive controls accurately reproduce the disturbance of political 
power. In confronting paranoia, psychiatry confronts itself, and indeed, needs to 
confront itself to register the effects of its control and to locate that which must be 
ordered. Such confrontation, however, always fails to reach the explicit point of actual 
recognition (the mental sciences can never diagnose themselves as sick or aberrant as 
the marginalizations of the so-called "anti-psychiatry" have demonstrated), and thus 
the therapeutic programmes and analyses continue to be generalized and ambiguous 
projects intent on maintaining the securities of established practice. It is precisely this 
action which has led Felix Guattari to comment: 
Psychoanalysis is no science: it is a politico-religious movement and 
should be treated in the same way as all the other movements that have 
proposed models of behaviour for particular times and contexts. Its 
conception of desire is 'ahead of its time' in appearance only; it is 
ahead only in perfecting the repressive support required by the logic of 
the system, and overhauling a technique of interpreting and re-directing 
desire and of internalizing repression. The object of psychoanalysis is, 
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in brief, what I would call collective paranoia... 117 
For paranoia is about power and the ordering of power, both as a condition and as an 
articulation of a condition. The use of the term within a wider framework of cultural 
discourse may provide more clues to this conspiracy of power. 
"'Felix Guattari, Molecular Revolution* Psychiatry and Politics (Harmondsworth, Middlesex 
1984), p. 86. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
The Failure of Integration 
paranoia in Recent American Culture & Literature 
1. The Kingdom of Death 
Since 1945, the changes to be observed in paranoia and its cultural presence 
have been radical and transformative. The effects of power already identified and their 
production of paranoia carry over into the period but undergo an extraordinary 
continuity under the impetus of two interlinked processes: the electronic revolution 
and its influence on the entire range of existential action, and the triumph of capitalist 
modes of production in the West as, in Hannah Arendt's terms, the totalitarianism 
emerging in the 1930's absorbed prior forms of imperialism. The development of 
political processes from the 1790s onwards within the impetuses of the industrial 
revolution, and already partially explored in the dissertation's introduction, emerges 
further in Arendt's understanding of the dominant place of ideology in these 
engineered environments. She states that: "[i]deological thinking orders facts into an 
absolutely logical procedure which starts from an axiomatically accepted premise, 
deducing everything else from it... "' The complexity of the political situation is one 
concerning: 
a restructuring of consciousness as both constituting and constituted in 
relation to its social and political field. Thus totalitarianism in power, 
in its drive towards global domination, witnessed the decline of the 
nation-state, the extension of statelessness, and the associated loss of 
rights of residence and government protection... the destruction of 
privacy and critical sensibility, the replacement of public involvement 
by indifferent passivity and loneliness, and the creation of a mass of 
'Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951; London 1986), p. 471. 
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indoctrinated units "for whom the distinction between fact and 
fiction.. . and the distinction between true and false... no longer 
exist[ed]. "2 
The post-1945 period effectively saw the consolidation of the United States' position 
as a major global power achieved after World War One. This was a necessary process 
after the setback of the Depression in the 1930's and the cosmetic confusions of the 
New Deal threatened to deny capitalist process its required expansion. World War 
Two provided the appropriate energies for a consolidation to take place, generating the 
two political forces which every state desires and which only war can deliver on 
capitalist terms: the unity of a nation at war, and the massive stimulation of the 
economy war production produces. 3 That the scenario described by Arendt and Carter 
should afflict the United States-and ensure a continuing basis for the forms of 
paranoia already studied-is due essentially to a post-war malaise of power. This 
malaise intensified a predicament for the United States in which, according to Eric 
Mottram, "[t]he American psyche is an extreme expression of a condition endemic in 
societies which need to believe themselves terminal and invincible, and which are 
therefore prone to perpetual anxiety. i4 The striking manifestations of this need 
occurred in the linked events which still underpin much of the American and 
international political situation: the global arms race, the anti-communist energies of 
the cold war and McCarthy period, and the disaster of the most visible of United 
'Dale Carter, The Final Frontier: The Rise and Fall of the American Rocket State (London 
1988), p. 20. Quotation from Arendt's The Origins of Totalitarianism. 
'In a lecture given at the Battersea Arts Centre, November 1988, Noam Chomsky estimated 
that immediately after World War Two the United States controlled 50% of global wealth; 
he estimates that share as currently about 20%, and probably declining following the 
economic policies of the 1980's. 
4Eric Mottram, 'Out of Sight But Never Out of Mind: Fears of Invasion in American Culture' 
in Blood On The Nash Ambassador: Investigations in American Culture (London 1989), p. 139. 
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States' sponsored conflicts, the Viet Nam war. 
The period, in fact, marks the most pervasive dominance of what Dwight 
Eisenhower called the "military-industrial complex, " and what others have called the 
"war machine. " The issue needs to be seen as a combination of "perpetual anxiety" 
with the cycles of capitalism to establish the way in which these two elements feed 
on one another to secure a production which is necessarily both productive and 
destructive. The analogue to the paranoid system is clear: the necessity of producing 
a continuity of threat and an inclusive perception which seeks to enclose phenomena 
within an either/or dynamic-actions, like weapons research, which are abundant in 
their consumption of energies and the range of their inventiveness; and the destruction 
implicit in this, where creative difference is selectively denied in a format of use and 
forced identity. 
In psychological contexts, the post-1945 period can be explained as one in 
which certain changes in the paradigm of forces succeeded one another. From this 
emerges the post-war concentration on alienation theory and then an uneven 
consensus regarding paranoia as a form of health, or, at the very least, a modern 
existential necessity, so that in 1966 Thomas Pynchon finds it entirely justifiable to 
leave his heroine Oedipa Maas, and his readers, in a modern American dilemma. 
Confronted with the possibility that an underground communications system called 
"Tristero" is operating in certain parts of the United States, Maas seeks comfort in the 
binary of delusion or truth: 
Either Oedipa in the orbiting ecstasy of a true paranoia, or a real 
Tristero. For there either was some Tristero beyond the appearance of 
the legacy America, or there was just America and if there was just 
America then it seemed the only way she could continue, and manage 
to be at all relevant to it, was an alien, unfurrowed, assumed full circle 
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into some paranoia. ' 
The rhythms of these sentences are masterly, pitching the surfaces and tensions of 
reality against learnt perceptual need. The sudden acceleration toward relevance and 
completion provides a textual basis reflecting the concerns of the period, and a 
launching point into Pynchon's next paranoid documentary, Gravity's Rainbow (1973). 
Speed, in fact, becomes the issue, as Paul Virilio has detailed in his work, suggesting 
how the increasing speeds of communication and the war machine have taken 
humanity to the point where human decision is under an impetus which ensures its 
concentration in isolated cartels, and even programmed electronics. ' The global 
interconnection of computers to operate financial markets and weapons systems are 
the primary examples here. The removal of certain possibilities of decision obviates 
the effective need for fear among the masses and as a consequence paranoia is 
suspended in a constant form of potentiality. Among those "in charge" paranoia 
remains as potent a focus of destructive force within the uses of power as it has ever 
done. Alternatively, these events have produced a global environment which Jean 
Baudrillard believes is one with: 
[n]o more hysteria, no more projective paranoia, properly speaking, but 
this state of terror proper to the schizophrenic: too great a proximity of 
everything, the unclean promiscuity of everything which touches, 
invests and penetrates without resistance, with no halo of private 
protection, not even his own body, to protect him anymore. ' 
'Thomas Pynchon, The Crying of Lot 49 (1966; London 1979), p. 126. Hereafter referred to 
as 'L49. ' Because of Pynchon's frequent use of ellipses, my ellipses in quotations from his 
novels will be given inside square brackets [... ]. 
6Paul Virilio, Speed and Politics: An Essay on Dromology, translated by Mark Polizotti (New 
York 1986). 
'Jean Baudrillard, "The Ecstasy of Communication" in ed. Hal Foster, The Anti-Aesthetic: 
Essays on Postmodern Culture (Washington 1983), p. 132. 
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But paranoia remains inside this phase of radical overcoding as a means of control, 
and it extends from the global perspectives allowed by nineteenth and twentieth 
century advances in technology and communications. Human consciousness and the 
body have become relays in the transfer of information, connected instantaneously to 
a truly global network of flows. The issue of time in this process is vital, as Virilio 
suggests: "All current technologies reduce expanse to nothing... If the parcelling out 
of territory-of territories of time-is envisioned like that.. . there will be nothing 
left 
but absolute control, an immediacy which will be the worst kind of concentration. i8 
The idea of the total-total control, total penetration, total surveillance-is 
consequently brought to an intensity which the rise and dissemination of paranoia as 
a concept, in its variety and pervasion, marks as a confinement and shaping of desire. 
Despite the value of their work, however, there is the danger of entering a 
phase of fatalism with analysts like Baudrillard and Virilio which is in itself a kind 
of paranoia, particularly where critical detachment involves a tacit acceptance of the 
current situation. Such acceptance may be present in Baudrillard's consistent 
predilection for phased apocalypse, or Virilio's tendency to include all in his critical 
scenarios. This fatalism is a desire for a determinism which confirms, or which offers 
an inevitability programme written into the analysis as confirmed prediction. Fiction 
or other forms of creative endeavour can provide an alternative medium of exploration 
where desire may work itself out within any programme as a more creative 
dogmatism. 
The disruption of history as a singular coherence has, perhaps more than 
8Paul Virilio & Sylvere Lotringer, Pure War, translated by Mark Polizotti (New York 1983), 
p. 69. Text italics. 
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anything else, developed the idea of alienation and anxiety as a "normal" condition in 
post-1945 American sociology. Rupert Wilkinson's analysis of this tendency-moving 
from Margaret Mead and David Riesman through to Christopher Lasch-suggests 
these analysts' relevance particularly in his and their predominant concentration on 
American character as fearful rather than confident. 9 The effect of a vast and 
continuing volume of American sociological discourse has not been one of detached 
diagnosis: in line with their public popularity and dissemination, Riesman and others 
in The Lonely Crowd (1950), a sequence of books by Vance Packard whose titles 
provide an appropriate index to the anxieties of the age, 1° and Christopher Lasch's 
aforementioned The Culture of Narcissism and The Minimal Self, have all explored 
and, in a way, conditioned a sense of anxiety in public consciousness. From this 
history, readers have been liable to jettison these texts' social critiques in favour of the 
identity their expositions and ideologies variously offer, as the programmes of their 
marketing and banality cut in. Equally, a collection of perceptive essays like Identity 
and Anxiety: Survival of the Person in Mass Society (1960), and the range of anxiety 
analyses involving all kinds of social activities since World War Two have offered a 
momentum of diagnosis, mostly derived from the tensions of the McCarthy period, 
which engages with the discourses of paranoia but rarely emerges from them. 11 The 
9Rupert Wilkinson, The Pursuit of American Character (New York 1988). See also ed. Rupert 
Wilkinson, American Social Character: Modern Interpretations (New York 1992). 
'°See, for instance, Vance Packard's The Hidden Persuaders (1957), The Status Seekers (1960), 
The Waste Makers (1960), A Nation of Strangers (1972), The People Shapers (1977), and 
more recently, Our Endangered Children (1983). 
"See ed. Maurice R. Stein, Arthur J. Vidich and David Manning White, Identity and Anxiety: 
Survival of the Person in Mass Society (Glencoe, Illinois 1960), and also Gordon W. Allport, 
The Nature of Prejudice (New York 1958); Milton Rokeach, The Open and Closed Mind: 
Investigations into the Nature of Belief Systems (New York 1960); Abraham Zaleznik and 
Manfred F. R. Kets de Fries, Power and the Corporate Mind (Boston 1975); Steven Starker, 
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literature of the period, as we shall see, goes far beyond this, providing a more 
effective "reorientation of estimates of a culture which shows how that complex 
known as normal life in a society is in fact a structure of psychopathology. "12 
Of course, the period from 1945 to 1984 in American sociology has been more 
complex and far more rewarding than this generalization allows. But there has been 
a tendency under the social hegemony to pursue sociological analysis into academic 
or populist enclosures where intellectual rigour disseminates or becomes static before 
the necessity of change. The United States is a culture rife with a literature of advice 
and self-regard, as a glance at any bookstore selection will confirm, and this has 
blossomed in the space left by the inability of much of recent sociology to proceed 
beyond diagnosis or tackle the social problems of the period. The distinction is most 
evident in a book like Christopher Lasch's The Culture of Narcissism which, in many 
ways, identifies modern constraints of consciousness, but then fails to open up spaces 
for any creative expansion which may challenge the hegemony. This is not due to an 
absence of revolutionary or differential strategies, though that is plain enough, but 
extends from the rigid posture such analysis prescribes for itself as the correct vision. 
Alternatively, more populist advice literature in the period offers in its bland discourse 
the sense to its readers that they are being "looked after, " especially as books dealing 
with positive thinking, diet or forms of calisthenics are inevitably accompanied by 
exploitative marketing which enmeshes consumers in an apparatus of belonging and 
use. 
The majority of Western populations therefore responded to the Second World 
PARATHIN : The Paranoia of Everyday Life (Far Hills, N. J. 1986). 
12Eric Mottram, William Burroughs: The Algebra of Need (London 1977), p. 14. 
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War and its aftermath-an experience which Leo Braudy sees as registering "deep in 
the popular mind the feeling that Somebody or Something did [run the world] i13-by 
concentrating on their discontinuities, their detachment from actuality and power, 
hoping to seek reconnection. The tragedy of the period is that to seek connection so 
often becomes the vulnerability and exploitation of finding what is given, and seeing 
in the combination of chance and design a total force before which submission 
becomes an automatic and repetitively superficial gratification. Totality for the United 
States after 1945 is, even more than in the past, the enclosure of a limitlessness inside 
narrow programmes of power, a compression designed continually to relaunch an 
ageing dream and a cynical reality whose final countdown becomes endlessly deferred 
in cycles of production, but whose promise and effects exert themselves on those who 
live within them. Rather than a negativity, this has been a process of astonishing 
abundance correlative to Foucault's insistence that power needs to be apprehended not 
in its repressive function but rather as a productivity. The paranoid dimension is 
continuously affirmed in Nietzsche's remark that "[e]verything absolute belongs in the 
realm of pathology. "14 
The late twentieth-century has thus revealed even further the reasons why the 
United States has been a consistent producer and nurturer of conspiracy belief, 
seemingly as part of its social fabric. Edward Shils suggests another way of 
understanding this situation in an examination of American attitudes towards 
secrecy-particularly in American nativist and populist tendencies-where the tensions 
13Leo Braudy, 'Providence, Paranoia, and the Novel' in E. L. H., 48,1981, p. 625. 
"Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, translated by Walter Kaufmann and R. J. 
Hollingdale (New York 1968), p. 267. 
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set up by secrecy, privacy and publicity offer crucial evidence about how conspiracy 
belief may be formed. Shils's statement about the different appeal of types of secret 
is vital in this respect, and especially with regard to the paranoid component of the 
phenomenon: 
In the condition of disequilibrium in which publicity destroys privacy, 
the kind of secret which fascinates and which disrupts is not the 
technical secret demanded by the raison d'etat. It is a secret with an 
aura of fatefulness. It is a secret in which the apocalypse dwells. " 
The development and expansion of weapons of mass destruction is later noted as the 
factor causing the convergence of these types of secret, where the "phantasies of 
apocalyptic visionaries [claim] the respectability of being a reasonable interpretation 
of the real situation, " as Manichean perception manifested itself more visibly beyond 
the demonstrative confines of "hole-and-corner nativist radicalism, religious 
fundamentalism and revolutionary populism. "16 
Shils cites three essential elements within the American proclivity for 
conspiracy belief: anti-intellectualism, anti-pluralism, and a broader sense of 
xenophobia or fear of any external force. Anti-intellectualism, as Richard Hofstadter 
has also shown, has been a consistent strand in American social behaviour since the 
seventeenth-century and has involved itself with conspiracy belief whenever the 
United States has had to confront complex issues. " Technology and economy are the 
obvious examples, though the existence of any esoteric form of knowledge as a 
framework of intangible coercion and control is liable to become the focus of 
"Edward A. Shils, The Torment of Secrecy The Background and Consequences of American 
Security Policies (Glencoe, Illinois 1956), p. 27. 
16Shils, The Torment of Secrecy, p. 71. 
17See Richard Hofstadter, Anti-Intellectualism in American Life (New York 1963). 
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conspiratorial belief. Factors of secrecy and seclusion intensify this, particularly in 
circumstances where "[n]o society has ever been so extensively exposed to public 
scrutiny as the United States in the twentieth century. " 8 Such obsession with scrutiny 
and surveillance, already mentioned as a primary element in detective fiction, operates 
now as the essential action of American domestic and international intelligence. This 
is intelligence of a kind enabled through the increasing surveillance of public and 
private space via security firms and technology in the domestic arena, and as the most 
sophisticated and expensive array of technology systems ever assembled in the United 
States' intelligence, global satellite and electronic surveillance capability. 19 From the 
use of satellite photographs to "prove" Soviet shipment of missiles to Cuba in 1962 
to the American public, to current use of surveillance capabilities as part of armament 
treaty verification, the thrust is toward a visibility so extensive that logic determines 
anything covert as malign. The extent to which mass concerns about surveillance are 
oriented more towards the visibility of all action rather than any sense of invasion of 
privacy is given in domestic terms by the widespread desire to be under surveillance 
as a safety factor, as in shopping malls and banks, and even at home. This condition 
of scrutiny offers dual protection to the fearful: that is, from external and internal 
18Shils, The Torment of Secrecy, p. 39. 
"In 1990 "the first installment of a 1991 intelligence authorization package totalling about $30 
billion passed through the Senate without a word of debate or discussion by the handful of 
members present... " Within this spending, "the biggest chunk, about $6 billion.. . goes to the 
National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), a 'black' agency under Air Force cover that builds and 
launches spy satellites for the entire intelligence community... Next is the Pentagon's National 
Security Agency (NSA), whose $4 billion budget makes it the hub of a worldwide network 
of listening posts eavesdropping on friends and foes alike... The CIA, by contrast, gets $3.5 
billion, including $600 million for covert actions... " The Washington Post, October 9,1990, 
p. A4. For an appraisal of surveillance theory and practice in the American and Western 
domestic arena, see Christopher Dandeker, Surveillance, Power and Modernity: Bureaucracy 
and Discipline from 1700 to the Present Day (New York 1990). 
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threat-the latter case extending from Puritanism into the electronic age the belief that 
surveillance will deny the self any opportunity for deviance. 
Francis Ford Coppola's film, The Conversation (1974), offers an intelligent 
examination of surveillance and the paranoia induced in those operating the 
technology and the subjects of their surveillance within an American domestic 
scenario. Coppola effectively pits two dynamics against one another to achieve this: 
the control of energies and seclusion required to maintain a lead in surveillance 
techniques and technology, personified in the lonely surveillance genius Harry Caul, 
and the fact that Caul's work involves cutting into, retrieving and making sense of 
parts of the soundtrack of existence. For the surveillance technician, however, making 
sense is meant to be the production of clarity or revealing a pattern or series of 
links-a conversation-rather than forming an overall understanding of the material 
gathered. In Arthur Koestler's terms, he should limit himself without question to the 
holons, or partial holons, he can establish from his surveillance. But a conversation 
requires dialogue and interaction, and when Caul oversteps these bounds and allows 
his imagination to intrude in the process, believing that his industrial espionage will 
be used to harm others, he enters into the destruction of the paranoia which requires 
such surveillance occur. Subsequently Caul becomes distrustful of his assistants, who 
leave him, and finds his emotional and sexual life invaded when a conversation he has 
with a woman is recorded by a competitor, and when his girlfriend demands more 
information than he is prepared to give about his background. 
The relationship with this girlfriend, set up in an apartment by Caul, visited by 
him infrequently for sex and deliberately left without knowledge of his whereabouts, 
signifies the alienation Caul experiences and makes others experience through his 
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work. Her question following his refusal to give information about himself-"How 
will I know you? "-sets the tenor of the film. For Caul, this knowledge would be 
power to control, as his work seeking covert knowledge for the corporate system 
demonstrates. In the woman's question, however, there are ambiguities which extend 
the tension of living under such stress; she may be seeking knowledge to control, but 
equally she tries to establish trust in a shared mutuality of information about the self 
through the communication of feelings, activities and personal history. The way she 
is forced to ask, though, necessarily destroys any hope of mutuality or trust, just as 
corporations find it necessary to employ Caul's services in an environment of secrecy 
and economic threat, and it is revealed that Caul's refusal to share his capabilities with 
friends and colleagues extends from the real threat of predatory competitors. 
From this point the creativity which Harry Caul possesses as a technician 
begins to disconnect him as he enters the tightening spirals of paranoia, which 
ultimately immobilize him before the repercussions of the system he has questioned. 
His religious belief-Catholicism-is imaged as fertile ground for rigid perception, 
especially in a scene involving him confessing fears about the harm his work may do. 
He then begins to hallucinate the murder of others and surveillance of himself, both 
of which are ultimately proved to him, though, in the latter case, he cannot find the 
recording source despite tearing his apartment apart. Significant in this destruction is 
Caul's reluctance to break a Madonna figurine; he finally does so, but finds it empty 
of the suspected microphone. 
The power of the film, beyond the superb acting, resides in Coppola's continual 
stress that the medium itself, the use of camera and microphone, operates as 
surveillance. This extends from the existential reality that all in American society exist 
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within a tension of constant surveillance, as well as that of a produced image in Don 
DeLillo's later observation that "[t]he twentieth-century is on film. It's the filmed 
century. If a thing can be filmed, film is implied in the thing itself. X20 The 
disjunction between image and soundtrack, the use of long range shots and obscured 
images, and the repetitive replaying and fragmentation of recordings as foreground and 
background soundtrack, all placed within a labyrinthine plot, consistently frame the 
action as partial meaning suggesting a system of meaning exists. Caul's paranoia is 
confirmed when he finds himself recorded and therefore part of the soundtrack and 
a wider system of meaning whose import he can only conceive of as threat. In 1974, 
of course, in the midst of Watergate and Nixon's paranoid-and ultimately 
implicatory-recording of himself and others, the resonance of this action is 
farreaching for the American psyche. By involving the viewer in Caul's perception (an 
increasing certainty), as well as the objective surveillance of the film as medium 
(which involves a sense of randomness and multiplicity), the film provides a creative 
inroad into the terror and destruction of individual and institutionalized paranoia: 
involvement and detachment, the ambivalence which paranoia and surveillance cannot 
escape. The final shot seems to be a suggestion by Coppola of a territory where 
mental health may be retained in the face of such psychic pressures, as Harry Caul sits 
amid the ruins of his apartment playing his saxophone as a desperate creative gesture 
to whoever may still be listening. 
In the second of Shils's elements of conspiracy, anti-pluralism is directly 
linked to anti-intellectualism by its suspicion that complexity and/or diversity harbours 
20Don DeLillo, Don DeLillo: The Word, the Image and the Gun, ed. Andrew Snell, BBC 
Television, 27 September 1991. 
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harm, and it operates as an ironic commentary on the vaunted American social 
programme of ethnic freedoms and freedom of opinion. Earlier materials have detailed 
some of the psychic tensions connected to paranoia suffered by immigrants arriving 
in the United States, where analysis focused consistently on outsiders' reactions to the 
forces constituting Americanism. The need for a singularity with which to define the 
self as opposed to the other, and to link the self to an undifferentiated mass, has 
fuelled conspiracy belief aimed at outsiders and has underscored the dangerous 
dynamic involved in American identity. As Edward Shils asserts, American identity 
frequently requires active assumption and maintenance above and beyond simple 
acquisition: "In America, there is more of a tendency to define a person as American 
by the extent to which [s/]he acts and feels and thinks in a way defined as 
American. X21 Individualism may be tolerated where exceptional abilities and energies 
can be harnessed for the reinforcement of American ideologies-as many American 
heroines and heroes in all forms of narrative demonstrate-but the distinction of active 
conformity as the quality of Americanism can lead directly to the formation of a 
House Investigation Committee into Un-American Activities, as occurred in the 
1950s. 
A poor and relatively unsuccessful film comedy by Joe Dante, The 'Burbs 
(1989), articulates many of these tensions which incite the terrorism latent in 
American social conformity, identity and the logic of belief. Its plot deals with a 
suburban close of houses somewhere near Chicago, and revolves around the suspicions 
a group of American surburbanites direct at their supposedly secretive and Teutonic 
or East European neighbours. Bruce Dern plays a Vietnam veteran convinced of the 
21Shils, The Torment of Secrecy, p. 77. 
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group's right to investigate, whilst Tom Hanks plays the reluctant liberal drawn into 
the scheme, all the while protesting about American domestic rights to privacy. A 
range of horror and mystery typology is used in portraying the dark, shuttered house, 
its ugly, male inhabitants, and their persistent and mysterious nocturnal activities, all 
in contrast to the surrounding diverse "American" characters and their domestic 
spaces. After penetrating the house a number of times, digging up the garden, and 
finally excavating and igniting a gas main in the cellar which destroys the house, the 
group are confronted with the fact that they have no evidence of wrongdoing and that 
their suspicions are totally unfounded. In a frenzied soliloquy, the Hanks character 
berates himself and the others for their destructive misapprehensions, ending his 
speech with the recognition that: "It's not them. It's us. We're the lunatics! " The last 
moments of the film, however, reverse the situation as the householder's car boot is 
found to contain skeletons and he bundles the injured Hanks into an ambulance and 
attempts to silence him permanently with a lethal injection. Thus the unreasonable 
xenophobia is ultimately validated, and the film pivots clumsily on the Freudian notion 
that an element of truth exists in every paranoia, however bizarre, and therefore that 
anyone holding systematized beliefs within certain ideological parameters has the 
right to investigate anyone else. 
Shils's final element, xenophobia and fears of invasion is a major topic in its 
own right, and one which has been covered elsewhere. 22 But what needs to be 
restressed is the range over which such fears of outsiders extend within the American 
psyche, from the cellular level through local community politics and thence to the 
'See Mottram, 'Out of Sight But Never Out of Mind: Fears of Invasion in American Culture, ' 
pp. 138-180. 
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national and international scenes. All levels feed one another to produce a social 
continuum of anxiety which may be turned into fear and paranoia by a selection of 
cues. At a cellular level the United States since 1980 has been in the grip of AIDs 
paranoia, which has been interpreted by virtually all conspiracy theorists and believers 
as an instigated effort to wipe out sectors of American society. The author experienced 
this first hand when, on entering Cooper Square in New York City in December 1985, 
he was given a leaflet, and on leaving he was given another; the first asserted AIDS 
as the product of homosexual and black community corruptions, which was being 
spread to morally correct Americans as part of a disruptive and probably foreign- 
orchestrated scheme; the second that AIDE was manufactured in a conspiracy 
involving the CIA and higher echelon government figures in order to wipe out 
homosexuals and ethnic minorities. Neither side were prepared to consider chance 
elements of genetic and biological mutation as a potential source area of AIDS, 
particularly where the urge to identify the enemy came from Manichean inheritances. 
The economic equation enters the scene where Americans are made aware, as part of 
the enormous structure of the health industry which generates billions of dollars a 
year, that they can purchase vitamin supplements containing anti-oxidants (like beta- 
carotene and selenium) which "reinforce" the immune system. 
At the other end of the scale, where threat must be identified as part of the 
rationale for international defence policies, the rhetoric continues in the same vein. 
The entire cycle of anti-communist paranoia, for instance, which has remained a 
priority of American xenophobia throughout the twentieth century from the activities 
of the "Red Scare" of the early decades and the appalling treatment of labour 
organizers, through the hounding of atomic scientists in the post-World War Two 
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period and McCarthyism, to Reagan's targeting of the "Evil Empire" extending from 
Moscow in the 1980s, reflects at every moment of its history a complex fusion of 
American fears. These must be seen in terms of individual obsessions-sexual, 
authoritarian or otherwise-manifested in figures like Woodrow Wilson, Henry Ford, 
William Randolph Hearst, Joseph McCarthy, J. Edgar Hoover, Richard Nixon, to name 
just some of the twentieth century's most influential Americans, just as much as part 
of wider national and universal patterns. In consequence, a major part of William 
Burroughs' writing is directed at the fact that "[m]ost of the trouble on this planet is 
caused by people who must be right, 1123 setting up incisive and frequently hilarious 
analyses of the authority manias which form the core of paranoia. Similarly, Stanley 
Kubrick's film, Dr. Strangelove; Or. How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the 
Bomb (1963), deconstructs the sombre tone of post-1945 nuclear propaganda to tap 
into the hysteria which permeates all elements of American and international security, 
science and technology. Kubrick's portrayal of individual obsession meshing with and 
logically extending defence systems and ideologies seemed only too true following the 
rumour that, during his defence briefing and national emergency rehearsal on assuming 
the Presidency in 1980, Ronald Reagan asked staff: "Where is the button, and when 
do I get to push it? "24 If this did not happen, Reagan's statement accidentally 
recorded before a national radio broadcast in 1984 warning the Soviets that "we begin 
bombing in five minutes" certainly did. J. K. Galbraith's book, How To Control the 
Military (1969), makes this point in its own way by attaching to the text, which details 
'William Burroughs, The Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse' in The Adding Machine 
(London 1988), p. 136. 
24City Paper, Washington, D. C., September 14,1989, p. 4. 
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the rise of the military-industrial complex in the cold war period, an "EPILOGUE: 
The Ideas By Which We Are Ruled. " Galbraith's initial assertion is that: 
the notion of a conspiracy to enrich and corrupt is gravely damaging 
to an understanding of the military power... The reality is a complex of 
organizations pursuing their sometimes diverse but generally common 
goals... 
The problem is not conspiracy or corruption but unchecked rule. 
And being unchecked, this rule reflects not the national need but the 
bureaucratic need-not what is best for the United States but what the 
Air Force, Army, Navy, General Dynamics, North American Rockwell, 
Grumman Aircraft, State Department representatives, intelligence 
officers... believe to be best. 2' 
But as writers as diverse as Melville, Kafka and Paul Goodman have shown, 
"bureaucratic need" operates as an extension of personal obsession built on systemic 
necessity rather than social good, providing an apparatus for the dissemination and 
enforcement of personal obsession as it may be locked into wider ideological 
concerns. Galbraith's epilogue reveals this in its sequence of quotations from United 
States Air Force generals-those men who control the ground and air-launched 
nuclear arsenals-taken from their blueprints for American survival which in the mid- 
sixties had no trouble finding major publishers. General Thomas S. Power states: 
But the military aspects of the Communist threat represents just one 
phase of the most insidious and gigantic plot in history. There are the 
economic, technological, political, ideological and other phases, all 
designed for one objective only, and that is the accomplishment of the 
ultimate Communist goal of total world domination. 26 
A colleague, General Nathan F. Twining found himself similarly threatened: 
I can summarize my views on national security planning into two 
sentences. The leaders of an organized conspiracy have sworn to 
destroy America and the Free World by one means or another, and 
25J. K. Galbraith, How To Control the Military (New York 1969), pp. 26-30. 
"General Thomas S. Power, USAF, Design for Survival (New York 1965), p. 52; cited in 
Galbraith, How to Control the Military, pp. 88-89. 
239 
there is no real evidence available at this time to indicate that their 
objective has been changed. Therefore we had better be prepared to 
fight to maintain our liberty. 27 
The most foreboding sense of this "Situation"-to use a term from Thomas 
Pynchon's V. (1961)-can be drawn, however, from the famous National Security 
Council Directive 68 of 1950, written largely by the arms negotiator Paul Nitze: "For 
a free society there is never total victory, since freedom and democracy are never 
wholly attained, are always in the process of being attained. But defeat at the hands 
of the totalitarian is total defeat. "28 If one then places this next to Secretary of 
Defense Robert S. McNamara's conclusions, made in 1968, the progression is 
revealing: 
Some critics today worry that our democratic, free societies are 
becoming overmanaged. I would argue that the opposite is true. As 
paradoxical as it may sound, the real threat to democracy comes not 
from overmanagement, but from undermanagement. To undermanage 
reality is not to keep it free. It is simply to let some force other than 
reason shape reality. 
... [A]ll reality can be reasoned about, and not to quantify what 
can be quantified is only to be content with something less than the full 
range of reason. 29 
Paranoia's potential within the use of reason has already been detailed, and is further 
reinforced by McNamara's frequent assertions throughout his book that security policy 
"depends on assuming a worst plausible case, and having the ability to cope with 
27General Nathan F. Twining, USAF, Neither Liberty Nor Safety (New York 1966), pp. 275- 
276; cited in Galbraith, How to Control the Military, p. 90. 
28Cited in Wilkinson, The Pursuit of American Characte r, p. 106. NSC 68 is widely considered 
to have been the foremost policy decision which ensured the post-1945 global arms race. 
29Robert S. McNamara, The Essence of Security: Reflections in Office (New York 1968), 
pp. 109-110. McNamara was Secretary of Defence in both the Kennedy and Johnson 
administrations, a period spanning the Cuban missile crisis and the significant escalation of 
the Vietnam War, as well as a significant phase of the post-World War Two arms race. 
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it. "30 In theory, this basis for strategy is reasonable; in practice it has been the policy 
through which a range of irrational obsessions and fears have been extended, driven 
on by needs for economic expansion and the inheritance of Puritan and Manichean 
perceptions of continuous internal and external threat. 31 Erich Fromm has articulated 
the contradictory bases of the United States' defence and foreign policy stance, seeing 
acute danger: 
in the assumption that what is possible must be considered to be a 
basis for decisions, rather than what is probable... The less one knows 
about the full reality of a situation, the less one is able and willing to 
analyze it empirically and thoroughly, and the more one tends to think 
of it in terms of abstract, paranoid thinking. 32 
Indeed, the vocabulary as well as the thought behind the theory and policy of nuclear 
strategy confirms Fromm's diagnosis and aligns them within the discourses of 
paranoia. Any survey of these prolific materials throws up a range of examples, from 
the determination of policy on "projections" to the statement that a: 
rational decision to use nuclear weapons is incredible; the potential for 
an irrational decision to use nuclear weapons in certain highly specific 
contingencies, however, makes US nuclear commitments both actual 
and credible. US nuclear deterrence thus rests on the threat of 
contingently irrational behaviour. 33 
30McNamara, The Essence of Security, p. 53. 
31Secretary of Defense, James Schlesinger's posture statement accompanying the United States 
fiscal defense report for 1975/6 stated: "Democracies are suffering from their traditional 
problem-they need an overt manifest threat in order to bring about appropriate allocation of 
resources within the society to maintain a defense establishment. " Cited in Arthur Macy Cox, 
The Dynamics of Detente: How To End The Arms Race (New York 1976), p. 43. 
32Erich Fromm, 'Paranoia and Policy' in The New York Times, 11 December, 1975. Text 
italics. 
33Edward Rhodes, Power and MADness (New York 1989), p17. Text italics. Later in his book 
Rhodes cites Thomas Schelling's The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, Mass. 1960), where 
in nuclear circumstances: It may be perfectly rational to wish oneself not altogether rational, 
or-if that language is philosophically objectionable-to wish for the power to suspend certain 
rational capabilities in certain situations" (p. 18). 
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Equally disturbing is the discussion by strategists of what has come to be known as 
"perception theory": the manipulation of mass populations according to the 
psychological impact of nuclear terror rather than the realities of weaponry 
imbalances, economic cost and political expediency. 34 Within these parameters 
Edward Luttwak, an expert in the field and adviser to a sequence of US Presidents, 
military chiefs and the American media, asserts that: "[o]bjective reality, whatever that 
may be, is simply irrelevant; only the subjective phenomena of perception and value- 
judgement count. i3s 
Reason in these circumstances is instrumental according to Max Horkheimer's 
definition-the totalitarian instrument in the necessary equation of power: we will tell 
you what reality is and then manage it for you. This is then reinforced by the 
organization of desire into mass needs to feel controlled and believe that superior 
forms of humanly-directed intelligence maintain order. Herbert Marcuse has described 
Western society as one organized rationally to serve irrational ends, and one in which 
"[t]he reality surpasses the culture, "" and it is at the point where reality intersects 
with the registering of fears that American writers have been most active in their 
efforts to construct statements challenging the production of reality as it has been 
designed for purposes of malign control. 
The late twentieth-century has seen no relaxation of these political and 
economic coercions, and the patterns of populist involvement in millennial belief 
'See Steven Kull, 'Nuclear Nonsense' in Foreign Policy, No. 58, Spring 1985, pp. 28-52. 
3S Edward Luttwak, Strategy and Politics: Collected Essays (New Brunswick, N. J. 1980), p. 60. 
Cited in Kull, 'Nuclear Nonsense, ' p. 34. 
"Herbert Marcuse, One Dimensional Man (1964; London 1968), p. 58. 
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identified by Norman Cohn and Michael Barkun continue in related forms. 37 The 
electronic revolution has built on the forum of pulpit and text to ensure the enclosure 
of large numbers of people over the vast areas of the United States, utilizing the range 
of broadcast possibilities as they have become available. In this progression, 
information broadcast by radio has seen the addition of television as a medium, the 
latter mutating through direct broadcast to the configurations of cable systems and 
satellite feeds. The net effect has been to move from the comparatively cumbersome 
and static printed artefact to the fluid, high velocity elements of electronic information, 
which has played an essential part in what McLuhan calls changes in the ratios of 
perception. 
In contrast to the hysteria and reaction generated by the important radio 
example, the broadcasts of Orson Welles's version of The War of the Worlds in 1938, 
and more recently in 1971, TV has altered the intensities of response among 
consumers, and through its greater penetration of domestic space has determined a 
more pervasive control of mass perception. Cable and satellite networks provide 
perfect access vehicles for religious and political organizations seeking the 
manipulation of belief and the sustenance of funds, penetrating households and 
through a variety of dramatic and psychological techniques ensuring ideological and 
economic addiction structured by fear. Fear, that is, of the variety of "enemies" erected 
by the networks-communists, Jews, Catholics, ethnic groups, etc, all as agents of 
Satan-and, probably of more importance, fear that fear will be withdrawn as an 
existential basis if the network ceases connection. The meaning provided by broadcasts 
37See Norman Cohn, The Pursuit of the Millennium (London 1957) and Michael Barkun, 
Disaster and the Millennium (New Haven 1974). 
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as part of a repetitive revelation structure becomes the vital underpinning to otherwise 
reified existence. 
As so often occurs in conspiracy belief, these networks operate as the perfect 
analogue of the systems of evil they seek to combat. Their status as networks radiating 
from interlinked and centralized sources matches exactly with their view of the evil 
forces they claim to fight. An example of this configuration is the Moral Majority and 
its chain of evangelical broadcasting "ministries, " with their measured intent to 
inculcate sets of values and responses by a variety of hidden and revealed means, all 
encapsulated within power manias and economic necessity. Again, this is clearly a 
battle fought out in the arena where notions of the other need to generate threat, and 
where the "phantasy of conspiracy requires the reality of counterconspiracy so that in 
the end the world becomes an arena in which two conspiracies operate, the wicked 
conspiracy of the enemies and [a] legitimate and morally necessary conspiracy... i38 
But while such religious networks enjoy considerable influence among the 
American population, particularly in areas like the Mid-West, the activities of other, 
supposedly entertainment-oriented networks demonstrate how, on a wider scale, the 
affected American psyche may sustain a potential to move into or live within paranoid 
systems of belief. Programming, and its projection within the ideology of advertising, 
is just one level of this effect. Beyond the repetition of stereotypical Manichean plots 
on soap opera and movie channels lies the social manipulation of programme 
targeting: for instance, a 1990 article on cable systems and their finances and 
proliferation in Texas reported as a matter of fact that cable movie programming in 
and around San Antonio, home to several large military bases, consisted almost 
38Shils, The Torment of Secrecy, p. 30. 
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entirely of Rambo, Chuck Norris and Arnold Schwarzenegger vigilante-type fare. 39 
These movies, with their focus on forms of sanctioned vigilante force against 
subversive threats, maintain systems of belief quite as entrenched as those fostered 
under religious programming, whilst easily outstripping them in terms of economic 
reward for the cartels of their production. This is the territory of McNamara's 
"management of reality, " particularly for a militarized population: the reinforcement 
of extreme forms of individualism as part of an ideology of the "conspiracy" potential 
in social darwinism, where violence and force offer a consumptive solution. 
***** 
The literary site of this section's investigation will again be the novel, the most 
prolific creative action to be engaged in locating and probing the coherences sought 
to bring the total ever nearer the reach of a humanity still nostalgic for Enlightenment 
beliefs. In these terms, the novel continues to be the prime territory for paranoia and 
its representation. This focus occurs most often as an interrogation of ordering 
principles and coherence as they provide a functional basis for history, and the ways 
in which history is used by systems and individuals at any point in the spectrum of 
power. The range of American authors who have engaged with paranoia and its 
consequences since 1945 is vast, 40 and for the focused purposes of this dissertation 
only one writer, Thomas Pynchon, will be dealt with extensively. Again, the approach 
39Broadcasting Magazine, 11 September 1990, p. 54. 
40Patrick O'Donnell's article, 'Engendering Paranoia in Contemporary Narrative' in boundary 
2,19: 1,1992, mentions Norman Mailer, Philip Roth, Joseph Heller, Robert Coover, Thomas 
Pynchon, Diane Johnson, Joseph McElroy, John Barth, Kathy Acker, Saul Bellow, Marge 
Piercy, Don DeLillo, William Gaddis, Ishmael Reed, and Margaret Atwood as representative. 
To these certainly should be added William Burroughs, Philip K. Dick, Kurt Vonnegut, Tom 
Robbins, Walter Abish, Robert Anton Wilson and Robert Shea. 
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will be to try and evaluate the appraisal of the production and effects of paranoia 
inside American culture, as those writers engage with it. 
The question that must first be asked when considering paranoia and fiction 
in the period, however, is how some American writers manage to represent and 
include paranoia without succumbing to the limitations and negativity-indeed, the 
boredom-which any paranoid perception inevitably reaches, given the constraints 
enforced by a specific production of meaning, particularly where, in Patrick 
O'Donnell's terms, paranoia in this fiction is invariably: 
a kind of logical desire: an attempt to make order out of chaos, to 
make or see connections, and then to resist mimetically the discourse 
of mastery. In each instance, however, the form resistance takes to the 
system that represses otherness merely replicates that system. Even 
more disturbingly, what appear to be resistant misrepresentations of a 
prevailing linguistic order homologous to the dominant political 
order-modern/postmodern gestures of hyperrealism, polyglossia, 
ambiguity, fragmentation, epistemological magnification-are shown 
to be cooperative resistances that relegate the problem to the realm of 
hermeneutics. 41 
An answer lies in the difference between literature and propaganda, where 
"[p]ropaganda is called upon to solve problems created by technology, to play on 
maladjustments, and to integrate the individual into a technological world... Thus 
[propaganda] codifies social, political, and moral standards. "42 In the connected issue 
of the relationship between language and reality, Edward Sapir and Benjamin Lee 
Whorf have proposed a model of linguistic use and interpretive potential according to 
a range of cultural constraints as part of what they view as a model of linguistic 
determinism. Writing on this topic Whorf quotes Sapir: "We see and hear and 
"O'Donnell, 'Engendering Paranoia in Contemporary Narrative, ' p. 204. Text italics. 
42Jacques Ellul, Propaganda: The Formation of Men's Attitudes, translated by Konrad Kellen 
and Jean Lerner (1965; New York 1973), pp. xvii, 163. 
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otherwise experience very largely as we do because the language habits of our 
community predispose certain choices of interpretation, " and later he suggests that the 
mind uses language in order to "make a provisional analysis of reality and then regard 
it as final... Western culture has gone farthest here, farthest in determined 
thoroughness of provisional analysis, and farthest in determination to regard it as 
final. "a3 
Alternatively, literature may challenge such tendencies with the use of multiple 
view-points, ambiguity and a concentration on plot as a form of enclosure which 
provides certain coherences but avoids paranoid obsessions for the meaning, the truth. 
The novels to be examined here all draw deeply on the particular obsession for plot 
and meaning which characterizes American social discourse as it uses energies 
summoned up by the vast outpourings of desire for security the era demanded as its 
rationale for existence. In this sense, Don DeLillo assumes the apotheosis of the 
paranoid and propagandist literary effort since World War Two to be the Warren 
Report on the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, where: 
we are in the realm of literature, in one of those obsessively 
encyclopedic novels that bore inward toward some central truth, which 
is all the more eternal for its utter inconsequence. This is the novel in 
which nothing is left out. 
... When experience is powerless, all things are the same. 
' 
The courageous and constructive efforts of the fiction which confronts paranoia in the 
post-1945 period, and retains consequence, achieves this status through a creative 
accomplishment linked seamlessly to an attempt to provide a critique of the controls 
43Benjamin Lee Whorf, Language, Thought and Reality: Selected Writings (Cambridge, Mass. 
1956), pp. 134,263. 
44Don DeLillo, 'American Blood: A Journey Through the Labyrinth of Dallas and JFK' in 
Rolling Stone, December 8,1983, p. 28. 
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which strive to enmesh all who live in modern Western society. A sense of these 
fictions' consequence arises in their involvement in the predicate of paranoia as a 
perceptive requirement, alongside a refusal to render experience up to the reader as 
powerless acceptance in systems of fatality which mark the ideal consumptive for late 
twentieth century corporate strategies. In these fictions the reader has to work and not 
just consume to establish a coherence, and becomes aware of the processes underlying 
the potential for paranoia simply by engaging the texts' attempts to extend a means 
for shared creativity and mutual cognition. 
The terrain these fictions explore is one where the political links between 
social control and the strategies of representation have never been more obvious. 
Again, Don DeLillo articulates the necessary tensions when in Libra (1988) a CIA 
operative apprehends the intersection of fear and desire organized conclusively by 
paranoia: 
He half wanted to lose control. He wanted a way out of fear and 
premonition. 
Plots carry their own logic. There is a tendency of plots to 
move toward death. He believed that the idea of death is woven into 
the nature of every plot. A narrative plot no less than a conspiracy of 
armed men. The tighter the plot of a story, the more likely it will come 
to death. A plot in fiction, he believed, is the way we localize the force 
of the death outside the book, play it off, contain it. The ancients 
staged mock battles to parallel the tempests in nature and reduce their 
fear of gods who warred in the sky... He had a foreboding that the plot 
would move to a limit, develop a logical end. 45 
The task for a whole range of writers has been to explore the deathward movements 
of American consciousness, to locate "a limit [and] a logical end" without recourse to 
the destruction inherent in such closure. Their writing, in fact, celebrates the very 
effort which disallows staticity in the American context, though the power they 
"Don DeLillo, Libra (New York 1988), p. 221. 
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analyse is clearly determined to structure ideologies of control which, whilst not static, 
restrict the dissolution of anxieties from which paranoia may extend. And as each 
writer makes clear, the transition from investigation and growth to manic urges for 
secure interpretation and total knowledge means a transition from the movement 
essential to creativity to the sacrificial stasis inherent in apocalyptic revelation. 
2. The stored coded years 
Thomas Pynchon 
A characteristic statement in literary criticism about Thomas Pynchon's writing 
is that "[i]f one were to impose a rubric on Pynchon's fiction, it would undoubtedly 
be paranoia. 1146 A remarkable element of the Pynchon Myth has been its generation 
of an enormous canon of critical theory, all relentlessly pursuing Pynchon's meaning 
and referentiality to supposed patterns, origins and constructions of purpose. It is an 
effort of precisely the kind Pynchon's novels remorselessly satirize and expose, 
moving from a fictionalized theory of paranoia into the creation of an epistemology 
by so many Casaubons. Pynchon's own invisibility, his refusal to provide a physicality 
of voice or presence to which critical theory might appeal, has gone some way to 
ensure this would happen. Whilst a number of critics have noted their complicities, 
none has attempted to radically question their own motives as they are reflected by 
the mirror of the fiction. The academic hunt performed in the service of knowledge 
has been a paranoia of precisely the kind of desired limitation the fiction has 
dramatized so skillfully. 
In this aftermath to a writing intent on providing the United States with a 
46Antonio Marquez, 'Everything is Connected: Paranoia in Gravity's Rainbow' in Perspectives 
on Contemporary Literature, 9,1983, p. 92. 
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register to its post-1945 consciousness, it seems the only useful contribution to be 
made is to focus on efforts the texts make to detail an historical momentum some of 
whose energies come from paranoia. For Pynchon's variously encyclopedic novels 
present an American dilemma in much the same way as the texts already covered; that 
is, to represent the position and response of the individual with regard to the exertions 
of power, that power extended from a specific lineage of controls whose 
manifestations continue to move forward in extraordinary metamorphoses, constantly 
changing and seeking new energies. The problem of paranoia-its simultaneously 
helpful move towards coherence, but the limitations and distortion of obsession-is 
given (in a very 1950s historical image) in V.: 
Perhaps history this century, thought Eigenvalue, is rippled with gathers 
in its fabric such that if we are situated, as Stencil seemed to be, at the 
bottom of a fold, its impossible to determine warp, woof or pattern 
anywhere else. By virtue, however, of existing in one gather it is 
assumed there are others, compartmented off into sinuous cycles each 
of which come to assume greater importance than the weave itself and 
destroy any continuity. 47 
The imposing of a singular pattern (or "rubric"), as paranoia attempts, becomes the 
central problem for a nation of multiplicities which has always proclaimed itself intent 
on "virtue" and committed to a "continuity" of liberty, yet which is terrified of 
fragmentation and is palpably obsessed with discovering the threat, if any, contained 
in unknown "fold[s]. " Pynchon's effort, in consequence, has been to gather the peculiar 
quality and force of American assumptions, and to trace their formulation, 
enforcement and acceptance, especially as in this passage's dense prose style where 
obsession operates as inclusive force, simultaneously driving and breaking rhythm. His 
four novels to date emphasise as much as anything else the connections and 
47Thomas Pynchon, Y. (1961; London 1975), p. 155. Hereafter referred to as 'V. ' 
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disconnections between history and the production of reality, developing enormous 
interlocking plots which pit consciousness against the social and historical forces 
which seek to shape it. His writing continuously involves itself in the idea put forward 
by Alain Robbe-Grillet that "[r]ealism is the ideology which each brandishes against 
his neighbour, the quality which each believes he possesses for himself alone. X48 
These investigations have taken place essentially in the structuring of desire for 
certainty and control where consciousness encounters a range of environments and 
systems accumulated by humanity to provide security within the political ordering of 
human perception. As fiction meshes with elaborate and frequently occulted historical 
research, and style confronts and uses a technological era of radical overcoding, the 
characters and the reader are thwarted in any effort to locate security. They are set 
adrift in an archaeology of effects whose causality remains ultimately untraceable, as 
the fiction demonstrates, precisely because of the hubristic flaws in inherited and 
adapted means used to attempt perception as a total controlling and controlled process. 
The description of Oedipa Maas's approach to the city of San Narciso, in The 
Crying of Lot 49 (1966), illustrates this action. Having been mysteriously designated 
executor of a former lover's will, Maas sets off within a parody of the obsessive 
nineteenth century (novel's) action, detection within the legacy plot, in which human 
origin succumbs to the anxieties of the distribution of wealth: 
She drove into San Narciso on a Sunday, in a rented Impala. Nothing 
was happening. She looked down a slope, needing to squint for the 
sunlight, on to a vast sprawl of houses which had grown up all 
together, like a well-tended crop, from the dull brown earth; and she 
thought of the time she'd opened a transistor radio to replace a battery 
and seen her first printed circuit. The ordered swirl of houses and 
"Alain Robbe-Grillet, For A New Novel: Essays on Fiction, translated by Richard Howard 
(New York 1965), p. 157. 
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streets, from this high angle, sprang at her now with the same 
unexpected, astonishing clarity as the circuit card had. Though she 
knew even less about radios than about Southern Californians, there 
were to both patterns a hieroglyphic sense of concealed meaning, of an 
intent to communicate. There'd seemed no limit to what the printed 
circuit could have told her (if she had tried to find out); so in her first 
minute of San Narciso, a revelation also trembled just past the 
threshold of her understanding. Smog hung all round the horizon, the 
sun on the bright beige countryside was painful; she and the Chevy 
seemed parked at the centre of an odd, religious instant. (L49, pp. 14- 
15) 
With accessible density, the passage demonstrates the interpretive predicament for the 
individual given the variables and controls governing human perception and its 
resources of knowledge. This predicament is offered simultaneously to the reader 
within a variety of significatory systems of which the writing itself, crucially, is only 
one. Maas is depicted matching an assortment of immediate and remembered data at 
an intersection of perceptual effects whose dynamics extend from religion, technology, 
organicism and semiotics, and whose conjunction operates at the interface of two 
opposing actions: the extension of a perceptual field, which changes according to 
temporal flow; and the instantaneity sought in fixed identity and the comparison of 
discrete objects. 
Oedipa Maas's name begins the problem with its links to the referentiality and 
potential for control given in the twentieth century by Freud's science of interpretation. 
Her surname, Dutch for "loophole" and Spanish for "more, " indicates either disruptive 
potential inside structure and theory, or simply further accretion. Her passage through 
the text is thus carefully placed in ironic tension with the passage of anyone through 
modem Western life: that is, given partial knowledge, yet driven by a continuous urge 
to assemble epistemological certainty. Correlatively, San Narciso suggests a site of 
desired interpretive staticity beset by the annoyingly fluid and penetrative access 
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points granted by modern technology: "it was less an identifiable city than a group of 
concepts... overlaid with access roads to its own freeway" (L49, p. 14). Maas thus looks 
down on a phenomenon already conceptualised before her perception brings yet more 
conceptualization to ensure that a pattern may emerge for her. In a very real sense-a 
reality, for the text, more real than the "concepts"-Maas participates through the 
accumulated baggage of her thought and culture in the process acutely described by 
Blake in his phrase "all who see become what they behold . "49 Blake is relevant here 
precisely because his reference is to the changes wrought in human sensory potential 
by the Industrial Revolution. Pynchon's environment is the site of the next 
technological progression which promises the reinforcement of sensory constraint: the 
electronic and military-industrial heartland of California. 
What Maas believes she experiences is an urban pattern juxtaposed with an 
electronic circuit, which the text further complicates by throwing in organic imagery. 
Nothing is 'natural, ' however, in the "well-tended crop" of houses, or in the "rented 
Impala" which brings her to the city; they signify merely the supremacy sought over 
nature by an ever-expanding and disparately owned technological effort, and assist in 
the transition to a programmed perception of electronics and meaning brought 
suddenly into focus through the smog as if in a camera sweep. Remembering DeLillo's 
statement that "[w]hen experience is powerless, all things are the same, " and in the 
contexts of Foucault's belief that "individuals are the vehicles of power, not its points 
of application... The individual... is one of [power's] prime effects, i5° Maas's 
49William Blake, 'Jerusalem, ' Chapter 3, Plate 66, line 36, in Complete Writings, ed. Geoffrey 
Keynes (Oxford 1972), p. 702. 
'Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews & Other Writings 1972-1977, ed. 
Colin Gordon (New York 1980), p. 98. 
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conjunction of San Narciso with an electronic circuit, when "[n]othing was 
happening, " takes on an insistently disturbing hue, a quality in the writing indicative 
of the controls to which thought and perception find themselves attached in a 
technological society. 
In this way Pynchon effectively plays on the action asserted by Robbe-Grillet 
that "[t]he style of the novel... constitutes reality. "" His project is thus to demonstrate 
how existence in post-1945 America involves experiencing a reality that is always 
already constituted. Pynchon's stress is on the changes demanded of human spatial and 
temporal sensibilities by modern technology, and in the changes wrought by 
electronics in particular, as they determine perceptual extent. The potential for 
paranoia emerges from this matrix of experiential powerlessness, this perceptual 
enclosure offering a seemingly unlimited range of information, which is appropriately 
given by a concentration in the passage on semiotics and religious revelation. 
In his analysis of the development of sign systems, Gilbert Adair has used an 
authoritative sequence of studies to show how graphisms extend from and organize 
economic systems to produce, "with the coming of the State, " an overcoding "whose 
aim is to render debt impossible of discharge, " both through overcoding and a 
deterritorialization of the sign in a despotism of the real. Adair's concentration is on 
epic form and at one juncture in his analysis alights appropriately for this study on 
Ezra Pound's epic obsessions, which sought to: 
include... [rather than] be about history, marshalling the "few dozen 
facts" which "give one a sudden insight into circumjacent conditions, 
into their causes, their effects, into sequence, and law. " [Pound's] model 
for their mode of "govern[ing] knowledge"? - "as the switchboard 
governs an electric circuit. " Thus these facts, "hard to find, " are "swift 
"Robbe-Grillet, For A New Novel, p. 161. Text italics. 
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and easy of transmission. X52 
Pynchon's writing is directed to achieving this inclusivity whilst showing the extent 
to which more contemporary technological influence has produced sets of 
interchangeable structures of revelation whose "intent to communicate" never provides 
the fulfillment promised. Those requiring such security are propelled into further and 
unending investments in controlled information. The carrot is always a sense of the 
ultimate: "[t]here'd seemed no limit to what the printed circuit could have told her (if 
she had tried to find out), " but here any fulfillment is disallowed both by the 
specialization of knowledge-limited, presumably, to some electronic elite-and the 
intersection of "hieroglyphic" mystery with McLuhan's concept of "pure information, " 
where "the 'content' of any medium is always another medium. 163 Surfaces and 
interiors seem to promise revelation, but only if a commitment is made to a set of 
controls and an endlessly deferring system of signification. This commitment, 
however, provides an entry from the "threshold" where Maas is positioned, into an 
environment where vertigiousness alternates with certainty. 
The potential, and actuality, of paranoia emerges here particularly with regard 
to its involvement with revelation. Maas's arrival at "an odd, religious instant"-and 
her final attendance at an auction overseen by a "puppet-master [and]... priest... of some 
remote culture" (L49, p. 127)-marks her position at an intersection of interpretive 
controls. These controls are engaged in delivering an environment of codes for 
perception, and offer sustenance to a passive consumerism of patterns whose totality 
"Gilbert Adair, 'Metamorphosis and Replication: The Civilian Epic of Comics and Horror' in 
Talus, 5/6, Spring 1991, pp. 107,109. Adair quotes from Ezra Pound, "I Gather the Limbs of 
Osiris" in Selected Prose 1909-1965 (London 1973), pp. 22-23. 
53Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man (London 1964), p. 8. 
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is always deferred; offering, in fact, an existence constantly on a "threshold of [... ] 
understanding, " a religion of constant accessibility to meaning, but the witholding of 
that meaning in the manipulation of debt. It is no mistake that the memory Maas 
brings to her communion with the pattern of San Narciso is the replacement of a 
battery in a radio. That is, a recharging of the disposable energies of electronic 
communication whose information is always a recycled "intent. " The logical impetus 
to a point beyond "intent" is given in Marshall McLuhan's belief that the Second 
Coming would occur in and through electronic circuitry: "pure information, " or in 
Pound's epical concerns, "sudden insight, " producing forms of ultimate knowledge. 
This impetus is further reinforced by a range of religious suggestion pervading 
the surfaces and interiors Pynchon carefully reveals through Maas's experience. Maas 
arrives on a Sunday (perhaps in time for Mass)54 in a Catholic settlement in which 
the subject of the will had "put down the plinth course of capital on which everything 
afterwards had been built, however rickety or grotesque, towards the sky" (L49, p. 14). 
She arrives in a Chevy Impala and sits in her car above the city; sitting, in fact, in 
technology named both for an African antelope and a hunting cry, preparing for her 
sacrificial venture into an electronic Babel. Her executive agency as bringer of the law 
relates her to Moses, particularly as she prepares to descend into the city with images 
of electronic circuit boards in her mind, as these suggest to her an ultimate knowledge 
to supplement the force of the law she holds. Law and knowledge thus are brought to 
organize a Babel of corporate symbol and language into a sense pliant enough for 
An allusion given credence by the reference to Mucho Maas later in the paragraph whose 
disc jockey activities are described as being as "stylized as the handling of chrism, censer, 
chalice might be for a holy man" (L49, p. 15). 
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meaning to emerge as inheritance. " 
What disturbs this project of an "ecstasy of communication, " driven toward an 
ecstasy of revelation, is the phenomenology of perception, the threat of entropic wind- 
down in the repetition and similitude of surfaces, and memory. Maas's vantage point, 
her "need ... to squint 
for the sunlight" and her "high angle" amid "smog" and the 
bright beige countryside, " interferes with her move towards totally prescribed 
revelation in a controlled environment. That is, the effects of control interfere with 
their desired production within the parameters of the Second Law of Thermodynamics. 
The momentum toward meaning built up by memory and structured by socio-cultural 
forces, however, requires the gesture of trying "to find out" with a personal input 
whose deviation from norms, or leap of faith, becomes the enclosure of paranoia. It 
is an enclosure where the sacrifice of self is necessary for the securities desired in 
Pynchon's assertive binary: "If there is something comforting-religious, if you 
want-about paranoia, there is still also anti-paranoia, where nothing is connected to 
anything, a condition not many of us can bear for long. "s6 
Maas's act of memory provides perhaps the most disruptive action for the 
control of perception, able to infiltrate the present with differentials from the past. 
According to Deleuze and Guattari, memory constitutes part of the schizophrenic pole 
in their model of the tensions affecting unconscious desire under the pressures of 
modern life. Memory is part of a set of energies "characterized by multiplicity, 
55I am indebted to Shamoon Zamir for some suggestions here from his reading of The Crying 
of Lot 49, particularly in terms of a religious symbolism. 
56Thomas Pynchon, Gravity's Rainbow (1973; New York 1974), p. 506. Hereafter referred to 
as 'GR. ' 
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proliferation, becoming, flowing, a breaking of boundaries, "" and it disrupts the 
contrary rigidities of the paranoiac pole, providing an indeterminacy to Maas's 
"religious moment" and resisting the immediate production of meaning. Capitalism and 
social darwinism attempt to dehistoricize and decode environments which may be 
subverted where memory provides a disturbance of reality, or a juxtaposition of 
different levels of the real, in its attempt to recode and interpret, and Maas's memory 
sets her momentarily adrift from the control of the immediate. A similar process 
affects the other nomadic or mobile characters of Pynchon's fiction, maintaining them 
in a limbo of potential rather than actual paranoia, as they seek to connect themselves 
to their memories and the reality whose surfaces parade before them. What may lie 
behind those surfaces becomes the primary obsession, and the fiction consequently 
explores the promise of an unveiling which the characters, trapped in fusions of 
Manichean and Enlightenment thought, can only conceive of in sets of alternatives: 
either total meaning, or total chaos. 
***** 
As Benny Profane, Herbert Stencil, Oedipa Maas, Tyrone Slothrop and Zoyd 
Wheeler are all aware, a pattern must be isolated to complement being and battle 
meaninglessness. In their circumstances, this means a plumbing of their own 
historicity to attempt to counter the disconnections made apparent in their experience 
of reality. What the fictions stress in the assembling of detailed and historicized 
environments is that pattern can only exist in the enclosure of paranoia if humanity's 
various power manias have determined this as a necessity. To make a pattern becomes 
57Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Kafka: Toward A Minor Literature, translated by Dana 
Polan (Minneapolis 1986), p. 4. 
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the exertion of a power detrimental to free and unmediated flows of information. 
In a novel like Pynchon's Gravity's Rainbow, there is no conscious way out: 
technological progress incites epistemologically exclusive drives, and vice versa, 
involving and consuming ever more of the natural and human resources available in 
the global logistical society. Where humanity is enslaved within the power systems of 
technology and technological production, so it has become enslaved to paranoia, a 
"Situation" represented at one point in Gravity's Rainbow as a synthetic ordering of 
carbon atoms within the layering of dreams-a juxtaposition of techno-Cartesian 
forces and perception able occasionally to overcome them-in the Ourobouros image: 
Kekule dreams the Great Serpent holding its own tail in its mouth, the 
dreaming Serpent which surrounds the World. But the meanness, the 
cynicism with which this dream is to be used. The Serpent that 
announces, "The World is a closed thing, cyclical, resonant, eternally- 
returning, " is to be delivered into a system whose only aim is to violate 
the Cycle. Taking and not giving back, demanding that "productivity" 
and "earnings" keep on increasing with time, the System removing 
from the rest of the World these vast quantities of energy to keep its 
own tiny desperate fraction showing a profit [... ] the System, which 
sooner or later must crash to its death, when its addiction to energy has 
become more than the rest of the World can supply [... ]. (GR, pp. 480- 
481; text italics) 
The lineage of American participation is given on several interlocking levels 
where forms of intertextuality indicate the continuity of forces. A focus of nineteenth 
century American command and technological intensities, the quarter-deck of the 
Pequod in Moby-Dick, produces Ahab's paranoid explanation and intoxication where 
"[a]ll visible objects, man, are but as pasteboard masks. But in each event-in the 
living act, the undoubted deed-there, some unknown but still reasoning thing puts 
forth the mouldings of its features from behind the unreasoning mask. If man will 
259 
strike, strike through the mask! "" The insistence on forms of certainty and reason, 
and the sense that something is there behind the surface indicates the paranoia 
produced at the peripheries of American nineteenth century expansion. By 1966 the 
change in spatial sensibility has altered the boundaries and the stress is more overtly 
linguistic to match a sense of dissemination, but the concern is still with surfaces and 
limits, and what they may hide: "[t]he act of metaphor then was a thrust at truth and 
a lie, depending where you were: inside, safe, or outside, lost. Oedipa did not know 
where she was. Trembling, unfurrowed, she slipped sideways, screeching back across 
grooves of years [... j' (L49, p. 89). Maas is certainly outside the command structure, 
not at the head of a "fixed purpose. .. laid with iron rails, whereon my soul 
is grooved 
to run" (MD, p. 266), as Ahab can claim at the extreme edge of hubristic interrogation. 
The paranoia possessing Ahab which fuels and guards his purpose is closer to that of 
Weissman/Blicero in Gravity's Rainbow, another maniac eager to launch his 
combination of technological, authoritarian and sacrificial concerns into an 
apocalyptically fulfilling moment. 
Maas, however, is part of the movement: "[t]he act of metaphor" ensures 
this. 59 Not only enmeshed historically and through language as complicit-her sexual 
involvement with Pierce Inverarity may be seen as a parallel to Ahab's consummatory 
dismemberment by the whale in his earlier voyage-she has to function within the 
legal and financial structure of the military-industrial establishment as "executrix. " 
Her powerlessness is figured by her recognition that metaphor, like the claims of 
"Herman Melville, Moby-Dick; Or, The Whale (1851; Harmondsworth 1983), p. 262. 
Hereafter referred to as 'MD. ' 
59Metaphor, in its Greek root, means to transfer, or carry across. 
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scientific theory, participates in both truth and lies, disallowing the firm hold on 
reality she desires; her potential for paranoia consequently functions in response to 
the "power" of her position in law and its necessary unravelling of coded inheritance. 
Never, as William Burroughs would say, an "innocent bystander, " Maas learns the 
historical and "vehicular" truth of her complicity as a citizen, something given greater 
intensity in the ordered reflexes of Tyrone Slothrop's corporately-tracked life. 
Both Slothrop and Maas continue throughout the enclosure of their texts to 
retain a potential for paranoia, but in lacking certainty, neither are paranoid. Both are 
uncertain, anxious and eager to locate the constituted reality which may conform to 
what is happening to them and which may therefore give them clues to the force 
behind their manipulation. Their paranoia is not realized as conviction, and thus 
replicates the plastic status of the alienated individual in totalitarian societies: 
respondent to the programming of fears and thus able to "act" and move through "an 
alien, unfurrowed, assumed full circle into some paranoia" (L49, p. 126). This process, 
in turn, is aided by the fluid and interchangeable status of the real, what Jean 
Baudrillard-continuing the relevance of electronics-calls "[a] fantastic short circuit: 
the real is hyperrealised. Neither realised, nor idealised: but hyperrealised. The 
hyperreal is the abolition of the real not by violent destruction, but by its assumption, 
elevation to the strength of the model. i60 
What may disrupt this organized action, as both Maas and Slothrop illustrate, 
is the friction of an individual or "irrational" vision, a seizing of revelation for the self 
which, unless one retains command as Ahab or Blicero does, is determined externally 
6°Jean Baudrillard, In The Shadow of the Silent Majorities... Or The End of the Social, 
translated by Paul Foss, Paul Patton & John Johnston (New York 1983), p. 84. 
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as madness and treated as such. Oedipa Maas finds herself desiring this 
marginalization after reviewing her perceptual options, her meditation taking place as 
a dialogue with her reflected image: 
Change your name [... ] she advised her reflection in the half-light of 
that afternoon's vanity mirror. Either way, they'll call it paranoia. They. 
Either you have stumbled [... ] on to a network... maybe even on to a 
real alternative to the exitlessness, to the absence of surprise to life, 
that harrows the head of every American you know, and you too, 
sweetie. Or you are hallucinating it. Or a plot has been mounted 
against you [... ]. Or you are fantasying some such plot, in which case 
you are a nut, Oedipa, out of your skull. 
Those, now that she was looking at them, she saw to be the 
alternatives. Those symmetrical four. She didn't like any of them, but 
hoped she was mentally ill; that that's all it was (L49, pp. 117-118). 
"The act of metaphor" becomes itself a pattern, its comparative and vehicular 
tendencies reflected in Maas's reflection. Surfaces stretch symmetrically and 
vertiginously away in an endless destabilization which can only be terminated, in the 
circumstances, by paranoia. Jacques Lacan's essay on "The Mirror Stage" is relevant 
here, where his "method of symbolic reduction... establishes in the defences of the ego 
a genetic order.. . and situates hysterical repression... as preliminary to paranoiac 
alienation. " At the end of the mirror stage, and the movement of the: 
I [in]to socially elaborated situations... [a] moment [occurs] that 
decisively tips the whole of human knowledge into mediatization 
through the desire of the other, [which] constitutes its objects in an 
abstract equivalence by the co-operation of others, and turns the I into 
that apparatus for which every instinctual thrust constitutes a danger, 
even though it should correspond to a natural maturation... 61 
Pynchon's subversive and appropriate use of a religious discourse structure, the 
"Proverbs for Paranoids, " is more immediate for those unwilling to enter the complex 
61Jacques Lacan, 'The mirror stage as formative of the function of the I as revealed in 
psychoanalytic experience' in Ecrits, translated by Alan Sheridan (London 1985), p. 5. Text 
italics. 
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enclosure of Lacan's theory. The fifth proverb states: "[p]aranoids are not paranoids 
[... ] because they're paranoid, but because they keep putting themselves, fucking idiots, 
deliberately into paranoid situations" (GR, p. 340). 
This narcissistic dimension assumes a further level of meaning in Pynchon's 
writing, as a critic has noted, where Marshall McLuhan's analysis of the Narcissus 
myth and its reflections on human interaction with technology become probable source 
materials. 62 McLuhan's stress in Understanding Media is on the etymological 
connection between Narcissus and narcosis, and he goes on to assert the accurate 
version of the myth in which, far from falling in love with himself as a reflection: 
Narcissus mistook his own reflection in the water for another person. 
This extension of himself by mirror numbed his perceptions until he 
became the servomechanism of his own extended or repeated image. 
The nymph Echo tried to win his love with fragments of his own 
speech, but in vain. He was numb. He had adapted to his extension of 
syst himself and had become a closed em. 63 
Melville's treatment of this predicament in Moby-Dick is a crucial connection of ego, 
technology and nature, mythically dramatized where exploration meets exploitation. 
Reflections of self and other provide "the image of the ungraspable phantom of 
life... the key to it all" in the opening chapter, before the look-out at "The Mast-Head" 
confronts the abyss created in prioritizing either meditation or purpose as exclusory 
actions. In the ensuing narcosis "this sleep, this dream is on ye, move your foot or 
hand an inch; slip your hold at all; and your identity comes back in horror. Over 
Descartian vortices you hover" (MD, pp. 95,257). 
Descartes has receded in the post-1945 predicament of Oedipa Maas, though 
62Thomas Schaub, Thomas Pynchon: The Voice of Ambiguity (Urbana, Illinois 1981), p. 94. 
63McLuhan, Understanding Media, p. 41. 
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elements of his logic remain to torture her with potential certainty among the systems 
that compose the environment she searches. Maas, in fact, has to face the implosion 
of boundaries that Moby-Dick locates in its apocalyptic ending, not at sea but inland 
in "the true continuity" of the "storm systems of group suffering and need, prevailing 
winds of affluence" which form "the legacy [that] was America. " Boundaries are 
absent because "[n]o one yet knew how to draw them, " articulating the crucial narcotic 
distortion of any creative function with which to face the "hundred alienations" (L49, 
pp. 123,124); Maas subsequently goes through cycles of alcohol, unknown illness and 
unlit Californian scenarios. Indeed, at the point where, as a critic suggests, California 
as "lot 49" is sold, ' Maas's perception metamorphizes into Yoyodyne's weapons 
technology: she becomes what she has dealt with, transformed into an extension of 
technology rather than the opposite action described by McLuhan. As she attends the 
concluding auction her perception has changed, and she "look[s] at the napes of necks, 
trying to guess which one was her target, her enemy, perhaps her proof" (L49, p. 127). 
***** 
Behavioural psychology in Gravity's Rainbow is just part of a totalized sweep 
of technological progression, but it underpins the entire notion of the novel which may 
be encapsulated in the question: what are the means by which humanity can arrive at 
a point of assured self-destruction? Directional coercion is of the essence, as the 
behavioural psychologist Pointsman seeks to extend and perfect Pavlovian 
experimentation in a human sphere already ordered in every conceivable area of 
'Gerd Hurm, Fragmented Urban Images: The American City in Modern Fiction from Stephen 
Crane to Thomas Pynchon (Frankfurt am Main 1991), p. 311. 
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existence. 65 Destabilization of perceptual security is one technique, the required 
conditioned reflex being plotted by a manipulation and repetition of stimuli in a 
stream of images to fill the alienated void. 
The key to this perfect order is the reduction of human sexual drives, 
biologically the energy of reproduction, to enclosures of repetition where human 
energies may be controlled at source. Pointsman's manipulation of his obstructive 
superior, Pudding, follows this course into coercive tableaux where the temporal 
staticity of pornographic representation isolates the condition of humans so enclosed: 
Pudding participates in a communion ritual of submission to the point of sado- 
masochistic coprophagy, his memories of imperial use providing the lever which 
Pointsman "throws" to staticize him in the controlled distortion and intensification of 
sensation. Pudding's desire, after a lifetime of authoritarian order, is to be "bound by 
nothing but his need for pain, for something real, something pure. They have taken 
him so far from his simple nerves" (GR, p. 273), and, as Paul Fussell has indicated, 
his ritual replays the useless sacrifices made at "Passchendaele [and] the Salient. i66 
Pointsman's authoritarian mania, however, focuses on Slothrop's "perfect 
65Henri F. Ellenberger notes the post-1945 global divisions in psychiatric philosophy and 
practice as being divided politically, so that "[i]n Soviet Russia, Pavlovian psychiatry was now 
an official doctrine, whereas psychoanalysis and kindred teachings were prohibited. In the 
United States equal freedom was granted to all psychiatric schools (to the Pavlovian as well 
as to any other), but psychoanalysis was factually prevalent... " (The Discovery of the 
Unconscious: The History and Evolution of Dynamic Psychiatry [New York 19701, p. 868). 
What Ellenberger doesn't mention is that the significant developments in behavioural 
psychiatry, such as the work by Wilhelm Wundt in the 1880s, and Ivan Pavlov's "discoveries" 
in the early 1900s, stimulated intense interest in the United States where there were at least 
a hundred different institutions conducting behavioural research by 1910; see John M. 
O'Donnell, The Origins of Behaviourism: American Psychology. 1870-1920 (New York 1985) 
for a survey of the crucial period of development of behavioural psychology in the United 
States. 
66Paul Fussell, The Great War and Modern Memory (London 1976), p. 109. 
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mechanism" (GR, p. 55) of sexual "precognition" as the ultimate enclosure of human 
instinct. The range of sexual metaphor harnessed by the text in all aspects of rocket 
conception, production and firing finds its primary representation in Slothrop's 
predictive sexual action. This is paralleled by the mating of rocket to human as the 
logical conclusion of Blicero and Gottfried's relationship of patriarchal dominance and 
extension of technology. 67 It is the predictive ability, fostered under a lifetime of 
industrialized conditioning, which so obsesses the behavioural scientist. The possibility 
of assured prediction drives Pointsman's paranoia on towards the dream of a control 
which disallows the unexpected reflex and instigates the emplacement of cause and 
effect structures in a seemingly reversed perfection. To a colleague's complaint that 
he's "putting response before stimulus, " Pointsman replies: "Not at all. Think of it. 
He's out there, and he can feel them coming, days in advance. But it's a reflex. A 
reflex to something that's in the air right now. Something we're too coarsely put 
together to sense-but Slothrop can" (GR, p. 56. Text italics). 
Pointsman's certainty represents a complex of issues, born of paranoid desires 
for security which seek to merge certainty of revelation with the ongoing urge toward 
unlimited production and consumption sought in the rhythms of human creativity. The 
fiction plays with this idea with its disconnected and shuffled temporalities, describing 
an apocalyptic circle (the opening and concluding rocket strikes) yet in its profusion 
of styles and fragmentedness precluding the form of enclosure which would provide 
the "perfect mechanism" of a metaphor for paranoia. 
Many of Pynchon's formal techniques stem from those largely pioneered in the 
"The symmetries and assymetries of these two relationships have been perceptively analyzed 
by Dale Carter, The Final Frontier, pp. 47-49. 
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writing of William Burroughs, and Burroughs' "basic formula of 'evil' virus: The 
Algebra of Need" provides the essential context for these issues of behavioural control: 
"[t]he face of 'evil' is always the face of total need... Beyond a certain frequency need 
knows absolutely no limit or control. "M His classic depiction of behaviourism run 
riot in the figure of Dr. Benway strikes at the heart of the sexual, religious and 
economic priorities of modern authoritarianism's concentration on metabolic control. 
Benway's statement in The Naked Lunch after his engagement by "Islam Inc. " lays out 
the strategies and repercussions: 
On the other hand, prolonged mistreatment, short of physical violence, 
gives rise, when skilfully applied, to anxiety and a feeling of special 
guilt. A few rules or rather guiding principles are to be borne in mind. 
The subject must not realize that the mistreatment is a deliberate attack 
of an anti-human enemy on his personal identity. He must be made to 
feel that he deserves any treatment he receives because there is 
something (never specified) horribly wrong with him. The naked need 
of the control addicts must be decently covered by an arbitrary and 
intricate bureaucracy so that the subject cannot contact his enemy 
direct. 69 
To Burroughs' definition of the paranoid as the person "in possession of all the 
factsi7° may be added the necessary observation that paranoia is an addiction to 
control, or in Pynchon's words "addiction to energy. " It is realized among those whose 
grip on power is achieved (but always, consequently, under threat); and is potential 
in those subjected whose use value exists only as long as it is potential and they 
remain unsure of the reality of their predicament. 
The value of Pynchon's writing, in these behavioural contexts, is to provide an 
"William Burroughs, The Naked Lunch (1959; London 1982), p. 3. Text italics. 
69Burroughs, The Naked Lunch, pp. 30-31. Text italics. 
'Cited in Mottram, 'Out Of Sight But Never Out Of Mind, ' p. 178. 
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index of consumptions which recesses behind the physical sacrifice to technology. 
Gottfried's mating with the rocket forms a priapic thrust towards an apocalypse which 
exists as a limit, whilst in its wake lies a far greater sacrificial territory littered with 
individual and mass anxieties from which the rocket draws its psychic energy. The 
effort to make sense in techno-Cartesian enclosures, as the reader pursues the same 
enervating task as the characters, uncovers this waste land, isolating consciousness in 
an entropic environment of radical overcoding. 
The reliance on "expert power" among those who control the modern nation- 
state is a revealing part of this interplay of paranoia and its potential amid a range of 
behavioural techniques. The portrayal of the scientist Pointsman and his relationships 
with "patients" and superiors provides one level of exploration. Another occurs in the 
detailed historical analysis throughout Gravity's Rainbow of the corporate global effort 
to design and use weapons of mass destruction. Magali Sarfatti Larson has located the 
origins of this development in her analysis of expert power. In this, she identifies two 
fundamental processes in the concentrations of power achieved by monopolizing 
certain discourses of knowledge: 
Its effects are measured in the non-physical constraint of accepted 
definitions, of internalized moral and epistemological norms. It is in 
one sense impersonal, for it makes the most general knowledge claims; 
yet it is also deeply personal, in that the individual who internalizes the 
general and special discourses of his or her culture experiences them 
as natural expressions or extensions of his or her own will and 
reason. 71 
At these intersections of power, reason and creativity the actuality of paranoia is 
never far away. This is particularly evident in the circumstances of political coercion 
71Magali Sarfatti Larson, 'The Production of Expertise and the Constitution of Expert Power' 
in ed. Thomas L. Haskell, The Authority of Experts: Studies in History and Theory 
(Bloomington, Indiana 1984), pp. 35-36. 
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for progress which have marked the twentieth century's military-industrial expansion. 
For the individual scientist or expert the tensions of internalization are to be borne and 
then used-by themselves and their masters-as forms of momentum. These move 
outwards into potent combinations of certainty and mystery which determine the close 
links between themselves, religion, the occult and the alchemist. Here again the 
essential element is a revelatory power whose control exists in its extension and 
restriction, where: 
conceptions of science... merge transcendant objectivity with powerful 
efficacy over nature in a knowledge which is never fully revealed by 
its technical embodiments. Like any system of ideas, scientific 
knowledge cannot be exhaustively displayed or codified. Thus, because 
it remains partly tacit and mysterious, it becomes inseparable from the 
person of the knower. 72 
In these contexts Eric Mottram's comments on Thomas Edison are apposite, 
particularly the fact that "it was Edison who made the first Frankenstein film in 
1910... The popularity of such media explorations suggests that Americans dream of 
a fusion between the desiring body and technics, like astronauts fused with their 
capsule. i73 Discussing the "control, certitude and... paranoia of surgeons, " Joan Cassell 
reports, amongst other things, a Chief of Surgery asserting that "[t]he surgical motto 
72Larson, 'The Production of Expertise and the Constitution of Expert Power, ' p. 56. Text 
italics. 
73" "nat Dark Instrument": The American Automobile' in Mottram, Blood on the Nash 
Ambassador, p. 45. See also 'The Metallic Necessity and the New American: Culture and 
Technology in America, 1850-1900' in the same collection. Pynchon has written an intriguing 
article in which he discusses forms of "Luddite" paranoia manifested in the masses 
undergoing various stages of technological revolution. He cites Mary Shelley's Frankenstein 
as a classic representation of this tendency, where technology and alchemy fuse to produce 
irrational fears focused on the figure of the scientist and his techniques. See Thomas Pynchon, 
'Is it O. K. To Be a Luddite? ' in The New York Times, Book Review section, 28 October 
1984. 
269 
is 'Sometimes in error, never in doubt, ""' an attitude mercilessly revealed in all its 
destructive implications in the routines of William Burroughs' Dr. Benway. 
Pynchon's scientists and experts thus represent a full documentation of an 
ideological constraint of energies. Their efforts merge a commitment to rigid structures 
of theory and production with lives lived in an agony of programmed needs. Under 
such intensity their consciousness transforms smoothly into the certainties of paranoia. 
Pointsman's subjects become part of his "need humorlessly, worldly to use their 
innocence, to write on them new words of himself, his own brown Realpolitik dreams" 
(GR, p. 57). These "dreams" focus on Slothrop's behavioural functions and use the 
Pavlovian theory of paranoia in an appropriately reflexive vocabulary of obsession 
and control: 
You've seen [Slothrop's] MMPI. His F scale? Falsifications, distorted 
thought processes... The scores show it clearly: he's psychopathically 
deviant, obsessive, a latent paranoiac-well, Pavlov believed that 
obsessions and paranoid delusions were a result of certain-call them 
cells, neurons, on the mosaic of the brain, being excited to the level 
where, through reciprocal induction, all the area around becomes 
inhibited. One bright, burning point, surrounded by darkness. Darkness 
it has, in a way, called up [... ]. We may have to starve, terrorize, I 
don't know ... 
it needn't come to that. But I will find his spots of inertia, 
I will find what they are if I have to open up his damned skull [... ] 
(GR, p. 104). 
Pointsman's diagnosis, enslaved to preordained theory and a physiological mapping, 
seeks a singular staticized "point" within a needed Manichean structure as the point 
of certainty. This provides a striking parallel with the obsessions of Benjamin Rush 
seen in Chapter Two. Indeed, the Manichean structure reproduces itself in a perfect 
scientific form, provided for Pointsman by his hero Pavlov in the "theory of opposites" 
74Joan Cassell, On Control, Certitude, and the "Paranoia" of Surgeons' in Culture, Medicine 
and Psychiatry, 11,1987, p. 233. 
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which the Russian developed in his analysis of paranoia and regarded as the basis of 
thought: "Our general idea of the opposite is a fundamental and indispensable idea 
which, combined with other general ideas, facilitates, disposes and, even, alone makes 
possible our normal thought. 05 Such a binary approach determines that the "spots 
of inertia" need to be located and energized within the conditioned reflexes of 
behavioural programming. This denies the liberty of a continuum ensuring that motion, 
and thence productivity, occurs as required. 
In this sense, Emerson's statement in Self-Reliance (1841) that "power ceases 
in the instant of repose, it resides in the moment of transition from a past to a new 
state" articulates the problem and the effort involved for paranoid theory and control. 
On the one hand paranoia desires to staticize, to render up meaning in a fixity, whilst 
on the other, and in the circumstances of technological progression, movement and 
"transition" are a prerequisite of production and consumption until the final death. 
Thus, "latent" paranoia is a necessary manipulative state. However, the staticities 
threatening with the assumption of the condition need to be avoided, just as, according 
to Dr. Benway, it is necessary that the subject "cannot contact his enemy direct. " 
A final and important example of the behaviourist issue in American cultural 
discourse of the period concerns the work of B. F. Skinner, especially his "utopian 
novel, " Walden Two, written in 1945 and published in 1948, precisely the narrative 
period of Gravity's Rainbow. This book, and Skinner's application of behavioural 
75Ivan P. Pavlov, Conditioned Reflexes and Psychiatry, translated by W. H. Gantt (New York 
1941), Vol. 2, p. 58. Pointsman later quotes from this portion of the text, a letter written by 
Pavlov to Pierre Janet. 
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science to social issues in following years, 76 may be seen to extend from Franklin 
D. Roosevelt's famous "Four Freedoms of America" concept developed through the 
New Deal and articulated in full in January 1941. In particular, the proclamation of 
"Freedom from Fear" provided the ironic impetus for American weapons expansion 
and Skinner's technologization of behaviour under a ruling elite. This elite has since 
been eager to set the agenda for a new engineered reality "beyond freedom and 
dignity, " as the title of another of his books asserted. Skinner essentially advocates an 
abolition of the political-in Walden Two the pioneer community simply ignores 
nation-state government-as part of a post-lapsarian nostalgia. He then bases his 
utopia on elements of heroic vitalism and rational principles formulated, as he says 
in his 1976 introduction, from "the great men who are said to have made a difference 
in human affairs... What is needed is not a new political order or a new kind of 
government but further knowledge about human behaviour and new ways of applying 
that knowledge to the design of cultural practices. "" 
From many objections to be levelled at Skinner two come immediately to 
mind: the first, in the contexts of the last chapter of Horkheimer and Adorno's 
Dialectic of Enlightenment, is that much of Skinner's rationalism proceeds from 
precisely the Enlightenment techniques which have proved so disastrous for humanity, 
not least in the realms of science and mental health. Secondly, Skinner's deflection of 
the fact that his ideas have been put into effective use by the system he abhors, and 
that democratic politics have all but been abolished in corporate global dominance, 
76See, for instance, B. F. Skinner's Science and Human Behaviour (New York 1953), Verbal 
Behaviour (New York 1957), and Beyond Freedom and Dignity (New York 1971). 
"B. F. Skinner, Walden Two (1948; New York 1976), p. xvi. 
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reveals the problem of dispensing with the political-it renders individuals totally 
malleable by the already-emplaced forms of control Skinner's behaviourism desires 
as security against totalitarianism. 
Two statements from the period offer different and compelling representations 
of immediate post-1945 America revealing that behaviourism wasn't so much an 
academic projection as a reality. Virgil Jordan's Manifesto for the Atomic Age (1946) 
fused post-Hiroshima fears with contemporary saturation propaganda concerning what 
Barry Goldwater later called the "positive side" of nuclear fission, seeing in an 
economy of nuclear abundance a situation where "the government's principal function 
would be social control. ' 78 Mary McCarthy goes further in 1947: 
The movies, the radio, the super-highway have softened us up for the 
atom bomb; we have lived with them without pleasure, feeling them as 
a coercion on our natures, a coercion coming seemingly from nowhere 
and expressing nobody's will. The new coercion finds us without the 
habit of protest; we are dissident but apart. 79 
This lays out some of the dimensions of an archetype of post-1945 American 
fiction, the drifter. Pynchon's primary representative of this alienation and 
discontinuous nomadism is Benny Profane in V. whose metamorphoses, under greater 
and more structured weights of law and technology, become Oedipa Maas and Tyrone 
Slothrop. Profane's inability to secure and maintain the emotional bases of his life 
leaves him suspended and liable to oscillation in Pynchon's calculated metaphor for 
such alienation, the yo-yo. This stress materializes in Profane's "therapeutic" riding 
of New York City's circular subway routes, his intermittent erections and a connected 
"Cited in Paul Boyer, By The Bomb's Early Light: American Thought and Culture 
Dawn of the Atomic Age (New York 1985), p. 143. 
79Mary McCarthy, 'America the Beautiful: Humanist in a Bathtub' in Commentary, 4, July- 
December 1947, p. 205. 
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fatalism, these latter phenomena acting as a prototype for Slothrop: 
Any sovereign or broken yo-yo must feel like this after a short time 
of lying inert, rolling, falling: suddenly to have its umbilical string 
reconnected, and know the other end is in hands it cannot escape. 
Hands it doesn't want to escape. Know that the simple clockwork of 
itself has no more need for symptoms of inutility, lonesomeness, 
directionless, because now it has a path marked out for it over which 
it has no control (V, p. 217). 
The dangers of such behavioural possibilities are in fact avoided by Profane's 
"inutility, " his inability to fashion his oscillatory tendencies to a regular pattern. 
Regularity is the clear requirement of American social and economic policy, given in 
the fusion of alienation, force and pure energy in the novel's military-industrial 
organization, Yoyodyne. Yoyodyne's beginnings stem from a "psychopathic craving 
for simple gyroscopes" (V, p. 227), a technological basis of motion and stability 
harnessed to provide directional information. It is not coincidental that the gyroscope 
is the component which forms an essential part of any modern weapons system, 
particularly in rocketry. 
Profane's final appearance in V. signifies an important denial of epiphany. This 
involves an entropic return from America "through the abruptly absolute night" (V, 
p. 455) towards the Mediterranean basin of the cultures from which modern America 
emerged, and into which Sidney Stencil sinks. Profane's yo-yo-like momentums 
preclude paranoia as he always fails to connect with the systematizations within 
which a focused terror could harden into shape. In line with this, his narrative 
contrasts to that within which Herbert Stencil seeks V. The former narrative is 
accessible in its relative linearities, whilst the latter moves through temporal shifts and 
networks of discoordinated research toward the "frayed end of another clue" (V, 
p. 452), a paranoia registered in its manic and disruptive splicing of histories toward 
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the narrative. 80 
In The Crying of Lot 49 Oedipa Maas stands closer to the "threshold" than 
Profane, her utility bringing her there in an action which dissolves as knowledge 
threatens to bring conviction or realization. This is a modern American Bleak House, 
in its movement through the inhuman codes and structures of law. Its difference to 
Dickens' novel lies in its lack of attempted closure-though epiphany seems 
tantalizingly close at the end-and its stylistically compact, shiny energies, realized 
from the fluid and manipulable state of American reality and its productive, 
technological momentums. Yoyodyne, in fact, is this realization, the "great digital 
computer" that: 
had conditioned the land to accept any San Narciso among its most 
tender flesh without a reflex of a cry [... ]. [Maas] had heard all about 
excluded middles; they were bad shit, to be avoided; and how had it 
ever happened here, with the chances once so good for diversity? For 
it was now like walking among matrices of a great digital computer, 
the zeroes and ones twinned above, hanging like balanced mobiles right 
and left, ahead, thick, maybe endless. Behind the hieroglyphic streets 
there would either be a transcendant meaning, or only the earth [... ] 
either some fraction of the truth's numinous beauty [... ] or only a power 
spectrum (L49, p. 125). 
Before Gravity's Rainbow and Pointsman, and yet in plot terms a production of the 
immediate post-war years and ongoing obsessions with behaviourist control, America 
becomes a land "conditioned [... ] without a reflex. " It is taken by corporate and 
technological control to a point where acquiescence and consumption operate as 
passive forms of response and reflex. The intervening years of manufactured threat, 
creating a continual "state of emergency"-as in the successively identical arguments 
80 ravity's Rainbow is clearly a representative step towards this narrative, especially in the 
opening remark: "No, this is not a disentanglement from, but a progressive knotting into [... ]" 
(GR, p. 3). 
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for hydrogen weapons' development, the Viet Nam war, and the so-called Strategic 
Defence Initiative or "Star Wars"-produces fiction moving toward the epiphanic 
apocalypse of the rocket strike and the breakdown of language as a medium of 
response. But here, before that, the binaries still exist, positing paranoia as an 
alternative reality and as a response, if only its comforting certainties can be attained. 
There are still "zeroes and ones, " differences to be used for creative endeavour, but 
the rocket that is to come bears the serial number 00000. 
Deleuze and Guattari's notion of "production" and "antiproduction" provides 
a useful understanding of the dynamic that informs Pynchon's writing where it 
analyses corporate connection and manipulation, and reinforces the sense suggested 
at the beginning of the chapter of capitalism's fusion of production and destruction as 
a necessary function of productivity. In their terms, Pynchon's use of paranoia is the 
appropriate concept to represent both individual and mass perceptual distortions. They 
suggest that: 
the capitalist effusion is that of antiproduction within production at all 
levels of the process. On the one hand, it alone is capable of realizing 
capitalism's supreme goal, which is to produce lack in the large 
aggregates, to introduce lack where there is always too much, by 
effecting the absorption of overabundant resources. On the other hand, 
it alone doubles the capital and flow of knowledge with a capital and 
an equivalent flow of stupidity that also effects an absorption and a 
realization, and that ensures the integration of groups and individuals 
into the system. 81 
For "stupidity" one may read delusion and/or conviction where a movement may be 
made from the anxiety of desire confronted by lack to "an absorption and a 
realization. " "Integration" pivots on desire, and the accessibility of the body-as a 
"Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, Volume 
Q, translated by Robert Hurley, Mark Seem and Helen R. Lane, (London 1984), pp. 235- 
236. Text italics. 
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producer of work and desire-is essential for control of these flows of energy. By 
penetrating the body through technological and other means "the system" effects 
control and tolerates and uses paranoia and potential paranoia as shapings of desire. 
This occurs most effectively in individual and mass forms of self-repression which 
are liable only occasionally to an externally destructive break-out from oppositional 
staticities. 
Pynchon's dramatization of behavioural controls among workers and experts 
reveals this, their various sexual preferences intensified in ritualization and sacrifice 
to prepare them for their eventual immolation in the rite of technical progress. And 
even creative opposition is swallowed up, or controlled through dissemination, by 
these processes. Kekule's dream, partially quoted above, is thus transformed into 
several levels of representation. Chief among these concern the complex of American 
fears obsessed with the corruption of the New World paradise, and the complicit and 
impotent recriminations of those involved scientists horrified after Hiroshima and, to 
use Pynchon's phrase, "[c]ooled by then to a vexed engineer-elitism" (GR, p. 483): 
"who, sent, the Dream? " It is never clear how rhetorical any of Jamf s 
questions are. "Who sent this new serpent to our ruinous garden, 
already too fouled, too crowded to qualify as any locus of 
innocence-unless innocence be our age's neutral, our silent passing 
into the machineries of indifference-something that Kekule's Serpent 
had come to-not to destroy, but to define to us the loss of... we had 
been given certain molecules, certain combinations and not others-we 
used what we found in Nature, unquestioning, shamefully perhaps-but 
the Serpent whispered, 'They can be changed, and new molecules 
assembled from the debris of the given... ' (GR, p. 482. Text italics). 
The smooth flows of the dream give way to broken analytic linearities interspersed 
with notions of hypnotic promise, encapsulating in the meshing of discourses Deleuze 
and Guattari's question: "[i]sn't the destiny of American literature that of crossing 
limits and frontiers, causing deterritorialized flows of desire to circulate, but also 
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always making these flows transport fascisizing, moralizing, Puritan, and familialist 
territorialities? "82 Pynchon's creative accomplishment is one consistently aware of this 
inheritance factor. His writing is always conscious of the damage poised within 
individual and cultural consciousness, and is careful to show how humanity has 
thought itself into predicaments whose energies extend from paranoia. 
It is thus that Slothrop fades from the text, disseminated as character from the 
splicing and dissolving of narratives into a single strand of apocalypse. This extends 
from a penultimate epiphany fusing patriarchal procreative forces with nature, where 
"Slothrop sees a very thick rainbow here, a stout rainbow cock driven down out of 
pubic clouds into Earth, green wet valleyed earth, and his chest fills and he stands 
crying, not a thing in his head, just feeling natural... " (GR, p. 729). The stress then 
moves on to the break up of language, rhythm and the "natural" where propaganda 
ensures the constriction of pure, unmediated experience or perception. This time 
Slothrop sees: 
a scrap of newspaper headline, with a wirephoto of a giant white cock, 




appear above with the logo of some occupation newspaper, a grinning 
glamour girl riding astraddle the cannon of a tank, steel penis with 
slotted serpent head, 3rd Armoured treads 'n' triangle on a sweater 
rippling across her tits. The white image has the same coherence, the 
hey-lookit-me smugness, as the Cross does. It is not only a sudden 
white genital onset in the sky-it is also, perhaps, a Tree... (GR, 
pp. 808-809. Text layout). 
Slothrop's explanatory potential for the authorities who have pursued him throughout 
82Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, pp. 277-278. 
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the narrative has disappeared; they have secured the required technology which renders 
him meaningless for them. This confirms his position as one of the preterite, the 
passed over, so that he moves outside the plot, attempting to evade the deathward 
movement identified by DeLillo. 
But this exile is to the alternative death of non-signification: removed as a 
focus of paranoia, Slothrop fades from a referential merging of plot systems which 
include the Tarot, Gnosis, the Kabbala, and other occult forms. They in turn pre-empt 
the rocket launch and suggest the multiple enclosures of belief organizing the fusion 
of control and death to come. The conclusion will examine how the act of narrative, 
the creation of story, is vital to coherences whose development for consciousness may 
be non-destructive; here, however, the stress is firmly on the end of narrative as plot 
exerts itself towards the termination of the novel's astonishing inclusivity, very much 
in line with Jean-Francois Lyotard's claim that our era has witnessed the repercussions 
of the end of "grand narratives" as resources of coherence. 83 Death emerges 
entropically in the multiplicity and overcoding of plots. The production of history by 
way of this inclusivity becomes the telling paranoia of Pynchon's analysis, 
simultaneously showing how certain and real the exploitation has been, whilst in the 
tracing of clues revealing the damage of suspicion perpetually maintained. 
A culmination of this project includes the inevitable "history" of American 
lineage in Western teleology, and it seems the appropriate place to end this section. 
Here, Pynchon is deep inside the elements which may determine an American cultural 
sense of its own process as being paranoid. The thoughts are those of the European 
83See Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, translated 
by Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi (Manchester 1984). 
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paranoid, Blicero, whose extension of his own condition is the entrapment America 
seems always unable to escape in its recurrent return to teleology: 
America was the edge of the World. A message for Europe, continent- 
sized, inescapable. Europe had found the site for its Kingdom of Death, 
that special Death the West had invented. [... ] Europe had gone 
deeper-into obsession, addiction, away from all the savage 
innocences. America was a gift from the invisible powers, a way of 
returning. But Europe refused it. It wasn't Europe's Original Sin-the 
latest name for that is Modern Analysis-but it happens that 
Subsequent Sin is harder to atone for (GR, p. 842. Text italics). 
Ultimately Pynchon is unable to avoid complicity in the problem of teleology, 
primarily in his use of allusion and referentiality to produce a fiction critical of the 
pathologies and desires for security any production of the past incites. The point at 
which his project involves itself with nostalgia can signify its susceptibility to the 
processes it creatively identifies as destructive. Deleuze and Guattari's comment on 
"[s]trange Anglo-American literature" goes some way toward suggesting the tensions 
that lie within this process, which, in the context of the last phrase of Gravity's 
Rainbow, move outwards from American culture to effect "everybody-": 
[These writers] overcome a limit, they shatter a wall, the capitalist 
barrier. And of course they fail to complete the process, they never 
cease failing to do so. The neurotic impasse again closes-the daddy- 
mommy of oedipalization, America, the return to the native land-or 
else the perversion of the exotic territorialities, then drugs, alcohol-or 
worse still, an old fascist dream... It has been a long time since Engels 
demonstrated.. . how an author 
is great because he cannot prevent 
himself from tracing flows and causing them to circulate, flows that 
split asunder the catholic and despotic signifier of his work, and that 
necessarily nourish a revolutionary machine on the horizon. 84 




I must Create a System or be enslav'd by another Man's. 
1 will not Reason & Compare: my business is to Create. ' 
To be an American is precisely to imagine a destiny rather than inherit 
one. We have always been inhabitants of myth rather than history. 
The materials which have gone before as a history of discourses and as a 
selective literary and cultural exploration have shown how a closed definition of the 
word, concept or history of paranoia is impossible. Any history of the sciences and 
cultures in which paranoia has emerged reveals two intertwined actions: a reflexive 
set of fears about the securities of understanding in a world beset by the inadequacies 
of reason, and the destructive uses of power in systems of authority unable to 
countenance change without fear and anxiety. This final chapter will assess the work 
of two contemporary American writers who, in their very different ways, have tried 
to move beyond the problems paranoia extends into existence and the creative act. 
The work of Hubert Selby, Jr., will be used as an example of American narrative 
reaching a point of implosion beyond the desire for and affirmation of certainties 
paranoia induces in those interrogating a world beset by troubling ambiguities. Selby's 
concentration on the disintegration and absence of self-esteem consequently provides 
scenarios in which American insistences on individualism lead inexorably to self- 
'William Blake, 'Jerusalem, ' Chapter 1, Plate 10,1.20-21, in Complete Writings, ed. Geoffrey 
Keynes, (Oxford 1972), p. 629. 
2Leslie Fiedler; cited in Marilyn Ferguson, The Aquarian Conspiracy: Personal and Social 
Transformation in the 1980's (London 1981), p. 142. 
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destruction. 
By contrast, much of Robert Duncan's poetry and cultural criticism explores 
the notion that paranoia is linked to creative processes in its appropriation of available 
energies towards a patterned vision and coherence. Of course, it is as "creative" to 
design weaponry and proliferate repressive bureaucracies as to live and write poetry, 
yet the malign qualities given to paranoia in American and other cultures need the 
corrective to be found in the poetics of an artist such as Duncan where his life's work 
stands as a real example of the development of constructive systems of art, knowledge 
and activism. This goes far beyond the facile notions of "positive paranoia" and 
"pronoia" detailed in the last part of Chapter Three's history of discourses in terms of 
recent psychiatric "discoveries" of human potential. In an effort to move away from 
the shortcomings of that approach, the term creative paranoia is preferred. 
1. They don't believe in honest mistakes 
Hubert Selby, Jr. 
Causality is never an issue of doubt in Hubert Selby's novels, and this infuses 
his writing with an appalling fatalism whose force overwhelms his characters and lays 
bare every flawed impulse and decision they make in their interaction with relentlessly 
exploitative environments. The notion of flaw is ever present, and provides the 
constant focus of a writing which variously explores the extreme consequences of the 
more overt modern American scenarios of paranoia: what constitutes health, narcotics, 
sexual oppression, capitalist monopolization of energies, and the use of law and power 
according to the whim of those so empowered-all of which are projected within 
cycles of addiction to points of self-annihilation. paranoia therefore is not the point 
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in Selby's writing, because his narratives manage, through their ferocity, to reach their 
limits of plot, and pain, degradation and self-knowledge, where paranoia is no longer 
available as an agency of engagement with the world. 
To introduce this brief appraisal of Selby the combination of two analyses of 
modern American social existence, focused on a priority of self-hatred, provide the 
effective register of paranoia as the undercurrent of Selby's writing. In his study The 
Culture of Inequality, Michael Lewis argues that the American social hegemony has 
developed and perpetuates what he calls an "individual-as-central sensibility" in order 
to preserve and regulate as far as possible the divisions of wealth and social 
empowerment. This has created an emphasis on equality in a society which offers "in 
reality, the equal chance for individuals to wind up unequal. i3 Lewis states: 
According to this sensibility, it is the individual alone who is socially 
significant, who determines what his or her contribution to the 
commonweal will be, and who is therefore responsible for the degree 
of personal success achieved. Society is seen as benign, offering up 
opportunities and waiting to be enriched by those who have the will 
and the capacity to make productive use of them. 
... the sensibility 
has at least one major interpretive implication: as 
success honors those who have achieved it, failure, and economic 
failure in particular, stigmatizes those who suffer it. 
... The individual-as-central sensibility makes personal aspiration a 
moral necessity and when such aspiration is to any extent thwarted, it 
virtually requires us to interpret this circumstance as of our own 
making. 4 
From this basis, developed from successive religious, secular and capitalist ideas over 
several centuries, the necessity of a preterite or stigmatized sector of the population 
to buttress the psychology of those above them becomes an essential requirement. It 
is fed both by direct oppression and the alienating and staticizing force within social 
3Michael Lewis, The Culture of Inequality (Amherst 1978), p. 4. 
'Lewis, The Culture of Inequality, pp. 8,10,17. 
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systems such as welfare and public housing projects-like those described in Selby's 
novels, Last Exit to Brooklyn (1965), and Requiem For a Dream (1978)-which offer 
to both liberal and conservative attitudes the perception that constructive efforts are 
being made towards equal opportunity. 
Lewis's stress in his concept of the individual-as-central sensibility is on the 
tension of maintaining self-esteem in the face of an ever-shifting perception of what 
constitutes success in both moral and material terms. The consumptive cycles of 
capitalism and their fluid repetition of fashion and cult systems, within which 
individuals may engage themselves and register their value, cost money and psychic 
energy, particularly as value depends in the "American Way" on what Lewis calls a 
"psychological jeopardyi' of constant insecurity. All of Selby's characters participate 
in this "psychological jeopardy" and move from it into a territory increasingly bereft 
of any meaning available for individual worth, just as Lewis identifies the logical 
progression for those seeking to reinforce their self-esteem: "Defamation of 
identifiable others, understood in terms of the psychological need created by the 
individual-as-central sensibility, is not an end in itself.. . but is rather a mechanism for 
convincing oneself, by contradistinction, of one's self-worth. v16 
The links forged here between self-esteem and situations produced by and 
beyond paranoia are not suggested simply due to the existence of a social 
environment in which defamation and suspicion are required to maintain individual 
self-esteem, though that seems valid enough. They emerge convincingly in tandem 
with the ideas of Harry Stack Sullivan considered in Chapter Three, which assert 
5Lewis, The Culture of Inequality, p. 16. 
6Lewis, The Culture of Inequality, p. 46. 
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paranoia manifested either as part of a schizophrenic condition or, with greater social 
pervasion, emerging from the child's first experiences of denied emotional attachment. 
Selby believes that in modern experience the primary "disease is... lack of love"' 
aligns itself on this process with frightening intensity, and the recurrent predicament 
in his narratives can be seen to represent the full American sociological import of 
what Sullivan calls "malevolent transformation. " This energization of the individual 
in reaction to the earliest experiences of fear and anxiety may lay "the 
groundwork... for the malevolent attitude toward life in general, in which other people 
are viewed as enemies... "8 The social environments described in Selby's fiction 
certainly bear this out at all levels of social interaction: from the violence of marital 
relationships, the manipulations of employment, and the microcosmic representation 
of interpersonal activity in capitalist scenarios, all imaged in a disintegration of trust 
and mutuality in narco-exploitative relationships. 
The catalyst in all these areas, just as it forms the basis of Sullivan's 
psychiatry, is self-esteem, and its complete disintegration is the harrowing result of 
the ego driven to extremes of self-destruction which extends throughout Selby's 
writing. In this respect, the prisoner in Selby's novel The Room (1971) oscillates 
between four conditions in relation to self-esteem: the resonant guilt of childhood and 
adolescent memory, the calm assurance of the crusading plaintiff, the violent abuse 
(directed both outward and inward) of "real" consciousness, and the clinical sadism 
of the behavioural fantasies. The early guilt provides evidence of how self-esteem 
'John O'Brien, 'An Interview with Hubert Selby' in The Review of Contemporary Fiction, 1 
(1981), p. 315. 
'Harry Stack Sullivan, The Interpersonal Theory of Psychiatry (New York 1953), p. 345. 
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may be nipped in the bud, disorienting a young consciousness into the assured 
response of fear from the certainty of committing transgressions according to some 
higher authority (the police, mother, God), whatever happens. This extends from and 
determines the alienating sexual experiences with his girlfriend Mary, and the sense 
that pleasure and pain must be fused as a singular for orgastic release in the use of 
self and other. This is given in the youthful fantasy which denies the mediation of 
creativity as prejudice and fear condition sexuality: "his eyes closed tightly trying to 
create a new image in his mind, one that would give meaning to the more and what 
he was feeling, but always ending up with the same one, the only one that seemed to 
satisfy his needs. " The "only" image is from a comic book, "a single frame... where an 
ancient and evil looking oriental had a white woman chained to a pillar in a large 
hall, i9 focusing pleasure into sadistic desecration and xenophobia which requires 
powerlessness-usually feminine-as the bolster to fear. 
From these beginnings the prisoner's fantasies of sadistic behavioural routines 
involving the policemen who arrested him become an extreme logical progression. 
They project Sadean tableaux to the limits of sadistic and authoritarian pleasure via 
the inflicting of pain and degradation, and these desires are played out where man uses 
technology and restraint against "animals" (the policemen as dogs) in an arena of 
torture and Darwinian supremacy. It is here that the deepest pessimism of Selby's 
writing is present as it reaches a limit signified by staticity and the notion, common 
to pornography, of appalling similitude: 
He continued to glance around the room and no matter how many 
times he looked at everything and everyone in the kennel, and no 
matter how carefully he investigated every little detail he could find no 
'Hubert Selby, Jr., The Room (1971; London 1988), p. 130. Hereafter referred to as TR. ' 
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change, neither in the whole nor in any little detail... Everything 
remained still and unchanging. 
Yet there was some kind of a change. Then, as he continued to 
look around the room, he slowly realized what the change was. It was 
within himself. The feeling of excitement and rapture.. . was slowly draining from him. 
He could not 
sustain it. (TR, pp. 213-214. Text layout) 
Only exhaustion provides "peace and security" (TR, p. 215). 
To read Selby, therefore, is to be made aware of the destructive potential 
within oneself and to see the proximity of addiction in everyday life. It is, in fact, to 
be forced to confront psychopathology as the basis of reality rather than any form of 
"deviation, " and to be taken to a point at which the human is seen to deny itself 
health. Selby's own words on this predicament are revealing: "I think of it more as a 
pathology. I feel that my books.. . are pathological in the sense that they are looking at 
the disease, they are trying to examine the disease... And the disease... is lack of 
love ... i10 Taken in context with the biblical epigraphs which open Selby's novels, and 
even sections of those novels, it becomes apparent that his own obsessions with 
control underwrite his fictions, setting them in grids of inevitability which extend from 
the Judaeo-Christian ethics of Western society, and move through the central 
intersection of ideas for American culture in the last 150 years, the conjunction of 
social-darwinism with capitalism. 
As such, the novels operate as parables whose personal vitriol is tempered by 
a prosodic technique aimed explicitly at countering the effects of the ego. Siting 
himself in a long tradition of impersonality-one of his favourite authors is 
Flaubert-Selby believes that truly creative writing is only possible once all traces of 
'OO'Brien, 'An Interview with Hubert Selby, ' p. 315. 
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the writer's ego have been excised. And like William Burroughs, with whom he shares 
this distrust of authorial ego, Selby believes that on a wider societal scale "it's the ego 
that's our greatest enemy. "" The remaining analysis will trace that belief as an 
extreme consequence of the anxieties and fears manipulating Americans in the post- 
Second World War period, and concentrate briefly on Selby's treatment of American 
egoism as disease, both as a pathology leading to destruction, and as a disease 
functioning in response to the conjunction of social forces in American society. 
Selby does not debate paranoia in his writing as Thomas Pynchon, Joseph 
Heller and Don DeLillo do: his writing virtually excludes suspicion so that it enters 
its own realm of reference in which horrific destruction is as certain as shame. What 
is most disturbing about this action is that all forms of certainty and blame are inner- 
directed so that the search for culpability rests in the powerlessness of the individual 
to avoid destruction. Selby is deliberately uninterested in any liberal sense that humans 
may be excused, or, more to the point, excuse themselves, according to their 
upbringing and environments. Thus, a succession of protagonists-Georgette, Tralala 
and Harry Black in Last Exit to Brooklyn, the unnamed prisoner in The Room, Harry 
White in The Demon (1973), and Harry and Sarah Goldfarb, Tyrone C. Love and 
Marion Kleinmeitz in Requiem For A Dream-drive themselves into situations where 
the destruction wreaked upon them, even in the most oppressive environments, is 
ultimately reflexive. That is, it originates either from within themselves or is triggered 
by their own actions. This represents a most virulent certainty about the potential for 
self-destruction, and it extends from Selby's belief that: "We all cause everything that 
happens to us, whether we recognize it or not. That's a cosmic law, which I also know 
"O'Brien, 'An Interview with Hubert Selby, ' p. 316. 
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from my own experience. "12 
Effectively, Selby's protagonists confront themselves in a series of interlocking 
enclosures beginning with the epigraphs which open each of the narratives. These 
predominantly Old Testament extracts enforce the weight of a universal and inevitable 
justice handed down from an all-powerful deity, and determine human response as 
alienation in a continuum of fear. The protagonists seek to numb this fear in the only 
way they feel possible: in the location of an experience sufficiently orgastic to 
overcome fear. Their mistake, as the writing repeatedly confirms, is to allow the 
satisfaction of ego-oriented desire to mediate this fear, thus constructing cycles of 
addiction within a pleasure/pain matrix. Pain becomes a necessary opposite to the 
pleasure sought to eradicate its effects, and as each successive "fix" achieves less and 
less satisfaction, so more and more intense orgastic charge is required to shift the 
individual within the matrix from pain to pleasure. 
It is this factor which ensures that sex in the narratives is so often a source of 
pain administered under the aegis of power. Driven to murder someone by pushing 
them under a subway train after a succession of sexual and kleptomaniac desires prove 
insufficient within his matrix of control, Harry White returns home in The Demon "as 
if he were being moved by some outside force or control, as if weirdly detached from 
himself. i13 Emotionally emptied by the experience and physically emptied by a night 
of sickness-a recurrent Selby image is vomiting as a violent racking and emptying 
of the body, a repetitive purging seeking reconnection to what David Shapiro called 
"Autonomy and Rigid Character"-he then makes love to his wife: "He felt and 
"O'Brien, 'An Interview with Hubert Selby, ' p. 315. 
13Hubert Selby, Jr., The Demon (1973; London 1977), p. 270. Hereafter referred to as TD. ' 
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experienced each and every move with heightened sensitivity and pleasure that were 
magnified by the sensation of fear, a fear of infinite power, a fear that forced him on 
and on long after desire had melted and flowed from his body" (TD, p. 272). 
Transgression becomes an inextricable part of the orgastic act likely to weld 
fear and pleasure, and ultimately bring on the confrontation which each protagonists' 
ego desires beyond its own self-omniscience. Whether it is narcotic or sexual 
disembodiment, the urge is to merge the self with the infinite power which pervades 
the narratives as an objectifying force. In their efforts to deal with this the protagonists 
objectify themselves in a manner occasionally reinforced by Selby's strategic shifts 
between first and third person narrative. In Last Exit To Brooklyn Tralala prostitutes 
herself to the point of becoming gang-raped detritus on an empty lot, while Harry 
Black seeks solace in homosexual encounters until he winds up similarly broken and 
used. When making homosexual love for the first time Harry fantasizes his wife's 
sadistic torture, combining pleasure and pain in a toxic fusion and generating the 
voyeuristic detachment of fantasy and pornography, and their fleeting fulfillments. The 
response to this emerges in the narrative in Harry's bemusement at his own self- 
detachment and objectification, which is imaged essentially as a detachment and then 
reconnection to phallocentric power. Fantasizing his wife's dismemberment and 
disembowelling by giant penises: 
... Harry sat watching, laughing his 
laugh and groaning, groaning with 
pleasure and then he heard the groan, heard it not only from inside, but 
heard it enter his ear from outside... 
... Harry 
looked at his prick hanging half rigidly between his legs. It 
hypnotized him and he stared at it for a moment knowing it was his yet 
not recognising it, as if he had never seen it before yet knowing he 
had... He looked at his penis again and the strangeness disappeared. He 
wondered briefly about his thoughts of a moment ago. He couldnt 
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remember them. He felt good. '4 
In The Room this process achieves a frightening intensity in the protagonist's 
obsessive return to a pimple on his cheek, driving infection into massive inflammation 
as the narrative unfolds. This conveys a brutally corporeal sense of external flaw fed 
internally by disease whose momentum is hastened by a consistent human return to 
and obsession with infection. Similarly, Harry Goldfarb's arm, turned gangrenous by 
intravenous needle infection, causes his and Tyrone C. Love's downfall as the interface 
breaks down between his body and the needed narcotic substance in Requiem For A 
Dream. In that novel, however, it is Harry's mother Sara who represents the most 
complete sense of personal objectification, moving into tightening spirals of 
amphetamine addiction to shape her body according to fantasy and media images: 
"After two weeks on the pills Sara was accustomed to their effects. She almost 
enjoyed the grinding of the teeth, and even if it annoyed her a little from time to time 
it was worth the slight inconvenience to feel so good and to see the weight dropping 
off. "" At the end of the narrative she becomes the site of medical objectification, 
undergoing force-feeding and shock therapy within a system where caring diagnosis 
founders under the egotistical clashes of doctors. 
Michel Foucault's important essay "A Preface to Transgression" offers some 
useful suggestions here with regard to the action of transgression and its links to 
sexuality and power in a world "where God is absent, and where all of our actions are 
addressed to this absence in a profanation which at once identifies it, dissipates it, 
"Hubert Selby, Jr., Last Exit To Brooklyn (London 1970), pp. 205-206. Hereafter referred to 
as 'LEB. ' 
15Hubert Selby, Jr., Requiem For A Dream (1978; London 1979), p. 133. My italics. Hereafter 
refrred to as 'RD. ' 
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exhausts itself in it, and restores it to the empty purity of its transgression. " 
16 Selby's 
writing actively seeks an exhaustion in the protagonists' profanation of themselves, 
their extension of themselves beyond any sense that they might remain inside the limit 
of any value. They use themselves in a disallowing of choice, desiring connection with 
the ultimate power they fantasize as existent in the void to be found within 
themselves. That power is total need, however, and an involvement in which 
inevitably becomes addiction to control and thence a torturous self-consumption. 
The rhythms and speeds of Selby's narratives ensure the material reflection of 
this process through language, accelerating into long unbroken intensities where 
orgastic fulfillment and representation of the transgressive are attempted. But as 
Foucault intimates, the use of the language of sexuality has ensured that totalities of 
this kind cannot be attained, that the discursive medium disallows the transcendental 
leap it desires: "On the day that sexuality began to speak and to be spoken, language 
no longer served as a veil for the infinite; and in the thickness it acquired on that day, 
we now experience finitude and being. In its dark domain, we now encounter the 
absence of God, our death, limits, and their transgression. "" 
Like Georges Bataille, whose writing forms the analytical focus of Foucault's 
essay, Selby's transgressive action is brought incessantly to bear on the conjunction 
of religion and sexuality as the fruitful territory for the transgression of limits. The 
final words uttered by Harry Black in Last Exit To Brooklyn are a famous example; 
having been fired from his post as union man and strike organizer, and having been 
16Michel Foucault, "A Preface to Transgression" in Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: 
Selected Essays and Interviews, translated by Donald F. Bouchard and Sherry Simon, (Ithaca 
1977), p. 31. 
17Foucault, 'A Preface to Transgression, ' p. 51. 
292 
rejected by all his homosexual acquaintances due to lack of money, Harry molests a 
boy in his neighbourhood and is savagely beaten by local toughs. The profanity and 
transgression he then articulates, heard only inside his consciousness, indicates the 
underlying desire for power beyond shame and powerlessness: having attempted to 
fellate the boy and having been beaten and left hanging from a fence in cruciform 
shape, Harry's words extend a reflexive condemnation into the void where neither God 
exists nor empowerment through possession of the phallus has been allowed: "He 
yelled again. He heard the sound loud inside his head, GOD 0 GOD, he yelled but 
no sound came from his mouth. He heard his voice loud in his head but only a slight 
gurgle came from his lips. GOD GOD YOU SUCK COCK" (LEB, 
p. 238. Text layout). 
Both The Room and The Demon feature similarly conclusive actions where the 
transgression of religious order leads to silence. The prisoner in The Room fantasizes 
a violent sexual encounter in a church which is intercut with the Lord's Prayer and 
imaged as a forcible communion rite. Taking place as a masturbatory fantasy, and thus 
a profane and wasteful spilling of seed, the fantasy finishes in a repetitive and silent 
yelling of "AMEN, " after which: For a moment he felt as if he would drown in his 
own juice as he heard words gurgling in his throat. Eventually they fell from his lips. 
o god. o god. no. no... " (TR, pp. 248-249. Text layout). "AMEN, " of 
course, means "so let it be, " but this is a long way from Kurt Vonnegut's "So it goes, " 
and thus the protagonists who reach such limits ultimately acquiesce to the void they 
face, torn in their addictive cycles between affirmation and negation until they realize 
in their silence and destruction the only forceful sense of their predicament. 
In line with this, Harry White in The Demon does "drown" after going beyond 
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fantasy to murder Cardinal Letermen as he serves Mass in New York's St Patrick's 
Cathedral on Easter Sunday, "this day of Resurrection" (TD, p. 305). He moves from 
the unfulfilling cycles of the Protestant work ethic into an inexorable frenzy of 
destruction aimed at Catholic symbolism and the 'representative' of God on earth: 
Time moved slowly but inexorably. But time was meaningless... 
[Harry] had arrived ahead of time. There was a time when the 
schedule, that timetable of achievement, had been everything, but then 
as he achieved his various goals, they became increasingly 
meaningless, and still he pushed and pushed, but where? He had 
arrived. Where now? Where? (TD, p. 304) 
All through the narrative Harry White finds himself thwarted and distorted by the 
mutual yet irreconcilable rhythms of success and his addiction, the latter an 
internalized time always eventually gaining priority over his progression through the 
trappings of capitalist success: the well-paid job, the wife and children, the house in 
a wealthy suburb. Describing the Mass, the narrative once again sets the onrush of 
transgressive desire against the temporal measure of ritual, providing further formal 
representation of a lacerating synchronic divergence: 
... and all he could 
do was stay within himself and become more and 
more a part of his disease 
... To him all the prophets testify, 
saying that everyone who believes 
in him has forgiveness of sins 
through his name. This is the word 
of the Lord 
Thanks be to God. 
and clutch more tightly to his package and his gut and bend a little 
more under the weight of his own hopelessness and become more and 
more appalled at what was about to happen and unable to find the 
means to yell out, No, and retreat... (TD, pp. 306-307. Text layout) 
What happens is another crucifixion merged with disconnected orgasm and silenced 
utterance, only this time it is Harry who urges the impaled Cardinal to "SAY IT, SAY 
294 
III riT... " (TD, p. 308), murdering the answer to a question which has 
meaning only for and "within himself. " 
The predicament is ultimately that of complete egotistical self-absorption, and 
a textual entrapment in what Foucault calls language's "dark domain. " For it is there 
in Selby's writing that the ego internalizes everything until self-annihilation occurs 
aligned with the desired self-apocalypse of absolute truth. Thus, stumbling away from 
his assassination of the Cardinal, Harry White takes a ferry out into New York 
harbour and performs a self-administered, engulfing crucifixion: 
... he stretched his arms out to the side 
like a bird and leaned forward 
and slowly, slowly, slowly moved forward and down and split his 
crosslike reflection and shadow as he suddenly hit the cold water.. . and 
the force of the tide and the undertow swept him deeper and deeper 
into the cold darkness and for the briefest of moments he stopped 
struggling and hung motionless as the truth of his life was suddenly 
thrust in front of him and he stared at this truth for a brief and infinite 
moment then opened his mouth in a scream but no sound came out... 
(TD, pp. 311-312) 
to common with some of the passages quoted in Chapter Four from The Crying of Lot 
49, a narcissistic action is primary, though here it takes the violent and necessary form 
of shattering the reflected image "and shadow" in the final orgy of self-hatred. 
Chronologically prior to The Demon, The Room opens with a narcissistic 
indeterminacy: "He was conscious of the dark stillness in the corridor. He knew there 
was nothing to be seen, yet he continued to stare thru the reflection of his face in the 
small window" (TR, p. 11), which then moves immediately into the lengthy, narrative- 
long assault on the image of the self via the pimple. The thrust of The Demon, as its 
title suggests, is towards the diabolic, and the culmination of that thrust is implosive, 
causing the destruction simultaneously of self and other-other both as reflected image 
and "shadow"/devil. In the end it is the only way to achieve what the narrative sets 
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out at its beginning as the obsessive problem for Harry White: "security. Not the 
security of the umbilical cord, but security from himself" (TD, p. 7). 
Selby has said about The Demon "I am obviously attacking the American 
Dream, 1118 and it is notable that the novel's finale should take place at the point of 
entry where so many immigrants arrived to take up the challenge of the New World 
and its individualistic opportunities. Harry White presumably leaps off the Staten 
Island Ferry which passes close to Ellis Island, enacting an implosive finale to the 
enclosure of the narrative as a shattering of the American Dream, particularly as that 
Dream operates as a perverse reflection of reality. Harry constructs and is enclosed by 
an imprisoning system which extends beyond paranoia from the beginning of the 
narrative-its enclosing epigraphs-and his assumption of an American value system 
as the index of his life. His sensibility emerges in the friction of these two systems: 
he is part of a relentless fatalism prefigured in the quotation from James 1: 12-15, and 
he participates fully in the contradictions which make up capitalist values. On the one 
hand, Harry enters a causality which continuously measures progress according to the 
accumulation of material possessions, and the 'perks' of abrogating Judaeo-Christian 
law and loyalties (as in executive use of prostitutes); on the other, he grapples with 
the spiritual void this abrogation creates, specifically as it is given in terms of the 
classic enclosure of self-repression. 
The target of this rage is the ego, a virulent self-hatred never at a loss for 
certainty or evidence in its reflexive posture, whilst in the background lie the drives 
of American culture which lead to the creation of this mode of consciousness. Gilbert 
Sorrentino has noted how Selby's writing replays the Frankenstein myth of creation 
"'O'Brien, 'An Interview with Hubert Selby, ' p. 321. 
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and self-destruction in an American context, and it is clear from each of the novels 
that their narratives operate as a hunting down of the ego in a succession of its 
deplorable recesses. The hunt is as responsible for the protagonists' lack of choice as 
is their failure to break out of the cycle of their self-destruction. They are written into 
a thrall for power whose exposure reveals a damage made potent by the narratives' 
own susceptibility to this thrall. Or, as in Eric Mottram's words, Selby cannot and does 
not stand detached from the subject of his writing for it "contains the suggestion of 
a direction of cure, a context for violence which is so authoritarian in itself as to be, 
by his own evidences, invalid. i19 
Selby's narratives ultimately concentrate on a determinism so intense that it 
intersects with the outer fringes of individualism, bridging the space between the 
denial of freedom of choice, in a universe of unmediated causality, and will as the 
determining factor in existence. Selby has stated categorically: "There is no plot [in 
my fiction]... Plots are false things. Plots aren't real. And in an absolute sense, I'm 
involved with reality. Plots are man-made constructions. "20 But Selby's writing 
contradicts this, becoming a pure representation of the American plot of enclosure and 
desired apocalypse, an absolute reality of American will towards the death prefigured 
by DeLillo in all plots. 
A further way in which Selby's writing compares with the work of Thomas 
Pynchon is in their parallel interest in the preterite, the disinherited destined for 
oblivion. But whereas Pynchon's preterite attempt to plot themselves into significance 
19Eric Mottram, 'Free Like the Rest of Us: Violence and Despair in Hubert Selby's Novels' in 
The Review of Contemporary Fiction, 1 (1981), p. 363. 
200'Brien, 'An Interview with Hubert Selby, ' p. 328. 
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and connection to the systems that surround and invade them, Selby's protagonists 
undergo traumatic separation in an extension into their own systems, seeking security 
in the engineering of their own fatality. The narratives are scathing about the 
oedipalization of plot structures in the twentieth century, simultaneously directing 
satire at Freudian interpretation (most obviously in Requiem For a Dream), and 
reducing parental influence in most of the narratives simply by pitting it against the 
overwhelming destruction of alternative systems of control. Families are seen as 
enclosures in which love is inevitably subsumed under the efforts required to gain and 
use power, love becoming a nostalgic reference to a point before empowerment 
matters. In this sense, the absence of fathers in the family units represented in The 
Room and Requiem For a Dream is vital, placing the stress firmly on the characters 
as active producers of themselves in relation to their social and economic 
surroundings. Again, the urge is to ensure that no excuses exist, excluding distraction 
from the terrifying swell of self-hatred which energizes the claustrophobic 
momentums of the writing. 
In fact, Selby's writing may be seen as an American fictional parallel to ideas 
put forward by Wilhelm Reich in works such as The Mass Psychology of Fascism 
(1933) and The Sexual Revolution (1936). Although Selby's novels grant less 
importance than Reich does to the effects of authoritarian family structures, and Selby 
writes firmly in (and in reaction to) the American tradition of individualism, both 
writers are concerned to trace the connections between sexuality, the inhibition of 
orgastic release, religion, and their conjunction in the production of fascism. The 
fantasized crusading plaintiff in The Room sets out to reveal and punish "a creeping 
neo-fascism" (TR, p. 17) in the society which punishes him, and the range of 
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consciousnesses the narrative represents offer a striking index in the evolution of 
fascist obsessions. Starting from early sexual inhibition, linked to mother and church, 
the power and violence manias which then ensue reinforce Reich's compelling 
statement that: 
people who are incapable of release must begin to sense sexual 
excitations as torturous, burdensome, destructive. In fact, sexual 
excitation is destructive and torturous if it is not allowed to achieve 
release. Thus, we see that the religious conception of sex as an 
annihilating, diabolical force, predisposing one for final doom, is rooted 
in actual physical processes. 21 
Selby's writing never flinches from describing the "actual physical processes" involved 
in the violence to self and others caused by the inability to find sexual release. The 
Demon is a catalogue of precisely this litany of violence, a picaresque apocalypse 
which combines a search for sexual release with the insatiabilities of capitalist drives. 
Harry White's sexual adventures lack the adolescent history of inhibition which 
underlies The Room, but it is clear that Harry searches for a release offering escape 
from what Reich calls "mystic distortion. "22 Such mysticism operates as part of social 
power-Reich's example is Nazi race theory-and is allied for control with the 
mystery of religion. It is through an excess of transgression that Harry White believes 
he can reach a demystification of the power that exerts itself within him, but all he 
succeeds in doing is ensuring the power of his ego's self-destructiveness and 
tightening the impossibility of release. 
At this edge of extreme power self-esteem's absence is seen to be directly 
related to a crucial factor for mental health, and the one which renders Selby's art so 
"Wilhelm Reich, The Mass Psychology of Fascism, translated by Vincent R. Carfagno 
(Harmondsworth, Middlesex 1970), pp. 180-181. 
22Reich, The Mass Psychology of Fascism, p. 24. 
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terrifying in its implications. This is very simply the death of experiential possibility 
in the triumph of social-darwinist ideology, and the inevitability that fascist 
obsessions pervade all levels of consciousness ultimately denying variation, 
alternatives or rhythms other than those linked to irrational power manias. But only 
fantasy can maintain self-esteem in circumstances where "'fascism' is the basic 
emotional attitude of the suppressed man of our authoritarian machine civilization and 
its mechanistic-mystical conception of life. X23 Thus Selby's comment on The Room 
that "[t]he price of hating others is loving yourself lessi24 is both accurate and 
reflexive: the appalling charge Selby's art manifests consequently leaves him open to 
the accusation of misanthropy traditionally levelled at great satirists, although both 
satire and paranoia as forms of creative energy are present only as the remotest of 
cultural traces. 
2. Robert Duncan and creative paranoia 
When a man's life becomes totally so informed that every bird and leaf 
speaks to him and every happening has meaning, he is considered to 
be psychotic. The shaman and the inspired poet, who take the universe 
to be alive, are brothers germane of the mystic and paranoiac. ' 
So Robert Duncan opens his essay "The Truth and Life of Myth, " which 
carries out a powerful indictment of the efforts in modern rationalistic cultures to 
exclude the truth inherent in myth, and to tie poetry and thought to the limitations of 
established convention. Indeed, the title of Duncan's book in which the essay was 
23Reich, The Mass Psychology of Fascism, p. 15. 
240'Brien, 'An Interview with Hubert Selby, ' p. 322. 
2'Robert Duncan, The Truth and Life of Myth' in Fictive Certainties (New York 1985), p. 2. 
Text italics. Hereafter referred to as 'TLM. ' 
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ultimately collected, Fictive Certainties, sets out the thrust of an argument ranging 
throughout his writing and poetry concerning the proportions of and need for essential 
fictions in the health and life of the mind and body in late twentieth-century America. 
This argument, and the ways it manifests itself in the work of Duncan will provide the 
bases on which this dissertation will organize itself towards a conclusion-though, in 
imitation of that work, not close, but remain open. 
Duncan has been chosen because of his relative contemporaneity, and because 
he deliberately and frequently confronted paranoia in his work, apprehending it both 
as a necessary part of the creation of poetry and as a political condition manipulated 
in particular forms in the modern nation state. Duncan lived and wrote through the 
Great Depression, World War Two and its aftermath, and the Cold War-these latter 
periods termed variously the "Age of Anxiety" and the "Age of Paranoia"-and 
developed an individual poetics which extended a creative paranoia in response. This 
poetics differed radically from the fashionable and conventional poetics of the same 
period sanctioned by the establishment and academy, particularly what has come to 
be called "Confessional Poetry" and the "New Criticism. " The action in these 
movements came in part from a neurotic need to recover the traces of a disseminated 
self and impotently substantiate the ego as a basis for anxiety and obsession with 
meaning inside "texts. " 
Duncan also presents a more radically engaged forum for political realization 
where paranoia is concerned than the efforts made in the American novel of the same 
period. There, two predominant exposures of and resistances to paranoia extend 
themselves against political coercions: the uses of detail in terms of documentary 
histories giving space to the information available, parallel to and exposing manic 
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paranoid gatherings of predetermined data; and the extensive uses of satire as a 
deflation or explosion of paranoia, whose closed systems cannot contain or attempt 
to deny the releases satiric humour detonates (and where Freud's excavations of the 
concealed truths in jokes and humour provide an example of an expansive technique 
of revelation). 26 Writers like Pynchon and Heller provide variously chilling and 
hilarious encyclopedias of American paranoia which demonstrate that "just as 
paranoia has much in common with the aesthetic completeness of narrative order, so 
narrative may gather coherence and strength from a paranoid vision. "2' Their fictional 
strategies edge towards what will be considered here in terms of the open forms and 
fictive certainties of Duncan's poetics, yet their narratives ultimately cannot resist the 
implications of closure inherent in DeLillo's reference to the tendency in plot to "move 
toward death, X28-or, indeed, a cultivated discourse with the entropic equilibriums 
associated with cultural needs for destructive forms of revelation and apocalypse. In 
contradistinction to this are the continual efforts within the poetics Duncan variously 
espoused towards patterned forms of revelatory disequilibrium, in line with his 
drawing on "Schrödinger's sense that the principle of life lies in its evasion of 
equilibrium. i29 
Like most Americans, Duncan had to deploy paranoia at a basic existential and 
26See Sigmund Freud, Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious (1906) in The Standard 
Edition of the Complete Psychological Works (London 1960), Volume VIII. 
27Leo Braudy, 'Providence, Paranoia and the Novel' in E. L. H. (48), 1981, p. 623. 
'8Don DeLillo, Libra (New York 1988), p. 221. Edward Jayne sees this scenario as one of 
tension "between the paranoid reassurances afforded by plot and the polydimensional (and 
polymorphous) truth of human experience which continues to be expressed by means of 
resistance against plot's impetus towards resolution. " Edward Jayne, The Dialectics of 
Paranoid Form' in Genre, 11 (1978), p. 147. 
29Robert Duncan, 'Towards an Open Universe' in Duncan, Fictive Certainties, p. 87. 
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political level as a survival mechanism through a period of crises and collapses of the 
American state in its post-(and continuing) -Civil War conditions. Duncan's experience 
spanned the destructions of the Great Depression, McCarthyism, civil rights activism, 
the Vietnam war, the Kent State murders, and the explosion of crime in late 
twentieth-century American urban and other environments. In particular, he was 
avowedly deviant in his homosexuality against the paranoid sexual normativeness of 
much of the American cultural scene of his lifetime, beginning with his extremely 
important essay, 'The Homosexual in Society' (1944). 30 In these and many other parts 
of his life and poetry, Duncan engaged with a crucial understanding for any 
contemporary perception of paranoia concerning the possible dimensions of the self 
in the social and political conditions emerging after 1945. These have been put 
succinctly by Robert Jay Lifton in his discussions of a "blurring of perceptions of 
where self begins and ends, " and where he cites the American critic Theodore 
Solotaroff, who states that "there is no such thing as even a relatively fixed sense of 
self, ego or identity-rather, there is only the subjective mind in motion in relationship 
to that which it confronts. "M The fears and anxieties generated about the atomisation 
of the self before state totalitarianism and nuclear weapons have created the ironic 
conditions of greater paranoia about self-autonomy just as that self has been forced, 
in Lifton's terms, into more convoluted Protean actions. Pynchon's characterization of 
Tyrone Slothrop in Gravity's Rainbow is a primary fictional response to this, yet the 
30Robert Duncan, 'The Homosexual in Society' in Politics, 1 (1944), pp. 209-211. 
Unfortunately, lack of space precludes an exploration of the links between Duncan's 
homosexuality, his poetry, and the homosexual elements within a Freudian theory of paranoia, 
if, indeed, such an exploration was worth pursuing. 
31Robert Jay Lifton, Boundaries (New York 1969), pp. 39,46. 
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fundamentally creative possibilities inherent in this condition have been explored to 
their greatest advantage within a strand of American poetic inheritance to which 
Duncan committed himself. This includes the multiplicities and contradictions made 
available to the individual as a creative process by American poets as diverse as 
Whitman, Dickinson, Pound, H. D., Oppen and Olson. What was vital to their various 
poetics was a resistance to modern insistences on rational definitions of selfhood as 
a locus for control and narrowly focused knowledge. The tensions of this problem 
were given in the nineteenth-century by the Danish philosopher Soren Kierkegaard 
through his considerations of dread, anxiety and fear: 
The law for the development of the self with respect to knowledge, in 
so far as it is true that the self becomes itself, is this, that the 
increasing degree of knowledge corresponds with the degree of self- 
knowledge, that the more the self knows, the more it knows itself. If 
this does not occur, then the more knowledge increases, the more it 
becomes a kind of inhuman knowing for the production of which man's 
self is squandered. " 
The effort for these poets was to seek knowledge which does not limit the self, avoids 
the "inhuman" propensities of paranoia, and does not squander the qualities of 
selfhood which engage with the multiple experiences of the life of the mind. In their 
different ways, therefore, these poets and Duncan interrogated what Quentin Anderson 
called in an American context "the imperial self, 03 formulating from the political 
tensions of that "imperial" status the means of a creative paranoia with which to 
confront the American thrust and modern disciplining of selves. Thus, Duncan 
affirmed that his epic sequence of poems, 'Passages, ' was: 
32Soren Kierkegaard, The Sickness Unto Death (Princeton, N. J. 1974), p. 164. 
33See Quentin Anderson, The Imperial Self: An Essay in American Literature and Culture 
(New York 1971). 
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a work in which I seek to lose myself in the hearing of the voice of the 
work itself, a work not of personality or oneself but of structure and 
passages. 
... What I would point out 
in my work as one of its underlying 
currents is the weaving of a figure unweaving, an art of unsaying what 
it says, of saying what it would not say. 34 
Duncan's effort in the 'Passages' and especially in his "Structure of Rime" sequence 
was to utilize the energies of paranoia in making connections and seeking a 
permanence in the linkage of poetics and certain harmonies of dissent through history. 
Sometimes this connectivity over-extends itself and asserts patterns of obscurity, but 
the sense exhibited in the latter part of this quotation contrasts importantly with the 
action signalled at the beginning of Gravity's Rainbow involving "not a 
disentanglement from, but a progressive knotting into" as detailed in the last chapter. 
Duncan, however, sought actively to deconstruct the restraining knots in the political 
control of myth, and: 
leave writer and reader 




The approach of the younger yet contemporaneous poet, Allen Ginsberg, is 
worth considering alongside Duncan's for its similarities and differences. Ginsberg has 
been more involved in exploring the anxieties of self-centredness where it exists as 
a produced social necessity, in tension with Lifton's sense of the increasingly 
boundary-less and Protean self. For Ginsberg this may be mediated where: 
he is making the continuous open-ended epic which will end with his 
Robert Duncan, 'The Self in Postmodern Poetry' in Duncan, Fictive Certainties, pp. 227,231. 
35Robert Duncan, "Where It Appears, Passages 4" in Bending The Bow (New York 1968), 
p. 15. 
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life: the information programme for [Ginsberg] is endlessly exploratory, 
continually forming, disintegrating and re-forming... His self- 
centredness does make for a certain monotony of urgency, despair, 
reiteration of disasters and tyrants, and disgust with his alternately 
melancholic and exuberant self. 36 
The explorative urge that includes senses of vulnerability and its conditioned responses 
comes to be an essential element in an engagement with the paranoid vision, 
especially where Ginsberg, in his finest work, is able to escape the polarizations of 
self-centredness. 
The actions and examples of paranoia in America during Duncan and 
Ginsberg's lives are multiple in the extreme, and the evidence extended in the last 
chapter could only trace some of the more obvious manifestations. The rise of the 
military-industrial complex and its annexations of political, social and psychological 
energies remains the most potent example of the ways in which paranoia plays its part 
in organizing and proliferating huge systems of information and invention, and this has 
emerged out of the creation of the modern nation state, corporate and state capitalism, 
and the linked series of industrial revolutions. Poets desiring to expose and combat the 
life-denying effects of these processes have had to develop poetics which counter that 
excess of creativity in its malign forms with their own excesses of systematized 
knowledge and modes of invention. Indeed, both Duncan and Ginsberg deliberately 
extend themselves and their poetics from the radicalism of William Blake, and the 
affirmation in The Marriage of Heaven and Hell that "[t]he road of excess leads to the 
palace of wisdom. i37 Similarly-and this time to paraphrase Blake again-in an 
environment in which the politics of industrialization threatens that those affected 
36Eric Mottram, Allen Ginsberg in the Sixties (Brighton 1972), p. 19. 
"William Blake, Complete Writings, ed. Geoffrey Keynes, (Oxford 1972), p. 150. 
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might become what they behold, excess must be met by carefully differentiated 
counter-strategies of excess, and paranoia needs to be met by a poetics of creative 
paranoia. For Duncan this requires the understanding that "[t]he very inspiration that 
carries the artist through in a state that combines fear for form and faith in form to 
realize the imperatives of his poem, moves makers of history who write their works 
in the lives of men" (TLM, p. 15). 
The enormous production of paranoid energies in this "history" has in large 
part been devoted to the production of exclusive fictions which Duncan sets his 
mythic recoveries against. Two different American cultural commentators, Noam 
Chomsky and J. K. Galbraith, have elucidated these fictions in illuminating ways. 
Chomsky argues that the needs for threat and the economic desirability of a war 
machine have required the sustenance of what he calls the "operative illusion, " where 
the American population is carefully administered insulating fictions from a power 
elite about the dangers confronted by the state, and the efficiencies with which it deals 
with them. The scenario is one in which: 
[c]ontroversy may rage as long as it adheres to the presuppositions that 
define the consensus of elites, and it should furthermore be encouraged 
within these bounds, thus helping to establish these doctrines as the 
very condition of thinkable thought while reinforcing the belief that 
freedom reigns. 
In short, what is essential is to set the agenda. 38 
Bakunin's exposure of what constitutes the ever-touted justification of deceit and 
illegality in these contexts, 'for reasons of state, " became the title of one of 
Chomsky's earlier books, and informs Galbraith's notion of "institutional truth, " or that 
set of fictions which "serves the needs and purposes of the large and socially 
3SNoam Chomsky, Necessary Illusions: Thought Control in Democratic Societies (Boston 
1989), p. 48. 
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pervasive institutions that increasingly dominate modern life. " Unfortunately, Galbraith 
hoped that the elite he was addressing in these circumstances at Smith College, 
Massachussets, "will choose reality, F69 and once again those likely to make political 
decisions find themselves back in the paranoid fictional drives and "management of 
reality" besetting Robert S. McNamara as detailed in the last chapter. 
Both Duncan and Ginsberg see an absolute necessity in post-1945 America to 
develop forms of protest in their poetry that challenge these exclusive fictional 
excesses as they extend from the encompassing grip of what Jacques Ellul, in his 
analysis of The Technological Society, called "technique, " the "totality of methods 
rationally arrived at and having absolute efficiency. "40 Duncan's sequence "Passages, " 
and Ginsberg's collections, Planet News (1968) and The Fall of America: poems of 
these states 1965-1971 (1972) employ poetics of exposure, outrage and deliberate 
mergings of myth and the layers of reality sold to captive populations in the 
maintenance of national emergency. Ginsberg assumes the role of antenna and reporter 
during his travels across America, drawing in the spectrum of news and coercions of 
perception and extending it back in patterned and juxtaposed segments of 
consciousness: 
The President at home 
in his swinging chair on the porch 
listening to Christmas Carols 
Vice-President returning from Far East 
"Check into yourself that you are wrong - 
You may be the Wrong" says Pope His 
39J. K. Galbraith, Commencement Address, Graduation Ceremony, Smith College, 
Massachusetts, July 1989. Published in The Guardian, 28 July 1989, p. 23. 
40Jacques Ellul, The Technological Society, translated by John Wilkinson (London 1965), p. ix. 
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Christmas Message -a' 
In 'Passages 26: The Soldiers, ' Duncan invokes the power of a direct address set 
against the current political discourse, and extends to those drafted into the Vietnam 
war and those on whose behalf they fight a field of aligned discourses and fictions, 
whose revelations sit energized in the poem in their cross-cultural referentiality, and 
which therefore convey at multiple levels of consciousness the impact of American 
global activities: 
O you, who know nothing of the great theme of War, 
fighting because you have to, blindly, at no frontier 
of the Truth but in- 
structed by liars and masters of the Lie, your own 
liberty of action 
their first victim... 
The first Evil is that which has power over you. 
Coercion, this is Ahriman. 
In the endless Dark the T. V. screen, 
the lying speech and pictures selling its time and produce, 
corpses of its victims burnd black by napalm 
-Ahriman, the inner need for the salesman's pitch- 
the image of the mannequin, smoking, driving its car at high speed, 
elegantly dresst, perfumed, seducing, without 
odor of Man or odor of sanctity, 
in the place of the Imago Xristi42 
The poetic action is to deconstruct the "agenda, " in Chomsky's phrase, and reassemble 
it within the creative paranoia of a mythicized consciousness drawing on East and 
"Allen Ginsberg, 'These States: Into L. A. ' in Collected Poems 1947-1980 (New York 1984), 
p. 376. 
"Robert Duncan, Bending The Bow (New York 1968), pp. 114-115. 
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West, which may be used to counter the instrumental reason of a government advised 
by the Rand Corporation. As Duncan states, "[f]or the illuminati of this kind of 
rationalism, all spiritual men seem to have regressed into the irrational darkness of 
primitive mind" (TLM, p. 28), and the need for Duncan is to reconstitute an 
understanding of what myth is and how it might extend a creative paranoia in place 
of the contemporary combinations of anxiety and fear. The processes of reading an 
epic sequence like "Passages"-that is, the learning, pleasure and exploration of an 
open field of formal, physical and gnostic possibilities-offer themselves for this 
purpose, and in political terms go further than Robert Bertholfs sense that "[c]reating 
an inner fiction of consciousness out of actual reality is a central proposition of 
Duncan's poetry. "43 
These fictional and systematizing possibilities extended through poetry need 
also to be aligned with certain philosophical debates emerging in the past 100 years. 
The decades just before and after the beginning of the twentieth-century, in fact, saw 
a particularly fruitful discussion of mental process and its synthesizing capabilities 
which included such luminaries as William James and A. N. Whitehead, and which led 
to the expansion of phenomenological apprehensions of how perception and thought 
interact. The direct impact of Whitehead on Charles Olson and thence Robert Duncan 
has been dealt with elsewhere, especially where Whitehead asserted the importance 
of poetic language as a necessary and dynamic adjunct to mathematical and scientific 
techniques in exploring the nature of "reality. " The largely ignored philosopher Hans 
Vaihinger deserves some mention for his championing of fiction in these contexts, 
"Robert Bertholf, 'Robert Duncan: Blake's Contemporary Voice' in ed. Robert Bertholf & 
Annette Levitt, William Blake and the Moderns (Albany, N. Y. 1982), p. 101. 
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even though he does not figure directly in any intellectual lineage claimed by Duncan. 
Vaihinger's The Philosophy of As-If: A System of the Theoretical, Practical and 
Religious Fictions of Mankind (1911; first translated into English 1924) advanced 
what he called the "Law of the Preponderance of the Means over the End, " and 
explained how thought and perception have to confront the world in the posture of 
developed fictions in order to deal with the profusion of phenomena. This profusion 
is organized into the patterns enabled where fictions are projected onto and relativize 
reality so that we deal with the world "as if" it existed according to our perception of 
it. The paranoid potentials obvious in this apprehension-both creative and 
malign-are not fully drawn out by Vaihinger, though, like Whitehead, he locates a 
synthesizing agency underpinning the coexistence of rational science and sensation, 
emotion and their linguistic forms. For Vaihinger, this agency is fiction, where "the 
essential element in a fiction is not the fact of its being a conscious deviation from 
reality, a mere piece of imagination-but we stress the useful nature of this deviation. 
This utility constitutes the transition from the pure subjectivity of Kant to a modern 
Positivism. "44 Vaihinger's stress on logic tends to de-emphasise the poetics of the 
situation, yet his work fed directly into the influential "General Systems Theory" 
developed by Ludwig von Bertalanffy, who saw in Vaihinger's: 
terminology [that] 'symbolic' or 'analogical' fiction is closely related to 
poetic metaphors on one side, and myth on the other... Primitive man, 
but also the artist and poet, looks at things as if they were all living. 
'Hans Vaihinger, The Philosophy of As-If: A System of Theoretical, Practical and Religious 
Fictions of Mankind, translated by C. K. Ogden (1911; London 1949), p. 99. In the preface to 
Bending the Bow, Robert Duncan states: "Working in words I am an escapist; as if I could 
step out of my clothes and move naked as the wind in a world of words. But I want every part 
of the actual world involved in my escape. I bring the laws that bound me into an aerial 
structure in which they are unbound as outlines of a prison unfolding. " Bending the Bow, p. v. 
My italics. 
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Thus he sees demons and gods in the forces of nature and even in 
objects of everyday use. Mythical experience is not a primitive 
precursor of scientific thought, for the latter is still bound to myths and 
personifications. On the other hand, the scientific mind tends to 
eliminate this mythical experience from its description of the world and 
thereby subjects our intellectual operations to a great internal 
tension. 45 
One might add to this, and to Duncan's insistence on the "truth and life of myth" as 
a means of using and/or mediating such "great internal tension, " Paul Ricoeur's 
essential understanding of the function of metaphor, which "is to compose an essential 
representation of human actions; its appropriate method is to speak the truth by means 
of fiction, fable and tragic mythos. "" What is clear in the developments of the 
electronic revolution, the media, and the extensions of information super highways is 
the recognition of the vital importance of fictions, and the degree of their penetrations 
of mental process, as a means of control. Advertising, as a permeation of twentieth- 
century life, may be seen as a training in being paranoid where subjects are impressed 
that if they do not possess certain commodities they won't be secure. The result has 
been an inability, in fact, to distinguish between documentary and fiction, powered by 
the imperatives of commodity capitalism which extends something less than an open 
field of signification and consumption. The ability to read fiction and therefore 
mediate paranoia is made less and less available, whilst the amount of fiction 
produced for consumption continues to proliferate, as Oedipa Maas finds to her 
distress throughout Thomas Pynchon's The Crying of Lot 49 where she is made aware 
45Ludwig von Bertalanffy, Perspectives on General Systems Theory: Scientific-Philosophical 
Studies (New York 1975), p. 67. 
46Paul Ricoeur, The Rule of Metaphor, translated by Robert Czerny, with Kathleen 
McLaughlin and John Costello (London 1971), p. 22. 
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that she lives perpetually "[a]s if... there were revelation in progress all around her. i47 
Some other thinkers need to be mentioned here. The first of these, Ernst 
Cassirer, is cited by Duncan in 'The Truth and Life and Myth' as a "twentieth-century 
mythologist" (TLM, p. 5) alongside Levi-Strauss, Freud and Malraux, amongst others. 
Cassirer's extraordinary three volume The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms undertakes 
an exploration of the synthesizing and systematizing capabilities of the mind, and the 
second part, "Mythical Thought" (1925), locates the vital role of myth in drawing 
together religion, science and notions of causality. Cassirer suggests that myth "begins 
with the intuition of purposive action, " and dispenses with any empirical senses of 
randomness or the accidental in what would now be identified as a "gestalt" 
sensibility. Thus, mythical thought sets itself against purely empirical causalities which 
look to specified chains of components for results. For mythical thought "the part does 
not merely represent the whole, but 'really' specifies it; the relationship is not symbolic 
and intellectual, but real and material. X48 Cassirer concludes by dealing necessarily 
with the relationship between myth and illusion, in the face of empiricism's use of 
illusion as the grounds for dismissal of myth's function in the creation of reality. But, 
as Cassirer argues, mythical thought possesses a sense of immanence which 
consciously extends through illusion its own truth and law; and in terms appealing to 
any artist, Cassirer articulates the ways in which art can counter the oppositional and 
negative forces which inhabit fixed systems of belief. These premises, however, are 
not given within the understanding of artistic processes available to Duncan in his 
`"Thomas Pynchon, The Crying of Lot 49 (1966; London 1979), p. 29. 
4RErnst Cassirer, The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, Volume Two: Mythical Thought, 
translated by Ralph Manheim (1925; New Haven 1955), pp. 49-50. 
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utilization and creation of open artistic forms: 
[T]he involvement and opposition of meaning and image are among the 
essential conditions of religion. If this involvement and opposition were 
ever replaced by a pure and perfect equilibrium, the inner tension of 
religion, on which rests its significance as a symbolic form, would be 
negated. The striving for such an equilibrium points therefore to 
another sphere. Only when we turn from the mythical image world and 
the world of religious meaning to the sphere of art and artistic 
expression does the opposition which dominates the development of the 
religious consciousness appear to be in a sense appeased, if not 
negated... In the return to this law there arises a new freedom of 
consciousness: the image no longer reacts upon the spirit as an 
independent material thing but becomes for the spirit a pure expression 
of its own creative power. 49 
Duncan sought to introduce forms of disequilibrium into this understanding of 
mythical thought and artistic process in response to his environments and their 
contemporary pressures. Pattern and coherence are certainly sought within American 
life, but the mythic extensions of America into a field of individual and communal 
actions which need to coexist in forms of disequilibrium are pursued with an 
appropriate poetics extending from the artistic revolutions of the twentieth-century. 
The problems of linking poetry and mythical thought with science and 
technology which Whitehead deemed necessary have found an example in the 
American polymath and designer, Buckminster Fuller. Fuller's extraordinary life and 
work was devoted to maximizing the potential of human survival systems and their 
uses of resources in ways which are as efficient as possible and justly distributed. 
Fuller's approach to technology and technological thinking was one deliberately 
intended to dissolve paranoia in scientific fields where it has been a key part of 
process. An example of this was his championing throughout the years of the Cold 
War of an "Ultra-High-Voltage World Electric Grid" which would link the world's 
a9Cassirer, The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, Volume Two, pp. 260-261. 
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electricity system through the Bering Strait between Alaska and the then Soviet Union, 
providing a globally viable, economic and politically mutual linkage of power systems. 
Fuller's theoretical expression of his intentions retains a drive for inclusivity and 
integration which aligns itself with a poetics of creative paranoia where it celebrates 
what Fuller called "synergetics. " His urge is always to integrate, but in ways that seek 
to avoid the dangers outlined in the introduction using Roland Barthes, where 
integration may be inclusively exclusive. Fuller requires that: 
the comprehensive realizer of relativity may become competent as an 
integrator of the until-then-threatening chaotic dissipation of common 
advantage of men in universe brought about by runaway, diametric 
preoccupations of specializations. The comprehensive realizer becomes 
a synergist. so 
Fuller wrote 'Total Thinking' in 1949 whilst in residence at Black Mountain College, 
North Carolina, an environment which encouraged him and a host of other American 
"comprehensive realizers, " such as John Cage, Charles Olson, Robert Creeley and 
Robert Duncan, in their efforts to explore the poetics of their disciplines in ways that 
would make them available across the spectrum of arts and sciences. In the decades 
following World War Two, Fuller's work at Black Mountain College extended from 
the energies manifested there in a community of multiple knowledge which recognised 
that methods of "total thinking" were necessary to challenge totalitarianism in all its 
forms, especially any paranoid "bias [which] precludes synergetic advantage. "sl 
What Fuller's writings demonstrate alongside the poetics that Duncan engages 
with is a working out of thought and an open inclusivity such as that insisted upon by 
50Buckminster Fuller, 'Total Thinking' in The Buckminster Fuller Reader (London 1975), 
p. 308. 
"Fuller, 'Total Thinking, ' p. 314. 
315 
another poet with Black Mountain College connections, Charles Olson. Olson's 
influential essays, 'Projective Verse' (1950) and 'Human Universe' (1951), are part of 
the determined counter- and creative paranoia that many American artists have 
concerned themselves with through the years since 1945. The former essay in 
particular sought to destroy the crippling notions and separations of mind, body and 
process which were simultaneously addressed by Gilbert Ryle in The Concept of Mind 
(1949). Ryle's intention is to expose the notions of mind as they are inherited from 
sixteenth-century mechanics and causality in ways that relate chronologically to 
Olson's poetics, not least where Ryle determines the shaping of consciousness since 
the Renaissance as "in part a transformed application of the Protestant notion of 
conscience. " The tensions arising from this have already been approached in the 
contexts of Charles Brockden Brown and early American Puritan inheritances, but 
Ryle goes on to show how mind and thought have since been consolidated within 
what he calls the "para-mechanical hypothesis" and the "perception recipe, " processes 
inherited from Cartesian philosophy determined to find a location for the disturbingly 
hidden processes of mind from which thought might be securely projected. Neither 
physiological mechanics nor rationality have been equal to this task because of the 
problems inherent in language as a medium of representation, and because they deny 
themselves the possibility of any gestalt apprehension of what mind involves in the 
actions of thought and sensation. At one point Ryle suggests that a major destabilizer 
of this concept of mind, and a momentum behind the endless penultimacy of self- 
referentiality, is the fact that "[o]ne thing I cannot prepare myself for is the next 
thought that I am going to think, 1152 which is precisely the energy underlying and 
"Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind (London 1978), p. 188. 
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sought in Olson's appropriation in 'Projective Verse' of Edward Dahlberg's insistence 
that "ONE PERCEPTION MUST IMMEDIATELY LEAD TO A FURTHER 
PERCEPTION. 163 Olson consequently seeks to regain the processes of projection for 
poetry in ways which are not chained to the anxieties of incompletion, and which are 
certainly not linked to the problems Ryle identifies in the analogy of thinking with 
seeing which rational epistemology insists upon: 
Thinking things out is described as consisting, at least partly, of 
consecutive 'seeings' of implications. But this is to describe theorizing 
work by analogies with what is not work but achievement... It is like 
describing a journey as constituted by arrivals, search as constituted by 
findings, studying as constituted by examination triumphs, or, in a 
word, trying as constituted by successes 54 
Charles Olson's take on this problem, and it is one placed at the forefront of the 
poetics deployed by Duncan and many other American poets through the twentieth- 
century, is the need to relocate poetry according to its kinetics and therefore 
"BREATH, " whereby measure from an energized bodily source asserts itself against 
intellectual annexations of measure. In these terms Olson sets "the HEART, by way 
of the BREATH, to the LINE" against "the HEAD, by way of the EAR, to the 
SYLLABLE 05 to assert projection and process against the ego-oriented forces of 
conclusion and closure. Again, it is a question of reading inside an area of inventions 
where "[t]he poem invents its form and invites the reader to enter the area of invention 
"Charles Olson, 'Projective Verse' in Selected Writings, ed. Robert Creeley, (New York 1967), 
p. 17. 
54Ryle, The Concept of Mind, p. 286. 
"Olson, Selected Writings, p. 19. 
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rather than immediate recognition. The poem is an energy transference... "s6 
Alternatives to the autonomy and rigid character of much contemporary poetry, to 
borrow David Shapiro's phrase, are thus extended against the pervasive cults of 
impersonality, dissociations of sensibility and confessional enclosures. 
Many of these issues concerning poetics and fiction are seen by Duncan, Olson 
and others to have emerged from the problematic inheritance bequeathed by that 
congregation of artistic events called "Romanticism, " especially the nostalgia for a lost 
unity or purity. However, Duncan and Olson have used John Keats's notion of 
"negative capability, that is, when a man is capable of being in uncertainties, 
mysteries, doubts, without any irritable reaching after fact and reasoni57 to identify 
the possibilities for poetry extending from what Duncan calls "the intellectual 
adventure of not knowing. " This is not a paranoia of insecurity but an environment 
in which fictions may be assembled towards a "truth ... not of What Is, but of What Is 
Happening" (TLM, p. 46). The problem for the poet in the Romantic legacy, however, 
has been the absorption of this "adventure of not knowing" into strategies of anxiety 
about subjectivity which may generate creative frictions in the apprehensions of self 
and other, but which also burden poetics with the staticities inherent in the dialectical 
process which supposedly ensues. Recent psychoanalytical work continues to plough 
a well-worked furrow concerning the sickness potential in obsessions with 
subjectivity-an obsession, of course, which the discourse and practice continues to 
56Eric Mottram, 'American Poetry, Poetics and Poetic Movements since 1950' in 7me Sphere 
History of Literature: American Literature since 1900, ed. Marcus Cunliffe (London 1987), 
p. 246. 
57John Keats, letter to brothers George & Tom, 22 December, 1817. Duncan mentions Keats 
and "negative capability" in 'The Truth and Life of Myth, ' Fictive Certainties, p. 46; and Olson 
in 'Equal, That Is, To The Real Itself in Selected Writings, p. 46. 
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entrench. For instance, Mikkel Borch-Jakobsen's The Freudian Subject (1988) sees 
paranoia as a general feature in the constitution of subjectivity where so much 
physical and mental energy is invested in the confrontation of the other and vain 
efforts to achieve its assimilation or destruction. An essential element of post- 
Romantic poetics concerned with strategies of creative paranoia has therefore been 
to overcome the primary Romantic plot of irretrievably lost unity. The sense of death 
in that plot which is engaged within such suffocating forms of inevitability has largely 
precluded a radical politics and has been responsible for much of the subsequent 
marginalization of arts in Western and American culture. 
The imperative in response to this continuing manifestation of "instrumental 
reason" is to develop a poetics which effectively counters the pervasive mythology of 
the Romantic artist as sick, unstable and less than whole, and who therefore possesses 
a voice with little weight in any political debate-though the work may have 
commercial value. Duncan's affirmation of the psychosis of "the shaman and inspired 
poet" is part of a poetic lineage (invoked also by Ginsberg, amongst other American 
poets) which seeks access to essential perceptions and fictions through the bardic 
necessity of a derangement of the senses. Whether through the exercise of 
imagination, vision, hallucination or narcotic experience-and, of course, the energies 
of composition and revision-the assertion that "[t]he fictive proposition is also 
visionary reality" has to be set against "the ready suspicion and accusation that the 
poet has not really earned or deserved to have wonder manifest in the poem" (TLM, 
pp. 28,25). It becomes an environment of reflexive paranoia and counter-diagnoses 
of sickness, with "truth" on all sides, something perhaps most evident in Ginsberg's 
experience of maternal madness, his visions of Blake, and the legal and other assaults 
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on his poetry and lifestyle through the 1950s and 1960s: 
Recent history is the record of a vast conspiracy to impose one level 
of mechanical consciousness on mankind and exterminate all 
manifestations of that unique part of human sentience... 
America is having a nervous breakdown... 
A huge sadistic police bureaucracy has risen in every state, encouraged 
by the central government, to persecute the illuminati, to brainwash the 
public with official lies about the drugs, and to terrify and destroy 
those addicts whose spiritual search has made them sick. 58 
Accusation and counter-accusation build and reinvest in the systems of paranoia 
which tend to reinforce the hegemony: the transformation of these energies on the 
poet's part into the creative paranoia of the realized destabilizing poem has a more 
potent effect. Indeed, the poem can demonstrate from its fictive and shamanic 
extensions that it is confronting a paranoid ideology in which, according to Regis 
Debray, the "transformation of the tool of demystification into a monstrous mythology 
takes political discourse back to animism and its authors from the status of a rhetor 
to that of a sorcerer. "59 
The extension of power in the totally administered society occurs in the 
government of a reality-principle alongside a charged recognition of the magic held 
by those wielding political and scientific power. The disruption of this in constructive 
ways depends upon a creative paranoia that systematizes in open forms and therefore 
fears any submission to occulted enclosures in which "[i]ntegration itself proves in the 
end to be an ideology for disintegration into power groups which exterminate each 
"Allen Ginsberg, 'Poetry, Violence, and the Trembling Lambs' in The Poetics of the New 
American Poetry, ed. Donald Allen and Warren Tallman (New York 1973), pp. 331-332. 
"Regis Debray, Critique of Political Reason (London 1983), p. 65. 
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other. i60 Thus, it is vital that the poet avoid the gravitation from visionary shaman 
to priest, as several critics have pointed out in relation to the explorations of 
Dionysian excess in America since the 1960s, 61 for in the territory of the priest lies 
the paranoia of repression inside closed form. 
Dionysus and the occult in Western culture has, in fact, been an abiding 
concern of the distinguished work of Norman 0. Brown, particularly where he has 
focused on the needs to engage creatively with paranoia in American culture. In this 
element of his work, Brown has sought to elucidate the ways in which paranoia is an 
essential part of the interaction of mystery, secrets and the occult in a society obsessed 
also with the nature of surveillance and the covert. As Brown suggests in his seminal 
essay, 'From Politics to Metapolitics' (1967), the problem for anyone engaged in what 
is termed here creative paranoia lies within the way politics operates in America, 
despite its democratic origins and process. Much more profound than Richard 
Hofstadter's notion of a "paranoid style" in American politics is Brown's assertion that: 
Politics is systems 
There is a hidden truth or secret 
that is what the Unconscious is all about 
But it cannot be put into systematic, reified, permanent form 
Systematic reified permanent form creates an elite who possess the secret 
(Platonic academy, occult order, political party, 
the repository of the secret) 
Mass mysticism is poetry 
an open secret62 
'Theodor Adorno, 'Theses Against Occultism' in 
Damaged Life (London 1978), p. 240. 
61See Eric Mottram, 'Dionysus in America' in Mottram, Blood On The Nash Ambassador 
(London 1989), pp. 181-220; and Shamoon Zamir, 'The Artist as Prophet, Priest and 
Gunslinger: Ishmael Reed's Cowboy in the Boat of Ra' in Callaloo, 17: 4, (1994), pp. 1205- 
1235. 
62Norman O. Brown, 'From Politics to Metapolitics' in Cater lt lar, 1,1967, p. 88. Originally 
delivered as the Frederic William Atherton Lecture at Harvard University, March 20,1967. 
321 
Hope-and by extension, a sense that paranoia may assume a creative dimension in 
these environments-emerges in Brown's somewhat utopian connection of "mass 
mysticism" and "poetry. " 
This is problematised, however, in Brown's more recent appraisal of poetry's 
position in American culture (and, not incidentally, where he mentions that Robert 
Duncan introduced him to contemporary American poetry). Brown suggests that poetry 
may be able to articulate "the Unconscious" in certain ways, but that in the culture it 
still confronts the fact that: 
mysteries are unpublishable... because they cannot be put into 
words... [and] because only some can see them, not all. Mysteries are 
intrinsically esoteric, and as such are an offence to democracy... Truth 
[in democracy] is what any fool can see. This is what is meant by the 
so-called scientific method. 63 
In these terms, therefore, poets work in areas which are fundamentally undemocratic, 
apprehending mysteries, dealing in revelations, and formulating their own systems in 
ways which are exclusive in the dimensions given to knowledge in much of the 
administration of society and culture. To avoid the destructive energies of paranoia 
elements of their work need to engage an approach of the order of Alfred Korzybski's 
"non-Aristotelian training" extended from his theory of General Semantics, where he 
demonstrates the possibilities of freeing oneself from the coercions and restricted 
perception of language and knowledge formulated within post-Aristotelian 
parameters. 64 
These issues provide a suitable transition point into a poem which shows 
63Norman O. Brown, 'Apocalypse: The Place of Mystery in the Life of the Mind' in 
Apocalypse And/Or Metamorphosis (Berkeley, CA. 1991), p. 3. 
'See Alfred Korzybski, Science and Sanity: An Introduction to Non-Aristotelian Systems and 
General Semantics (1933; Lakeville, CT. 1958). 
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Duncan deliberately wrestling with the energies and potential repressions manifest in 
poetry, and the paranoia inherent in their American poetic circumstance. Duncan's 
'Santa Cruz Propositions, ' written initially between 13-28 October 1968 and collected 
in Ground Work: Before The War (1984), offers an extraordinary collage of events 
in which the poet's questioning of his proximity to the dangers of paranoia reveals 
itself within questionings of the poet's relation to "The Muse, " the Academy and its 
systematizing of knowledge, the warfare of American society, and other poets. Duncan 
carefully sites the poem in relation to certain temporal and spatial fields of action, 
anchoring systems of experiential process which emerge in a series of formal 
possibilities in response to various anxieties. Section One opens and pursues "The 
Muse" via the image of the poet as surfer, imbued with West Coast momentums and 
poised at the unfolding margin of American energies, yet anxiously aware of the 
creative/destructive matrix involved in a poetics of revelation: 
I 
[10PM-1AM, 13-14, October 1968] 
Troubled surfer seeking the about-to-break line 
of the wave in it to ride toward revelation, 
... and the depth of the sea you would have borne forward 
is the depth of an impending failure among us who 
if we fall from the board, as we must, 
fall into the facts of the polluted stream. 
Poetry! Would Poetry have sustaind us? It's lovely 
... a current that sweeps all stagnant things up 
into a torrent of confidence beyond thought. 65 
65Robert Duncan, 'Santa Cruz Propositions' in Ground Work: Before The War (New York 
1984), p. 36. Hereafter referred to as 'SCP. ' One of Duncan's important techniques throughout 
the poem is to vary typeface and the size of typeface from speaker to speaker, and different 
sequence to sequence, as an emphasis of difference within an overall collagic effect. As far 
as possible, this will be replicated in quotation here, as will the essential formal arrangement 
of the poetry on the page, thus requiring that each quotation be indented, however short. 
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The first section of the poem features a series of rhythmic polarities which engage 
with the debate about knowledge, the creative process and their relationship to "The 
Muse" where: 
Yet we need her. We don't need her... 
Yet we want her. We don't want her (SCP, p. 37) 
in an oscillation built on the sense that: 
The mind is not content but 
must build even of discontent histories, 
palaces, commands, grand 
impositions --all for Her! (SCP, p. 37) 
The fact that "The Muse" cares nothing for these actions generates an energy of 
insecurity in the poet who recognises that only: 
his word-power go[es] out futilely 
to war with the insolent mob where 
her boundaries advance. (SCP, p. 38) 
Yet it is also in this insecurity and the shifts of Lifton's Protean self that the poet (and 
here Duncan moves into the first person) may secure their connections to and play 
within the extensive fictions available. The Muse, " and within the sense of Julia 
Kristeva's notion of the semiotic or pre-oedipal language: 
Old Mummummymurmurur 
turns in the applause of her surfs 
and takes us with her inevitably 
away from the light, westward, 
into the undertow and night of our species. 
... the transformations of Who-I-Am, 
as if incomplete, inconsistently surviving 
in me. (SCP, pp. 38-39) 
In the final part of the poem's first section Duncan brings together this maternal force 
with the "Ur-Father, Hairy Bull of the Waters/bellowing in her, " seeing in their union 
a fertile turbulence: 
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They were One, He/She 
of the Great Mouth Chaos became in them, 
Chaos expiring in the Speech of the Winds. 
(SCP, p. 39). 
Such chaos finds in poetry of this kind its most amenable mediation into expression 
where open form provides a less constricting pattern free of the rigidly formulaic. 
Indeed, as recent movements within science towards what is now termed "Chaos 
Theory" show, there have been more fulfilled recognitions among scientists that they 
need to turn away from the paranoia of instrumental reason towards discovery 
techniques that are prepared to embrace fictional and other apprehensions. As James 
Gleick suggests: 
Chaos poses problems that defy accepted ways of working in science. 
It makes strong claims about the universal behaviour of complexity. 
The first chaos theorists... had an eye for pattern, especially pattern that 
appeared on different scales at the same time. They had a taste for 
randomness and complexity, for jagged edges and sudden leaps... They 
feel [contemporarily] that they are turning back a trend in science 
toward reductionism, the analysis of systems in terms of their 
constituent parts: quarks, chromosomes, or neurons. They believe that 
they are looking for the whole. " 
Poets all along have been involved in what Jerome and Diane Rothenberg's 
exploration of world poetics identifies as a "Symposium of the Whole, " drawing their 
title from Robert Duncan, and it still remains to be seen whether science can fully 
enter into the creative paranoia which has been and continues to be variously 
employed by "Technicians of the Sacred" the world around; to which end science must 
forsake its largely destructive component and commodity oriented paranoia. 67 
In the second section of 'Santa Cruz Propositions' Duncan assembles a collage 
66James Gleick, Chaos: Making a New Science (London 1988), p. 5. 
67See ed. Jerome Rothenberg, Technicians of the Sacred (Berkeley, CA. 1985) & ed. Jerome 
and Diane Rothenberg, Symposium of the Whole: A Range of Discourse Toward an 
Ethnopoetics (Berkeley, CA. 1983). 
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of materials which focus more particularly on the extension of paranoia from specific 
power situations. "The Muse" metamorphosizes into Charles Dickens' "Madame 
Defarge, " the figure of revolutionary terror around and within whom paranoia is 
generated as a political necessity, and who: 
knots into the thread of his life to enlarge his Fate 
her own 
[21 October] plotted deprivations of his sight. 
(SCP, p. 40) 
The first part of section two grounds itself in a parody of the dialogue between 
Socrates and Diotima concerning the intertwinings of love and knowledge, especially 
as they have been politically and culturally oriented around the Socratic gnothi 
seauton, or need to "know thyself" as a predicate for successful action and mental and 
emotional fulfillment. It is the tension between the desired security of knowing the self 
and the Keatsian and Romantic "adventure of not knowing" that underlies this poetic 
confrontation of paranoia, centred on the problem of: 
an assumed knowingness about his 
gnawing Nothing so that he wants Knot 
that has befuddled Philosophy with method. 
Him and his nosey sayauton! 
(SCP, p. 40) 
The tension is intensified on several interweaved levels as the articulator of these 
thoughts remains the feminine Muse/Defarge figure. In a passage immediately prior 
to this, Duncan lays bare the problems for the intellectual poet beset by desires for 
priestly powers inside the politically organized scope of creative energies, where he: 
stands at the Gate of the Claim he would make 
to the exalted rank he sees 
accorded to the persons of Socrates and Kierkegaard, 
grand PhDs of an academic Immunity 
he does not see as it is 
shaken in the terrors Mind knows in Her thrall. 
(SCP, p. 40) 
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In a reading of and commentary on this section, Duncan stated that during 
composition he "was listening to a graduate student read part of his thesis on 
Kierkegaard and it struck me that the thesis was written in all earnest-and a thesis 
in theology, which is more appalling-by somebody who had never been in the 
territory at all as an experience . i68 At the time, 
Duncan was teaching on the 'History 
of Consciousness' course in the graduate program at the University of California, Santa 
Cruz, and as his commentary on the poem details, he became radically aware of the 
intersections of paranoid energies involved in the systematizing of knowledge, the 
compositional process, the contemporary American cultural energies manifested in 
terms of Dionysus and Eros, and the incursions into consciousness via the media of 
violence and murder. Duncan talks of his teaching situation in which "I was trying to 
get across to [the students] reading texts, and what happened to them in the dreams, 
and what happened in life, like a happy paranoiac reads everything as being of 
consequence. What would we assume if the world was a message? " This is then 
juxtaposed with the earnest ignorance of the graduate student-and consequently the 
complicity of the academy in the control and formulation of knowledge-in amongst 
the social upheavals of the 1960s, and the specific event of a murder in Santa Cruz, 
so that: 
suddenly a new piece of data was in. A Japanese doctor and his entire 
family were found murdered by the side of this swimming pool by 
some maniac killer. And the newspapers then for the next two or three 
weeks were filled with it. The killer was found soon, and the message 
and the reasons, so while I was instructing a class to produce a 
paranoiac poem looking at newspapers as being news of what was 
happening, a paranoid was loose who was doing exactly the same thing 
and built into the poem then in its collage are sections of the 
"Robert Duncan reading 'Santa Cruz Propositions, ' section two, at the Polytechnic of Central 
London, June 1975. 
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instructions, the printed instructions, that this paranoiac had had for the 
murder of the doctor and his wife and children, people he didn't know 
at all. And more than that, built into it are as also coming as absolute 
parts of the poem are sections of the newspaper copy talking about the 
finding of the killer. And this... back and forth then goes into a 
dialogue directly with Diotima's discussion of the murderess and 
absolutely hostile to mankind nature of Eros. 69 
The poem and the murders here predate by a year the notorious Manson murders and 
those at the Altamont rock festival. Eric Mottram has shown in detail how these latter 
events focused many sensibilities on the destructive energies within the separations of 
Dionysus and Eros where unrestrained power and violence enters the dance of release 
so earnestly sought in America during the 1960s. 7° Duncan's warnings are both 
prescient and part of the wider debate about the nature of creative energy through the 
period. What marks Duncan's work here, however, along with the poetry of Allen 
Ginsberg and Norman 0. Brown's cultural investigations, are the efforts to draw out 
of a poetic synthesis a means of recovering creative alignments of paranoia. The 
reading of the world in these terms needs to be made in forms capable of resisting 
coercion and limitation, and may need to be extended from shamanic invitation. A 
poem such as Ginsberg's "Wichita Vortex Sutra" (1968) and Brown's book Love's 
Body (1966) execute a similar collagic and juxtapositional strategy to that employed 
by Duncan in 'Santa Cruz Propositions': 
"What do you mean, Diotima, is Eros then evil and Foul? " 
Frazier's residence was a dilapidated cowshed behind a half- 
dozen larger similar structures 
"He is a great demon, and, like all spirits, he is 
intermediate" 
69Duncan, Polytechnic of Central London, June 1975. 
70Mottram, 'Dionysus in America, ' pp. 181-220. 
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"as brought to you by the people of the Free Universe" 
... The victims, their hands tied with scarves, were shot and thrown into the pool of the $250,000 Ohta home, a half-mile 
from Frazier's ramshackle cabin 
"sacrifices and mysteries and charms, and all" 
reachd by a flimsy swing bridge 
"prophecy and incantation find their way. The wisdom 
which understands this" 
(Indefensible! ) 
Hidden under trees, however, are the camps of young people 
with wild hair and outlandish customs 
"went into the garden of Zeus and fell into a heavy sleep" 
(SCP, pp. 40-41) 
The rejection of Eros, the appalling slaughter of the Japanese family, and the "sleep" 
in the "garden of Zeus" are dynamically interlinked manifestations of life denial which 
Duncan extends further on in the section into a mantric reoccurrence of "need" and 
"desire" as they draw energies inwards before destructive paranoid release. The poet 
is not exempted from this danger, as Duncan acknowledges, and prepares for the final 
section of the poem where he attacks Denise Levertov for what he believes are the 
self-destructive techniques of her anti-war protest. For Duncan love must be chosen 
as an energizer of thought and arbiter of knowledge, but only as an inclusive energy 
whose release will be an on-going revelatory force, as Eric Mottram also asserts in 
concluding his study of 'Dionysus in America' when he states: "It is Eros we must 
choose beyond Dionysus. The Devil is death if you let him stop you. 'M Duncan's 
conclusions are more cryptically given within the complex relationship explored 
71Mottram, 'Dionysus in America, ' p. 219. 
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throughout the poem between poet and muse, and the entanglements of Socratic 
necessity producing the tortuous ambivalences within "desire" and "need": 
[28 October] Mankind must stop! 
She dances upon his heart! 
His Nature tramples his heart! 
(SCP, p. 43) 
The result in contemporary circumstances may be the confusions inside which the 
poet's energies are diverted from creative paranoia to exclusive forms of self-analysis 
and/or destructively transformational protest. Such confusions in wider terms also 
conceal and reveal the occult force desired by those extending systems of authority, 
especially in any appropriation of revolutionary energies, ensuring that they truly 
revolve to re-emplace the dominance and utility of paranoia. Thus Duncan ends 
section two with this ironic and chilling warning: 
Madame Defarge signals the Court that the Sentence is at 
hand. 
Her secret agents provocateurs stir among the listeners, 
fingering the men who are to die 
"in order to give birth" a new Law and Order! Anew! " 
(SCP, p. 44). 
Section three of 'Santa Cruz Propositions' consists of an address to Denise 
Levertov, intercutting and completing the poem with materials from Levertov's poems 
and communications between the two poets. Although she does not mention 'Santa 
Cruz Propositions' specifically, Levertov's essay 'Some Duncan Letters--A Memoir 
and Critical Tribute' explores the grounds for Duncan's response to her poetry and 
activism during the late 1960s and early 1970s. Duncan casts her as "Kali, " the Hindu 
goddess of rage and destruction, for her proclamation in poetry later published in To 
Stay Alive (1971) that "There comes a time when only Anger is Love. " (SCP, p. 46), 
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the line with which Duncan concludes his poem. Levertov is accused by Duncan of 
allowing destructive revolutionary energies to limit her poetics, and, within the scope 
of his poem, of metamorphosing into "Madame Outrage of the Central Committee" 
(SCP, p. 45), thus turning from a creative paranoia to: 
the center of terror 
that is the still eye of the storm in her: 
(SCP, p. 46) 
Lcvertov replies somewhat ironically that, within a wider context of disagreement and 
misreading, she had "never been given to paranoia, " and that many of Duncan's 
reactions to her anti-war poetry exhibited an "'irritable reaching' stretch[ing] beyond 
'fact and reason' to search out complications for which there is no evidence. i72 There 
is validity in both poets' positions, of course, as each pursued their chosen form of 
activism in a period of desperation before individual and state-endorsed violence. In 
her terms Duncan may well have fallen foul in his misreadings of Levertov of that 
tendency bemoaned by Keats and against which was set "Negative Capability": what 
is not in doubt, however, is the extent to which Duncan attempts to fulfill a poetics 
of creative paranoia which he sets against destructively fixed purpose and the media- 
reinforced banalities of the period's appropriation of love, turning it into a discredited 
and impotent force. The interchange between the two poets provokes in both an 
intertextuality resolved to explore and systematize the radical issues of the moment, 
so that where Duncan extends his paranoid vision of "Käli, " so Levertov responds 
with her own creative paranoia: 
(And meanwhile Robert 
72Denise Levertov, 'Some Duncan Letters--A Memoir and A Critical Tribute' in Robert 
Duncan: Scales of the Marvelous, ed. Robert Bertholf and Ian Reid, (New York 1979), pp. 91, 
108. 
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sees me as Kali! No, 




I wrote it, but know such love 
only in flashes. 
when only anger 
is love'- 
And the love that streams 
towards me daily, letters and poems, husband and child, 
sings ... 
)73 
Overall, therefore, 'Santa Cruz Propositions' is a powerful exploration of what 
creativity may be in its multiple manifestations, and within the context of 1960s 
American urges towards "freedom" suggests how those attempting self-empowerment, 
with whatever justification, must beware the inevitable and destructive entanglements 
of paranoia. The poet may be able to provide an environment of creative paranoia for 
him or herself and, by extension, others receptive to an open and invitational form. 
Furthermore, this will depend on the poet being wary, as Olson warned Duncan, of 
"wisdom as such, " or signs or systems adhered to outside the Blakean imperative of 
the self-produced system where "art is washed away, turned into that second force, 
religion. i74 Duncan's extensive development of what he called his "Grand Collage" 
throughout his poetry, especially in the epic 'Structure of Rime' and 'Passages' 
sequences, confronts the problems of mediating the chaos and imprisoning systems of 
the world with an approach energized by creative paranoia. 'Santa Cruz Propositions' 
stands as a microcosm of that overall design, placing the paranoia of those obsessed 
"Denise Levertov, 'Report' in To Stay Alive (New York 1971), pp. 81-82. 
74Charles Olson, 'Against Wisdom As Such' in Black Mountain Review (1954), Vol. 1, No. 1, 
p. 37. 
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with power alongside the creative paranoia of the poet challenging with his own 
energizing forms. This action is given perhaps best in section two where, in the 
energies of meaning conjured out of collagic juxtaposition, Duncan momentarily 
defines the appalling prospects of American senses of personal and universal security: 
Every man armd! 
To keep the Peace! 
"and dead at another moment" In need! 
(SCP, p. 42) 
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CONCLUSION 
Countercultures, secret societies, academies-the tribes and the anti- 
tribes--collide, mix, change, and move towards an optimum membership of 
one. The secrets are out, Initiation becomes Self-initiation or the verb 
"initiate" grows steadily intransitive... As an interior sociology and archeology 
of the processual, [ethnopoetics] is also a tool for opening the secrets further, 
opening them into our lives. ' 
This dissertation has undertaken a history of paranoia in an effort to understand how 
perceptions of mental process and consequently how perception itself may be politically 
determined. It has placed a history of discourses alongside literary and cultural analyses to 
demonstrate both differences and alignments in the metamorphosis of paranoia as a concept 
and a diagnosis throughout Western and American culture and science. In particular it has 
traced the ways in which paranoia has variously existed as reflexive term, operating in 
contexts of suspicion, certainty, indictment and reaction, where definitions of normativeness, 
health and coercion have extended from paranoid positions of power to encourage paranoid 
responses in those subjected. 
From its vantage point in the late twentieth-century as the major world power-at 
least militarily and culturally-the United States continues to be vexed by the problems of 
paranoia. The exercise of power manifested to sustain and proliferate its influence in this 
position continues an extraordinary production of paranoia, focused both on external and 
internal threats to the advancement of American liberal capitalist democracy. This process of 
production still emanates on a broad cultural level from what was identified at the outset of 
'George Quasha, 'The Age of the Open Secret: a writing piece on Ethnopoetics, the Other 
Tradition, and social Transformation, ' cited in Symposium of the Whole: A Range of Discourse 
Toward an Ethnopoetics, ed. Jerome & Diane Rothenberg (Berkeley, CA. 1983), p. 342. Text 
italics. 
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the dissertation as a particular "American ideology, " in H. T. Wilson's sense, and, 
simultaneously, from an understanding that "one of the consequences of [the American] 
rational vision was a separation of magnanimous moral intent and pragmatic power- 
seeking. t12 
Furthermore, as it approaches the turn of the century the United States faces what 
Michael Barkun suggests is a dangerous confluence of "two strands of apocalyptic thought, " 
highlighting the particular teleological drive within American culture in which so many recent 
writers have aligned their plots, their sense of paranoia, and their "Thinking About the End 
in Contemporary America. 16 Barkun identifies these apocalyptic strands as religious, 
involving an upsurge in millennial beliefs, and secular, with specific stress on scientific 
perceptions of the breakdown of ecological, physiological and social systems. His fear is that: 
the disquieting possibility remains.. . that if both strands of apocalyptic thought 
should agree on the reading of events, then the potential for one grand self- 
fulfilling prophecy is greatly increased and panic may produce the effects once 
assigned to supernatural agents. 4 
This apocalyptic scenario offers a range of prospective fulfillments to both mass and elite, and 
plays itself out within what Korzybski termed the "infantilism" of twentieth-century thought 
and action, 5 where an emphasis on abstraction within present education and the functioning 
of language and belief provides fertile territory for the paranoid perception. 
Unfortunately, much of the contemporary appraisal of paranoia as a significant 
element in this apocalyptic scenario and in American culture as a whole does not move the 
'Clive Bush, The Dream of Reason (London 1977), p. 3. 
'Michael Barkun, 'Divided Apocalypse: Thinking About the End in Contemporary America' in 
Soundings, LXVI, 3 (Fall 1983), p. 257. 
4Barkun, 'Divided Apocalypse, ' p. 278. 
'Alfred Korzybski, Science and Sanity: An Introduction to Non-Aristotelian Systems and General 
Semantics (1933; Lakeville, CT. 1958), pp. 508-525. 
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debate beyond a focus on and participation in desires for scientific certainty, or a conviction 
that destructive forms of paranoia are an inevitable price to pay in the prevailing social and 
political conditions. The discourses of the mental sciences continue to refine their nosologies 
with each new case that aligns itself, and is aligned, within a complex of symptoms and 
theories intent on integration and exclusivity. Cultural and literary criticism continues to use 
paranoia as a broad and inclusive term, but there has been a sequence of recent studies 
identifying paranoia as a "post-modern" condition, especially in relation to conspiracy theory 
and the role of paranoia in contemporary political systems and narrative forms. 6 These 
analyses frequently cite the appropriation of meaning or systematization of meaning out of 
potentially infinite significatory possibilities (the "post-modern text"), especially where that 
systematization works against and within the implied values of the text, as a perceptual act 
akin to paranoia, if not actually paranoid itself. Where any distinction is drawn between a 
psychotic and/or debilitating mental condition and that of perception seeking to construct 
meaning from the materials available, or where the "positive" aspects of such paranoia are 
extolled, participation in a series of post-modem utopian opportunities-according to the 
theorist at hand-is offered as the means of resistance to disease or malign coercion. As 
Martin Jay has demonstrated in a recent discussion of the place of melancholy in 
contemporary thought and critical practice, such opportunities might include: 
the more cynical and anti-redemptive postmodernist voices in the apocalyptic 
chorus... expressed in Lyotard's fascination with libidinal intensities, Derrida's 
valorization of infinite, unconstrained linguistic play, and Baudrillard's 
6See, for instance, Eli Sagan, The Honey and the Hemlock: Democracy and Paranoia in Ancient 
Athens and Modern America (New York 1991); Ronald K. Siegel, Whispers: The Voices of 
Paranoia (New York 1994); William Bywater, The Paranoia of Postmodernism' in Philosophy and 
Literature, 14 (1990), pp. 79-84; Linda Fisher, 'Hermeneutics of Suspicion and Postmodern 
Paranoia: Psychologies of Interpretation' in Philosophy and Literature, 16 (1992), pp. 106-114; as 
well as a recent spate of unpublished PhD theses from American universities analysing postmodern 
fiction, conspiracy theory and paranoia. 
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celebration of the hyperreal world of simulacral overload. ' 
Aside from the internal contradictions of some of these arguments in their treatment 
of paranoia, the most disturbing feature is a political inadequacy in their challenge to the 
controls placed on information dissemination and the varieties of creative activity within 
science and the academy. That is, they lack an energised apprehension, or paranoia, directed 
at the regulation of the arts as a conglomeration of activities disruptive to centralised control. 
Although, of course, they do not aspire to the condition of a politically and creatively 
challenging poetics, they also do not fulfill what Noam Chomsky, after Dwight MacDonald, 
terms the "responsibility of intellectuals" where they maintain and sustain an ideological status 
quo inside the academic establishment, and consequently extend already emplaced forms of 
justification and permission throughout education, law and government. 8 The notions of 
resistance to or positive uses of paranoia extended from these arguments has little of the 
intellectual, mythical or physiologically engaging energies offered in the poetics described in 
Chapter Five. 
In another sector of the debate, there are distinct problems in relation to recent 
discussions about paranoia and associated conditions within the so-called "anti-psychiatry" 
movement. Notwithstanding the effectiveness of the anti-psychiatry challenge to the damaging 
theory and practice of much of the mental sciences, and, indeed, of the usefulness of the work 
of analysts such as Deleuze and Guattari for this dissertation, reservations about the wholesale 
theorization of the value of insanity and disengagement need to be addressed. Joel Kovel has 
'Martin Jay, 'The Apocalyptic imagination and the inability to mourn' in ed. Gillian Robinson and 
John Rundell, Rethinking Imagination: Culture and Creativity (London 1994), p. 38. 
'See Part II of Noam Chomsky, The Chomsky Reader (New York 1987), entitled 'The 
Responsibility of Intellectuals' which includes the 1966 essay of the same name, as well as 
"Objectivity and Liberal Scholarship" (1968) and "The Manufacture of Consent" (1984), pp. 59- 
136. 
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advanced a compelling critique of Deleuze and Guattari's "schizoanalysis" from his 
perspective as an avowedly Marxist psychiatrist, although, where he states that "the ontology 
with which [Anti-Oedipus's] arguments are laboriously advanced is so twisted out of shape 
that it itself qualifies for delusional status, "' he misses the point that in the paranoid terrain 
of psychiatric and political analysis that is precisely their subversive goal. However, Deleuze 
and Guattari's effort to expose the exercise of paranoid control in contemporary culture and 
society by identifying liberatory potentials in schizoid states leads in Kovel's understanding 
to a: 
need to locate emancipatory possibilities deep within the subject to assume a 
kind of continuity between schizophrenia and normal experience... Yes, there 
is an amazing uncodable flow to the schizophrenic's inner world-but it occurs 
at the price of desociation... 
In fact, one might turn the argument around. The schizophrenic reveals 
not emancipation but the negative of emancipation: not free but anti-free. The 
critical negativity within being-that capacity to refuse the given world while 
remaining one's self-is demolished and transposed to the zone of non-being, 
where self as well as world are refused, broken-down, then commingled into 
the autistic configuration... So far as schizophrenic autism is removed from the 
everyday, to that degree it has lost the capacity of transforming material reality 
(including collective human reality) and with it, the only real possibility for 
emancipation. Schizophrenia, in fact, is hell. " 
Even with the difficulties associated with the terms "normal" and "self" in these contexts, the 
thrust of Kovel's argument illuminates the ways in which radical analysis may extend itself 
too far into a rarefied theoretical (or even evangelical) atmosphere. The value of Deleuze and 
Guattari's schizoanalysis thus lies more in its extraordinary gestural qualities, outlining 
strategies of resistance to the rigidities of paranoia from past examples in culture and science 
and present energies of mental exploration, becoming a psychiatric poetics at its most 
'Joel Kovel, 'Schizophrenic Being and Technocratic Society' in ed. David Michael Levin, 
Pathologies of the Modern Self: Postmodern Studies on Narcissism, SchiZO12hrenia, and Depression 
(New York 1987), p. 343. 
10Kovel, 'Schizophrenic Being and Technocratic Society, ' p. 343-344. 
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effective moments. 
In many ways, the problem presented in Deleuze and Guattari's work is one 
inextricably tied into Romantic notions linking madness and creativity, especially where the 
creative act may challenge or be counter to the cultural and political hegemony. Interestingly 
enough, this was recognized in American psychiatry as early as 1892 at a conference held 
before the Chicago Academy of Medicine where the debate surrounding Dr James G. 
Kiernan's paper, 'Art in the Insane, ' provoked some enlightening responses. Kiernan argued 
strongly that artistic manifestations in patients diagnosed insane were the last signs of sanity, 
or what he called a "conservative element, "" rather than the extant and developing theory 
linking madness and artistic creativity. Much of the artistic evidence Kiernan and others 
presented as worth considering were the product of what Dr C. B. Burr's categorization of the 
art of the insane termed "the symbolic and inventive" type of patient characteristically 
suffering from paranoia and chronic delusional forms of mental illness. Most important, 
however, was the warning from Dr C. G. Craddock that: 
The specialist in any department of science should guard against a narrowness 
of view necessarily conditioned by his habitual mode of thought. It is a fact 
that psychiatrists seek to find abnormalities in all minds. This tendency of 
psychiatric thought is doubtless responsible for the prevalent view that genius 
is a morbid phenomenon, a manifestation dependent upon neuropathological 
degeneracy. 12 
A reflexivity of paranoia is fleetingly implied, but does not seem to have been followed up 
in the ensuing practices of much of American psychiatry. 
However, American artists since the American Revolution have long been obsessed 
"James G. Kiernan, 'Art in the Insane, ' originally published in Alienist and Neurologist, 13 (1892), 
p. 244-275; cited in John M. MacGregor, The Discovery of the Art of the Insane (Princeton, N. J. 
1989), p. 151. 
"'Discussion of the Paper on "Art in the Insane"' in Alienist and Neurologist, 13 (1892), p. 686; 
cited in MacGregor, The Discovery of the Art of the Insane, p. 153. 
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with these issues of paranoia as they emerge from and intersect with efforts to protect a 
society deliberately founded on carefully written principles which have then been amended 
solidly year after year in a proposed condition of republic in revolution. This condition-in 
which paranoia has been rife-has also been one prone to an "eternal reoccurrence, " 
according to Norman 0. Brown, where "[p]erpetual conflict is the rule of politics/the reality 
principle/the world as we know it, " and in asking "[i]s there any alternative? " he suggests: 
A metapolitical solution to the problem of madness 
would see politics as madness 
and madness as the solution to politics... 
Madness is even the solution to the problem of madness... 
it is all a problem of communication 
the poet says, Madness is oneness lost 
But oneness regained is madness also. 13 
Again, there is a necessary yet problematic drive in the utopianism of the desire to "find a 
way of being permanently unstable, " for the varying states of conflict within the domestic and 
international arenas administered by the United States have certainly been forms of permanent 
instability, at least through the twentieth-century. What Brown is advocating, of course, is 
a way of achieving metapolitical revolution which could overcome state and individually- 
fostered conflict as a destructively paranoid means of self-preservation. In this process poetry 
can be an agency of identifying and making available nonsense to enable a break out of the 
"[s]ystematic permanent reified form" and secrets of power, using: 
Poetry [as] the solvent which dissolves 
the vigorous stereotypes of political ideology 
the numb automatism of political reflexes 
the somnambulist gravity of literal believers" 
In many ways, then, paranoia can be seen as the failure of history, yet as Gilbert 
13Norman 0. Brown, 'From Politics to Metapolitics' in Caterpillar, No. 1,1967, pp. 75-76. 
"Brown, 'From Politics to Metapolitics, ' pp. 77,88,93. 
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Adair has pointed out paranoia is also an essential perceptual and cultural field for epic 
poetry, particularly in the American scene, where: 
To deny the Fall-to break out of paranoid myth-is the magnificent, harried 
promise of the American experience... The history the epic includes must 
indeed be imperialist, and.. . paranoia is the condition 
for writing an epic in an 
age of discontinuities. 's 
However, even as great an epic poet as Robert Duncan, used in this dissertation as an 
example of a poet capable of deploying creative paranoia within his poetics, may have 
problems with the necessity of mediating paranoia in his art. The search for too many 
connectivities and the insistence or implication of overriding structures may inhibit the 
metapolitical resistances sought in the poetry. Perhaps it should be sufficient to say that myth 
operates as forms of representation by which people try and explain where they are. In 
Duncan's case he occasionally veers towards wanting more than this so that a poem sequence 
like the 'Structure of Rime' (where "rime" means connections) places movements like the 
Berkeley free-speech organization of the late 1960s alongside Blake and other events and 
figures through past and present implying that there is a degree of permanence in the history 
of social dissent. The anarchist tradition sought by poets like Duncan and Allen Ginsberg 
offers valuable examples of dissent, but also extends the friction of political paranoia to the 
poetics of their creative paranoia, as well as being less than continuous. 
What Duncan and Ginsberg do provide as a counter to this understandably paranoid 
connectivity is a proliferating sense of the need to keep mind open within the systematizing 
urge, and to avoid the paranoia that extends itself in those elements of an exploitative and 
needlessly competitive American society. Invoking Whitman, Ginsberg has stated "'First 
"William Gilbert Adair, 'Epic fiction and imperial content in post-war America, ' unpublished PhD 
thesis, University of London 1990, p. 342. 
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thought, best thought, ' that candor ends paranoia, i16 but on any terms liberation is 
increasingly hard to locate in the plethora of American liberal capitalist democracy and 
corporate controls, for in those contexts there is a eulogization and offering of liberty in the 
ideology of choice and individualism which in fact is largely negated in the transactions of 
energy and spirit required by the social contracts of much of American life. There is a need 
also, therefore, to use imagination and justice where the setting up of human rights means 
their conflict with the rights of others, and it is here that poetics suggests a life of the mind 
that is capable of mediating the paranoia that springs from the American cultures of 
abundance and difference. That is, mind operating in the basic terms of the Greek etymology, 
para-noia, mind beside itself, but trained in a range of poetics to be so. paranoia is only 
really countered and turned into a positive and creative process by education and self- and 
socially conscious confrontations of what the social structure of the United States really is, 
something which may still be extended from those crucial documents, the American 
Constitution and the Bill of Rights. Arthur Miller describes the prospect in the following 
terms: 
The opposite of paranoid politics is Law and good faith. An example, the best 
I know, is the American Constitution, and the Bill of Rights, which de- 
symbolize the individual and consider him as the sum of his acts rather than 
his hidden thoughts and propensities for plotting evil. " 
In an American democracy where the political system rests on all being subject to the law and 
fulfilling their responsibility, Robert Duncan's poem, 'The Law I Love Is Major Mover, ' 
"Allen Ginsberg cited in 'Allen Ginsberg, Morality in Media square off over indecency' in 
Broadcasting, April 23 1990, p. 59. 
"Arthur Miller, 'It Could Happen Here-And Did' in The New York Times, 30 April 1967, section 
2, p. 17. 
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provides the crux of the matter in its lines, "Responsibility is to keep/the ability to 
respond, "" as paranoia must be mediated by creative paranoia in the perceptions of those 
subjected and those in power. The epigraph to this conclusion from George Quasha is driven 
both by a sense of the reality of what America (and the world) is and by an optimism which 
needs to be nurtured. Otherwise, in Charles Olson's warning: 
the present will lose what America is the inheritor of: a secularization which 
not only loses nothing of the divine but by seeing process in reality redeems 
all idealism fr theocracy or mobocracy, whether it is rational or superstitious, 
whether it is democratic or socialism (sic). 19 
What is certain, however, is that the history and effects of paranoia continue, and require 
further analysis. 
18Robert Duncan, The Law I Love Is Major Mover' in The Opening of the Field (New York 1960), 
p. 10. 
19Charles Olson, 'The hinges of civilization to be put back on the door' cited in Symposium of the 
Whole: A Range of Discourse Toward an Ethnopoetics, ed. Jerome & Diane Rothenberg (Berkeley, 
CA. 1983), p. 446.343 
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